16/2/19: Trump-o-rama taking a dip?

Summarizing the U.S. economic 'themes' of the last 21 years:

or put differently: 13 years of 'ugly', 8 years of 'euphoric'.

Source for the great chart (ex-my annotations): https://www.topdowncharts.com/.

15/2/19: Still Drowning in Love [for Debt]...

Debt... Sovereign debt... and Valentines...

A decade post-GFC, we are still shedding love to our overly-indebted sovereigns... so nothing can ever go wrong, again...

15/2/19: Nothing to Worry About for those Fiscally Conservative Republicans

H/T to @soberlook:

U.S. Federal deficit was up $192 billion y/y in December 2018. Nothing to worry about, as fiscal prudence has been the hallmark of the Republican party policies since... well... since some time back...  That, plus think of what fiscal surplus will be once Mexico pays for the Wall, and Europeans pay for the Nato.

Soldier on, Donald.

15/2/19: Euro area is sliding toward recession

Based on the latest data through January 2019, Eurozone’s economic problems are getting worse. In 4Q 2018, Euro area posted real GDP growth of just 0,.2% q/q - matching the print for 3Q 2018. Meanwhile, inflation has fallen from 1.7% in December 2018 to 1.6% in January 2018. And Eurocoin - a leading growth indicator for euro area GDP expansion slipped from 0.42 in December 2018 to 0.31 in January 2019. This marked the third consecutive month of decline in Eurocoin, and the steepest fall in 8 months. Worse, July 23016 was the last time Eurocoin was at this level.

Within the last 12 months, Eurozone growth has officially fallen from 0,.7% q/q in 4Q 2017 to 0.2% in 4Q 2018, HICP effectively stayed the same, with inflation at 1.6% in January 2018 agains 1.5% in January 2018. And forward growth indicator has collapsed from 0.95 in January 2018 to 0.31 in January 2019.

Euro area is heading backward when it comes to economic activity, fast.

Germany just narrowly escaped an official recession, with 4Q growth at zero, and 3Q growth at -0.2%

Italy is in official recession, with 3Q 2018 GDP growth of -0.1% followed by 4Q 2018 growth of -0.2%.

Industrial goods production is now down two consecutive months in the Euro area as a whole, with latest print for December 2018 sitting at - 4.2% decline, following a -3.0% y/y fall in November 2018.

Worse, capital goods industrial production - a signal of forward capacity investment, is now down even more sharply: from -4.4% in November 2018 to -5.5% in December 2018.

7/2/19: S&P on Irish Banks Outlook

S&P on Irish banks outlook for 2019, with my comments included: https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/trending/wU14cpHw2NfouDi3MnHVQw2.

7/2/19: Global Trade Indicators: Tanking

There is no reason to panic about global growth. None. None at all...

Source: topdowncharts.com with my annotations

Nothing to see here. Because, obviously, structurally and statistically lower growth in trade turning negative on foot of Baltic Dry Index literally collapsing over the last two weeks, while China data and stock markets signals remain negative, is just a glitch...

5/2/19: The Myth of the Euro: Economic Convergence

The last eight years of Euro's 20 years in existence have been a disaster for the thesis of economic convergence - the idea that the common currency is a necessary condition for delivering economic growth to the 'peripheral' euro area economies in the need of 'convergence' with the more advanced economies levels of economic development.

The chart below plots annual rates of GDP growth for the original Eurozone 12 economies, broken into two groups: the more advanced EA8 economies and the so-called Club Med or the 'peripheral' economies.

It is clear from the chart that in  growth terms, using annual rates or the averages over each decade, the Euro creation did not sustain significant enough convergence of the 'peripheral' economies of Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain with the EA8 more advanced economies of the original euro 12 states. Worse, since the Global Financial Crisis onset, we are witnessing a massive divergence in economic activity.

To highlight the compounding effects of these annual growth rates dynamics, consider an index of real GDP levels set at 100 for 1990 levels for both the EA8 and the 'peripheral' states:

Not only the divergence is dramatic, but the euro area 'peripheral' economies have not fully recovered from the 2008-2013 crisis, with their total real GDP sitting still 3.2 percentage points below the pre-crisis peak (attained in 2007), marking 2018 as the eleventh year of the crisis for these economies.  With Italy now in a technical recession - posting two consecutive quarters of negative growth in 3Q and 4Q 2018 based on preliminary data, and that recession accelerating (from -0.1% contraction in 3Q to -0.2% drop in 4Q) we are unlikely to see any fabled 'Euro-induced convergence' between the lower income states of the so-called Euro 'periphery' and the Euro area 8 states.

17/1/19: Why limits to AI are VUCA-rich and human-centric

Why ethics, and proper understanding of VUCA environments (environments characterized by volatility/risk, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity) will matter more in the future than they matter even today? Because AI will require human control, and that control won't happen along programming skills axis, but will trace ethical and VUCA environments considerations.

Here's a neat intro: https://qz.com/1211313/artificial-intelligences-paper-clip-maximizer-metaphor-can-explain-humanitys-imminent-doom/. The examples are neat, but now consider one of them, touched in passim in the article: translation and interpretation. Near-perfect (native-level) language capabilities for AI are not only 'visible on the horizon', but are approaching us with a break-neck speed. Hardware - bio-tech link that can be embedded into our hearing and speech systems - is 'visible on the horizon'. With that, routine translation-requiring exchanges, such as basic meetings and discussions that do not involve complex, ambiguous and highly costly terms, are likely to be automated or outsourced to the AI. But there will remain the 'black swan' interactions - exchanges that involve huge costs of getting the meaning of the exchange exactly right, and also trace VUCA-type environment of the exchange (ambiguity and complexity are natural domains of semiotics). Here, human oversight over AI and even human displacement of AI will be required. And this oversight will not be based on technical / terminological skills of translators or interpreters, but on their ability to manage ambiguity and complexity. That, and ethics...

Another example is even closer to our times: AI-managed trading in financial assets.  In normal markets, when there is a clear, stable and historically anchored trend for asset prices, AI can't be beat in terms of efficiency of trades placements and execution. By removing / controlling for our human behavioral biases, AI can effectively avoid big risk spillovers across traders and investors sharing the same information in the markets (although, AI can also amplify some costly biases, such as herding). However, this advantage becomes turns a loss, when markets are trading in a VUCA environment. When ambiguity about investors sentiment and/or direction, or complexity of counterparties underlying a transaction, or uncertainty about price trends enters the decision-making equation, algorithmic trading platforms have three sets of problems they must confront simultaneously:

1. How do we detect the need for, structure, price and execute a potential shift in investment strategy (for example, from optimizing yield to maximizing portfolio resilience)? 
2. How do we use AI to identify the points for switching from consensus strategy to contrarian strategy, especially if algos are subject to herding risks?
3. How do we migrate across unstable information sets (as information fades in and out of relevance or stability of core statistics is undermined)?

For a professional trader/investor, these are 'natural' spaces for decision making. They are also VUCA-rich environments. And they are environments in which errors carry significant costs. They can also be coincident with ethical considerations, especially for mandated investment undertakings, such as ESG funds. Like in the case of translation/interpretation, nuance can be more important than the core algorithm, and this is especially true when ambiguity and complexity rule.

17/1/19: Gonzo: Deplatforming the Mensheviks

My contribution to Max Keiser and Stacy Herbert’s new documentary series ‘Gonzo’ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lyTWT7jpCyg starting at about 14:50.

17/1/19: 2019 Outlook

My post on economic outlook for 2019 is now available from the Focus Economics: https://www.focus-economics.com/blog/constantin-gurdgiev-thoughts-on-the-global-economy-for-2019

17/1/19: U.S. Imports Demand and Final Household Consumption

A great post from the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco blog (https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2019/january/how-much-do-we-spend-on-imports/) showing estimates for total imports content of the U.S. household consumption, with a break down of imports content across domestic value additive activities and foreign activities.

Key results: “Our estimates show that nearly half the amount spent on goods and services made abroad stays in the United States, paying for the local component of the retail price of these goods. At the same time, imports of intermediate inputs make up about 5% of the cost of production of U.S. goods and services. Overall, about 11% of U.S. consumer spending can be traced to imported goods. This ratio has remained nearly unchanged in the past 15 years”.

Note: Top bars in both panels are computed directly from PCE and headline trade data. Bottom bars in both panels reflect authors’ adjustments to account for imported content of U.S. goods and U.S. content of imported goods.

The above shows that imports play far lesser role in the U.S. households' consumption than popular media and public opinion tend to believe. This, in part, explains why Trump tariffs war with China has had a very limited adverse impact on domestic demand in the U.S.

17/1/19: Eurocoin December 2018 Reading Indicates a Structural Problem in the Euro Area Economy

December 2018 reading for Eurocoin, a lead growth indicator for euro area posted a second consecutive monthly decline, falling from 0.47 in November to 0.42 in December. December reading now puts Eurocoin at its lowest levels since October 2016.

Charts below show dynamics of Eurocoin, set against actual and forecast growth rates in the euro area GDP and  inflation:

Per last chart above, the pick up in inflation, measured by the ECB’s target rate of HICP, from 1.4% at the end of 3Q 2017 to 1.7% in 3Q 2018 has been associated with decreasing growth momentum (Eurocoin falling from 0.67 q/q to 0.48, and growth falling from the recorded 0.7% q/q in 3Q 2017 to 0.2% q/q in 3Q 2018).

With this significant downward pressure on growth happening even before any material monetary tightening by the ECB, Which suggests that euro area growth problem is structural, rather than policy-induced. While QE did boost growth from the crisis period-lows, it failed to provide a sustainable momentum for significantly expanding potential growth. Thus, even a gradual slowdown in monetary easing has been associated with a combination of subdued, but accelerating inflation and falling growth.