Showing posts with label Promo notes. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Promo notes. Show all posts

Thursday, June 11, 2015

11/6/15: Anglo's Toxic Legacy: It Is Still Around Us, Today...


Here is an edited version of a note from 4Q 2014 that I provided to a non-commercial party interested in the matters of the Anglo Irish Bank that outlines my view of the sharp practices at the bank and the spillover from these practices across Irish banking, economic and political systems.

"As you know, Ireland was forced by the ECB and the EU to bail out its banks. The most egregious case involved Anglo Irish Bank - a mono-line property lender that was nationalised on January 21, 2009 and bailed out using Irish Government funding to the tune of EUR29.3 billion.

Funds for this bailout came from a combination of the Troika loans and taxpayers-owned National Pension Reserve Fund and thus, de facto, amounted to taxpayer financing of the bank.

Nationalisation of the Anglo Irish Bank, as we now know, came on foot of the bank, the auditors and regulators failing to report egregious sharp practices in the bank when it comes to the regulatory rules that date from the early 1990s through 2008 and include systemic and wilful overcharging of customers, breaches of liquidity rules, bank providing funding for its own directors on the basis of preferential treatment of public disclosures in collusion with another bank, INBS, bank engaging in misclassification of loans as deposits, and bank providing funding to its own customers for share price support schemes.

Any one of these sharp practices would have resulted in either a bank closure in a properly regulated regime, such as, for example, the U.S., and/or a complete wipeout of the equity value of the bank in the markets.

Two Examples

Take one example of one such practice. The overcharging problem at the Anglo Irish Bank continued from 1990 through 2004, with clients billed on average 0.3% concealed margin on their loans without notification of the customers charged and without disclosure to the auditors. Bankcheck review of the large number of loans revealed that 80% of these were involving overcharging. More importantly, from the point of view of the current situation, the Irish Government agencies, such as the IBRC and Nama, as well as the purchasers of distressed loans from Anglo borrowers, continue to charge the rates that include the original fraudulent mark ups, despite at least one official judgement on the matter issued by the Irish court. Taken in perspective, the overcharging - officially and on the record exposed in Irish and US courts - represents a quantum of estimated EUR1 billion of overstatement of publicly recorded and audited profits declared by Anglo through the period of 2004, and although we have no means for ascertaining the quantum of overcharging since 2004, the figure of at least around EUR2 billion total over the span of 1990-2014 is most likely a conservative estimate. This overcharging was notified to the Irish authorities repeatedly and on the record, with no action taken in response to notifications by the current Government, the Financial Regulator and/or the Central Bank.

In another sharp practice, the bank lent money to a single customer to cover margin calls on CFDs held against the bank own shares and, subsequent to the accumulated loans in excess of EUR2 billion, the bank arranged and funded a buyout facility for 10 investors (also clients of the bank) who were lent funds by the bank predominantly on unsecured basis to purchase shares underlying the said CFD positions. In simple, most basic terms, the bank used its lending book to prevent a share price collapse that could have resulted from the disclosure to the markets of the cumulated CFD positions.

Impact

In effect, thus, Irish taxpayers were compelled by the European component of the Troika, the EU and the ECB, in contravention of the IMF advice, to underwrite losses in a bank that was neither systemic to the Irish economy (it had basically no retail deposits and conducted virtually no retail business) nor operated within the confines of banking regulations and laws. On foot of the Anglo Irish Bank rescue, we were compelled to rescue an equally egregious Irish Nationwide Building Society - a counterpart to some of the sharp practices carried out in the Anglo Irish Bank.

Between 2007 and 2013, Irish Government debt rose by EUR155.8 billion - the largest jump in debt relative to GDP of any country in the euro area, including Greece. More than 22 percent of this increase is down to Anglo Irish Bank and irish Nationwide Building Society rescues. 

The damage runs deeper than that, however. If the Irish Government was allowed by the ECB to shut down Anglo Irish Bank prior to nationalisation, Irish Government debt today would have been around 93% of GDP as opposed to the current level of 112%. But this does not take into the account the potential contagion that resulted from the Anglo Irish Bank collapse to other banking institutions in the country. At the time of the September 2008 banking Guarantee, the State and its advisers have argued that not rescuing Anglo Irish Bank would have spread market panic to other Irish banks. 

This claim is, in my opinion, dubious. It could have been as likely, if not more so, that shutting down a rogue institution (or, with INBS - two rogue institutions) in a public and transparent manner could have resulted in more confidence in the systems and procedures present within Irish regulatory and supervisory regime. By opting to preserve and secure Anglo Irish Bank and INBS, Irish Government at the time sent a signal to the markets that any institution, including that with questionable business model, strategy and practices will be preserved and protected. In turn, such a signal was consistent with telling the markets that Ireland has no will to or cannot (due to the limited regulatory abilities) distinguish rogue operators from legitimate and functional ones. The effect of this could have been undermining confidence in all Irish banks, in order to protect a rogue one.

Ireland opted for a solution of shoring up and covering up the structural vulnerabilities exposed by the Anglo Irish Bank practices in the system of our regulation and supervision, as well as governance. This is neither a sustainable strategy, nor is a markets-securing strategy.

Legacy

The legacy of the Anglo Irish Bank-related debt remains with us. Currently, Irish Central Bank holds some EUR25 billion worth of long-term Government bonds issued to offset Emergency Liquidity Assistance credit line extended to the bank liquidators. Ireland is mandated by the EU and ECB to gradually sell these bonds into private markets. As we do so, the burden of this debt is befalling Irish people who will have to fund interest and principal on these bonds into perpetuity. 

There is an easy solution to this problem that ECB can enact within a minute: the bonds should be left in the Central Bank and cancelled at maturity. This implies no cost for European taxpayers and no new issuance of money by the ECB.

In ethical terms (moral hazard etc), such a move is warranted due to the sheer scale of deception and concealment of the facts of the Anglo Irish Bank operations that have been exposed to-date and are still being exposed and that were not disclosed at the time of the September 2008 Guarantee or, indeed, at the time of the 2010 Troika 'Bailout'. In other words, the argument can and should be made that both the Guarantee and the Bailout involved Irish commitments to lenders and lenders agreements that were not reflective of the full informational disclosures by the Anglo Irish Bank and the INBS.

In moral terms and economic terms, Irish people have paid a huge price for the crisis - far more than their fair share, given the fact that in rescuing Irish banks, we have underwritten a rescue of private bondholders and banks across the EU, the US. Irish people are paying for the crisis with dramatically higher rates of suicide, destroyed families, lost or endangered family homes, decimated health care system, devastated pensions, underfunded education and childcare, and an economy that in per capita GDP terms has sustained the third biggest drop across all Euro area countries. A large share of these costs is attributable to EU and ECB decision to force Irish Government to accept full losses in the Anglo Irish Bank and INBS - two rogue banking institutions that were not systemic to Ireland - which itself was predicated on incomplete information and misleading information being supplied to the Irish authorities at the time of decision making.

Furthermore, it is my opinion that the legacy of the Anglo and INBS - embodied in the continued process of disposal of the residual bonds on the insistence of the EU and ECB - is toxic to the democratic institutions of Ireland, from the point of view of the future. As long as Irish political elites are forced to deal with the legacy of the bonds disposals, there will remain an incentive for the Irish establishment to stay mute on the issues of systemic breaches in regulatory, supervisory and legal frameworks around the operations of the two rogue institutions. In return, official refusal to deal with the legacy fuels public mistrust of the core democratic institutions of the State, increasing the appeal of the extreme ideologies and political positions. 


The legacy of Anglo and INBS is so toxic that it prevents a rational, informed discovery of facts and debate of these facts as relating to the regulatory and supervisory breaches within Irish financial system. The only way we can functionally deal with this malfunctioning of the state systems is if the European authorities allow Ireland to move beyond the cost of carrying the repayments accruing from these liabilities on the State balance sheet. Only after shedding the immediate burden of having to finance their legacy can we, as a nation, move to the stage of addressing deeper, more structural problems exposed by the crisis.


Note: Details of overcharging sharp practices at Anglo Irish Bank that allegedly continued into IBRC and Nama are discussed here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/06/1062015-bombshell-goes-off-on-anglo.html. Details of Mr. Morrissey letter quoted in the Dail (Irish parliament) are available here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/06/11615-full-letter-concerning-ibrc.html. Details of the affidavit filed by Mr. Declan Ganley with Irish authorities concerning overcharging allegations are available here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/06/12615-anglo-overcharging-saga-ganley.html. Details on evidence of Nama value destruction and other systemic problems are covered here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/06/14615-why-read-wallaces-speech-on-nama.html.


Tuesday, December 23, 2014

23/12/2014: RTE Finance: Money Grows on NTMA Trees


Oh dear, dear... Irish State Broadcaster is clearly in the need of some cash for training... or else, they are geniuses of the unimaginable proportions. Either way, RTE has discovered nothing more, nor less than a genuine money creation principle of the Irish Government Promo Notes.

Don't believe it? Read here: http://www.rte.ie/news/business/2014/1223/668729-central-bank/

Let me summarise the logic:

  • Anglo & INBS went bust (we know).
  • Government created IBRC to 'close off' Anglo & INBS, funded by the Promissory Notes (government debt issued to government-owned agency)
  • Government created a swap to 'close off' IBRC: NTMA issued a bunch of 'IBRC' bonds (government debt) that were swapped for IBRC Promissory Notes (government debt).
  • The 'IBRC bonds' were given by NTMA to the Central Bank of Ireland which is obliged to sell them.
  • NTMA, at the same time, on the sideline as a part of its normal business borrowed cash from the private markets. It stuffed this cash into Irish banks as deposits, getting paid nada on the euro and paid interest on this cash to the private markets, which amounted to a lot more than nada.
  • NTMA then 'bought' back some of the IBRC bonds from the CBI, paying with cash it borrowed from the markets on which it paid interest and will continue paying interest.
  • RTE described the above as a 'costless' transaction, cancelling the debt.
  • In reality, debt is still there right were it was, except if before interest on IBRC bonds was payable to the Central Bank it is now payable to... drum roll... the private lenders who lent money to NTMA.
That last bit is something RTE just couldn't spot with the Hubble Telescope of Financial Wisdom they deployed in the above link.

Which brings us to the Nobel Prize-worthy breakthrough at the RTE: money grows on trees or locates itself at the end of a rainbow or something of the sorts... but in the end, money is free for the State Broadcaster that truly does get 'free' money (aka taxes)...


Oh dear...

Two twitter reactions:



Wednesday, March 26, 2014

26/3/2014: 13 months on, the Promo Notes deal stinger is still in...


Back in September 2013 I wrote in Sunday Times that ECB might want to consider accelerated disposal of the Government bonds held by the Central Bank post-restructuring of the IBRC Promissory Notes: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/10/8102013-german-voters-go-for-status-quo.html

And now, guess what... http://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/pressure-to-offload-long-term-bonds-in-promissory-note-deal-over-ecb-unease-1.1737924#.UzJ8fqxmKCE.twitter

Per Irish Times article linked above:

"Ireland is facing pressure to offload the long-term government bonds it issued as part of last year’s promissory note deal and at a faster pace than the timetable originally outlined, amid continuing concerns from the European Central Bank about the deal.

The ECB is reviewing the controversial promissory note deal as it prepares to publish its annual report for 2013.

… A crucial aspect of the promissory note deal agreed last year after months of negotiations was the length of time the Central Bank would hold the long-term bonds that replaced the promissory notes."

I have consistently argued that promo notes restructuring represented the perfect target for debt relief for the state. One example is here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2012/03/2132012-anglos-promo-notes-perfect.html. And I highlighted our 'deal's' sensitivity to earlier disposal of bonds here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/03/2332013-sunday-times-10032013.html (see bottom of the article for box-out).

Friday, February 15, 2013

15/2/2013: Loose Lips of Brendan Howlin & Jens Weidmann's Bother

Strong words today on the Irish Promo Notes deal from ECB's Jens Weidmann via Bloomberg (link to full interview here):

"It’s important that we draw a clear line between monetary and fiscal issues. The transaction in Ireland demonstrates how difficult it is for monetary policy to free itself from the embrace of fiscal policy once you’re engaged. The Irish government in its very own statements underscored the fiscal elements in this transaction.

"I’m rather strict when it comes to the definition of monetary financing. It’s important to draw a clear dividing line and accept the limitations of Article 123 for our actions. It’s not difficult from that to guess what my position is. [I would guess he is 'troubled' by the deal]

"The Irish government liquidated the IBRC. That has repercussions on net financial assets and has to be assessed against the background of Article 123. Of course the Eurosystem has to make sure that its actions are in conformity with its rules and statutes. [Widemann here clearly links NPV from the deal (small but positive by my estimates at EUR4.3-6.5bn, with some other analysts getting their estimates out to EUR8bn or roughly 25% of the original Promo Notes issuance or 30% of the remaining outstanding amounts) to the issue of whether the deal is legitimate.]

"I’m not passing a legal judgment on a particular transaction, but I think it is clear from what I said that I’m very concerned about monetary policy being too closely intertwined with fiscal policy and crossing the line to monetary financing. That’s why I was very skeptical about some of the decisions in the past, and you can be sure that I apply the same benchmark to this transaction.

"Once you cross a certain line, setting a precedent, it’s very difficult to come back and argue against the next similar transaction. That’s why it is important to define our mandate narrowly, so we’re not drawn into fiscal policy matters. There is a reputational issue, there’s a credibility issue. It might make it more difficult to focus on our main objective credibly. If governments had wanted to provide additional funding to Ireland, they could have tapped the ESM.

"We took note of this issue in the Governing Council. Our deliberations aren’t public. Apart from that, the transaction is out there, it’s known, it’s very transparent. Everybody has his own judgment on this -- I have mine.

"The transaction as such is technically a bit complex but it has a fiscal nature as stated by the Irish government. That’s clear enough." [Oh, here we come: Irish Government and senior Ministers have gone out talking about the 'social' dividend on the deal 'savings' etc. This might just bite the Government back. Rhetoric about Government spending (in any way) at least a share of the deal short-term cash flow savings will clearly signal that the Irish Government has pulled ECB into monetary financing and thus opens up the whole affair of the deal to legal challenge in Germany. As they used to say in WWII: 'Loose Lips Sink Ships'... care to listen, Minister Howlin?]



Monday, February 11, 2013

11/2/2013: What's David Hall's Case is Now About?



In light of the recent changes to the IBRC position and the Promo Notes, there can be some confusion around the case David Hall has taken against the Minister for finance. In particular, the confusion can arise due to the claims that we have made a "deal" on the promissory note and in light of the IBRC Bill 2013 provisions (Article 17). Let me try to (speculatively, I must add) shed some light.

The promissory notes were a product of the Credit Institutions (Financial Support) Act 2008 passed by the Dail Eireann on October 2, 2008. More specifically, the Minister for Finance, in allocating capital funds to the insolvent Irish banking institutions (see more of the background on this here: ), relied upon the provisions of the 2008 Act, Section 6. However, article 6.3 of the Act clearly stated that “Financial support shall not be provided under this section for any period beyond 29th September 2010, and any financial support provided under this section shall not continue beyond that date.” Furthermore, the Minister was given such powers (limited by the above date) to appropriate “all money to be paid out or non-cash assets to be given by the Minister… may be paid out of the Central Fund or the growing produce thereof” (Section 6(12)).

Furthermore, to the point of Defense in the case, Article 6(4) of the Act stipulates that “Financial support may be provided under this section in a form and manner determined by the Minister and on such commercial or other terms and conditions as the Minister thinks fit. Such provision of financial support may be effected by individual agreement, a scheme made by the Minister or otherwise.” This section is still covered by the 29th September 2010 cut-off date, but in so far as it covers (potentially) multiannual commitments created before that date but with a maturity beyond that date, it is unclear if this section covers the duration of the original Promissory Notes. Regardless of whether it does or not, the section is constrained explicitly by Section 6(5) which states: “Where the Minister proposes to make a scheme under subsection (4) – (a) he or she shall cause draft of the proposed scheme to be laid before each House of the Oireachtas, and (b) he or she shall not make the scheme unless and until a resolution approving of the draft has been passed by each such House.”

David Hall is claiming that in a democracy and under article 17 of the Irish Constitution the Dail and our elected representatives have the power to appropriate funds from the central fund (which, like all the rest of the Government funds, is made up of receipts and our taxes).

The point here is that David Hall is saying that it is not constitutional that one person, namely the Minister for Finance, or any future Minister for Finance, could spend monies (or future moneys) through issuance of bonds, various securities, even using another Promissory Note without any upper limit being set on such payouts and without any cabinet or Dail approval or vote.

According to David Hall’s case, this constitutes the core threat to the democracy enlisted within his claim. He believes that under the constitution that TD should have to vote on such expenditure and that they cannot give away their constitutional powers.

The fact that the current Promissory Note (and only in relation to IBRC notes) has been changed and eliminated does not alter the risk of future breaches of constitutionality (if David Hall is correct in his challenge) or abuses of the public purse.

Thursday, January 31, 2013

31/1/2013: Summary of David Hall's Case on Anglo Promo Notes

With the latest twist in David Hall's case on IBRC Promo Notes constitutionality, I decided to post, at last, the summary of David's case as was read out (note - this is not an exact transcript, but darn close to it) in the court earlier this week.

Needless to say, I am disappointed with the ruling issued today, in so far as it simply rejected consideration of the merits of the case, and thus, the case remain outstanding.



Here are the main points of the High Court action taken by David Hall against the legality/constitutionality of the IBRC and EBS promo notes that was presented this week in the court by the Plaintiff. I could not attend the defence statement due to ill health.

Please note, I am no legal expert, so will try to offer the below without a comment on the constitutional or legal issues.


Per Plaintiff's presentation, in a statement made by the Minister for Finance to Dail Eireann on the 30th of March 2010, the Minister announced provision of capital support by the State to the Anglo Irish Bank. The announcement referenced capital injection during that week in the specific form of the Promissory Note payable over the period of 10-15 years. The Minister for Finance, therefore, supplied capital of EUR31 billion to 3 financial institutions: ca EUR25.3 billion to Anglo, EUR5.4 billion to INBS (split as EUR5.3bn in Promissory Note and EUR100mln as a Special Investment Scheme) and EUR350mln to EBS (split as EUR250mln in Promissory Note and EUR100mln in Special Investment Scheme).

The Minister for Finance has also provided the Central Bank of Ireland with the letters of comfort, confirming that the Government of Ireland would indemnify the CBofI in the case of any losses arising from the ELA provision to the Anglo, INBS and EBS. The above financial institutions were thus enabled to borrow, using the Promissory Note as collateral, from the Emergency Liquidity Assistance funds (ELA) of the Central Bank of Ireland.

The key point of this is that the Promo Notes and SIS measures were entered into the General Government Deficit in 2010, raising the headline figure to 32% of GDP and adding to the General Government Debt in 2010, however, since the requirement for these payments did not arise until during the course of 2010, none of these expenditures estimates appeared in the forecasts made in Budget 2010 that were prepared back in December 2009. The next point it that the Government, pursuant to Article 28 of Bunreacht na hEireann, prepared and presented to Dail Eireann the 2011 Estimates of Receipts and Expenditure for the year ending 31st December 2011. Payment of the Promissory Notes was contained in Note 6 under 'Non-Voted Capital Expenditure'. Non-Voted Capital Expenditure means that the Dail did not vote on the expenditure.

Key points: The Dail Eireann did not vote in the Promissory Note expenditure in Budget 2010 or Budget 2011.

The case taken is based on the constitutional argument relating to:

Article 28.4.4 of Bunreacht na hEireann: The Government shall prepare Estimates of the Receipts and Estimates of the Expenditure of the State for each financial year, and shall present them to Dail Eireann for consideration.

Article 17.1 of Bunreacht na hEireann: 1. As soon as possible after the presentation to Dail Eireann under Article 28 of this Constittution of the Estimates of receipts and Estimates of expenditure of the State for any financial year, Dail Eireann shall consider such Estimates. 2. Save in so far as may be provided by specific enactment in each case, the legislation to give effect to the Financial Resolution of each year shall be enacted within that year.

Article 17.2 of Bunreacht na hEireann: Dail Eireann shall not pass any vote or resolution, and no law shall be enacted, for the appropriation of revenue or other public monies unless the purpose of the appropriation shall have been recommended to Dail Eireann by a message from the government signed by the Taoiseach.

Article 21.1.1 of Bunreacht na hEireann: Money Bills shall be initiated in Dail Eireann only.

Thus, Bunreacht na hEireann gives to Dail Eireann a constitutional primacy in the area of State finances and mandate the actual, real and continued involvement of Dail Eireann in the appropriation of revenue and/or public monies. Central to the democratic nature of the State is the oversight of public expenditure by the elected representatives of the People who under Article 6 of Bunreacht na hEireann are sovereign and from whom all power is derived.

As Plaintiff stated, the Promissory Notes were created and funds for their financing were allocated by the Minister for Finance, including the related letters of comfort without involving the elected legislators. Furthermore, the issue of letters of comfort purported to appropriate and has appropriated public funds in an unspecified and unlimited amount in relation to the provision of liquidity assistance in the banking sector.

Per key points 1 & 2 above, the members of Dail Eireann did not consider the making of the Promissory Notes and/or the giving of letters of comfort, did not vote on whether or not to make the Promissory Notes and/or grant such an indemnity; and did not mandate or otherwise authorise the Promissory Notes and/or letters of comfort.

Considering that the Promissory Notes and letters of comfort were extended funding commitments over the time horizon of originally envisioned 10-15 years, the making or provision by the Minister for Finance of Promissory Notes, extending over such a long period of time and over such enormous sums of public funds and/or provision of a purported indemnity to CBofI constituted an attack on the democratic nature of the State and was unlawful and is unconstitutional being contrary to Articles 6 and/or 15 and/or 17 and/or 22 and/or 28 of Bunreacht na hEireann.

As I'd say, Bang! Up to 6 articles of Constitution potentially violated by the previous Government.

Plaintiff requested in the case for the Minister for Finance to identify the precise statutory or other legal basis authorising then provision of the Promissory Note. Alas, to-date there has been no response to this request. Two acts potentially can be argued provide such basis: 
-- Credit Institutions (Financial Support) Act, 2008 and/or
-- Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Act 2009
However, per Plaintiff statement in court, neither makes adequate legal provision for the financial assistance of the extent and/or nature and/or duration committed to by the Minister for Finance. Here are the reasons - as argued by the Plaintiff - for this.

Regarding the Credit Institutions Act 2008:
-- In 2010, the provisions of the Section 6 of the Act prohibited the giving of financial support beyond the 31st of December 2015 and from the 23rd of November 2010 beyond the 20th of June 2016. Of course, the promissory Notes extend to 2025 and thus, could not therefore have been authorised by the said Act.
-- The above provisions cannot be construed as authorising the making of Promissory Notes appropriating public monies, absent a requirement for a resolution of Dail Eireann prior to the provision of same having regard to the requirements of Bunreacht na hEireann.
-- The provisions of section 6(1) Credit Insitutions Act, 2008 do not provide for or allow or permit the Minister to make such large scale and long term financial support to a third party credit institution and did not permit for the provision of support equally a sum in excess of EUR31 billion to the Notice Parties herein.

Regarding the Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Act 2009:
-- There is no lawful basis for provision of financial support through the Promissory Notes to continue to 2025 or at all and the making and provision of such Promissory Notes was ultra fires the power of the Minister of Finance with the consequence that the said Promissory Notes are null and void.
-- Neither the 2009 nor 2008 Acts can act to excuse the absence of a resolution providing for Promissory Notes voted upon by Dail Eireann in accordance with Article 17 of Bunreacht na hEireann.


The implications of the case are massive. The Plaintiff actually argues that
-- The Promissory Notes and the associated letters of comfort are unconstitutional and, if that is proven to be the case, these instruments are illegal and have no real validity. 
-- The repayment of the Notes in March 2011 was illegal
-- The swap for direct Government debt of the note in March 2012 was illegal
-- The Minister for Finance actions constitute the unlawful delegation or transfer of constitutional power from Dail Eireann to the Minister.

Beyond this, the Plaintiff case argues that the creation of the Notes was in contravention of the Article 123 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union by:
-- Extending financing from the public purse to third parties (as prohibited by Article 123 (2) of the Treaty) and clarified by the Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993.
-- Violation of Article 123 in provision by the Central Bank of Ireland of ELA to the IBRC.
-- Absence of lawful basis for the issue of the letters of comfort

The Plaintiff stated in court that in the absence of the Promissory Notes, the Irish Central Bank has accepted that the IBRC is insolvent and that the provision of ELA to an insolvent credit institution is illegal. Thus, the provision of Promissory Notes to the Anglo Irish Bank was an unlawful ruse to create the pretence of solvency so as to enable the provision of ELA. Fighting words these are. But there's more. The provision of ELA was in turn used to repay third party liabilities of Anglo Irish Bank. Further it was intended by the Minister for Finance and by the Central Bank of Ireland that the Irish people would in effect, over the period of the Promissory Notes, repay the ELA on behalf of Anglo Irish Bank. The members of Dail Eireann were expressly removed from and denied any involvement in this decision which was an egregious attack on the democratic nature of the State.

I hope to provide a summary of the State responses to the statement as delivered in court.

Monday, December 17, 2012

17/12/2012: More spin on Promo Notes 2012


Here's the latest saga on Anglo Promo Notes 'non-payment' in March 2012:


This relates to the past here on the topic.

The point raised, allegedly, by the Department of Finance is as follows: Promo Note was 'settled' not in cash, but by issuance of a bond, so that

  1. Irish Government issued a bond (which is to say borrowed money) to the IBRC
  2. IBRC took the bond to the 'market' to obtain cash in exchange for it
  3. Absent a 'market' for this bond, Bank of Ireland took the bond on for one year and paid the IBRC €3.06 billion (presumably, Bank of Ireland borrowed the funds to do so from the ECB using the bond as the collateral)
  4. The IBRC paid down the ELA with the money.
  5. ELA was written down by the required amount in 2012.
Let's re-narrate this in more simple terms:
  1. Irish Government official went to a restaurant for a working lunch without having any money
  2. The official, upon consuming lunch, wrote an IOU for €100 covering the bill to her lunch companion who had a credit card with him.
  3. The credit card was maxed-out, so the second official called his bank and arranged for a 1-day overdraft facility from the bank to cover the bill, using as security the IOU from his lunch companion.
  4. The credit card owner then used the credit card new facility and paid €100 bill.
  5. The restaurant recorded payment of €100 bill.
Now, two questions:
Question 1: was the bill paid? Answer: yes. Proof: if no, then the restaurant could claim that no payment was received, so no tax is due on the proceeds from this payment. I doubt the Revenue will be so keen to allow this.

Question 2: did the original official pay the bill? Answer: it depends on which scenario will take place in 1 day: Scenario A: Original official does not intend to settle the debt (IOU) - in which case she defaults on loan from the second official and no payment by her was made under the IOU agreement. Scenario B: Original official honors her commitment, and the original IOU was a form payment.

However, Question 2 is purely academic from the standpoint of whether the lunch was paid for or not - it was paid. Full stop.

Substitute 'Promo Note' for 'lunch' and you have it. Promo note 2012 was paid. QED

Sunday, December 16, 2012

16/12/2012: Stop the nonsense on 'non-payment' of Promo Notes 2012




In recent weeks, the Irish Government has engaged in a willful and undeniable distortion of fact. Here is one example of a senior Minister on the record saying that : ""[The Government] didn't pay the promissory note this year…"
http://www.herald.ie/news/rabbitte-rules-out-31bn-payment-for-anglo-debt-3321386.html

The same was repeated today on RTE programme.

The Ministers must know that according to the official exchequer accounts, the Promissory Note due 2012 was paid in full.

In the Budget 2013 Economic and Fiscal Outlook (official document released by the Department of Finance: http://budget.gov.ie/budgets/2013/Documents/Budget%202013%20-%20Economic%20and%20Fiscal%20Outlook.pdf) contains the following references to repayment of the Promissory Note 2012:




Page C.19, explanatory note to Table 10 (reproduced above): "The 2012 IBRC Promissory Note payment was settled with a Government bond…"

In Table 10 above, 2012 item for "Promissory Note Repayment of Principal" enters -€3.1 billion, fully confirming the repayment was made.

Page C.22 Table 13 clearly identifies 2012 Promissory Notes repayment as being "Non-cash payment in 2012 of IBRC promissory note" and states in the explanatory note below the table that "In 2012 the annual promissory note payment to IBRC was made with a Government bond". The same is entered on page C.5 under the Table 1.

The details of the bond settlement scheme are here:
http://www.finance.gov.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=7195

ECB position on what transpired vis the Promo Notes in March 2012 is outlined here: http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2012/html/is120404.en.html quoting from Mario Draghi's responses to press query regarding the note payment (emphasis mine):
"we take note of the scheduled end-March redemption of the promissory notes and a subsequent reduction in Emergency Liquidity Assistance provided by the Central Bank of Ireland. We expect that the future redemptions will be met according to the schedule to which the government has committed itself."

The above was confirmed less than a week later: Few days after repayment of the March 2012 note, Joerg Asmussen, a member of the ECB's executive board, was speaking in Dublin where he "reiterated the ECB's view that Ireland must continue to repay the Anglo Irish Bank promissory note". Asmussen clearly did not believe that Ireland did not pay 2012 installment on the notes.
Soruce: http://www.rte.ie/news/2012/0411/ecb-official-warns-irish-banks-on-debt.html


The transaction of 'non-payment of cash payment' involved Irish State issuing a €3.06bn bond that was funded by Nama for the period of time it took Bank of Ireland to deliver approval by shareholders. Thereafter, the bond was transferred to the Bank of Ireland for 1 year. Which means that comes April 2013, Irish Government must have some sort of an agreement in place as to what to do with this bond. Either the Bank of Ireland agrees to hold it longer, or the bond has to be sold to another holder.

Here is NTMA Issuance Circular for that bond: http://www.ntma.ie/erratum-2015-bond-offering-circular/

Now, note: the coupon on that bond is 4.5%, far less than 5.5% issued in August 2012, after significant improvements in Irish secondary markets bond yields, so 4.5% Promo Notes Bond is a 'better' deal than ordinary bonds. Which means that Bank of Ireland was buying a dodo. Of course, Nama effectively backstopped Bank of Ireland, which simply borrowed money from the ECB to fund the bond.

All of this stuff I explained back in April 2012. But here's a bit worth repeating: in 2012 Promo Notes carried no interest (the last year of a two years holiday), while in 2012 the state paid 4.5% on 3,629.92 million bond. Thus, the cost to the taxpayers of Minister Noonan's 'non-payment' was €163.35 million annualized.

Which means that were Minister Noonan to repeat the exercise comes March 2013, he will be increasing the interest bill on Promo Notes by the above amount on top of the already hefty €1.9 billion one scheduled for 2013.


Saturday, October 27, 2012

27/10/2012: UBS on Irish banking debt restructuring



UBS' European Weekly Economic Focus is dealing in detail with the prospects of Ireland getting a deal out of the EU Summits promises to break the links between the banks liabilities and sovereign liabilities. Comments are mine.

"Taking the June 29th statement at face value, there is a strong case for supporting Ireland by breaking the link between the government and the financial system." 

[I wholeheartedly agree - the case can be made across a number of points: (1) Ireland de facto underwritten the euro system in the early stage of the crisis; (2) the cost of (1) to Irish taxpayers is unprecedented in modern history; (3) Irish banking fallout is partially based on absolutely mis-shaped monetary policy pursued by the ECB; (4) Ireland is the only country in the euro periphery, in my view, that has potential to organically grow out of the current Great Recession, assuming the country gets a significant (€40-45 billion) writedown on the banks debts; and more]

"There are two potential routes for euro zone support to the Irish state. The direct route involves the ESM acquiring all or a part of the government’s stake in the banks, thereby assuming responsibility of the Irish lenders and absolving that liability of the Irish state. The alternative, less generous, approach is a relief on the promissory note/ELA commitments by the ECB."

[I disagree - the impact from both of these measures taken individually will be minor. What is needed is a combination of the two measures, with ELA commitments writedown of at least €30 billion. The reason for this is simple: the ESM will not be able to take on IBRC liabilities even in theory as IBRC is not a functional bank. Hence, route 1 outlined by UBS can amount to ca €5-6 billion in maximum potential recovery to the Irish state. Route 2 take by itself alone will simply see marginal relief on the net present value of promo notes liabilities, something close to €3 billion yield. Hence, even combined, such measures are unlikely to generate more than €10 billion, or roughly 1/8th of the assumed current and future liabilities.]

"In our view, there is very little chance that the ESM will acquire a stake in Irish lenders any time soon, for the simple reason that a direct ESM intervention requires the establishment of a euro area bank regulator and that would take a long time, in our view." [I agree. And worse, not only ESM has to be fully established, it also has to be fully operational and, potentially, have a track record of sorts before it can be used to underwrite banking sector directly.]

"What’s more, Ireland will need to remain a programme country for longer. Depending on the potential scale of the intervention, the first argument is likely more important that the second, but either way this route is not likely to be available for a long time." [I fully agree and this is the reason why I argued earlier this week that the Irish Government push to 'exit' the programme is rushed and unwise.]

"How about a recapitalisation via the sovereign? To start with, this approach does not help sever the link between the sovereign and the banks, one key driver for euro area intervention. More importantly though, it is not clear to us that Ireland will qualify for that sort of intervention even if it tried, for the simple reason that ESM funds can only be provided to limit ‘the contagion of financial stress’. The financial sector in Ireland is no longer a threat to the rest of the euro area and, as such, it would not qualify for ESM intervention. 

[I spoke about this factor for a number of years now. As long as Ireland continued replacing private liabilities to bondholders and inter-bank funding sources with sovereign obligations, it continued to dilute its own power in the bargaining game. I warned years ago that once we complete this process, we will be left alone. No tramp cards in our hands. Fully exposed to carrying the weight of banking debts on taxpayers shoulders. This Government and the previous one have failed to listen. Now, its a payback time.]

"The only way around this is if the ESM facility is made available retrospectively, but that is unlikely if the statement from the Dutch, Finnish and the German finance ministers where they rejected ESM assistance for ‘legacy assets’ is true." 

[At the time of June 29th summit I wrote about the cumulative potential exposures that such retrospectively can yield. It was clear then, as it is clear now, that ESM will not be able to absorb all potential calls on such a measure. Hence, Fin Mins statement breaking retrospectively clause is fully rational and expected.]

The rest of the note is based on a superb and must-read analysis by Karl Whelan of the promo notes.

In summary - and this is my view - Irish policymakers have carelessly forced the country into a corner: we worked hard to assure some stabilization in fiscal space, which in turn undermined our ability to get meaningful relief. Congratulations to our policy makers who seemingly traded the interests of the longer term debt crisis resolution for friendly pats on the back from Europe.