12/2/15: IMF's Latest Ukraine 'Package'... It's Political

As expected, the IMF announced a revised package of loans for Ukraine today. Below is the statement with some comments.

Top line conclusions:

1. IMF Extended Fund Facility Arrangement gives Ukraine more breathing space (three years at a shorter end of debt repayments) and avoids significant repayments due this year under the old arrangement.
2. Nonetheless, the new package is still too short in its maturity - Ukraine will need closer to a decade to rebuild the East and own economy, and to implement reforms, while allowing reforms to take hold and start delivering on growth. 
3. IMF funding comes with expectations of European funding and will probably (at this time it is uncertain as no details have been released yet) imply Fund participation to 2/3 of the total package.
4. Ukraine needs not more loans, but a Marshall Plan with loans:grants ratio of 1:1 or close and total package volume of USD60 billion and duration of at least 10 years. In ignoring the grim realities of Ukrainian economy, the IMF has once again gone for a political compromise instead of a real solution.

IMF statement (select quotes):

"February 12, 2015: Nikolay Gueorguiev, Mission Chief for Ukraine, issued the following statement today in Kyiv: “The mission has reached a staff-level agreement with the authorities on an economic reform program, which can be supported by a four-year Extended Fund Facility, in the amount of SDR 12.35 billion (about $17.5 billion, €15.5 billion), as well as, by considerable additional resources from the international community. The staff level agreement is subject to approval by IMF Management and the Executive Board. Consideration by the Executive Board is expected in the next few weeks, following the authorities’ implementation of decisive front-loaded actions to achieve program goals."

So the total package extended to Ukraine is now in the region of USD40 billion. This might be enough, if the hostilities in the East end in the next month or so, and assuming post-hostilities ending, Ukraine regains the regions as a part of at least some Federal structure. Barring that, if the regions gain significant autonomy from Kiev, it is hard to see how the Ukrainian economy can sustain a loss of ca 15-20 percent of its GDP and still fund the debt it will be carrying.

“The policies under the new arrangement, developed by the Ukrainian authorities jointly with Fund staff, are designed to address the many challenges confronting the Ukrainian economy. Economic activity contracted by around 7-7½ percent in GDP in 2014, weighed down by the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, which  has taken a significant toll on the industrial base and exports, undermined confidence and ignited pressures on the financial system. The economic reform program focuses on immediate macroeconomic stabilization as well as broad and deep structural reforms to provide the basis for strong and sustainable economic growth over the medium term."

It is worth noting that in October 2014 WEO, IMF estimated 2014 GDP decline of 6.5% and forecast growth of 1% in 2015, followed by 4% in 2016 and 2017. At an upper reach of the latest estimate, the Ukrainian economy was shrinking at an annual rate of 1.5 percent in Q4 2014. Which is quite surprising as prior to that it was falling by 2.0-2.2 percent per quarter. Meanwhile, EBRD and others are forecasting for Ukrainian economy to shrink 5% in 2015 (a swing of difference of 6 percentage points compared to the IMF dreaming).

Ukraine's “…2015 budget initiates an expenditure-led adjustment to strengthen public finances within the availability of resources. This required bold, but necessary, measures, including keeping nominal wages and pensions fixed. The budget is supported by revenue reforms, including increasing the progressivity of the personal income tax and streamlining the tax system. The authorities are committed to medium term reforms of the civil service and the important health and education sectors, aiming to improve quality and efficiency, as well as widening the tax base and improving customs and tax administration. Fiscal consolidation would continue over the coming years which together with the debt operation envisaged by the authorities will strengthen debt sustainability."

All of this sounds benign, until you think about the impact of these reforms on Ukrainian power base (oligarchs), and foreign investment (sensitive to taxation regime). In addition, behind the 'widening of the tax base' rests a push to increase effective tax burden on general population. Now, consider this: inflation is running at close to 13% pa, hrivna is devaluing, taxes are rising (both in terms of enforcement and rates and breadth of applications), while nominal wages are fixed. And that in a country with GDP per capita (adjusting for PPP) at $8,240.4 in international dollar terms (for cross-referencing, comparable figure is $24,764.4 in Russia). So how soon will there be social unrest boiling up?

Again from the IMF release: “The authorities are firmly committed to deep and decisive measures to reform the critical energy sector. They have developed a comprehensive strategy aiming to foster energy efficiency and independence, increase domestic gas production, and restructure Naftogaz. As part of this strategy, and to rehabilitate Naftogaz while eliminating its drain on the budget, the authorities have decided to implement frontloaded gas and heating price adjustments aiming to reach full cost recovery by April 2017, while protecting the poor through revamping social protection schemes and allocating sufficient budgetary resources. At the same time, efforts are under way to improve Naftogaz’s corporate governance, as well as the framework for payment compliance and recovery of receivables."

What the above means is that cost of energy to middle classes and above will rise and it will rise dramatically. Note two things in the above: one part of this increase will come from eliminating energy subsidies these classes currently receive.  But another shock will come from "eliminating [Naftogaz] drain on the budget" which means that supports for low income earners and the poor in the form of subsidies will have to be loaded onto the rest of the population if Naftogaz were to be a cost-recovery vehicle.

“Monetary policy will be geared toward returning inflation to single digits in 2016 within a flexible exchange rate regime. To strengthen confidence in banks and improve their ability to intermediate credit and support economic activity, the authorities are moving ahead with a multi-pronged strategy to rehabilitate the banking system. The regulatory and supervisory framework will be upgraded, including through measures to address above the limit loans to related-parties; banks’ balance sheets will be strengthened, where needed, following a prudential review of banks; and measures will be undertaken to enhance banks’ asset recovery and resolution of bad loans."

Banking reforms are desperately needed in the Ukraine, as banks are running non-performing loans to the tune of 20 percent and that is before any losses taken on Eastern Ukrainian operations and before we take out foreign lenders who face lower NPLs due to more selective lending to larger enterprises and foreign companies. But driving inflation down to single digits by 2016? Any one can pass the IMF folks a reality pill? Driving inflation down to these levels will require a massive deflation of demand and money supply. Which will cut across bot the above reforms in taxation and wages moderation, and across the banks reforms too.

“Structural reforms will aim at improving business climate, attracting investment and enhancing Ukraine’s growth potential. To this end, the authorities are advancing efforts toward deregulation and judicial reform and implementation of the anti-corruption measures.  They will also proceed with state-owned enterprise reforms, to minimize fiscal risks and improve corporate governance structures and de-monopolization."

All is fine. Except we have no idea what any of it really means. Still, major risk to Ukraine on this front is what will it do replace lost Russian (and other CIS) investments and remittances?


In short, so far, we have very little to go on the IMF latest package fundamentals, but plenty indications that Ukraine is in for some serious, serious social and economic pain in years to come. This pain is necessary. But what is highly questionable is whether this pain is feasible over the 4 year horizon of the new programme. Should Ukraine get some real help: a Marshall Plan with, say at least 50:50 grants to loans ratio and a package worth around USD60 billion over 10 years instead of 4 year loans that only shore up redemptions of other debts?

11/2/15: Baltic Dry Index: Another low...

Readers of this blog would be familiar with the Baltic Dry Index and with its importance in flagging up trends in global trade and, especially, in European trade.

Well, today, BDI has hit a historical low...

Source: @MktOutPerform

Good luck digging up any good news in that one...

9/2/15: Sanctions: "poisoning the public water supply in the hope of killing some enemies"

An excellent article on the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a tool in geopolitical conflicts: http://www.capx.co/sanctions-against-russia-are-dangerously-defeating-in-a-globalised-economy/

Quick quotes:

"Research by the Peterson Institute for International Economics in 1997 showed that, in instances where the United States imposed economic sanctions in partnership with other nations, between 1945 and 1970 they were successful in 16 cases and failed in 14 – a success rate of 53 per cent. Between 1970 and 1990, when sanctions were applied more prolifically, they succeeded in 10 instances and failed in 38, reducing the success rate to 21 per cent. ...Unilateral US sanctions had a high success rate of 69 per cent between 1945 and 1970, tumbling to 13 per cent in the period 1970-90."

Meanwhile, "in economic terms they carry a cost. …the reality is that Russia is the European Union’s third largest commercial partner and the EU, reciprocally, is Russia’s chief trade partner. Who thought it was a good idea to subvert this arrangement?"

"Economic sanctions have the same credibility as poisoning the public water supply in the hope of killing some enemies. Sanctions are not a weapon that can responsibly be used in a globalised economy."

Yep. On the money. Though I am not so sure that "killing some enemies" is even an attainable goal here: so far, sanctions have been hitting predominantly smaller enterprises (via cut off of credit supply) and ordinary people (via supporting currency devaluations). As per oligarchs and Government-connected elites, for every instance where their property abroad has suffered, there are tens of thousands of instances where devalued ruble has made their forex holdings and forex-denominated portfolios of investments increase in purchasing power. So be prepared to see more concentration of economic power in Russia in their hands over the next 12 months.

8/2/2015: Composite Activity Signals Weakening of Growth in BRIC

Having covered Manufacturing PMIs and Services PMIs for BRIC economies, let's take a look at the Composite measure of PMIs.

First, combined Composite Measure for all BRIC economies. The measure is based on a sum of Services and Manufacturing PMIs for each country, weighted by the relative size of each economy (as a share of the global GDP, based on IMF data).

As the chart above shows, Composite measure of PMI-captured activity has fallen for the BRIC group from 102.3 in December 2014 to 101.1 in January 2015. 3mo average through January stood at 101.9 against 102.5 in 3mo period through October 2014 and 100.8 in 3 months through January 2014. Since July 2013, the recovery in BRIC PMIs was weak and volatile, with downward trend setting in from June 2014.

Next, consider disaggregated PMIs for Russia as opposed to BRIC-ex-Russia:

The chart above shows the divergence between Russian PMIs and those of the rest of the BRIC group. This divergence set in in October 2013, well before the start of the Ukrainian crisis in December 2013-January 2014. Nonetheless, even removing Russia out of the equation, BRIC PMIs have slipped in January 2015 compared to December 2014.

Conclusions: Overall trends in BRIC PMIs show weakening of the economic activity in January 2015 compared to December 2014. This weakening does not remove the positive trend established following April 2014 local low in the series, but it does suggest that the recovery trend in PMIs is likely to be much weaker this time around than post September 2011 local low. Meanwhile, Russia is continuing to diverge from the BRIC trend and is showing significant deterioration in activity in January, consistent with expectations of major economic growth pressures in Q1-Q2 2015.

8/2/15: BRIC Services PMIs: Poor Performance in January

BRIC PMIs for January are continuing to show divergence in growth across the four economies. I have covered manufacturing sector trends here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/02/8215-bric-manufacturing-pmis-one-cold.html.

Now, let's take a look at Services PMIs:

• Brazil Services PMI fell to 48.4 in January from 49.1 in December signalling deeper contraction and marking fourth consecutive month of sub-50 readings. Current 3mo average is at 48.7 and this compares poorly to the already contractionary 49.7 3mo average through October 2014. January 2014 3mo average was 51.2. 
• Russian Services PMI dropped significantly from already poor reading of 45.8 in December to strongly contractionary 43.9 in January. 3mo average through January 2015 is at 44.7 and this compares unfavourably to 3mo average through October 2014 at 49.5. We now have 4 consecutive months of sub-50 readings in the series. 3mo average through January 2014 was 52.2. Overall, substantial decline in Services activity as signalled by the PMI reading.
• China Services PMI stayed declined from 53.4 in December 2014 to 51.8 in January 2015. This is the weakest performance since July 2014. 3mo average through January is at 52.7, virtually unchanged on 52.6 average 3 mo reading through October 2014 and an improvement on 51.4 3mo average through January 2014.
• India Services PMI improved from 51.1 in December to 52.4 in January, with 3mo average through January reading at 52.0 - ahead of 3mo average through October 2014 (51.1), and ahead of 3mo average through January 2014 (47.4).
• Overall, Russia (-1.9 points), China (-1.3 points) and Brazil (-0.7 points) posted declines in Services PMIs in January compared to December 2014, while India (+1.3 points) posted an increase. 
• Conclusion: BRIC Services sectors are still suffering from weak growth conditions, similar to those observed in December, with Russia being the weakest, followed by Brazil, and with very weak and weakening growth in China, set against improving growth in India.

Chart and summary table below:

8/2/15: BRIC Manufacturing PMIs: one cold January for growth

BRIC PMIs for January are continuing to show divergence in growth dynamics across the four economies, across the two key sectors, and a broad slowdown in growth across majority of the BRIC parameters. Here are some details:

Starting with Manufacturing PMIs:

• Brazil Manufacturing PMI improved marginally to 50.7 from 50.2 in December. Current 3mo average is at 49.9 and this compares as a weak improvement on 49.4 3mo average through October 2014. January 2014 3mo average was 50.3. Across the board - weak growth returned to Brazil's manufacturing, but both m/m and 3mo on 3mo growth improvements were poor.
• Russian Manufacturing PMI dropped significantly from already contractionary 48.9 in December to strongly contractionary 47.6 in January. 3mo average through January 2015 is at 49.4 and this compares unfavourably to 3mo average through October 2014 at 50.7. However, 3mo average through January 2014 was even worse - at 48.7. Overall, substantial decline in Manufacturing activity as signalled by the PMI reading and second consecutive month of sub-50 readings.
• China Manufacturing PMI stayed virtually flat at 49.7 in January as compared to 49.6 in December. 3mo average through January is at 49.8, down on 50.6 3mo average reading through October 2014 and on 50.3 3mo average through January 2014. Just as in the case of Russia, Chinese Manufacturing activity posted second consecutive month of sub-50 readings.
• India Manufacturing PMI slipped from 54.5 in December to 52.9 in January, with 3mo average through January still reading at 53.6 - ahead of 3mo average through October 2014 (52.0), and ahead of 3mo average through January 2014 (51.1).
• Overall, India (-1.6 points), and Russia (-1.3 points) posted declines in Manufacturing PMIs in January compared to December 2014, while Brazil (+0.5 points) and China (+0.1 points) posted increases. Declines outstripped increases by a wide margin and two economies (China and Russia) posted sub-50 readings. 
• Conclusion: BRIC manufacturing sectors are still suffering from weak growth conditions, with Russia being the weakest, followed by China, and with very anaemic growth in Brazil and slowing growth in India.

Chart and summary table below:

Services PMIs covered in the next post.

8/2/15: Carry Trades Returns: More Pressure for Ruble & CBR

Carry trades involve borrowing in one currency at lower interest rates (say in Euro or Japanese Yen) and 'carrying' borrowed funds into investment or lending in another currency, bearing higher interest rates (e.g. into Australia or New Zealand, or Russia or Brazil). The risk involved in such trades is that while you hold carry asset (loan to, say, an Australian company), the currency underlying this asset (in this case AUD) devalues against the currency you borrowed in (e.g. Yen). In this case, your returns in AUD converted into Yen (funds available for the repayment of the loan) become smaller.

With this in mind, carry trades represent significant risks for the recipient economies: if exchange rates move in the direction of devaluing host economy currency, there can be fast unwinding of the carry trades and capital outflow from the host economy.

Now, let's define, per BIS, the Carry-to-Risk Ratio as "the attractiveness of carry trades" measured by "the ...risk-adjusted profitability of a carry trade position [e.g. the one-month interest rate differential]... divided by the implied volatility of one-month at-the-money exchange rate options".  In simple terms, this ratio measures risk-adjusted returns to carry trades - the higher the ratio, the higher the implied risk-adjusted returns.

Here is a BIS chart mapping the risk-adjusted ratios for carry trades for six major carry trade targets:

Massive devaluation of the Russian Ruble means that carry trades into Russia (borrowing, say in low interest rate euros and buying Russian assets) have fallen off the cliff in terms of expected risk-adjusted returns. There are couple of things this chart suggests:

1. Dramatically higher interest rates in Russia under the CBR policy are not enough to compensate for the decline in Ruble valuations;
2. Forward expectations are consistent with two things: Ruble devaluing further and Russian interest rates declining from their current levels.

Still, three countries with massive asset bubbles: New Zealand, Australia and Mexico are all suffering from far worse risk-adjusted carry trade performance expectations than Russia.

The Russian performance above pretty much confirms my expectations for continued weakness in Ruble and more accommodative gradual re-positioning of the CBR.

8/2/15: Reformed Euro Area Banks... Getting Worse Than 2007 Vintage?..

For all the ECB and EU talk about the need to increase deposits share of banks funding and strengthening the banks balance sheets, the reality is that Euro area banks are

1. Still more reliant on non-deposits finding than their US counterparts; 
2. This reliance on non-deposits funding in Euro area is actually getting bigger, not smaller compared to the pre-crisis levels; and
3. This reliance is facilitated by two factors: slower deleveraging in the banking system in the Euro area, and ECB policy on funding the banks, despite the fact that Euro area banks are operating in demographic environment of older population (with higher share of deposits in their portfolios) than the US system. Note that Japanese system reflects this demographic difference in the 'correct' direction, implying older demographic consistent with lower loans/deposits ratio.

Here's the BIS chart on Banking sector loan-to-deposit and non-core liabilities ratios  showing loan-deposit ratios:

Note: 1)  Weighted average by deposits. 2)  Bank liabilities (excluding equity) minus customer deposits divided by total liabilities. 3) The United States, Japan and Europe (the euro area, the United Kingdom and Switzerland). This ratio measures the degree to which banks finance their assets using non-deposit funding sources.

Source for the chart: http://www.bis.org/statistics/gli/gli_feb15.pdf.

7/2/15: Euro Area's Debt Addiction

Europe's debt addiction in one chart: the following chart plots total domestic and cross-border credit to non-banks, at constant end-Q2 2014 exchange rates, in per cent of GDP:

Source: BIS: http://www.bis.org/statistics/gli/gli_feb15.pdf

In the above:

• The solid lines are actual outcomes, 
• The vertical lines indicate the 2007 beginning of the global financial crisis and the 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers. 
• Figures include government. 
• The dashed lines reflect long term trend, calculated as for the countercyclical capital buffer in Basel III using a one-sided HP-filter.

Two obvious conclusions emerge from the above:

1. Since the start of the Global Financial Crisis, debt addiction expanded both in the US and the Euro area, with US addiction rising faster than the Euro area's.
2. The gap between Euro area and US dependency on debt at the end of 2014 stood at a similar level as at the start of the Global Financial Crisis and above the pre-crisis level. That is despite the fact that in the US, most recent manifestation of the debt addiction has been associated with much higher economic growth and jobs recovery than in Europe.

6/2/15: Two Tax Inversions Islands

Remember Tax Inversions Islands? Ireland ≠ Bermuda?

Bloomberg have a neat reminder:

Source: http://www.bloomberg.com/infographics/2014-09-18/tax-runaways-tracking-inversions.html

6/2/15: Cyprus AWOL on Troika 'Reforms'

Yes, at some point, Troika won't be able to handle all the bad news flying its way... for now, however, a new alarm at the barbwire fence of European Reformism: Cyprus is heading off the Troika Reservation:

Whatever might have made Cyprus rush for the AWOL, I'll let you discover, but judging by the foreclosure and insolvency framework reforms approved by the Troika in Ireland, one can't be too much surprised if any country would have much of faith in Troika expectations on that front. Then again, Cypriots would probably remember how EU regulators first encouraged accumulation of Greek sovereign debt in Cypriot banks, then haircut that debt, causing instant insolvency crisis across the Cypriot banks. Why would anyone listen to the same people giving advice on 'structural' reforms next, puzzles me.

5/2/15: IMF and Ukraine: 'Scaling Back' Risk Is Real

Generally, I rarely comment directly on Ukrainian economy as was explained before on this blog. But the latest set of news is certainly falling into the category of 'big time news'.

As I noted before, IMF were in Kiev since mid-January and were going over the Ukrainian Government request for switching lending to Ukraine into a different facility (see http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/01/2112015-ukraine-requests-extended-fund.html). In January, IMF head, Christine Lagarde gave an interview to Le Monde, saying that no partner of the IMF can participate in a funding programme when some 20% of the Ukrainian economy remains impacted by the conflict in the East.

So far, under stand by arrangements, IMF committed USD17 billion in funding for Ukraine, of which Kiev already received disbursements of USD3.2 billion in May 2014 and USD1.4 billion in September. Under stand-by arrangements, funding is provided for up to two years, so in 2015, Ukraine must redeem USD1.42 billion in IMF funding and some USD9.6 billion more in maturing government debt. Of this, more than USD4 billion is due in Q1 2015. Meanwhile, currency and gold reserves of Ukraine are down to USD7.5 billion - below debt maturity levels for 2015.

Now, IMF is reportedly (see here: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-05/ukraine-allows-hryvnia-free-float-raises-key-rate-to-19-5-) "is seeking to limit its share of the aid burden in discussions on an expanded bailout for Ukraine, according to two people with knowledge of the institution’s stance, as a military conflict pushes the sovereign closer to default."

Note: IMF limiting new funding share to 2/3rds will mean that of USD15 billion that Ukraine wants to get over the next 2 years, USD5 billion will have to come from 'other' sources. If IMF were to restrict its total share to 2/3rds of all bailout money, then in the new funding, the non-IMF share will be USD4 billion. One might think that the funds can be provided by the EU - keen on partnership with Kiev. But EU talks a lot, yet delivers little. In 2014, EU Commission President, Barroso stated that the EU is willing to commit EUR11 billion to fund Ukraine over 2 years. So far, EU delivered only EUR1.4 billion in 2014 and committed to provide EUR1.8 billion in 2015. EBRD and EIB promised Ukraine EUR6.5-8 billion in funding, but delivered only EUR2.2 billion so far. Germany promised and delivered EUR1.6 billion to Ukraine in 2014 and in January this year committed to provide further EUR500 million.

The point is that absent IMF funding an entirely new programme, it is impossible to see how Ukraine can continue servicing and redeeming existent debts and cover current deficit that is expected to hit double digits in 2015. On the other hand, IMF is aware of this reality as well as of the lack of will in Europe and the US to fund Ukraine. Worse, stung by the 'partnership' with EU in funding euro area crisis-hit countries, the IMF is itching to cut back its engagements with difficult partners. Meanwhile, Ukraine has - completely understandable - difficulties pushing through IMF-mandated reforms. And to add to the complexity of the situation, the EU and US are nursing major differences in their respective objectives when it comes to what the two players want to see emerging from the current crisis.

In my view, Ukraine is now being played in the game of geopolitical chess by all sides, with the IMF struggling to remain independent (even pro-forma). The tragedy of all of this is that Ukraine is being prevented, by a combination of poor funders cooperation and ongoing conflict in the East, from actually engaging in reforming its economy, politics and society. My sympathies on this mess are with Ukraine and President Poroshenko - they got the short ends of all sticks.

Note: In my opinion, Ukraine needs a much more structured package of supports, including larger loans, on more benign terms, and grants, and over a longer horizon. In effect, it needs a Marshall Plan.