Friday, January 11, 2019

11/1/19: A Behavioral Experiment: Irish License Plates and Household Demand for Cars


While a relatively well known and understood fact in Ireland, this is an interesting snapshot of data for our students in Behavioral Finance and Economics course at MIIS.


In 2013, Ireland introduced a new set of car license plates that created a de facto natural experiment in behavioural economics. Prior to 2013, Irish license plates contained, as the first two digits, the year of car production (see lower two images). Since 2013, prompted by the ‘fear of the number ’13’’, the license plates contain three first digits designating the year and the half-year of the make.


Prior to 2013 change in licenses, Irish car buyers were heavily concentrated in the first two months of each year - a ‘vanity effect’ of license plates that provided additional utility to the earlier months’ car purchasers from having a vehicle with current year identifier for a longer period of time. Post-2013 changes, therefore can be expected to yield two effects:
1) The ‘vanity effect’ should be split between the first two months of 1H of the year, and the first two months of 2H of the year; and
2) Overall, ‘vanity effect’ across two segments of the year should be higher than the same for th period pre-2013 change.


As chart above illustrates, both of these factors are confirmed in the data. Irish buyers are now (post-2013) more concentrated in the January, February, July and August months than prior to 2013. In 2009-2012, average share of annual sales that fell onto these four months stood at 44.8 percent. This rose to 55.75 percent for the period starting in 2014. This difference is statistically significant at 5% percent level.

The share of annual sales that fell onto January-February remained statistically unchanged, nominally rising from 31.77 percent for 2009-2012 average to 32.56 percent since 2014. This difference is not statistically significant at even 10%. However, share of sales falling into July-August period rose from 13.04 percent in 2009-2012 to 23.19 percent since the start of 2014 This increase is statistically significantly greater than zero at 1 percent level.

Similar, qualitatively and statistically, results can be gained from looking at 2002-2008 average. Moving out to pre-2002 average, the only difference is that increases in concentration of sales in January-February period become statistically significant.

In simple terms, what is interesting about the Irish data is the fact that license plate format - in particular identification of year of the car make - strongly induces a ‘vanity effect’ in purchaser behaviour, and that this effect is sensitive to the granularity of the signal contained in the license plate format. What would be interesting at this point is to look at seasonal variation of pricing data, including that for used vehicles, controlling for hedonic characteristics of cars being sold and accounting for variable promotions and discounts applied by brokers.

11/1/19: Euromoney on U.S. and Global Credit Risk: 2018 in review


My comment on key trends in the U.S. credit risk changes in 2018 and a glimpse into 2019 'crystal ball' for Euromoney and ECRhttps://www.euromoney.com/article/b1cmrkm17q1cm9/ecr-survey-results-2018-us-decouples-from-improving-g10-trend-angola-egypt-lead-africa-recovery.


11/1/19: Capital Gains Tax: Human Capital vs Other Forms of Capital


This is exactly the source of policy-induced wealth inequality in the modern advanced economies: the disparity between labor income tax and capital gains tax that (1) incentivises accumulation of capital gains generating assets; (2) increases wealth inequality arising from non-meritocratic transfers (spousal and inheritance); and (3) reduces gains from meritocratic investment in human capital.


Now, factor this into tax-adjusted returns on various forms of capital: Intangible Capital returns are taxed at a corporate tax level at below the Physical Capital returns tax rates, which fall lower than the Capital Gains tax rate. Meanwhile, returns to the [intangible] Human Capital are taxed at the rates of higher margin Income tax rates. Go figure why wealth inequality is rising (as entrepreneurship is shrinking).

10/1/19: QE or QT? Look at the markets for signals


With U.S. Fed entering the stage where the markets expectations for a pause in monetary tightening is running against the Fed statements on the matter, and the ambiguity of the Fed's forward guidance runs against the contradictory claims from the individual Fed policymakers, the real signals as to the Fed's actual decisions factors can be found in the historical data.

Here is the history of the monetary easing by the Fed, the ECB, the Bank of England and the BOJ since the start of the Global Financial Crisis in two charts:

Chart 1: looking at the timeline of various QE programs against the Fed's balancesheet and the St. Louis Fed Financial Stress Index:


There is a strong correlation between adverse changes in the financial stress index and the subsequent launches of new QE programs, globally.

Chart 2: looking at the timeline for QE programs and the evolution of S&P 500 index:

Once again, financial markets conditions strongly determine monetary authorities' responses.

Which brings us to the latest episode of increases in the financial stress, since the end of 3Q 2018 and the questions as to whether the Fed is nearing the point of inflection on its Quantitative Tightening  (QT) policy.

Wednesday, January 9, 2019

9/1/19: Student Debt Bubble Adjusted for Wages and Employment Costs Growth


Student loans debt has been steadily rising in recent years, at rates far in excess of the rates of growth in overall credit to the U.S. households. However, the data shows conclusively, that the degree of leverage risk implied by growing student debt is now out of control. Here are two charts, referencing the levels of student debt to earnings and employment costs since 1Q 2005:
Source: Bloomberg

Source: my own calculations based on data from Fred database

In very simple terms, adjusting for labor compensation to college graduates, student debt growth rates since 1Q 2005 have exceeded the growth rates in returns to college degrees. The rate of this excess, cumulated from 2005-2006 period is around 2.5 times. In other words, student debt has grown 2.5 times more than the growth rate in college degree-holder's labour compensation.

9/1/2019: Assets with Negative Returns: 1901-present [Updated]


Updating the chart for major assets performance 1901-present, based on data from http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2018/12/191218-assets-with-negative-returns.html:


This is epic.

9/1/19: Corporate tax inversions and shareholder wealth


Our new paper "U.S. Tax Inversions and Shareholder Wealth" has been accepted for publication in the International Review of Financial Analysis:


The paper abstract:
"We examine a sample of corporate inversions from 1993-2015 by firms active in the U.S. markets and find that shareholders experience positive abnormal returns in the short-run. In the long-run, inversions have a deleterious effect on shareholder wealth. The form of the inversion and country-pair differences in geographic distance, economic development and corporate governance standards are determinants of shareholder wealth. Furthermore, we find evidence of a negative and non-linear relation between CEO total return and long-run shareholder returns."

9/1/19: Banca Carige & the Promise of Euro Banks Insolvency Resolution Regime


Italy has been the testing ground for the European regulatory framework for resolution of insolvent banks for several years, running. In all past sagas, the framework has been shown to fall short of protecting the taxpayers from the risk contagion loops that dominated the banking sector insolvency resolution regimes during the Global Financial Crisis. And the latest problem bank, Carige, is no exception.

Per latest reports (https://www.ft.com/content/b9fe3384-1427-11e9-a581-4ff78404524e) the Italian Government is pushing toward nationalization of the troubled lender in need of at least EUR400 million in fresh capital - capital it can't raise in the markets. The Government is also set to guarantee new bonds sold by Carige.

Carige assets of ca EUR25 billion are set against current capitalization of just EUR84 million. Per V-Lab data, Banca Carige is suffering from a massive spike in liquidity risk, with illiquidity index (a measure of liquidity risk) spiking to its highest levels in more than 21 years:


In late December, the ECB has taken the unprecedented step of placing Banca Carige in temporary administration, with administrators given three-month mandate to reduce balance sheet risks and arrange sale/merger/takeover of the bank. As a part of this work, the administrators are trying to review the Italian Government guarantee (issued in December) that led to the Italian deposits guarantee fund (FITD) purchasing EUR320 million of Carige's bonds.  In a notable development, the purchased bonds are potentially convertible into equity in an event of Carige's capital levels falling below regulatory threshold. In other words, these are CoCo-type bonds, implying the state fund is carrying the entire risk of Carige's future capital breaches. Beyond this, there are on-going talks with the Government on the possible SGA SpA (state-owned bad assets fund) purchase of some of the Banca Carige's non-performing assets. As an important aside, the existent bondholders in Carige are not subject to the bail-in rules the EU has put forward as the core measure for reforming banking sector insolvency regime.

These guarantees, buy-ins into Carige's bonds, lack of bondholders bail-in, and potential purchases of the bank's troubled loans constitute a de facto bailout of the bank using sovereign (taxpayers) funds. In other words, the European banking insolvency regime core promise - of shielding taxpayers from the costs of banks bailouts - is simply an empty one.

9/1/19: Twin Secular Stagnations Thesis: Productivity Growth


For those of you following my coverage of the Twin Secular Stagnations thesis, here is more recent evidence on sluggish productivity, via @soberlook and @oxfordeconomics;
In simple terms, post-2008 crises, we have not recovered in terms of productivity growth in the advanced economy. This is one of the core blocks to the supply-side part of the TSS thesis: a permanently lower expansion in productivity, driven by a range of factors, including demographics and technological innovation (the nature of).

Friday, January 4, 2019

3/1/19: Happy New 2019 or 2018 or 2008...


Happy New Old Year 2019... oh, wait...


As @lisaabramowicz1 notes: "The gap between 3-month T-bill and 10-year Treasury yields has collapsed in the past few weeks and is now at a new post-crisis low." Or, put differently, the short run is the long run and vice versa. Which means that market expectations for longer term funding costs are now on par with markets assessment of the present, and the long term risk premium has been drawn to near zero. It also means that investors no longer view longer term returns as being attractive - a bond markets way of saying that any monetary policy normalization will have to be checked against the markets over-reliance on debt and leverage.

As a chart posted by @boes_ shows: the Fed has managed, so far, to completely flip upside down markets perceptions of forward risk pricing:


The white line above is the U.S. yield curve on the first day of Jay Powell's tenure at the Fed, against the blue line today.

Whether these expectations are macro-driven (concerns about future growth) or risk-driven (concerns about the Fed's capacity to normalize rates and money supply into the short- to medium-run based on liquidity/leverage/financial markets concerns) is an open question. It might be that the markets are now synchronized to price yeans the signs are pretty ugly for 2019 investment contribution to growth as well.

Sunday, December 30, 2018

29/12/18: It pains me to no end to see America being reduced to this...


I am not a psychologist or psychiatrist. I am not even a sociologist. So my comments below are based simply on my observations as a human being.

In literature - from Arendt to Kafka, from Levi to Bulgakov, from Platonov to Solzhenitsyn, from Shalamov to Gogol, from Ionesco to Kundera, from Klima to Marquez, from Kinckaid to Coetzee, from Brodsky to Walcott, and so on - a license of power awarded to one by a title or a job, by the state or the sovereign policy, by order or diktat is commonly associated with dehumanization of the awarded. In more common media and popular studies, see https://www.npr.org/2011/03/29/134956180/criminals-see-their-victims-as-less-than-human and https://www.npr.org/2011/03/29/134956180/criminals-see-their-victims-as-less-than-human the notion of a sadistic bureaucrat / soldier / officer / office holder is commonly associated with the license for violence promoted by the State.

With this in mind, in a case of our modern liberal democracies, when such violence / sadism does arise, the dehumanization of its victims and the dehumanization of the officials involved in these acts reinforce each other. Repeated on a rare occasion, such violence and dehuamization of its victims by the officials simply erodes our social trust. Repeated systemically, it risks dehumanizes our entire society, potentially creating systemic racism, xenophobia and debasement of core human values.

With a good part of the last two decades associated with a new - in nature, although not, necessarily in levels - degrees of violence the American society has inflicted onto other states (via numerous regime changes, direct wars, indirect/proxy wars, bombings, drone attacks, etc), and within its own borders on its own people (police violence, police shootings, snooping & spying on its own citizens, mass surveillance, state violence against whistleblowers and so on), the dehumanization of the American society has been growing at a frightening pace. As the result, xenophobia, anti-immigrant sentiments, white supremacism, ant-semitism, Russophobia, political polarization, and other forms of general incivility have been pushed from the extreme fringes of the American society toward its center. The values the Americans still espouse in verbal and propagandistic discourses - those of the freedom of speech, of family, of the land of opportunity, of social mobility, of competition, of private enterprise, and so on - are now coming under the pressure when tested against empirical reality.

And, as of late, we have entered yet another, even more worrying turn of this vicious spiral downward: the dehumanization of our security apparatus. This worries me. A lot. The brutality with which we are treating people, families, kids arriving at our borders with a legitimate claim to an asylum and a legitimate hope (subject to testing) for better lives is contrary to the basic foundations of the American society: its openness to others, its support for the family, its willingness to extend opportunity for betterment of self, its basic humanity.

Last night, this prompted a twitter thread from me that some of you asked me to reproduce in one place. Here it is:

I have travelled to the U.S. for 28 years now. As a Green Card holder, as a Russian and an Irish citizen, as a GC holder again. In ALL my personal interactions with Border Control, I never witnessed any non-professional, non-courteous behavior toward myself or others around. +

+ The accounts from the treatment of asylum seekers, illegal migrants, and the Dreamers are - to me - one of the core pieces evidence of how America’s institutions are changing and have changed over the years from being a melting pot of colures and ethnicities, a land of +


+ opportunity for millions of newcomers, a place where family and children are treasured to a heartless, callous, amoral regime. Here are the facts (via nymag.com/intelligencer/… @NYMag ): +

“A. Portillo, …was taken into custody by CBP in California… her 5-month-old was sick. [Portillo] was giving her baby an antibiotic but said she wasn’t allowed to keep the medication after she was detained. Her baby got sicker as they were held in “freezing” cells — iceboxes — +

+ In a different case, “the seven-year-old Guatemalan girl died of a combination of septic shock, fever, and dehydration, just hours after she was taken into CBP custody.” +
+ Yet “another young girl who fell dangerously ill while in CBP custody. The girl, whose mother told officials her daughter had a preexisting medical condition, went into cardiac arrest but eventually made a full recovery.” +

+ These are not the acts of a civilized law enforcement. These are acts of barbaric power-drunk abusers of the basic principles of humanity. That we endow them with jobs, salaries, pensions, respect & even veneration is beyond the pale for a 21st century ‘liberal democracy’. +

+ These are not even the acts of law enforcement consistent with the principles of the rule of law, for it treats legal asylum seekers - those who have a legal RIGHT to apply for asylum - as sub-human subjects. +

+ If you doubt my judgement on this, here are U.S. Congress legislators on the subject: "New Mexico representative Ben Ray Luján said the holding cells where children and adults are held are “inhumane.” +

+ Texas representative Al Green said what he saw was “unbelievable and unconscionable.” “The [ASPCA] would not allow animals to be treated the way human beings are being treated in this facility,” Green said. “To tolerate what I have seen is unthinkable.”

+ We are empowering this behavior by those representing us at the borders. Just as we are empowering the behavior of police abusers who kill innocent people with zero consequences. We are empowering them by idolizing the brutality of coercion the state licenses out to them. +

+ We are empowering them by voting for the lawmakers who can note - on the record, in the media - the inhumanity of our regime, yet do absolutely NOTHING to stop it. We are empowering them by believing that Putin, Xi, Iran, whoever else you can imagine are causing our problems. +

+ We are empowering them by mistreating migrants, including those who are undocumented, who live and work around us. Before it is too late, before we’ve lost all remnants of civility, decency, honour, compassion, we must stop. Stop ourselves, first.


I am pained by the fact that the American society has grown to tolerate such abuses of power, without demanding better from their lawmakers, their executive, their officers of the State. We are marching toward the inevitable and unenviable collapse of civility as long as we tolerate such abuses to be perpetrated in our names, in the name of the law. 

Saturday, December 29, 2018

29/12/18: Vultures, Prime Ministers and the Mud of 'Values' in Newtonian Finance


In a recent conversation with the Irish Times (https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/leo-varadkar-defends-vulture-funds-and-criticises-practices-of-irish-banks-1.3742477), Ireland’s Taoiseach (Prime Minister), Leo Varadkar, “has defended so-called vulture funds”, primarily U.S-originating buyers of distressed performing and non-performing mortgages, “stating that they are more effective at writing down debts than banks which “extend and pretend” rather than reaching settlements with homeowners.”

Mr Varadkar alleged that:

  • “…homeowners whose mortgages were sold off to such funds would be “no worse off” than those whose loans were owned by the banks.”
  • And, “he disagreed with the use of the term “vulture fund” and criticised the practices of our own banks.”

A direct quote: “I’m always reluctant to use the term vulture funds because it is a political term. What we’re talking about here is investment banks, investment funds, finance houses, there are lots of different things and lots of different financial entities there and the term is used, vulture funds. But you’ll know from the numbers that they’re often better at write-downs of loans than our own banks. Our own banks tend to ‘extend and pretend’ rather than coming to settlements with people.”

Let’s deal with Mr. Varadkar’s claims and statements:


1) Is ‘vulture fund’ or VF a political term? 

The answer is no.

As a professor of finance, I use this term without any political context or value judgement. As do Investopedia, and the Corporate Finance Institute (CFI), along with a myriad of text books in finance and investment, as do the Wall Street, Bloomberg, Reuters, Wall Street Journal… In fact, all of the financial sector. For example, CFI defines VFs as “a subset of hedge funds that invest in distressed securities that have a high chance of default”. So, Mr. Toaiseach, the term ‘vulture fund’ is a precisely defined concept in traditional, mainstream finance. It is not a political term and it is not a term of ethical value assigned to a specific undertaking. In fact, as a finance practitioner and academic, I see both positive and negative functions of the VFs in the markets and society at large. Just as a biologist would identify positive aspects of the vulture species in natural environment.

Vulture Funds are invested in and often operated by ‘different financial entities’, including ‘investment banks’. They are a form of ‘investment funds’ when they are stand-alone undertakings. Which covers the entirety of the Taoiseach’s argument on this.

As an aside, a term ‘financial house’ used by the Taoiseach is not a definable concept in finance in relation to mortgages or other assets lending. Instead, FT defines a financial house as “A financial institution that lends to people or businesses, so that they can buy things such as cars or machinery. Finance companies are often part of commercial banks, but operate independently.” 

In other words, financial organisations and entities purchasing distressed and insolvent Irish mortgages cannot be classified as ‘financial houses’, and any other classification of them allows for the use of the term Vulture Fund.


2) Can VFs be regulated into compliance with the practices other lenders are forced to adhere to?

The answer is no. 

They simply cannot, because VFs always, by their own definition, pursue a strategy of recovery of asset value, not the recovery of debtor solvency. Regulating them as any other undertaking, e.g. banks, will remove their ability to exercise their specific strategies. It will de facto make them non-VFs.

Here is CFI on the subject: ““Vulture” is a metaphor that compares vulture funds to the behavior of vulture birds that prey on carcasses to extract whatever they can find in their defenseless victims.” Note the qualifier: defenceless victims: CFI is not a softy-lefty entity that promotes ‘victims rights’, but even corporate finance professionals recognise the functional aspects of the vulture funds. VFs cannot trade/exist on the same terms of traditional lenders, because: (1) they are not lenders (they do not pursue transformation of short term funding into long term assets, as banks do), (2) they have zero (repeat zero) social responsibility (no legislation can induce them to have any such a mandate in terms of social responsibility in funding assets as banks have, because such a mandate would invalidate the VFs investment model), and (3) unlike lenders, VFs deal with specific types of assets and specific areas of risk-pricing that cannot be covered by the lending markets precisely because of the implied conflict between the lenders’ longer-term market strategies, and the need to recover and capture asset values. In other words, you can’t make vultures be vegans. And I place zero political or social value in these arguments. It’s pure finance, Taoiseach.

“Vulture funds deal with distressed securities, which have a high level of default and are in or near bankruptcy. The funds purchase securities from struggling debtors with the aim of making substantial monetary gains by bringing recovery actions against the owners. In the past, vulture funds have had success in bringing recovery actions against sovereign governments and making profits from an already struggling economy.”

What this tells us is (a) VFs pursue legal seizures of assets from debtors as a norm (in the case of mortgage holders - this amounts to evictions of renters and forced sales of owner occupied properties); and (b) VFs are good enough at that job to force sovereign nations into repayments (which puts into question even the theory of efficacy of any consumer protections the Government can put forward to restrict their practices).


3) Are debtors better off or as well off under the vulture fund management of their debts as under other banks’ management?

The answer is: it depends. 

If a debtor genuinely cannot recover from insolvency, then forcing earlier insolvency onto them actually provides a benefit of offering an earlier restart to a ‘normal’ financial functioning of the debtor. This is the ‘clean slate’ argument for insolvency, not for VFs. In order to achieve this benefit, the insolvency must be done with a pass-through of losses write-downs to the debtor (avoiding perpetual debt jail for the defaulting debtor). The VFs simply do not do this on any appreciable scale, and are even less likely to do so in the tail end of the insolvency markets (later into insolvency cycle).

Why? Because they have no financial capacity to do so. Do a simple math: suppose a VF purchases an asset for EUR60 on EUR100 of debt face value (40% discount on par). Costs of managing the asset can be as high as 5%. Cost of capital (and/or expected market returns) for VFs is ca 15%-18% due to high risk involved. The asset is assumed to return nothing - it is severely impaired, like a mortgage that is not being re-paid. To foreclose the asset, the VF has to pay another cost of, say, 10% (legal costs, eviction-related and enforcement costs, etc including costs involved in disposing of underlying property against which the mortgage is written). And the process can take 1-2 years. Suppose we take the mid-point of this at 1.5 years. There is uncertainty about the legal costs and timings involved. Suppose it involves 10% of the total mortgages pool purchased by the fund. The cost or recovering funds for the VF, accounting for compounded interest on VF’s own funding, is now EUR22.99-25.91. Take the lower number of this range, at EUR22.99 per EUR60 asset purchased. Suppose the VF forecloses on the house and sells it. Suppose the house is an ‘average’ one, aka, consistent with the current residential property price index metrics, and the mortgage was written around 2005-2007 period. This means the house is roughly 20 percent under the valuation of the mortgage at the mortgage origination. So the VF will get EUR80 selling price on EUR100 loan. If the mortgage was 90% LTV, roughly EUR90. Take the latter, more favourable number to the VF. and allow for 1.5 years cumulative asset growth of 20% (property values inflation). VF’s cumulative returns over 1.5 years are 25.06% or 16.04% annualised. The VF has barely performed to its market returns expectations. There is zero room for the fund to commit any write downs to homeowners in this case. None in theory, none in practice.

In contrast, the banks do not face market expectation of returns in excess of 15% pa on their assets, nor do they face the cost of funding at 15-18%, which means they can afford passing discounts to the homeowners.

The situation is entirely different, when a debtor can recover from insolvency, e.g. via pass-through to the debtor of market value discounts on their debt (30-40% that VFs would get in the sale by the bank), or via restructuring of the loans, a VF will never - repeat, never - allow for such a restructuring, because it results in extending the holding period of the asset required for recovery. VFs are not in business of extending, and, yes, Taoiseach is correct on this, they are also not in business of pretending.

Now, the logic of selling non-recoverable (via normal routes of working out) assets to VFs can accelerate the speed of insolvency. But the logic of selling recoverable assets to VFs only forces insolvency onto borrowers where they do not require such for the recovery. Any restructured, but performing mortgages sold to VFs will be inevitably foreclosed (insolvency created), even though they are recoverable (insolvency is not optimal). And there is nothing the Government can do, short of forcing VFs to become non-VFs, to avoid this.

I append zero, repeat zero, social impact costs to this analysis. These are, however, material in the case of mortgages and foreclosures, especially due to the adverse impact of such actions on demand for social housing, and in light of ongoing housing crisis in Ireland.


4) Are VFs subject to “the the same regulations and the same consumer protections as the banks,” as the Taoiseach claimed?

Answer is no. 

VFs do not adhere to the same regulations and the same oversight as the banks. The proof of this is the fact that Government is currently supporting legislative attempts to bring VFs into the regulatory net, aka the Michael McGrath’s bill that FG support. If the Government is supporting a new legislation, the Government is admitting that current regime of regulation for the VFs is not sufficiently close to that of the banks. If the current regime is sufficient to cover consumer protection to the extent that the banks regulations are, then why would there be a need for a new legislation?


In a summary: the Taoiseach is simply out of his depth when it comes to dealing with the simple, well-established in mainstream finance, concept, such as the VFs. This is doubly-worrying, because the Taoiseach is leading the charge to provide a new regulatory regime, to cover the areas that he appears to have little understanding of.

Per Taoiseach: “We support that and we are going to make sure that anyone who has a mortgage, who is repaying their mortgage, making a reasonable effort to pay it, continues to have the exact same protections, the exact same consumer protections as they would if the loan was still owned by the banks.”

This is a wonderfully touchy statement of the objective. Alas, Mr. Taoiseach, you can’t have asset ownership by the VFs combined with the regulatory protection measures that invalidate VFs’ actual business model. And you can’t scold the banks for ‘extending and pretending’ on borrowers, while at the same time codifying these ‘extensions’ for all investment funds, including the VFs. The cake vanishes once you eat it. Finance is Newtonian, in the end.