16/10/15: How to Write Perfect Vacuum

Here is one rare occasion where, simultaneously,

1. An academic achieves a certain degree of notoriety laying a claim to authoring just one working paper that no one have seen; and
2. An academic achieves completeness of an argument by not publishing the only paper he claims to have authored that no one have seen.

Consider the following posting on the SSRN site:

Can Philosophy Be Justified in a Time of Crisis?

Nathan J Robinson 

Harvard University

September 3, 2015

Abstract:      

In this paper, I take the position that a large portion of contemporary academic work is an appalling waste of human intelligence that cannot be justified under any mainstream normative ethics. Part I builds a four-step argument for why this is the case, while Part II responds to arguments for the contrary position offered in Cass Sunstein’s “In Defense of Law Reviews.” First, in Part I(A), I make the case that there is a large crisis of suffering in the world today. (Part I does not take me very long.). In Part I(B), I assess various theories of “the role of the intellectual,” concluding that the only role for the intellectual is for the intellectual to cease to exist. In Part I(C), I assess the contemporary state of the academy, showing that, contrary to the theory advanced in Part I(B), many intellectuals insist on continuing to exist. In Part I(D), I propose a new path forward, whereby present-day intellectuals take on a useful social function by spreading truths that help to alleviate the crisis of suffering outlined in Part I(A).

And that's it. 

Point (1). There is no paper enclosed. And I cannot locate a paper anywhere on the web. The author does not seem to have written a single published paper / article / book chapter prior to that with exception of a children's book or beyond a handful of non-academic articles on matters of interest and subject depth of the Huffington Post. The author does not seem to have any specialisation in the subject matters covered in the abstract. 

Point (2). The abstract is bold. But the abstract is also self-contained: if the unique role of an intellectual is to spread "truths that help to alleviate the crisis of suffering", then the role of an intellectual does not include publication of research on themes unrelated to the topic of "alleviating the crisis of suffering". In other words, to complete his own argument by own example, Mr. Robinson is required not to publish his own paper. Which he does. 

And the world is going gaga over a non-published and not-available-anywhere paper... Which is to say, simply, the Huffpo intellectuals go shrill for an abstract. 

Chill, folks... it all might just be a student prank, or a poorly executed attempt at discovering the next Theory of Justice, or neither...or it might just be the denouement to intellectualism: a falsifiable statement that no one will ever be bothered to falsify because... err... it is already refuted by the very existence of an abstract in absence of a paper...

But, really, can we have a paper, Nathan?.. Please, pretty?..

15/10/15: Budget 2016: Tech & Entrepreneurship Perspective

My take on the Budget 2016 from the perspective of tech sector: https://www.siliconrepublic.com/video/dr-constantin-gurdgiev-on-budget-2016-stimulating-consumption-by-taking-credit-card-on-future

And more of the discussion of the Budget from technology sector and entrepreneurship perspective here: https://www.siliconrepublic.com/video/dr-constantin-gurdgiev-on-budget-2016-stimulating-consumption-by-taking-credit-card-on-future

Thanks to @iia for hosting the event and to the Silicon Republic for putting the discussions into broader public domain.

I covered the Budget in broader setting of economy-wide entrepreneurship and start ups formation here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/10/141015-there-isnt-ireland-without-mnc.html.

14/10/15: There isn't Ireland without MNC Inc.: Budget 2016

Budget 2016 went in like a circus convoy entering a sleepy town: all pomp and all the excitement with little substance of change in tow.

Budget 2016 is a political budget and not an economic one. The point of all the smaller taxation measures in it, relating to people working for living, is simple: get those voters, vulnerable to swing Left to stay Centre. Sinn Fein got punched, few independents too; Labor got cookies to hand out. But even on this count, Budget 2016 was a fizzle of a firecracker with mostly smoke to show in the end:

1. Much lauded idea of exempting from USC all earners
2. Virtually all net gains for low income earners from this Budget do not accrue from Michael Noonan spending tax revenue or Government cash, but from minimum wage increase. Just how exactly does minimum wage hike (a mandated cost imposed onto employers - rightly or wrongly is not the point here) qualify as a fiscal policy measure (aka, Government fiscal management of the economy) beats me. Proper economics have no room on fiscal policy side for the scenarios where Government spends not its own money on stimulating its own votes. Note: Employer PRSI change is virtually immaterial, costed by the Department of Finance at only EUR7 million over full year. Where this might help somewhat is in alleviating pressure on employers to cut working hours.

Besides the above aberrations, the Budget was a net positive for current consumption spending, and was a net zilch for investment. Now, here the Government logic is completely off the charts. We are borrowing money to fund the Budget 2016 measures. And we are channeling this borrowed cash into activities that are not expected to generate a return, since these are non-investment activities. Multipliers for current consumption are miserable - most of the stuff we will be buying with the few quid we got in Budget 2016 is stuff made elsewhere and all we can collect in this economy from it is a small gross payout on labour in the retail and logistics sector. Whatever the social imperatives can be for such a 'stimulus' (and they are quite sound in some cases), it is poor economics and poor strategy.

When it comes to economics: Budget 2016 continues with a well-established theme of doing everything possible to demolish productive entrepreneurship spirit in the country. This time around, it is doing it with a flavour of simultaneously pretending that we are pro-entrepreneurs. 

Take the following post-Budget 2016 numbers:

1. Income tax: What maters here from entrepreneurship and modern economy activity is the upper marginal tax rate, not the base rate. Why? Because people do not choose to become entrepreneurs to earn EUR34,000 a year. It is that, brutally, simple. So in Ireland post-Budget 2016 we have a 40% upper rate kicking in at EUR33,800. Across the pond, in the UK, this happens at EUR59,900. Get it? Forget entrepreneurs, we are talking about school teachers being high earners according to our tax codes.
2. Dividends taxation: You get dividends on your investments (rare, but happens in normal economies). Your upper tax on these is 55% here in Ireland, whilst in the UK it is 38%. Darn, those rich retail investors who carefully select better quality long-term non-speculative shares (majority of which pay dividends). Whack them hard, shall we?
3. Capital gains Tax: We are a basket case. We have general rate of CGT of 33% which is higher than UK's 28%. We have now a new measure that allows for some reduced CGT on the first EUR1 million at 20%. Minister Noonan thinks that is a great way to reward successful entrepreneurs. In the UK, they think a reward should involve 10% CGT for such investors. For investment returns of up to EUR13 million 'entrepreneurship Island' reserves an effective (reduced by Budget 2016) rate of 32%. In the UK it is 10%. There is no CGT exemptions for qualifying investors and no CGT rollover for reinvestment in Ireland, whilst both measures are available in the UK. Case closed.
4. Capital gains structural incentives: For years Irish policymakers and Enterprise Ireland have been struggling with the fact that majority of Irish entrepreneurs opt for early exits from companies - in other words, instead of building large Multinational Enterprises, our entrepreneurs too often opt for a sale of company early on. It has been an explicit objective for Irish development agencies to stimulate growth of companies beyond certain thresholds in size in the past. And Budget 2016 just created an added (albeit small) incentive to exit earlier, rather than later (the cap on preferential rate being set at EUR1 million). Classic example of incentives contradicting objectives.
5. VAT: in Ireland, post-Budget 2016, this stays 23% and the crazy situation of charging VAT on services provided to non-VATable entities remains in place. In the UK, VAT is 20%. Thresholds: in Ireland VAT accrues for traders with revenue of >EUR37,500, but in the UK the threshold is Stg82,000. Get that, all of you self-employed and sole traders.

Of course, there is one, just one, area where Irish Government continues to impress the world: Multinationals-linked Tax Optimisation schemes. Ireland now has a Knowledge Development Box bestowing 6.25% corporate tax rate on... err... we don't quite know what. Promise is - it will apply to 'certain' patents and software copyrights. Which is just a tiny sub-set of actual business innovation and knowledge acquisition. And it is the subset that MNCs dominate. The Department of Finance estimate this measure to cost the Exchequer EUR50 million. Which really tells you just how much real activity this Knowledge Development Box is going to generate (answer is: very little) as opposed to how much of the old tax optimisation loopholes it is expected to absorb (answer is: plenty).

NY Times headline from yesterday says it all, really:

Our Knowledge Development Box is 'boxier' than that of the UK - our 6.25% tax beats their's 10% one. Case closed: MNCs win, and there is no economy beyond that which matters.

Anyone noticing that the world around us and the world inside Ireland is shifting toward supporting human capital-centric growth (yes, not labour or PAYE or specific sector, but Human Capital-centric)? Well, over 40 submissions from various bodies and individual analysts to Budget 2016 did. They also spelled out that this shift entails two key things:

• The need to recognise the risks assumed by workers and entrepreneurs working in this New Economy; and
• The need to recognise the fact that human capital-endowed workers are higher earners (not the rich, but well above the average).

People like myself have been drumming this beat for ages now. Still, Budget 2016 does nothing to resolve discriminatory taxation of human capital under the USC system, discriminatory taxation of human capital in self-employment under the USC system and broader income tax system, and it has done nothing in terms of even considering asymmetric risk loadings that entrepreneurs and self-employed carry compared to PAYEs. The Budget does help by introducing Earned Income Tax Credit to offset, partially (by 1/3rd) the glaring discrimination against self-employed inherent in the PAYE tex credit system. But this is hardly a measure to fully address the problem of the taxation system vastly out of tune with realities of modern economy.

Time to ask that pesky question, thus: Does this Government understand modern economy or do we still have leadership that thinks in terms of early 20th century proletarian world?

The sop of the 'entrepreneurship' measures unveiled in Budget 2016 is illustrative to the above question:

• Corporation tax exemption for start ups for the period of 3 years has been extended. The measure 'costs' the Exchequer EUR2 million per annum (per Budget 2016 estimates) same as the estimate for the measure in Budget 2015. Apparently, even by Department own figures, there is zero growth in uptake of this measure year on year. 
• The Knowledge Development Box - which is for all intents and purposes is about useful for entrepreneurs and start ups as the Beats by Dre headphones are to the donkey.
• The EIIS scheme to incentivise investment into start ups has been 'fixed' (by increasing company limit from EUR5 million to EUR15 million). Except, the fix addresses non-existent problem and the real problems remain not tackled. You see, you gotta be a fabled unicorn (in Irish market terms) to raise EUR15 million as a start up. Majority of entrepreneurs need far less capital than EUR5 million. So the old ceiling was not a barrier in EIIS scheme. However, EIIS is excruciatingly  bureaucratic and difficult to navigate, which it remains such after Budget 2016. And EIIS is not suitable for raising small funding that majority of start ups really need up front - EUR100,000-200,000. Which, once again, Budget 2016 left unaddressed.

And that's it. Entrepreneurs and the self-employed, high Human Capital-endowed workers, start ups, their directors and advisers, as well as their key employees - all can now send their 'Thank You' cards to the Minister for all the love and support extended to them yesterday. Or they can continue to send their business to the UK and Northern Ireland, where quietly, without labelling themselves to be the 'Best ... Country to Do Business In' the fiscal powers are trying to run a more benign environment for investors, entrepreneurs and start ups.

11/10/15: Tax Code Simplification and Deadweight Loss of Taxation

In a recent speech (see notes here), I discussed the need for tax reforms in Ireland and, specifically, for flattening of the income tax system.

Here is an interesting, albeit dated, paper on the subject of tax codes simplification as the tool for reducing the Deadweight Loss of compliance and improving tax compliance and enforcement: http://www.columbia.edu/~wk2110/bin/epi.pdf.

H/T to @brianmlucey for the link.

11/10/15: Of Central Banks and Spoons in the Arctic

Much has been said recently about the need for normalisation in the policy rates environment (in plain English - the need to hike interest rates off zero bound) and much has been inked about the feasibility of such normalisation. So the latest G30 intervention on the subject is both banal and late in timing.

But, as posted by @Schuldensuehner a few minutes ago on twitter:

Which is basically telling us two things:

1. Talking of any normalisation, given the quantum of financial assets accumulated since 2007 by the Central Banks is about as realistic as talking about mining Mars for fresh water; and
2. Talking of anything, but the Central Banks, taking up the task of providing liquidity in the current environment is about as sensible as arming an ice-breaker with a spoon: sure it chips ice, but good luck making much of a progress.

11/10/15: Equity Derivatives: Shadow Banks are Clawing Back

Remember them, 'financial weapons of mass destruction'? No, not the CDS, and other debt derivatives, but rather the equity derivatives? Here's a reminder.

Well, the are baaack... baby... with a vengeance on the short term side:

So look at who's printing the stuff in truck loads? U.S. - carry trade of the past, Europe - carry trades of the present...

And when you look at maturity profile - short-termism is in vogue:

But what not to like? Key counterparties are, again, 'other financial institutions' - aka shadow banks:

Smelly stuff, courtesy of cheap credit for the select few from the Central Banks...

Note: Source for the above charts: BIS Quarterly Review, September 2015 

10/10/15: What, When, If the $7 trillion SWFs Gorilla Moves?

Remember this bit about Central Banks' reserves taking a dip globally? And now consider this, about Sovereign Wealth Funds shrinking their income/assets. The alarmism is premature, as the article explain, since SWFs are (1) big, (2) likely to see return to inflows of funds once oil and broader commodities prices recover, and (3) longer-term investment vehicles with broad mandates. Which implies there is not so much panic looming from SWFs downsizing their holdings (selling assets).

But the key is in the second order effects: as long as oil prices remain low, SWFs are not going to be active buyers of assets in the near term (so demand base for assets is taking a knock down, currently being obscured by the Central Banks' demand in some areas - e.g. Euro area, and/or by leveraged plays and carry trades still available on foot of Central Banks (more limited) adventurism. Which means that any 'normalisation' in monetary policies today is likely to coincide with a period of subdued demand from the SWFs for assets. And that is pesky enough of a problem to worry anyone in the markets.

Beyond this concern, note two other problems arising from the current oil price slump:

1. SWFs, having parked their buying for now, are becoming less predictable per strategy they might take when prices do recover (the longer the period of oil prices slump, the higher is uncertainty); and
2. How the future balancing between liquidity risk and returns going to play across the SWFs strategy (again, the longer the period of low oil prices, the more likely exit from the oil price slump will entail SWFs pursuing less risk-loaded assets and opting for greater safety - a sort of precautionary savings motive for the SWFs).

10/10/15: Who Gains From TTP & TTIP? Not Free Trade!

For all those in need of understanding why TPP (the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement) and TTIP (the Trans-Atlantic counterpart of the TPP) are not about free trade, read this simple summary of the core argument against state-promoted trade.

Key quote (emphasis in italics is mine): "The TPP, like all other trade agreements of its type, was designed to serve the strategic interests of the governments involved, and has nothing to do with opening up new opportunities for free trade among ordinary members of the domestic societies that are taxed to finance the governments involved. There is no doubt that certain large corporate interests with political power will benefit from agreements like TPP. Large interests have the clout and the resources to change and shape these agreements to favor them. Small enterprises and businesses, and small entrepreneurs will only endure greater restrictions."

QED.

10/10/15: IMF’s Macro Data and That “Iceland v Ireland” Question, again

Recently, I posted some data from the IMF Fiscal Monitor for October 2015 comparing fiscal performance of Iceland and Ireland and showing the extent tp which Iceland outperforms Ireland in terms of fiscal deficits and Government debt metrics. You can see the full post here.

Now, consider economic performance, especially of interest given recently strong performance by Ireland in terms of GDP, GNP and even Domestic Demand growth rates.

So let’s take a look at IMF's latest economic data and revisit that "Iceland v Ireland" question.

Let;s first take a look at the real GDP per capita, setting peak pre-crisis levels of 2007 (for both countries) as 100 index reading and tracing evolution of the real GDP per capita. Both countries are expected to regain their pre-crisis GDP per capita levels in 2015, with Iceland reaching 0.17% above the pre-crisis peak and Ireland reaching 0.29% above the same measure.

We are not going to dwell on the gargantuan (20%+) GDP/GNP spread or the fact that Irish Domestic Consumption per capita is nowhere near pre-crisis peak (see here). In pure real GDP per capita terms, Iceland is doing as well or as badly as Ireland so far.

The same applies to GDP per capita expressed in current prices and adjusted for differences in exchange rates and price levels (the Purchasing Power Parity adjustment). Iceland is at 112.9 index reading in 2015 forecast, Ireland at 113.1 index reading. For 2016, Iceland is forecast to be around 117.5, Ireland at 117.8. Neck-in-neck.

However, when it comes to the labour market performance, the close proximity between two countries vanishes.

Unemployment rate in Iceland rose from 2.3% in 2007 to a peak of 7.525% in 2010 and is expected to be at 4.3% in 2015, falling to forecast rate of 4.1% by 2016-2017 before rising to 4.4% in 2020. Ireland is faring much worse. Our unemployment rate was double Iceland’s in 2007 - at 4.67% and this peaked in 2012 at 14.67%. Since 2012, the rate fell, with 2015 outlook set at 9.58% - more than double Iceland’s rate, falling gradually to 6.9% in 2020 - more than 50 percent higher than Iceland’s.

Employment rate also tells the story of Iceland’s outperformance. And worse - dynamically, this outperformance is set to continue deteriorating for Ireland. In 2007, Iceland’s total employment ratio to total population was 57.5% against Ireland’s 49% - a gap of 8.5 percentage points. This year, per IMF projections Iceland’s employment ratio will be around 55.8% against Ireland’s 42.2% - a gap of 13.6 percentage points. In 2016 (the furthers forecast by the IMF), Iceland’s employment rate is projected to be 56.5% against Ireland’s 42.7% - a gap of 13.8 percentage points.

Since the beginning of the crisis, Irish policymakers extolled the virtue of our open economy and exports as the drivers for economic recovery. Aptly, we commonly regard ourselves to be a powerhouse of exporting activities. Which means that we should be leading Iceland in terms of our external balances performance. Reality is a bit more mixed. Iceland’s current account deficit stood at a whooping 22.8% of GDP in 2008 on foot of strong ‘imports’ of capital into the banking system. Ireland’s was more benign at 5.73% of GDP. However, since the peak of the crisis, both countries achieved massive improvements in their current account balances, with 2014 ending with Iceland posting a current account surplus of 3.41% of GDP and Ireland posting a current account surplus of 3.62% of GDP. However, in 2015, IMF forecast for current account balance shows Iceland pulling ahead of Ireland, with current account surplus of 4.61% of GDP against Ireland’s 3.2% of GDP. This gap - in favour of Iceland - is expected to persist (per IMF) through 2020.

Table below summarises the sheer magnitude of positive adjustments to pre-crisis and crisis worst points of performance on all metrics above, through 2015 for both countries:

In summary: 

• In absolute terms, both Ireland and Iceland have made big adjustments on low points of performance pre-crisis and at the peak of the crisis through 2015. 
• Iceland clearly outperforms Ireland in labour market terms. 
• Ignoring the caveats on composition of Irish GDP, Ireland and Iceland perform basically in similar terms in terms of economic activity recovery. 
• In terms of external balances, Iceland currently leads Ireland, after having lagged Ireland through 2012. 
• Iceland solidly outperforms Ireland in fiscal metrics of Government debt and deficit dynamics.

The evidence above is sufficient to reject the claims that Ireland outperforms Iceland in recovery.

10/10/15: IMF: Un-Clued on U.S. Monetary Policy Normalisation

For all the positivity chatter about the return of the U.S. growth and 'normalisation' of the interest rates environment pushed into the world of unsuspecting journos by the IMF in its latest WEO Regional Outlook: Western Hemisphere, there is a nagging suspicion that something is strangely amiss.

Take the pesky problem of the U.S. monetary policy being exceptionally loose (or accommodative) since 2008. Chart below shows this by plotting a rate gap between policy rate and the 'neutral rate' with negative values indicating accommodation. Note, neutral rate is defined as the rate consistent with the economy achieving full employment and price stability over the medium term. Note also that adding in QE (over and above simple policy rate) pushes the metric of accommodation well beyond all historical comparatives in size (depth) and duration (length of time accommodation is present):

Now, naturally, one would expect these 'accommodative policies' to create a vast sea of surplus (relative to 'natural rate' consistent) liquidity (aka: money) in the U.S. system. And, naturally, one would expect that any 'normalisation' in the monetary policy would entail removing this surplus over time. Which, again, naturally, should translate into higher rates.

IMF obliges, providing us with this handy chart tracing forward expectations for U.S. policy rate:

The lift-off suggested in the chart above is rather steep and is steeper than the lift-off suggested by market pricing of futures (red line). In a sum, the chart above says: We have no idea what 'normalisation' will look like, but let's hope it will be more benign than the Fed signals and Primary Dealers Survey have been.

But here is a pesky little thing: You won't spot the same dynamics in IMF WEO forecast for either inflation or Libor rates. And the reason is pretty obvious: the more aggressive the Fed path in the chart above, the lower are growth projections in the chart below:

IMF forecasts from 2016 out to 2020 fall squarely in line with 2010-2015 averages for GDP growth (aka inflationary pressures) but are in excess of the 2010-2015 average for inflation itself.

In simple terms, despite all the talk about 'normalisation' of rates, the IMF is really saying that through 2020, we can expect the monetary environment (and with it the interest rates outlook) to be more benign than over pre-crisis average. Worse, inflation is expected to accelerate even though growth is expected to slip.

How does any of this square well with the idea of the Fed rate going to 3.75% as projected in the second chart above? Does any of this square well with projected 2016 interest rates for the Fed going to 1.2-1.3% against Libor under 1.2%? Does any of this square well with forecast inflation jump from 0.906% in 2015 to 1.404% and inflation outlook heading toward 2.322% by 2020?

In short, IMF expectations on both Libor and the Fed rate can be very tight.  Especially over the 2016-2018 horizon. If the Fed does stick to its signalled path (chart 2 above), growth will suffer relative to IMF projections (last chart above), despite already heading toward 2010-2015 average by 2019.

In the mean time, none of the IMF forecasts are consistent with Fed policies addressing in any reasonable way the built up of monetary policy excesses of the past.

Welcome to the world of forecasting after ZIRP. Shall we call it Fudge?..

10/10/15: IMF: "Honey, we've Japanified the World"

Much has been written this week about IMF’s World Economic Outlook and the belated catching up the IMF are performing to the reality of

1. Faltering Emerging Markets, but improving Advanced Economies
2. Flattening Global growth, but momentum recovery in the Euro area (that depends on the World demand for its exports); and
3. Largely still-ignored, but nonetheless hanging like a dark shadow over the IMF's forecasts, secular stagnation.

Now, with some time lapsed over all that media circus, let’s take a look at hard numbers.

Here is the breakdown of IMF changing forecasts.

First up, World real GDP growth forecasts. How did these evolve over the recent years?

Yep, that’s right. Back in October 2012, IMF was projecting 2015 growth to come in at 4.418%. This gradually fell back to 3.847% forecast in October 2014. This week outlook for 2015 full year global economic growth is 3.123%. All along, the IMF has been signing praise to structural reforms, ownership of various programmes (IMF-run programmes) and monetary policies efforts. Year after year, after year cheerleading the world to ‘next year things will be great’. Do observe how every forecast starts with the premise that "next year, there will be an uptick in growth". And the end game is 1.295 percentage points lower growth outrun for 2015 in October this year than back in  October 2012.

Guess what, every year from 2015 on, current forecast shows lower growth than that expected in the earliest WEO report containing such a forecast.

Ditto for the Advanced Economies, as shown in the chart below

Things are no better for the Euro area, despite the already low aspirations that the IMF had for the common currency area from the start:

And for the Emerging Markets - ditto.

You wonder how on earth can these 'rosy forecasts --> ugly reality' picture can be consistent with IMF ever-expanding 'sustainable' lending to the states in trouble? It doesn't, of course, for IMF growth projections simply do not support the lending the Fund is doing. Instead, it is the efforts of the Central Banks at printing money to monetise debt that make this pile of Government-backed junk 'sustainable' for now.

Now, 2010-2011 were pretty awful years overall for the global economy. Still, it managed to squeak out 4.828% average rate of growth in these gloomy days. Now, we have a global recovery, and volumes of structural reforms written, re-written and re—re-written. IMF is now virtually running half the planet and majority of Government are obligingly ‘owning’ their programmes. Beyond, we have tens of trillions of printed/minted/QEd/instrumented/engineered debt and cash instruments flooding the markets.

And yet:

• In 2015-2020, per IMF latest projections, Global economic growth is going to be lower than 2010-2011 average in every year.
• The same is true for the Advanced economies;
• The same is true for the Euro area; 
• The same is true for the Emerging Markets.

Actually, the rot has been ongoing since 2012. Here is the cumulative growth that has been achieved (through 2014) and is forecast to be achieved (from 2015 through 2020) since 2010 across the main regions:

You can’t make this up: even with the Euro area contained within it, Advanced Economies group outperforms Euro area group by almost 3/4rs.

The chart below slices the same data slightly differently, by looking at cumulative growth the IMF projected for 2015-2017 period.

Abysmal? You bet.

Based on 2010-2011 average, we should see Global economy expanding by 15.2% over the three years of 2015-2017. Instead, IMF projects growth of 10.86%. Advanced economies should grow by 7.4% based on 2010-2011 averages, but current forecast implies growth of 6.58%. Euro area economy should grow by 5.6% based on 2010-2011 averages, but current outlook implies growth of 4.87%. Emerging Markets should be growing by 22.1% under 2010-2011 average rates, and are now projected to expand by 14%.

Amidst all this, talking about Governments around the world ‘owning’ more reforms, as the IMF continues to do might be as close to Einstein’s famous dictum about insanity as one can get.

In the entire IMF review of the Western Hemisphere (that includes NAFTA states), there is only one, cursory mentioning of the phrase “secular stagnation” even though the entire WEO database published by the Fund screams it from every data set imaginable. But there are plenty of mentions in the WEO and the Fiscal Monitor and the GFSR for the need for the Euro area to harmonise more. Presumably because all this harmonisation before has not led us to where we are today - running an economy that is growing by margins statistically pretty darn indistinguishable from zero. There are admonitions by the IMF for the Emerging Markets to get onto the bandwagon of structural reforms too. Because the IMF prescriptions have worked so well in Europe, the dynamism of the continent is now overwhelmingly... err... what's the word here?... suffocating?..

Truth is, folks, we are now all Japanified. Time for the IMF to catch up with that trend and think up real reforms, such as

• Dealing with debt overhangs not by bleeding households and companies dry, but by restructuring these, 
• Dealing with slacked investment and enterprise creation not by shoving more cheap funds into the banks, but by using monetary firepower (the little that is still left floating around) to free households from debt and giving them lower taxation burdens, while providing proper risk and tax treatment of debt,
• Dealing with excessive policies harmonisation and coordination by encouraging the states to take the route to greater financial, fiscal and economic management independence, and
• Promoting not the divisive, Us-vs-Them types of quasi-regional trade deals recently welcomed by the IMF under the US-led TPP and TTIP, but inclusive trade negotiations under the WTO umbrella.

Because, as Japan's example has taught us so far, Japanification can't be cured by printing presses and fiscal stimuli. And it is sure as hell can't be cured by the IMF 'structural reforms'...

9/10/15: Subsidies and Irish Agriculture: 2014 Data

Per latest data from CSO, Net Subsidies accounted for 59.6% of agricultural income in Ireland in 2014, ranging from 105.3% in the Midlands to 40.6% in South-West.

High as a kite on subsidies, Irish agriculture nonetheless managed to improve, thanks in part to lower euro valuations, its value added relative to subsidies. In 2012 net subsidies counted for 72.1% of total operating surplus (or income) in the sector, falling to 63.4% in 2013.

Key computational definition here are for GVA (Gross Value Added) and Operating Surplus (Income):

GVA at basic prices = Agricultural Output at basic prices – Intermediate consumption
Operating Surplus =    GVA at basic prices – Compensation of employees
                              –  Fixed capital consumption
                              + Other subsidies less taxes on production

Net value added in Irish agriculture in 2014 was EUR1.463 billion, up on EUR1.316 billion in 2013.

For the politicians claiming immense importance of the sector to Ireland, a quick reality check: Gross Value Added (which includes all labour inputs and capital spending in the sector, as well as subsidies net of taxes) stood at EUR2.192 billion in 2014.

And of that, subsidies accounted for 69.4 percent of total Gross Value Added - more than 2/3rds of Irish Agricultural Value Added came via a cheque from Europe, not from customers buying the goods.

In fact, claims about Irish Agricultural Sector contribution to the economy are often wildly off the mark. Per CSO data, the highest metric of this sector activity - Agricultural Output at Basic Prices is EUR7.328 billion for the entire 2014 and of these 20% (one fifth) were net subsidies.