According to today's reports, the y-o-y tax take in January is down 15% (hat tip to B.).
My personal projection, given the dynamics of 2008 tax intake (remember, Q1 2008 was still positive growth territory and lagged tax revenue was rolling in) is that we are going to finish 2009 with ca 15-17% down on 2008. 2007-2008 decline was 9.4%, implying we are going to collect €34,550-35,380mln in 2009 or a shortfall of up to €7,080mln on 2008 revenue, not €3,898mln as DofF forecast in January. My previous post forecast €7,698mnl shortfall, so January figure appears to be generally supportive of this.
As B. mentioned, this will bring our revenue to 2005 level - 'four years lost' as he puts it. This is about right - fundamentals (productivity, wages, costs inflation) all point to ireland having abandoned growth path around 2003-2004 which means a return - in nominal terms (using Eurozone average inflation rate) - to 2002-2003 levels by the end of 2011 will be mean reverting (with downward overshoot, of course) for underlying growth fundamentals.
P.S. Meanwhile - our Vacuum-Head in Politics Watch has spotted the following idea from Gay Mitchell (FG MEP). Surely, the nation falling off the cliff into an abyss of a severe recession and fiscal insolvency has nothing better to do than engage its MEPs in advocating Gaelic subtitles in cinemas. Too bad Gay's brain power never stretched to imagine watching a French or a German film with Irish and English subtitles littering the same screen. Oh, dear...
Sunday, February 1, 2009
European v American Model: Labour and Leisure
Recently, I was invited to adjudicate TCD's Hist annual debate with Yale. It was, as such nights always are, a really great exchange of good-spirited fun and youthful energy. The topic of the debate was the clash of two values systems: the so-called American Model of economic development against the caring social-economy model this side of the Atlantic.
Great fun aside, neither Yale, nor TCD team produced much of earth shattering factual evidence to defend their arguments. Instead, several commonly held cliches, became the focal points fo the entire discourse.
One of these was the argument advanced by the TCD side that Americans enjoy lower quality of life than Europeans because the former work longer hours than the latter. It was frustrating watching the Yale team inventing epicycles to by-pass the thorny issue. In reality they did not have to do this, since the claim is simply not true.
Some years ago I worte about the matter in several articles (see an example here). But all comparisons between the quality of hours spent outside paid work enjoyed by Americans and Europeans are somewhat qualitative. 'Sure, maybe Americans do less own work at home, but what if Europeans actually enjoy house work?' goes an argument from the Eurofans side.
Ok, so Americans do indeed work longer hours than Europeans do. The question then becomes as to why these differences arise? Economics distinguishes two sources of greater aggregate hours worked in any economy:
"We observe that in most countries the role of the intensive margin seems to be important before the mid 1970s" [which implies that American workers, on average, tended to work longer hours per person than their European counterparts not in the years of heartless Reganomics, but in the years of liberal Democrats - Kennedy, LBJ and Jimmy 'The Peanut' Carter].
"Thereafter, the contribution of the average hours per employee is very poor... In general, the two dimensions of the extensive margin have a minor impact before the 1970s. Thereafter, in all countries the relevance of the three variables is quite similar." [This shows that consigned to long term unemployment, Europeans are working less since the onset of the 1980s - precisely when Europe decided to depart from the 'American' model of flexible labour markets in favour of the socialist/welfare state model of employment].
And so, "about 2/3 of the observed fall in the total hours of market work in European countries, relative to the US, is mostly explained by the dynamics of the extensive margin (that is, by the employment and the participation), and roughly 1/3 by the dynamics of the intensive margin (the hours worked per employee), particularly after the 1980s."
I rest my case...
Great fun aside, neither Yale, nor TCD team produced much of earth shattering factual evidence to defend their arguments. Instead, several commonly held cliches, became the focal points fo the entire discourse.
One of these was the argument advanced by the TCD side that Americans enjoy lower quality of life than Europeans because the former work longer hours than the latter. It was frustrating watching the Yale team inventing epicycles to by-pass the thorny issue. In reality they did not have to do this, since the claim is simply not true.
Some years ago I worte about the matter in several articles (see an example here). But all comparisons between the quality of hours spent outside paid work enjoyed by Americans and Europeans are somewhat qualitative. 'Sure, maybe Americans do less own work at home, but what if Europeans actually enjoy house work?' goes an argument from the Eurofans side.
Ok, so Americans do indeed work longer hours than Europeans do. The question then becomes as to why these differences arise? Economics distinguishes two sources of greater aggregate hours worked in any economy:
- the extensive margin - differences in hours worked due to differences in employment and labour force participation rates; and
- the intensive margin - the number of hours worked per person employed.
- Concerning the impact of the extensive margin, the authors show that "the two dimensions of the extensive margin, the employment rate and the participation rate, explain the most of the total-hours-gap between regions. Moreover, both ratios have similar weight." In other words, Americans work longer hours than Europeans primarily because more Americans than Europeans are in employment and in the labour force. To say that Europeans 'enjoy' less work and more leisure is, according to this finding, equivalent to say that Europeans enjoy being unemployed and having no prospect of ever gaining a job in the future.
- "Conversely," say the authors, "the intensive margin, measured by the number of hours worked per employee, has the smallest role."
"We observe that in most countries the role of the intensive margin seems to be important before the mid 1970s" [which implies that American workers, on average, tended to work longer hours per person than their European counterparts not in the years of heartless Reganomics, but in the years of liberal Democrats - Kennedy, LBJ and Jimmy 'The Peanut' Carter].
"Thereafter, the contribution of the average hours per employee is very poor... In general, the two dimensions of the extensive margin have a minor impact before the 1970s. Thereafter, in all countries the relevance of the three variables is quite similar." [This shows that consigned to long term unemployment, Europeans are working less since the onset of the 1980s - precisely when Europe decided to depart from the 'American' model of flexible labour markets in favour of the socialist/welfare state model of employment].
And so, "about 2/3 of the observed fall in the total hours of market work in European countries, relative to the US, is mostly explained by the dynamics of the extensive margin (that is, by the employment and the participation), and roughly 1/3 by the dynamics of the intensive margin (the hours worked per employee), particularly after the 1980s."
I rest my case...
Saturday, January 31, 2009
DofF Forecast: does it hold any water?
I have a serious question to ask of our Government: Do budgetary projections by the DofF in (e.g those contained in their January 2009 Addendum covered here) hold any water?
In particular, no one has yet taken the DofF forecasters to a task of explaining how on earth, with projected:
These numbers - the backbone of Irish Government plans for the year - are suspiciously incongruous. Not only because they do not seem to add up. But also because we have no reason to trust DofF forecasts on the basis of their historical accuracy.
Do Government numbers hold up to scrutiny?
This week, it came to media attention that the entire Department of Finance employs only one PhD-level economist. As far as I am aware, we do not know:
Furthermore, per my knowledge, no one knows who exactly is responsible for supervision and execution of forecasting in DofF and what model is being used. Searching DofF website for Chief Economist reveals no such person. We do not know whether forecasting function is, indeed, an established and managerially resourced function of the Department. Ditto on the Risk Analysis side, which requires both an expert in microeconomic risk modeling and macroeconomic risk specialist.
It is simply not sufficient to say that accountancy or previous budgetary experience, potentially possessed by some DofF employees (how many?) qualifies the Department to deliver any sort of economic analysis or projections. Certainly not the ones which can used by the Government to argue about the need for one reform or another.
In fact, to see the absolute poverty of economic policy research output produced by DofF one should go straight to the source: here. They might as well publish these reports in Gaelic only, for no serious economist would recognize this as proper economics.
One example: in the sole document relating to economic reviews and outlook for 2008, titled Irealnd's Contribution to the Public Consultation Process on the Review of the EU Budget (I am not kidding - they couldn't even spell Ireland correctly). Here, DofF's 'Research' team devotes only 4 pages to the entire analysis of a vital fiscal policy process. The issue of EU-wide tax - something that was a hot topic of debate in Ireland throughout 2007-2008 is given 148 words! Of course, DofF gives five times this much to the discussion of CAP - suggesting, perhaps, our Finance boffins are more comfortable in the cow sheds than in the world of macro-finance and macroeconomics.
Getting basic research wrong - something that is being done by virtually all Irish Government departments on a routine basis - is a serious issue. Brandishing as a major reform a promise to get policies onto an 'evidence-driven' platform, as our Government did last week (see here: 3rd bullet point under Taxation heading), while having no capability to prepare proper economic analysis is hardly a responsible way of governing.
When even the mighty fail by poor research
Few months back, I was sent a research note from PIMCO's cult giant, Bill Gross. Gross is an archetypal salesman, in my view, who has fantastic intuitive understanding of the market (which is way more than our public sector mandarins and politicians have). This is, in most instances, sufficient to earn high rates of return and to contain downside risks.
But, it is not enough to do two things -
(a) provide rigorous analysis of your position in the market at any point in time - past, present, or future; and
(b) explain to others why your intuitive searchlight is capable of picking the right opportunities out of the mass of potential investment strategies.
Published in June 2008 (see here: those of you who attended my class last Fall in TCD's MSc in Finance would recognize it) the note contained a rant about US inflation indices. Specifically, Gross expended some 4 pages of small print arguing that
"What are the investment ramifications [of the 'fact' that U.S. inflation is closer to worldwide levels than previously thought]? With global headline inflation now at 7% there is a need for new global investment solutions, a role that PIMCO is more than willing (and able) to provide. In this role we would suggest: 1) Treasury bonds are obviously not to be favored because of their negative (unreal) real yields. 2) U.S. TIPS, while affording headline CPI protection, risk the delusion of an artificially low inflation number as well. 3) On the other hand, commodity-based assets as well as foreign equities whose P/Es are better grounded with local CPI and nominal bond yield comparisons should be excellent candidates. 4) These assets should in turn be denominated in currencies that demonstrate authentic real growth and inflation rates, that while high, at least are credible. 5) Developing, BRIC-like economies are obvious choices for investment dollars."
Lacking:
Back to DofF numbers
But I am not telling this story with some malice towards Gross or PIMCO in mind. At the very least, the man can spell Ireland better than our DofF boffins can. Instead, I am using it as an illustration as to the importance of proper research in backing any strategy - investment and/or policy-related. PIMCO's operations are much more superior to what is going on in our DofF and the rest of civil service when it comes to the quality of research and analysis. This implies that if people like Gross can get things spectacularly wrong, people that occupy our DofF - quipped with one token PhD level economist - simply have no chance at getting anything right.
Remember their latest numbers:
This spells serious trouble for the Government. Suppose that due to increases in the income tax, VAT and other taxes, the revenue were to decline by, say, 2.1% of GDP - as it did in less recessionary 2008. This would imply that tax increases will still be contributing positive revenue growth for the Exchequer, although on a much smaller scale. In such a scenario,
Add to this the fact that while DofF was basing its numbers on -4% growth rate in GDP for 2009, the economy quite probably will contract by at least 5% - balooning potential deficit to 15-16% this year.
A scary thought, indeed, because even the IMF will not lend Mr Cowen a penny with such financial performance on the plans. So much for Brian, Brian&Mary's 'evidence-based' policies...
In particular, no one has yet taken the DofF forecasters to a task of explaining how on earth, with projected:
- shrinking GDP (-€7.6bn in 2009 in nominal terms relative to 2008) and GNP,
- negative inflation (-1%),
- rising unemployment (+2.9 percentage points on 2008) and falling employment (-4%), and
- rising, not falling, Net Current Expenditure (+4.3bn in 2009),
These numbers - the backbone of Irish Government plans for the year - are suspiciously incongruous. Not only because they do not seem to add up. But also because we have no reason to trust DofF forecasts on the basis of their historical accuracy.
Do Government numbers hold up to scrutiny?
This week, it came to media attention that the entire Department of Finance employs only one PhD-level economist. As far as I am aware, we do not know:
- Where and when did this person obtain her/his degree?
- Was her/his degree in the field of macroeconomic modeling?
- Has he/she ever published peer-reviewed research in the areas of taxation and/or macroeconomic forecasting?
Furthermore, per my knowledge, no one knows who exactly is responsible for supervision and execution of forecasting in DofF and what model is being used. Searching DofF website for Chief Economist reveals no such person. We do not know whether forecasting function is, indeed, an established and managerially resourced function of the Department. Ditto on the Risk Analysis side, which requires both an expert in microeconomic risk modeling and macroeconomic risk specialist.
It is simply not sufficient to say that accountancy or previous budgetary experience, potentially possessed by some DofF employees (how many?) qualifies the Department to deliver any sort of economic analysis or projections. Certainly not the ones which can used by the Government to argue about the need for one reform or another.
In fact, to see the absolute poverty of economic policy research output produced by DofF one should go straight to the source: here. They might as well publish these reports in Gaelic only, for no serious economist would recognize this as proper economics.
One example: in the sole document relating to economic reviews and outlook for 2008, titled Irealnd's Contribution to the Public Consultation Process on the Review of the EU Budget (I am not kidding - they couldn't even spell Ireland correctly). Here, DofF's 'Research' team devotes only 4 pages to the entire analysis of a vital fiscal policy process. The issue of EU-wide tax - something that was a hot topic of debate in Ireland throughout 2007-2008 is given 148 words! Of course, DofF gives five times this much to the discussion of CAP - suggesting, perhaps, our Finance boffins are more comfortable in the cow sheds than in the world of macro-finance and macroeconomics.
Getting basic research wrong - something that is being done by virtually all Irish Government departments on a routine basis - is a serious issue. Brandishing as a major reform a promise to get policies onto an 'evidence-driven' platform, as our Government did last week (see here: 3rd bullet point under Taxation heading), while having no capability to prepare proper economic analysis is hardly a responsible way of governing.
When even the mighty fail by poor research
Few months back, I was sent a research note from PIMCO's cult giant, Bill Gross. Gross is an archetypal salesman, in my view, who has fantastic intuitive understanding of the market (which is way more than our public sector mandarins and politicians have). This is, in most instances, sufficient to earn high rates of return and to contain downside risks.
But, it is not enough to do two things -
(a) provide rigorous analysis of your position in the market at any point in time - past, present, or future; and
(b) explain to others why your intuitive searchlight is capable of picking the right opportunities out of the mass of potential investment strategies.
Published in June 2008 (see here: those of you who attended my class last Fall in TCD's MSc in Finance would recognize it) the note contained a rant about US inflation indices. Specifically, Gross expended some 4 pages of small print arguing that
- US inflation has been historically higher than measured by the CPI;
- True US inflation should be much closer to the 'global' average (including such economically stable and developed countries like Venezuela, Indonesia, Brazil, Philippines, Thailand, Columbia, Turkey, Ecuador and Vietnam - out of a sample of 24 countries chosen, seemingly, to deliver Gross' point).
"What are the investment ramifications [of the 'fact' that U.S. inflation is closer to worldwide levels than previously thought]? With global headline inflation now at 7% there is a need for new global investment solutions, a role that PIMCO is more than willing (and able) to provide. In this role we would suggest: 1) Treasury bonds are obviously not to be favored because of their negative (unreal) real yields. 2) U.S. TIPS, while affording headline CPI protection, risk the delusion of an artificially low inflation number as well. 3) On the other hand, commodity-based assets as well as foreign equities whose P/Es are better grounded with local CPI and nominal bond yield comparisons should be excellent candidates. 4) These assets should in turn be denominated in currencies that demonstrate authentic real growth and inflation rates, that while high, at least are credible. 5) Developing, BRIC-like economies are obvious choices for investment dollars."
Lacking:
- serious analysis - Gross tweaked the evidence to support his own premise;
- proper investigation of academic and practitioner research - Gross ignored the fact that several Congressional and academic investigations since the early 1990s have concluded that CPI actually overestimates the true extent of inflation in the US by between 0.5% and 1% pa,
- has missed a significant H2 2008 rally in Treasuries, Munis and TIPS;
- calling for heavier weighting for commodities-linked economies came at the time of extreme valuations of these economies (e.g Russia and Brazil both have peaked in June-August 2008), before they fell off the cliff in H2 2008;
- led to an unprecedented cancellation of dividends by several PIMCO munis funds - the first time in known history any fund suspended payouts for what is, in effect, a monthly yield-generating securities class.
Back to DofF numbers
But I am not telling this story with some malice towards Gross or PIMCO in mind. At the very least, the man can spell Ireland better than our DofF boffins can. Instead, I am using it as an illustration as to the importance of proper research in backing any strategy - investment and/or policy-related. PIMCO's operations are much more superior to what is going on in our DofF and the rest of civil service when it comes to the quality of research and analysis. This implies that if people like Gross can get things spectacularly wrong, people that occupy our DofF - quipped with one token PhD level economist - simply have no chance at getting anything right.
Remember their latest numbers:
- shrinking GDP (-€7.6bn relative to 2008),
- negative inflation (-1%),
- rising unemployment (+2.9 percentage points on 2008) and falling employment (-4%),
- a revenue fall-off for the Exchequer of just €3.9bn for 2009 relative to 2008, and
- a total revenue as a percentage of GDP actually rising from 33.6% in 2008 to 33.7% in 2009
This spells serious trouble for the Government. Suppose that due to increases in the income tax, VAT and other taxes, the revenue were to decline by, say, 2.1% of GDP - as it did in less recessionary 2008. This would imply that tax increases will still be contributing positive revenue growth for the Exchequer, although on a much smaller scale. In such a scenario,
- the net Exchequer borrowing will jump from 6.3% of GDP to 8.4% of GDP,
- the General Government Deficit will rise by €3.8bn in 2009 - from 9.1% of GDP projected by DofF assuming €2bn in savings goes through, to over 12%.
Add to this the fact that while DofF was basing its numbers on -4% growth rate in GDP for 2009, the economy quite probably will contract by at least 5% - balooning potential deficit to 15-16% this year.
A scary thought, indeed, because even the IMF will not lend Mr Cowen a penny with such financial performance on the plans. So much for Brian, Brian&Mary's 'evidence-based' policies...
Friday, January 30, 2009
Debt Mountain 'Ireland Inc'
For those of you who missed my yesterday's article in the Indo on this topic, see here. The article was filed before we had latest figures on the stupendous amount of negative net worth on Irish corporate balance sheets (here).
JohnM was right in his comment that the State has been 'dumping' risk on taxpayers. The irony is - the state has been 'dumping' risk also onto the shoulders of debt-loaded companies, households and even the stock markets. About the only segment of the population that escaped this 'benevolence' of our Leaders is the public sector. Although one must recognise that some workers in the public sector are being paid too little, given that a few of them are actually productive in their jobs, just as one must recognise the fact that not everyone in Fianna Fail is happy to support what the Government has been doing to us.
The above caveats aside, it is, thus, the difference between ZanuPF and ZanuFF that the former cronies are wearing military uniforms, while the latter favours grey suits of the civil service and bearded folks from the unions.
JohnM was right in his comment that the State has been 'dumping' risk on taxpayers. The irony is - the state has been 'dumping' risk also onto the shoulders of debt-loaded companies, households and even the stock markets. About the only segment of the population that escaped this 'benevolence' of our Leaders is the public sector. Although one must recognise that some workers in the public sector are being paid too little, given that a few of them are actually productive in their jobs, just as one must recognise the fact that not everyone in Fianna Fail is happy to support what the Government has been doing to us.
The above caveats aside, it is, thus, the difference between ZanuPF and ZanuFF that the former cronies are wearing military uniforms, while the latter favours grey suits of the civil service and bearded folks from the unions.
Mushroom Cloud Redux II
Per excellent comment (see here and scroll to comment) to an earlier post on this matter, here are comparatives for Irish Banks index vis-a-vis European Banks. The first chart plots, as before, time series of indices.
In many ways, the series do indeed co-move much closer together until about October 2008, when things are starting to go per-shape for Ireland. This trend of significant deviations in Irish Banks from their peers in Europe accelerated through today, although to see this more clearly, consider the second chart below.
If you look at the correlations between Irish bank shares and both indices, it should be pretty clear that a relatively close link between Irish and European financials broke down around September 29th and was never repaired since. (Note that these are weekly moving correlations, so that a date of 13/10/2008 corresponds to data from 7/10/2008 through 13/10/2008.)
In fact things have spun completely out of sync starting in mid November - precisely when Irish Government got busy 'repairing' our Banking sector. In fact, things got much more dramatic in terms of Irish v EU Banks than in terms of Irish Banks v EU markets since the end of December.
Overall, my strategy still stands, but it is even more pronounced in terms of Irish Banks v European Financials: "Lenihan/Cowen are about to speak? Short Ireland, long Europe"... The only thing worth examining at this junction is whether 'long Europe' might be inferior to, say, 'long US' or UK. But that has nothing to do with our Government's ability or with the topic of this post.
Update: Irish bank shares correlations with both EU Financials and EU total price index are now moving down - ca 96% last night's close (in weekly moving correlations terms) to 86% today... Watch these!
In many ways, the series do indeed co-move much closer together until about October 2008, when things are starting to go per-shape for Ireland. This trend of significant deviations in Irish Banks from their peers in Europe accelerated through today, although to see this more clearly, consider the second chart below.
If you look at the correlations between Irish bank shares and both indices, it should be pretty clear that a relatively close link between Irish and European financials broke down around September 29th and was never repaired since. (Note that these are weekly moving correlations, so that a date of 13/10/2008 corresponds to data from 7/10/2008 through 13/10/2008.)In fact things have spun completely out of sync starting in mid November - precisely when Irish Government got busy 'repairing' our Banking sector. In fact, things got much more dramatic in terms of Irish v EU Banks than in terms of Irish Banks v EU markets since the end of December.
Overall, my strategy still stands, but it is even more pronounced in terms of Irish Banks v European Financials: "Lenihan/Cowen are about to speak? Short Ireland, long Europe"... The only thing worth examining at this junction is whether 'long Europe' might be inferior to, say, 'long US' or UK. But that has nothing to do with our Government's ability or with the topic of this post.
Update: Irish bank shares correlations with both EU Financials and EU total price index are now moving down - ca 96% last night's close (in weekly moving correlations terms) to 86% today... Watch these!
Thursday, January 29, 2009
Mushroom Cloud Redux
Per my earlier posts, here are the latest comparisons between our Financials and the broader European markets.
A new dip is courtesy of our Government's 'Best 5 Ways to Ruin a Country' Framework that I released yesterday (beating the Irish Times in bringing it to public attention by some 12 hours - here).
But enough bragging - back to charts.
The first one is self-explanatory:
Mass of volatility (risk) being dumped onto Irish shares by our Government wobbling on economic crisis and banks is self evident. If the Government was really accountable for its actions, maybe investors could have taken it to courts for value destruction.
Alas, this is not how the real world works. Here, on Planet reality, Brian-Brian-Mary prevaricate (in taking hard decisions), we pay. And so it looks like we've had a bear rally and now we are back on a downward track. The only hope - it might bottom out at somewhere above 550 for ISEQ FIN this time around, fingers crossed.
It is the second chart that opens up a more detailed picture of the latest outbreak of the Irish markets disease.
As shown above, weekly correlation between Irish Financials (ISEQ FIN) shares index and the broader Eurozone markets had a series of rollercoaster rides ever since the current Government took up a task of 'fixing' our economy. In particular, Irish markets forays outside the 'No Hedge' territory - into low positive (below 0.25 or negative) correlation values implies that at virtually every point of change in the Government policy, an investor would have done better by betting against the Irish market and in favour of the broader European indices. As powerful of an indication as one can get that markets do not trust this Government in resolving Ireland's economic crisis.
I mean, how bad can the things get for a Government if selling into Brian-Brian-Mary's statements can become a winning strategy for investors?..
A new dip is courtesy of our Government's 'Best 5 Ways to Ruin a Country' Framework that I released yesterday (beating the Irish Times in bringing it to public attention by some 12 hours - here).
But enough bragging - back to charts.
The first one is self-explanatory:
Mass of volatility (risk) being dumped onto Irish shares by our Government wobbling on economic crisis and banks is self evident. If the Government was really accountable for its actions, maybe investors could have taken it to courts for value destruction.Alas, this is not how the real world works. Here, on Planet reality, Brian-Brian-Mary prevaricate (in taking hard decisions), we pay. And so it looks like we've had a bear rally and now we are back on a downward track. The only hope - it might bottom out at somewhere above 550 for ISEQ FIN this time around, fingers crossed.
It is the second chart that opens up a more detailed picture of the latest outbreak of the Irish markets disease.
As shown above, weekly correlation between Irish Financials (ISEQ FIN) shares index and the broader Eurozone markets had a series of rollercoaster rides ever since the current Government took up a task of 'fixing' our economy. In particular, Irish markets forays outside the 'No Hedge' territory - into low positive (below 0.25 or negative) correlation values implies that at virtually every point of change in the Government policy, an investor would have done better by betting against the Irish market and in favour of the broader European indices. As powerful of an indication as one can get that markets do not trust this Government in resolving Ireland's economic crisis.I mean, how bad can the things get for a Government if selling into Brian-Brian-Mary's statements can become a winning strategy for investors?..
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