Economics 23/04/2010: As Greece crashes, Finns are talking gibberish

Sometimes, it is wise for policymakers not to speak to the media. This is usually true when the policymakers have no idea what they are talking about. Case in point – FT’s story (here) about the Finnish PM backing German plan for a new treaty on tougher fiscal deficit and debt measures for the Euro area.

“Finland is sympathetic to controversial German proposals for a fresh European Union treaty if necessary to enforce fiscal and economic discipline in the eurozone after the Greek debt crisis.” Mr Vanhanen, PM of Finland, said “the priority should be to look for ways to tighten rules within the existing treaty, including the withdrawal of EU structural funds from countries that ignore official warnings from Brussels over excessive budget deficits”.

So far, so good.

Per FT, “his comments came amid the most serious crisis in the euro’s 11-year history, with Greece on the brink of a bail-out from the IMF and fellow eurozone countries. “Greek debt is not so big but there is a domino threat so we need to isolate the problem as early as possible,” said Mr Vanhanen” (italics are mine, of course).

Oops! Did he really say that? At 117% of GDP at the end of 2009, and pushing toward 130% by the end of this year, Greek debt is ‘REALLY BIG’, folks. This is precisely why Greek bonds are trading now at the yields close to those of junk-rated Pakistan!

Mr Vanhanen “insisted the crisis must not be allowed to disrupt plans by Estonia to join the euro next January and said the eurozone must keep its doors open to aspirant members.” Why not? He warned that “any delay would “send totally the wrong message” to other aspirant members, such as Latvia and Lithuania, which are making tough budget cuts and other reforms to keep alive hopes of euro entry.”

So hold on, Mr Vanhanen. You say that these countries are undertaking reforms only in order to comply with the euro entry rules, not because these are the right things to do? What hope do we, the Eurozone taxpayers, have that once admitted into the club these countries will not turn Greek? None, certainly, judging by Mr Vanhanen remark.

My humble advice – if you are a politician with no expertise in economics or finance, don’t give interviews.

7/6/2012: Sunday Times May 13, 2012

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from May 13, 2012.

With Greek and French elections results out last week, the European leadership is rapidly shifting gears into neutral when it comes to austerity. Within two weeks surrounding the French elections, the Commission has issued a set of statements pushing forward its ‘growth budget’, and issued new proposals for enhancing European investment bank.

This, of course, is a classic rhetoric of damage limitation, contrasted by the reality of the currency union that is in the final stage of the crisis contagion. Having spread from economic to financial and subsequently to fiscal domains of the euro area, the cancer of Europe’s debt overhang has now metastasised to its political leadership. And the financial pressures are back on. Since the late March, credit default swaps spreads have widened for all but two core euro area states (excluding Greece), with an average rate of increase of 10.6%, implying that the markets-priced cumulative probability of the euro zone country default within the next 5 years is now, on average, close to 24%.

Next stop is a period of extended navel-gazing, with summits and ministerial dinners, contrasted by the European electorate moving further away from the centre of power gravity.

By autumn we will be either in a selective euro unwinding (Greece exiting) or in a desperate policies u-turn into mutualisation of the national and banking debts, supported by a return to high pre-2011 deficits and an acceleration of the debt spiral.

The former is going to be extremely disruptive in the short run. Portugal will be watching the Greeks closely, while Spain and Italy will be sliding into unrest. If properly managed, Greek and, later Portuguese exits will allow euro area to cut losses. With a stronger ESM balancesheet, euro area will buy more time to deal with the markets panic, but it will still require serious structural adjustments to shore up the failing currency union. Mutualisation of debt will remain inevitable, but deficits run up can be avoided in exchange for slower reduction in deficits.

The latter option of starting with mutualising debt, while allowing for new deficit financing of growth stimuli will be a road to either a collapse of the common currency within a decade or a Japan-style stagnation. The central problem is that the current political dynamics are forcing the euro area onto the path of growth stimulation amidst a severe debt overhang. The lack of real catalysts for economic recovery means that a temporary stimulus will have to be replaced by sustained debt accumulation. In other words, the political cure to the crisis a-la Hollande, not the austerity, will spell the end of the euro zone.

There are two sides to this proposition.

Firstly, the villain of the European austerity is a bogey. In 2011-2012, euro area fiscal deficits will average 3.7% of GDP per annum, identical to those recorded in 2010-2014 and deeper than in any five-year period from 1990 through 2009, including the period covering the recession of the early 1990s. The ‘savage austerity’, as planned, is expected to result in historically high five-year average deficits. At over 3.2% of GDP, 2012 forecast deficit for the common currency zone will be 6^th largest since 1990.

Instead of shrinking, euro area governments over-spending will remain relatively static under the current ‘austerity’ path. Per IMF, general government revenues will account for 45.6% of GDP in 2011-2012, well ahead of all five-year period averages since 1990 except for 1995-1999 when the comparable figure was 46% of GDP. The same comparative dynamics apply to the government expenditure as a share of GDP.

In other words, euro area voters are currently revolting against the austerity that, with exception of Greece and Ireland, is hardly visible anywhere.

Secondly, the talk about Europe’s growth stimulus is nothing more than a return to the policies that have led us into this crisis in the first place. In 1990-1994, euro area public debt to GDP ratio averaged 59%. By 2005-2009, the average has steadily risen to 71%. In 2010-2014, the forecast average will stand at 89%, identical to the ratio in 2011-2012. Euro area is now firmly stuck in the policy corner that required accumulation of debt in order to sustain economic activity. Since the mid-1990s, the EU has produced one growth policy platform after another that relied predominantly on subsidies and public investment.

By the mid-2000s, the EU has exhausted creative powers of conceiving new subsidies, just as the ECB was flooding the banking system with cheap liquidity. At the peak of the subsequent sovereign debt crisis, in March 2010, Brussels came up with Europe 2020 document – yet another ‘sustainable growth’ scheme through featuring more subsidies and public investment.

At the member states’ level, private debt-fuelled construction and banking bubbles were superimposed onto public infrastructure investments schemes and elaborate R&D and smart economy bureaucracies as the core drivers for jobs creation. State spending and re-distribution were the creative force driving economic improvements in a number of countries. Amidst all of this, euro area overall growth remained severely constrained. For the entire period between 1992 and 2007, euro area real economic growth averaged less than 2.1% per annum, while government deficits averaged over 2.5%. The only three years when public deficit financing was not the main driver of growth were the peaks of two bubbles: 2000, and 2006-2007.

In brief, Europe had not had a model for sustainable growth since 1992 and it is not about to discover one in the next few months either.

Which brings us to the core problem facing the European leadership – the problem of debt overhang.

As a research paper by Carmen M. Reinhart, Vincent R. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff published last week clearly shows, “major public debt overhang episodes in the advanced economies since the early 1800s [were] characterized by public debt to GDP levels exceeding 90% for at least five years.” The study found “that public debt overhang episodes are associated with growth over one percent lower than during other periods.” Across all 26 episodes studied, “the average duration …is about 23 years.”

Now, according to the IMF data, the euro area will reach the 90% debt to GDP bound in 2012 and will remain there through 2015. Statistically, the euro area will be running debt levels in excess of 90% through 2017. Between 2010 and 2017, IMF forecasts that seven core euro area states will be facing debt to GDP ratios at or above 90%. Of the four largest euro area economies, Germany is the only one that will remain outside the debt overhang bound. Increasing deficits into such a severe debt scenario would risk extending the crisis.

After two years of half-measures and half-austerity, the euro as a currency system is now less sustainable. The survival of the euro (even after Greek, Portuguese and, possibly other exits) will depend on structural reforms, including change in the ECB mandate, political federalisation and fiscal harmonisation beyond the current Fiscal Compact treaty.

The real problem Europe is facing in the wake of the last week’s elections in Greece and France is that traditional European elites are no longer capable of governing with the tools to which they became accustomed over decades of deficits and debt accumulation, while the European populations are no longer willing to be governed by the detached and conservative elites. Not quite a classical revolutionary situation, yet, but getting dangerously close to one.

CHARTS: 

Box-out:

This was supposed to be a boom year for car sales as the threat of getting an unlucky ‘13’ stuck on your shiny new purchase for some years was supposed to spell a resurgence in motor trade fortunes. Alas, the latest stats from the CSO suggest that this hoped-for prediction is unlikely to materialise. In the first four months of 2012, new registrations of all vehicles have fallen 8.5% year on year and 60% on 2007. New private cars registrations have suffered an even deeper annual fall, down 10.2% year on year although since the peak they are down ‘only’ 56%. The news of the motor trade suffering is hardly surprising. Unemployment stuck above 14%, fear of forthcoming tax increases in the Budget 2013, plus the dawning reality that sooner or later interest rates (and with them mortgages costs) will climb sky-high are among the reasons Irish consumers continue to stay away from purchasing large ticket items. Cyclical consumption considerations are also coming into play. Over the last 4 years, Irish households barely replaced their stocks of white goods. Given the life span of necessary household appliances, the households are likely to prioritize replacing ageing dishwasher or a fridge over buying a new vehicle. Families compression with children returning back to parental homes to live and grandparents taking over expensive crèche duties are also likely to depress demand for cars. Lastly, there is a pesky consideration of the on-going deleveraging. Irish households have paid down some €36 billion worth of personal debts and mortgages in recent years. Still, Irish households remain the second most indebted in the Euro area. New cars registrations fall off in 2012 shows that in the end, sanity prevails over vanity and superstition, at the detriment to the car sales industry. 

Economics 18/09/2009: Idiot's guide to the Galaxy

One of my favorite books in the Universe, The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy has been surpassed, if only momentarily, by a publisher in Ireland producing this superb Idiots' Guide to Science and Economics. Behold, the front page of today's Indo:
Of course, Mary Coughlan's theory of Relativised Evolution or Evolutionised Relativity and the absolutely unfortunate nature of the venue at which she managed to live up to her well-deserved name 'Calamity Coughlan' are straight out of the chapter 'National Embarrassment Exemplified'. It is a serious public blemish on an otherwise worthy event of IDA launching a serious campaign to attract more FDI into Ireland that I wrote about before (here). No need to detail much here, Indo's article speaks volumes, one can wonder now as to what evolutionary process can lead to the emergence of the species so ignorant of basic knowledge as Mrs Coughlan. One note worth making - the fiasco perfectly exemplifies Kevin Meyers' excellent argument in the same paper today (I might not agree with it myself, but Mrs Coughlan has made his case iron-clad).

But Brian Lenihan's lack of grasp of simple realities of public finances and economics is as breathtaking as Mrs Coughlan's lack of basic erudition. After weeks of being fed drivel of FF backbenchers' and hacks' version of economic ("Nama bonds are not debt", "We will get cheap money from ECB", "ECB supports us" etc), it seems our own Finance Minister got convinced that there is such a thing as a Free Lunch. Per Indo's article here, Lenihan "gave his firmest pledge yet that there would be no tax hikes in the December Budget. And Mr Lenihan challenged anyone who doubted him to "watch my lips"... Mr Lenihan said he was committed to introducing a carbon tax... But he gave his clearest indication yet that the Government would not bring in a property or water tax this year. "I am not aware of any other (new tax hikes)," he said.

Ok, three Indo reporters (including senior ones) failed to actually query the details of this statement the Minister made. But the very fact that Lenihan actually said what he did is a testament to the fact that this Government has no real financial brains in the Cabinet at the time of fiscal and financial crises. None at all.

Per statement itself, Minister Lenihan obviously does not consider introduction of the Carbon tax to be a new tax. Presumably, he lived so long outside the real world, in the world of chauffeur driven Mercs and vast taxpayer-paid perks that he might be under the impression that Carbon tax already exists, so 'introducing' it will not constitute an imposition of a new charge on taxpayers.

The Minister also indicated that he has seen no other tax proposals (other than the Carbon Tax and Property Tax). Has he read his own Commission for Taxation voluminous report? Or has it escaped his field of view as the Lisbon Treaty volume had escaped Brian Cowen's view earlier?

Finally, the Minister has to be living in the surreal world where a €20bn-plus shortfall between tax receipts and liabilities can be covered by something other than taxes. Indo's journos refer to the possibility of €4bn savings on the expenditure side as the means for avoiding new taxes. Have they done a simple sum ever before? Has Minister Lenihan done a simple sum ever before?

Even if the Government does deliver on €4bn in savings, and even if part-year measures announced in April 2009 budget continue through the full year 2010, the entire savings will not be able to cover a quarter of the fiscal spending gap. If the Government commits to fully ending all capital expenditure in 2010 and if the economy grows by 5% in 2010, the expected fiscal gap will still be in excess of €8bn in 2010.

This money will have to be borrowed in the international markets. The roll-over of a vast sea of short-term debt issued in 2008-2009 will have to happen. Is Minister Lenihan really buying the idea that these state liabilities - some €30bn worth already accumulated, plus Nama's €54bn expected plus the ones awaiting NTMA's printing press on the back of long term unemployment increases into foreseeable future can be 'deflated' away at the current rates of spending and taxation without raising new taxes?

Well, only in the world where Einstein authored On the Origin of Species, perhaps?

Economics 12/09/2009: More NAMA lies exposed

One interesting observation on Nama and a quick follow up to the developing story on ECB alleged unwillingness to deal with nationalized banks.

We, on the critics of Nama side, have expended much gunpowder arguing that there is a natural, legally binding order of rights contained in each asset class held by investors in and lenders to the banks. This order requires that first to take the hit in any balance sheet adjustment will be the shareholders. Then the subordinated debt holders and lastly the secured debt holders. This argument is used by myself and others to show that taxpayer must be last in the firing line - after all of the above take their dose of bitter medicine.

Yet in all of this excitement we forgot the humble contractors. Now, many of the loans Nama will buy into will be written against properties on which some work has been performed in the recent past, or is even ongoing today. The problem is, our heroic developers in many cases have not paid their bills to the contractors providing this work. As far as I can understand, these unpaid contractors are the holders of the priority right on repayment in the case of liquidation of the development firm - ahead of the bank holding lien on the property.

Of course, Nama can go and tell the larger contractors that, look guys, you forget your claims on work done, write it off as a loss on your taxes and we will look after you when time comes to finish the properties. Smaller contractors will be simply told to get lost - suing the state (Nama) is a very expensive business for them. This is dandy in the banana republic we live in. But estimated (rumored) 30% of the properties Nama will claim under loans purchases will be outside this state - in countries like the USA, UK, France, Germany, Bulgaria, Romania. Nama has no sway there and their courts are not going to toe Brian Lenihan's line of National Interest. So in these countries, the unpaid or underpaid contractors can seize the properties ahead of Nama, leaving Nama with loans devoid of collateral.

This should be fun to watch as our legal eagles from Nama fly over to, say,

• Newcastle to fight the UK system that treats people supplying work as real corporate citizens with real rights; or
• Plovdiv to fight Bulgarian courts, where a leather-jacketed Petar would have to explain to them that if you owe money to his cousin, you either should leave now and forget about that unfinished apartment complex 'with amazing views of the local dump' or risk never seeing your own little 4-bed in Howth ever again.

Have our Brian Twins thought of that little pesky complication?

Now to the issue of ECB. Several of us - again from the Nama critics or sceptics - have done some digging on the issue. What my colleagues now firmly claim is that per their sources, there is a mandate on the ECB to actually treat publicly owned banks in exactly the same way as privately held banks so as not privilege the former over the latter.

Here is what I have found:

Per ECB own research paper The European Central Bank: History, Role and Functions written by Hanspeter K Scheller (link to it here) (Second revised edition, 2006), Annex I provides excerpts from the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Part 3 Community Policies, Title VII: Economic and monetary policy, Chapter 1 "Economic Policy":
"Article 101
1. Overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the ECB or with the central banks of the Member States (hereinafter referred to as ‘national central banks’) in favour of Community institutions or bodies, central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly from them by the ECB or national central banks of debt instruments.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to publicly owned credit institutions which, in the context of the supply of reserves by central banks, shall be given the same treatment by national central banks and the ECB as private credit institutions."

Emphasis is mine. This clearly states that the pro-Nama supporters are simply wrong in claiming that the ECB will treat nationalized banks or Trust-owned banks any different from the privately held banks.

Further quoting from the same ECB publication:
"Article 21 Operations with public entities
21.1. In accordance with Article 101 of this Treaty, overdrafts or any other type of credit facility with the ECB or with the national central banks in favour of Community institutions or bodies, central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly from them by the ECB or national central banks of debt instruments.
21.2. The ECB and national central banks may act as fiscal agents for the entities referred to in Article 21.1.
21.3. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to publicly owned credit institutions which, in the context of the supply of reserves by central banks, shall be given the same treatment by national central banks and the ECB as private credit institutions."

So the same stands. Now, last year, the ECB issued clarification on Article 101 prohibitions of financing (here) which actually stresses that this prohibition (restricting Central Banks from providing ‘overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facilities with the ECB or with the central banks of the Member States … in favour of …public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings' and Article 21.1 of the ECB Statute that mirrors this provision):

• also applies to any financing of the public sector’s obligations vis-à-vis third parties (so technically, either Nama as a state-own undertaking cannot borrow in the future from the ECB via debt issuance of its own - which will imply that Nama own bonds will have to be priced for sale in private markets only, implying horrific cost to the taxpayers of financing Nama work-out, or nationalized banks will have exactly the same access to the ECB lending in the future as Nama will) and
• crucially, that in dealing with publicly owned credit institutions there is no restriction of Article 1 under the ECB statues.
  

In fact, the legal opinion clearly states that Article 1 is designed to restrict National Central Banks' and ECB being used to finance 'public sector' - i.e to raise funds for the Exchequer, not for the credit institution operations.

Here is another interesting factoid. Chart below clearly shows that many European countries operate state owned banks. In Germany, for example the market share of state-owned banks is in excess of 40%.Source: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1360698

Are pro-Nama advocates saying that these banks have no access to ECB's discount window as well? Or will ECB treat them somehow differently from the nationalized Irish banks? If the latter is true, should this be kept hidden from the Lisbon Treaty debate? (Now, personally, I do not believe Irish banks, if nationalized, will have any trouble in raising funding either via ECB or via private markets, so the above question is a rhetorical one).

Now, logic of Article 1 as stated above, actually suggests that the ECB will have harder time allowing Nama - a state-owned non-credit institution explicitly prohibited from obtaining financing from the ECB - to swap its own bonds for ECB's cash than it would allow state-owned bank - a credit institution explicitly allowed to obtain such funding from ECB - to do so. ECB's own paper and legal opinions are confirming, therefore that it is Nama, not the nationalized banks, that would have much harder time getting support from the ECB!

29/5/2012: Fiscal Compact - one very interesting view

I rarely post articles by others on this site, usually preferring links, alas the following article is not available on the web. Its full attribution goes to the Irish Daily Mail (Monday 28, 2012 edition) and it is written by one of the best - if not the best - commentators in the paper both sides of the pond - Mary Ellen Synon.

It is a must-read to understand the context of the Referendum, because it places our vote into the broader and more real context than any domestic debate we might have on merits or failings of the Treaty.

Please note, I am not advocating you follow Mary Ellen's conclusion on the vote - as you know, I am not advocating in favour of any direction of the vote. Make your own choice. I am posting this because I think that many risks highlighted in the article are real.

To be fair to the 'Yes' side, if any of you, readers, spot an excellent article on that side of the argument, I will be delighted to post it. So far, I have not come across one, but that might be due to the omission, rather than lack thereof. (see update below)

Thus, judge for yourselves:

Update: I remembered - the best argument for 'Yes' side I ever read is from another economist, one whose opinion I respect and who has provided many clarifications during this debate to my own occasionally erroneous positions - Professor Karl Whelan. Here's the link and here are his full remarks on the Treaty - certainly worth reading.

17/9/2014: Letting Go Ireland's Tax Arbitrage Model Will be a Painful Process

OECD has put forward their proposals for new international tax rules that, in theory, could eliminate tax-optimisation structures that have allowed many multinational companies (such as Google, Apple, Pfizer, Amazon, Yahoo and numerous others) to cut billions of dollars off their tax bills. The proposals were prompted by the G20 request issued last year and the measures announced this week have already been agreed with the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs (44 countries).

The proposals form just a part of the overall international tax reforms package called “Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” that will be unveiled in 2015 and is commonly known as BEPS.

There are two pillars in the current announcement.

The first pillar addresses only some of the abuses of dual-taxation treaties that generally aim to prevent double taxation of companies trading across the borders. The OECD is proposing to make amendments to its model treaty package that would prevent cross-border transactions from availing of tax treaty reliefs whenever the principal reason for the transaction is to avoid tax liability. This is a principles-based change, recognising the spirit or the principle of the dual-taxation treaties. De facto, the aim is to prevent the situation where preventing dual taxation leads to the scenario of dual non-taxation.

As with all principles-based reforms, the devil will be in the fine print of the actual regulations and economist's mind is not the best guide for sorting through these. From the top, were the measures to succeed, profits shifting via the likes of Ireland to tax havens will be if not fully stopped, at least significantly impaired. The result will be putting at risk tens of billions of economic activity booked via Ireland. In some cases, practically, this will mean that activity will be re-domiciled to other jurisdictions, where it really does take place. In other, however, it will become subject to tax in the country that stands just ahead of the tax haven in the pecking order of revenues flows. Ireland might actually benefit here, since our tax regime is still more benign than that offered in other countries.

To support the first pillar, however, the OECD also wants to restrict the amount of profits that a company can report in its intra-company accounts when these are based offshore. In effect this will put a cap on how much of their activity companies can attribute to the intra-company transactions or to force companies to redistribute profits generated by intra-company divisions across the entire group.

This is likely to undermine our ability to gain from re-allocation of revenues mentioned above. For example, suppose a company has a division based in Ireland that holds the company IP. The division is highly profitable, despite being very small: revenues it earns from other parts of the company operating around the world are covering the alleged cost of IP. If these profits were capped and/or required to be redistributed around the world to other divisions of the same company, the incentive for the company to retain its IP in tax optimising location, such as Ireland, will be gone no matter what our tax rate is.


The second pillar relates to the rules on tax residency. In particular, the OECD said that the existent rules that allow companies to operate facilities in a country without registering tax residency there should be abolished. The result, if adopted, will be to force companies like Google, Apple and Amazon to pay taxes on activities carried out in larger European states in these states by removing the channel for profit shifting to Ireland and other countries. The OECD is explicit about this by insisting that companies with 'significant digital presence' in the market should be forced to declare tax residence in that country.

Ireland's official response to this threat is that majority of MNCs trading from here do have significant presence here in form of large offices and big employment numbers. This is a weak argument for two reasons. One: Irish operations are relatively small for the majority of MNCs, compared to their global workforce. Two: majority of Irish operations of MNCs are sales, sales-support, marketing and back office. In other words, these support larger markets workforce.


The first pillar of the proposal is likely to impact sectors such as phrama and tech, where significant profits are generated by IP, trademarks and patents and these are often held off-shore in what are de facto shell subsidiaries not registered for tax purposes in the countries where actual activities of the company are based.

The second pillar is even more damaging to smaller open economies such as Ireland, because it mirrors the old EU proposal for CCCTB basis of corporate taxation. This pillar will likely push activities that are registered in countries like Ireland back into the countries where actual transactions take place, favouring larger economies over smaller ones.

For example, take a US company running sales support centre in Ireland servicing Spain. This activity is supplied by Spanish-speaking, largely non-Irish staff that has been imported into Ireland not because they are more productive here or have better human capital or face lower costs of employing, but because their presence in Ireland allows the company to book sales in Spain into Ireland. In fact, absent tax arbitrage, it would probably be cheaper for the company to employ these workers in Spain.

Back in 2013, Reuters reported that 3/4 of the largest US MNCs in tech sector channeled their revenues from sales across the EU into Ireland and Switzerland, avoiding reporting these activities in the countries where actual customers resided.

If OECD proposals are implemented to reflect the spirit of the reforms, the tax arbitrage bit of the abnormal return on locating labour-intensive activities in Ireland will be gone. This, by itself, may or may not be enough to put those jobs on the airplanes back to Spain, Italy, Germany, France and elsewhere. But if other countries start making themselves more competitive in labour costs, tax and regulatory regimes, defending Ireland's competitive proposition will be harder and harder.

This process - of erosion of Irish competitive advantage - will be further accelerated by the OECD proposals on tax data sharing and clearance which envisages massive increase in the data reporting burdens on the multinational companies. The cost of compliance and audits this entails will be large and increasing in complexity of companies' structures, leading to more incentives for them to rationalise and streamline their operations worldwide. A tiny market, like Ireland, much more efficiently serviceable via the larger economy like the UK, is unlikely to win in this race.


OECD proposals can have a pronounced effect on economic growth, employment and financial health of a number of countries, including Ireland, Luxembourg, Switzerland, and the Netherlands because the proposals will force MNCs to change their global operations structures and move jobs out of tax optimisation states toward the states where real activity takes place.

From Ireland's point of view, closing off of the loopholes can have a dramatic effect on the ground if it is accompanied by other trends, such as renewed corporate tax rate competition that can challenge our attractive headline rate of 12.5%, erosion of Irish regulatory and supervisory regimes competitiveness, increase in cost inflation and other inefficiencies. Instead of competing on being a tax arbitrage conduit, Ireland will have to start competing on the basis of real economic fundamentals, such as skills, public policy, public goods and services, private markets efficiencies, etc.

Ironically, the threat of the elimination of tax arbitrage opportunities can result in Ireland becoming more competitive and more successful over time, assuming the Governments - current and subsequent - play it smart.

Daily Economics 25/04/09: John McGuinness & Alan Ahearne

For my comment on John McGuinness' story, scroll to the bottom.

Alan Ahearne, the newly minted adviser to the Government, has gone into an overdrive mode, tackling the 20 dissenters (including myself) who dared to challenge NAMA as a taxpayers' nightmare waiting to happen (in the Irish Times: here) and striking at criticism against his masters in the Leinster House (Irish Independent report today: here).

Per Ahearne's musings in the Times
It is indeed sad to read an article that so flatly denies itself a chance at having an argument, as Alan's treaties on What's wrong with nationalization. Alan spent some time studying our earlier Times piece (see more on this here), but it is also obvious that he had hard time coming up with arguments against its main points.

Let us start from the top.

"The recommendation that nationalisation of the entire Irish banking system is the only way we can extricate the banks and the economy from the serious difficulties we are experiencing risks diverting the debate away from issues that are much more central to the success of the ...Nama proposal." Alan follows up with a list of such 'central issues' from which our article was allegedly diverting the debate. Alas, all are actually covered in our article. As an aside, we never argued for nationalization of "the entire banking system", but of the systemically important banks alone.

"As in other advanced economies, bank nationalisation is seen very much as a last resort." Our article states that: "We do not make this recommendation from any ideological position. In normal circumstances, none of us would recommend a nationalised banking system. However, these are far from normal times..." We clearly were not advocating nationalization as some sort of a good-fun measure.

"It is important to recall that there is an overwhelming international consensus that the so-called good-bank/bad-bank model on which Nama is strongly based presents the opportunity for achieving an enduring long-term solution to the banking crisis." Actually, there is no such 'consensus'. And even if there was one, just because many other Governments have been working with this specific model does not mean that (a) the model actually works, (b) Ireland should follow in their footsteps and (c) this is the best option for resolving the crisis. The model does not work, as in the US, for example it has managed to absorb vast resources (which Ireland does not possess) and had come under heavy criticism as not delivering.

The fact that Ireland should not blindly follow in others footsteps is apparent. But it is also rather amusing, for the Indo (see below) reports today Alan's own insistence that we should not follow the US in stimulating our economy. No tax breaks to the suffering workers, says Alan, because we are different from the US in fiscal policies. NAMA and no nationalization, says Alan, because we want to follow the US lead in financial markets policies. Same Alan, two divergent points of view...

"One of the main issues identified in the article is the need to restore bank lending. This is a central objective of the Nama initiative. Nationalisation, on the other hand, creates a significant risk of undermining the capacity of the banks to raise funds internationally for domestic lending." Two things worth mentioning.

1. Alan clearly contradicts here his own statement that our article risks 'diverting' national attention from the core issues relating to NAMA. Obviously it did not: restoring bank lending is "a central objective of the NAMA" (per Alan) and it was identified in our original article as "one of the main issues".
   
2. The argument that nationalization undermines banks capacity to borrow internationally is a pure speculation. Firstly, our banks have little capacity to borrow internationally as is. Secondly, when they regain such capacity their ability to do so will be underpinned by public guarantees. Third, why a state-owned (and thus a fully state-insured) bank wouldn't be able to borrow from other banks and the markets? What would prevent, say London- based investors buying BofI bonds when these bonds carry a much stronger default protection under state guarantees than the one afforded to them by the half-competent current management?

"Investors would surely give the Irish market a wide berth in the future – not just in the banking sector – if the State undertook such an extreme step." No they won't, Alan. Banks and public finance in Ireland are in a mess. Investors have already priced these factors in. The markets understand the difference between a healthy, albeit not necessarily extremely profitable company like Elan or CRH and the nationalization-bound banks or economically illiterate Exchequer policies. Such are the basics of investment markets.

Nationalizing banks with clear privatization time line and disbursing privatization vouchers to the taxpayers will send strong signals to the markets that Ireland is:

• serious about the banking crisis;
• ready to support household balance sheets in crisis;
• can creatively stimulate its economy without destroying it fiscal position;
• will not waste privatization revenue in a gratuitous public spending boost, thus supporting long term fiscal health; and
• will have a transparent and fixed downside on its banking rescue commitments (i.e no repeated rounds of post-NAMA recapitalizations).

Which one of these points contributes to the international investors shying away from Irish stocks?

"It is difficult to see a credible exit strategy from wholesale bank nationalisation." Read our article on the topic in Business & Finance magazine, Alan. Also, the original Times article, stated in plain English: "...nationalisation offers an opportunity, should the Government see such a need, to share directly with the taxpayers the upside in restoring banking sector health. Such an opportunity could involve a voucher-style reprivatisation of the banks and could be used to provide economic stimulus at a time of scarce resources, at no new cost to the exchequer." So no real mystery as to how a credible exit strategy can be devised, Alan.

But NAMA without nationalization offers no exit strategy at all (credible or not). In fact, it offers no strategy for ending the rounds of repeated bailouts of the banks either.

"Under the Nama initiative the taxpayer is protected from unforeseen losses through the Government’s commitment to levy the banks for any losses incurred." This is simply wrong! Once NAMA owns the assets, what recourse onto banks will the state have should the quality of the assets bought fail to match the price paid? As far as I can see - none. But under nationalization, the state owns all - good and bad assets, and it can price these assets on the ongoing basis as more information on the quality of loans arrives.

"The State has already, under the recapitalisation programme, potential for benefiting from the upside in terms of the recovery in the share prices of the two main banks. The State has an option to purchase at a very low price 25 per cent of the existing ordinary shares in Bank of Ireland, and will soon have a similar claim on AIB." I am sorry, Alan, the 25% shares in BofI and AIB relate to the €5bn that we, the taxpayers have already paid for these banks recapitalization. These shares are wholly independent from NAMA liability and from the future liabilities we will incur under NAMA-triggered second round of recapitalizations. Whichever way you twist it, Alan, the state will have to spend additional cash buying the shares of the banks after we have paid for NAMA!

About the only statement in the entire article I find myself at least in a partial agreement with is: "Empirical evidence strongly suggests that private banks perform better than nationalised banks. International studies have shown that too much “policy-directed” lending by wholly state-owned banks has retarded economic growth. The simple truth is that nationalisation creates a significant risk of a political rather than a commercial allocation of credit." However, the problem here is three-fold:

1. NAMA is at the same, if not even the greater, risk of becoming politicised;
2. Banks are going to be majority state-owned post-NAMA (if only at double the cost to the taxpayers), so Ahearne's musings do not resolve the problem he posits; and
3. We are not in the normal times when empirical evidence holds...
   

we are in a mess! and Alan's confused rumblings on the topic illustrate the extent of this mess well enough for me.

Per Ahearne's economic policy musings in the Indo
US-styled fiscal "stimulus wouldn't work well anyway in a small, open economy, and, of course, the budget position is such that it just doesn't allow it," Dr Ahearne told Engineers Ireland conference.
Of course he is right on this, but him being right on the technicality does not mean that:

• It is right to raise taxes on ordinary workers and businesses, as the Budget did, amidst the recession;
• It is right not to cut public spending by an appreciably significant amount, as the Budget did;
• It is right to continue awarding public sector wage hikes, as the Government is doing with consultants;
• It is right to rely on senile plans for Irish-styled 'stimulus' that will waste money on unproven projects, as the Government did;
• It is right to continue resisting reforms of the public sector, as the Government is doing.
  

Ahearne further said that 'if the US and the global economy improves next year and Ireland continues to get its public finances in order, then Ireland would be in a position to make a "strong recovery"'. Really, Alan? How so? Through a miraculous return of Dell jobs, Google engineers jobs? Waterford jobs? Tralee jobs? By reversing our losses in exports competitiveness? By scaling down the atrociously high cost of doing business here? Dr Ahearne is so far removed from reality of economic environment that he believes the entire economy can be rescued by the IDA efforts alone?

"Ireland is regaining its competitiveness "very quickly" because of rapidly falling wages, he said", as the Indo reports. "Of course, those declines are painful but they will price a lot of people back into the labour market and, therefore,they are setting the foundations for the recovery." This amazingly callous statement comes from a person who is secure in his own public sector job with high salary. It also comes from an official of this Government.

Wage declines have been borne out by the private sector alone, Alan. Unemployment increases have been borne by the private sector alone, Alan. And most of the real income loss to those still in the jobs has come courtesy of your masters policies - the Budget. How is this restoring any sort of competitiveness vis-a-vis other economies where the Governments are putting in place tax cuts?

Here is a lesson that Dr Ahearne failed to learn in all his years of studying economics:

• Higher tax rates amidst the most generous welfare system in Europe mean that marginalized workers will not have an incentive to return to the labour market.
  
• Higher taxes in a restricted labour market (with high costs of hiring and firing workers and high minimum wage rate) hamper jobs creation.
  
• Higher taxes on already debt-loaded households mean that more and more families are facing the ruin and precautionary savings are rising, reducing our internal economy growth potential.
  
• But most importantly, higher taxes on human capital mean that productivity growth is going to be constrained for years to come.
  

It is that simple, Alan, any recovery will require productivity growth in this economy outpacing the cost of living rises and the cost of doing business growth. Your policies have just hiked the latter by some 10% - courtesy of taxes and levies increases in the Budget, while restricting productivity growth by failing to provide any real support for businesses or incentives for workers to get off the dole. You are travelling in exactly the opposite direction to the one that has to be taken if we are to get productivity-driven recovery.

John McGuinness' appearance on the Late Late Show tonight was a logical conclusion of months of pinned up rage that this country is feeling toward the Cabinet - and primarily to Mr Cowen, Mr Lenihan and Mrs Coughlan - towards the public sector at large and towards the scores of mostly nameless, faceless (but sometimes publicly visible) 'advisers' who have systemically destroyed the prosperity of this country and its chances of coming out of the recession as a competitive and growth-focused economy.

McGuinness avoided offering direct examples of gross incompetence and outright insubordination that are so often exemplified by some of our public sector departments and quangoes. This was his choice, but the country needs to know of these acts and it needs to know the names of those who carry on their duties in such a manner. He also avoided placing the blame for the mess we are in where it really belongs, at the feet of:

• the participants in the Social Partnership that managed to squander billions of our money to finance wasteful 'investment' and social cohesion programmes and to set this economy into the rigid infrastructure of inflexible labour laws, senile minimum wage restrictions, mad political correctness and corrupt local governance. Some of the Social Partnership members were the reluctant parties to this outrage - brought in under the threat of union violence against businesses and entrepreneurs. Others made it their life-long ambition to get their organizations to the feeding trough. Roles of all should now be questioned and the entire Partnership model must be scrapped;
• the Government that has for the last 6 years chosen to take no serious policy action to reign in its own employees and their unions and that has retained inefficient and often markets-retarding monopolies. The Government that simply bought its way through the elections, policy conflicts and minor reforms;
  
• the political culture that promotes mediocrity and punishes statesmanship. Our academic and policy debate systems that promote complacency, competition for public funding, anti-entrepreneurial ethos, social welfarism and provide philosophical and ethical foundations for systematic moral and financial debasing of the taxpayers, wealth creators, jobs providers and consumers, promoting instead the unquestioning support for NGOs, quangoes and public sector;
  
• some business elites that, in exchange for state contracts handouts looked the other way as the political and social elites of this country carved our wages and earnings to their own benefits. It is a telling sign of the depreciation of the entrepreneurial spirit in this country that faced with a wholesale destruction at the hands of incompetent (and often outright malicious) policymakers, our business leaders remain largely silent, uncritical of the Government.
  

This should not be held against the person who has now become the first man from inside the FF tent to voice his honest and informed opinion. Instead, there should be firm focus on completing the task he started - the task of recognizing the fact that we are currently being ruled by the three 'leaders' who have shown over the last year complete inability to run the country in crisis. It is time for us not to ask them to go, but to tell them that they must go.

Blunders of Mary: I would encourage the readers of this blog to submit any publicly documented evidence of Mary Coughlan's incompetence at the helm of DETE or indeed of her incompetence at the previous ministerial appointments.

Here is the first one: on April 2 Mary Coughlan has publicly displayed the lack of knowledge as to the existence (let alone the details) of the new Social Welfare Bill put forward by her own Government and already scheduled for a full debate in the Dail in late April. As the bill provides for adjustments in unemployment benefits and conditions, the bill would be at least partially linked directly to Mary Coughlan's ministerial brief. Responding in the Dail to the question concerning this bill, Mary Coughlan said she had no knowledge of any such legislation.

There was, of course, her infamous failure in the Lisbon Treaty debate (here); and an equally spectacular flop during her tenure as Minister for Agriculture, when an ordinary farmer's question exposed her lack of knowledge concerning her ministerial brief.

She earned herself a nickname of 'Sarah Palin of Donegal' after she told radio listeners on April 11th that Irish shoppers go to Northern Ireland only to buy cheap booze (here). This showed such monumental disrespect for ordinary families her Government has squeezed out of savings, pensions and earnings, that she should have been sacked on the spot for such proclamations.

The rumor mill in the public sector if full of accounts - that are yet to be documented - of her undiplomatic behaviour at foreign missions, outrageous antics at the meetings with international business leaders and arrogant statements in addressing top corporate brass. This is far from being a hallmark of an independently-minded politician - it is a direct result of her gross unsuitability for the position of responsibility that she occupies.

Economics 09/05/2010: What sort of EU leadership?.. Part 1

Prepare to be afraid, ye the financial markets – those always-on-time and forever-effective super leaders of the Eurozone have concocted a Plan. A Plan to deal once and for all with the frightening levels of their own governments’ insolvency. A Plan code-named Bondzkrieg!

The troops of illiquid and insolvent PIIGS will be backed by the armies of the liquid, but pretty much nearly as insolvent the rest of EU. The attack, commencing possibly as early as on Monday next will be a two-pronged strategy: a pincers manoeuvre.

Part 1 will, per latest reports from the EU16 summit, require an issuance of Euro Commission Bonds. These will be backed by the EU16 states’ guarantees and something that is called ‘an implicit ECB guarantee’. Sounds terrifying, folks:

1. What is exactly an ‘implicit ECB guarantee’? A sort of ‘we might print mucho Euro notes, should Brussels default’ stuff? What kind of nonsense is this? The best the ECB can do is promise to monetize the EU Common bond in the same way it monetizes Greek junk bonds. Yet, the latter has not stopped contagion, only accelerated it by undermining the ECB credibility.
2. What will back these Common bonds? The solvency of the EU nations guaranteeing them? But wait – isn’t the problem the EU is facing is precisely the very lack of solvency? How is it going to work then? A severely indebted and deficit ridden pack of nations issues new debt to cover up the old debt problems? Well, that did work for the Russian Government a miracle back in 1998. Without actually resolving the problem of excessive and long-running deficits, and without either restructuring (default) or deflating (devaluation which is a de facto default) the existent pile of debt, the new EU-wide bond issue will simply transfer Greek-style problems of the PIIGS to the rest of EU. Given that we are talking about roughly a €1 trillion worth of junk, the entire pyramid scheme concocted by the EU is going to collapse unless Germany is good for underwriting the entire EU16 with its economic might. Trouble is – Germany can’t. It has little prospect of growth and its’ current economy simply cannot carry the burden of the rest of EU16 obligations.
3. What will be the seniority of these bonds? If the new bond is subordinated to the existent state bonds (as implied by a ‘guarantee’ proviso), these bonds will have no meaning. If it will be senior to existent member states’ debt, then issuing them to pay down sovereign debt will be equal to deflating seniority of sovereign issues already outstanding. Which, in common English, is called defaulting on existent debt.
4. How can these bonds be priced? Normally a bond is priced by a combination of factors. Some are exogenous – such as global liquidity and portfolio driven demand. Some are endogenous – such as analysis of what the sovereign deficit is for the issuer, what debt burden the issuer is paying and what prospects for economic growth (and other components of future default probability) does a sovereign face. Finally, expected Forex positions for sovereign currency in which the bond is denominated are taken into account. Care to guess what any of these endogenous variables might be for the EU16? Right – they are totally meaningless. Will EU bond be written against EU own debt (which is nil) or against guarantors’ debt (sovereigns already overloaded with debt)? Will the Forex rates relate to the ECB rate which the ‘sovereign’ issuing the bonds (the EU Commission) cannot control (due to ECB independence)? Will EU ability to repay these bonds rest on Euroarea economic growth? If so, what does this mean, since the EU Commission collects revenue from EU27, of which 11 member states are not a party to issuance of the bond! Will, for example, UK government assume liability to the Eurozone-issued bonds by committing its own economy to the risk of a call on the bond should, say, Belgium decide to default?

The second prong of the EU attack on the markets is the incessant blabber about the need to set up an EU-own rating agency. Here, the promised might is clearly unmatched by any sort of internal capability:

1. The EU itself cannot certify own annual accounts, despite having only in-house own auditors. Even these are refusing to sign off on EU accounts for over a decade now. How can the same institution produce a credible rating agency that will be entrusted with providing assessment of the EU credit worthiness?
2. Can the EU-imposed metrics be seriously treated as fundamental benchmarks for solvency? Give it a thought – the EU oversees a union of member states bound by own sovereign treaty to uphold the Maastricht Criteria targets. The EU has failed to enforce these in the case of Greeks, Portuguese, Spaniards, French, Italians, Belgians and so on. In other words, the EU cannot enforce its own rules, let alone police economic and fiscal performance parameters required to issue any sort of risk assessments. In fact, this year Euroarea deficit is expected to reach 6.6% of GDP and in 2011 -6.1% - way above the 3% the block set as its own rule. Debt to GDP is heading for double digits, before we add banks supports. Letting the EU run a rating agency is equivalent to letting an alcoholic run a bar!
3. The entire idea of an EU rating agency traces back to Merkel’s and Sarkozy’s desire to shift blame for the Greek (and indeed PIIGS) debacle off the shoulders of the European governments and Brussels and onto the shoulders of ‘speculators’ and the Big-3 rating agencies. Of course, the logical inconsistency of the EU attacks on the Big-3 is painfully obvious. The Big 3 are accused for failing to properly recognize and publicize risks to the systemic solvency of financial institutions in the case of ABS/MBS and so on. Yet, the minute the rating agencies actually do their jobs – as in the case of PIIGS in recent months – they are standing accused of… well… doing the jobs only to well? Can anyone have any trust in a ‘rating agency’ set up by the very people who are simply and evidently incapable of a simple logical argument?

Mrs Merkel have stated this Friday: "Those who created the excesses on the markets will be asked to pay up -- those are in part the banks, those are the hedge funds that must be regulated ... those are the short-sellers and we agreed yesterday to implement this more quickly in Europe." Obviously, over a decade of fiscal recklessness across the PIIGS was never a problem for Mrs Merkel. And she is supposed to be the reasonable one?

All I can say, folks, forget any hope for growth in Europe with this sort of leadership.