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I thought it is worth sharing few thoughts on a superb article by Satyajit Das"Debt shuffling will be a self-defeating exercise" in July 12 Financial Times (sorry - no link) concerning the European bailout fund. All quotes are from the article, with some of my additions/explanations etc.
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) “…structure echoes the ill-fated collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) and structured investment vehicles (SIVs). …In order to raise money to lend to finance member countries as needed, the EFSF will seek the highest possible credit rating – triple A. But the EFSF’s structure raises significant doubts about its creditworthiness and funding arrangements…”
The €440bn bailout fund created a SPV, “backed by individual guarantees provided by all 19 member countries. …The guarantees are not joint and several…”
This means that SPV – an insurance fund against sovereign defaults – is in the need of an additional insurance mechanism against the risk that one or more of the funders fail to pay up into the EFSF. This is achieved by “…a surplus ‘cushion’, requiring countries to guarantee an extra 20% above their ECB contributions.”
One point, not mentioned to Das is that this ‘cushion’ fund is itself subject to risk as a call on the ‘cushion’ will require some states near default to supply even more funding to the fund. In other words, to any of the PIIGS participating in supporting one of their fellow member states, the cost of the EFSF bears a 20% premium reflective of the ‘cushion’. Just how this is going to be feasible for severely financially stretched states remains to unknown. Take one example – for Ireland this would mean that our €5bn exposure to the EFSF is, in reality, a €6bn exposure.
Das focuses on the overall risk transfer within the EFSF arrangement, saying that the ‘cushion’ “is similar to the over-collateralisation used in CDOs to protect investors in higher quality triple A rated senior securities.”
Das puts some numbers on this: “If 16.7% of guarantors (20% divided by 120%) are unable to fund the EFSF, lenders to the structure will be exposed to losses. Coincidentally, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland happened to represent around this proportion of the guaranteed amount. If a larger eurozone member, such as Italy, also encountered financial problems, then the viability of the EFSF would be in serious jeopardy.”
There are other problems with the EFSF. Das notes the issue of ratings migration – the situation where if one eurozone member state experiences problems, then the ‘cushion’ will suffer to the proportion of that member state contribution to EFSF, thus reducing overall insurance pool and adversely affecting overall EFSF ratings.
There is an added and much more severe problem here that no one dares to talk about. If one of the PIIGS experiences problems contributing to the EFSF, then other eurozone states with tight borrowing constraints might have an incentive to ‘run on the bank’, attempting to hover up EFSF funds before they are depleted while simultaneously withholding all contributions to IFSF. First mover advantage here will guarantee a payoff, while staying on the sidelines guarantees at least an up to 120% hit on the member state own funding.
As Das correctly points, “any ratings downgrade would result in mark-to-market losses to investors. …Given the precarious position of some guarantors and their negative ratings outlook, at a minimum, the risk of ratings volatility is significant. This means that investors may be cautious about investing in EFSF bonds and, at a minimum, may seek a significant yield premium. The ability of the EFSF to raise funds at the assumed low cost is not assured.”
So the problem then is that from a political standpoint, EFSF might be borrowing in the markets at 3.5-4%, while lending out to PIIGS at 5%. Should interest rates rise, or inflation tick up, or Euro devaluation continues, the net of costs safety band of 75-125bps can be exhausted very quickly. As the safety band is being eroded, the pressure on triple A ratings will rise, triggering the need for further insurance provisioning. Which can, in turn, put pressure on the troubled states to cut provisions for the EFSS. The EFSF will then turn into a loss-making subsidy generator to the PIIGS.
Germans won’t be too happy to see this. The noises from Germany – the main underwriter of the EFSF will put added pressure on the PIIGS to act fast, increasing a probability of a run on EFSF and triggering ratings pressures once again. Notice that to get to this point won’t require an actual run on the fund – a simple rise in the probability of a run will do the damage.
Das’ superb analysis comes at the end of his article (emphasis is mine):
“Major economies have over the last decades transferred debt from companies to consumers and finally onto public balance sheets. A huge amount of securities and risk now is held by central banks and governments, which are not designed for such long-term ownership of these assets. There are now no more balance sheets that can be leveraged to support the current levels of debt.
The effect of the EFSF is that stronger countries’ balance sheets are being contaminated by the bail-out. Like sharing dirty needles, the risk of infection for all has drastically increased.
The reality is that a problem of too much debt is being solved with even more debt.
The EFSF …may be self defeating and unworkable. The resort to discredited financial engineering highlights the inability to learn from history and the paucity of ideas and willingness to deal with the real issues.”
Of course, much of this criticism is pretty close to heart for Nama - an SPV with even lesser transparency, accountability and capability of management. Irony has it, the SPV has no insurance 'cushion' provisions and instead becomes a direct liability of the Irish state as its guarantor. Then again, we already know this much...
Using the same data as in the previous post on car registrations (see here), let’s take a look at the underlying demand for cars and see if this year’s increase in new car registrations is really driven by the scrappage scheme or by the ‘vanity’ effects of 2010 license plates. To do this, I separated cars that belong to a luxury segment (priced above €45,000) from other new cars.
Since demand for luxury cars should be less elastic with respect to scrappage scheme, we can treat the number of new vehicles registered in this category of prices as being a control group – the group that would have seen its demand rising pretty much independent of the scrappage scheme.
The >€45,000 vehicles control group is strongly robust as an instrument for overall demand over 2006-present, as shown by correlations in levels and yearly changes, reported in the table below. As the first chart below shows, this strong correlation became somewhat reduced during the recession, with luxury cars sales suffering more pronounced declines in absolute levels of sales: and in year on year changes in levels of sales:
However, as the last chart above shows, luxury vehicles have posted a more significant rise in year on year changes in sales over 2010, than their more price elastic (and thus scrappage scheme elastic) counterparts.
So I estimated two structural relationships between levels and yearly changes in car sales, shown in the two charts below: Notice high coefficients of determination, signalling high explanatory power of the ‘vanity’ effect (sales of luxury vehicles) on overall sales (sales of cheaper vehicles). Given that the demand for cars around January of each year has nothing to do with actual fundamentals-driven demand, tending to follow instead the pinned up demand in realisation of the ‘vanity’ plate effects, these relationships provide an estimate of the ‘vanity’ effects on overall demand for new cars.
A snapshot of the 2010 data here: Removing this effect from the sales of new cars, table below shows clearly that vanity effects accounted for more cars sold in all months of 2010 so far. In other words, scrappage scheme introduction, alongside all other factors (such as significant depreciation of older vehicles, increases in family sizes, etc during 2008 and 2009 crisis years) have been responsible for lesser number of car sales than the ‘vanity’ effect of having a 2010 license plate. Of course, this is not a perfect estimate, but the persistency with which the numbers come out to show the power of the completely silly license plates vanity ‘competition with the Joneses’ is frightening. Oh, and it does show that the Government didn’t really ‘save our auto retail industry’, but rather once again helped inflating the artificial demand.
I trawled through the CSO database on vehicles registration, trying to find some information concerning the efficiency of our emissions-reducing policies on taxation of vehicles and found some pretty interesting results. Here are the latest charts, for the data ending June 2010.
The first chart above shows all passenger vehicles registered (new and used) on a monthly basis. It clearly highlights the fact that our license plates act as a major vanity point. There are severe peaks in January each year, followed by more demand-driven local peaks in May-July (as families prepare for vacations). It is also interesting to note that despite the scrappage scheme and the psychologically significant change to ‘10’ plates, January 2010 was still posting fewer vehicles registrations than January 2009. Instead, what is significant in 2010 is the return of March local peak – a feature of 2006-2007.
There is a clear and strong dominance of demand for diesel engines, compared with petrol. This trend started in July 2007 – a year ahead of the new taxation system based on emissions was introduced.
And the ‘vanity effect’ is even more evident in new vehicles registrations (chart below):
Chart above clearly shows lack of demand for alternative fuel vehicles. It also shows that prior to 2010, peak demand months for cars was not coincident with peak demand for alternative fuel vehicles, suggesting different structure of the market for normal passenger vehicles when compared to alternative fuel vehicles. However, the data is still thin on alternative vehicles, as their sales prior to the recession are extremely thin. Finally, an interesting feature of this data suggests that during the recession, demand for alternative vehicles has been slightly more robust than for ordinary types of vehicles. This is most likely due to demographic of purchasers – more urban, professional, more secure in their jobs consumers of alternative fuel vehicles are also more likely to weather the recession with greater confidence than the general population. (Note of caution: given the short term horizon of this data, and low levels of alternative vehicles sales, these points are ‘educated guesses’ rather than hard evidence).
Diesel vehicles make up the vast majority of eco-friendlier Band A vehicles in Ireland, while heavily subsidised alternatives are lagging well behind petrol engines in comprising ecologically cleaner segment of Band A vehicles. As a driver of a mid-size diesel with emissions equal to a smaller and less comfortable Toyota Pious (ooops… Prius), I am can testify to the fact that our Government policies currently reward vehicles few of us want to drive, yet which pollute as much as (or as little) as vehicles people actually choose. It does seem to me that should Ireland’s Greens pursue in earnest their objective of cutting emissions, they should provide better incentives to cleaner diesel technologies.
Notice that a greater proportion of the diesel engines registered in 2010 are Band A emissions, compared to all alternative fuels (hybrids etc) combined. In proportional terms, hybrids etc are less emissions-reducing than the average new vehicle registered, while diesels are more emissions abating. This is a new trend since January 2010 and most likely reflects two changes in demand and supply: firstly, there is a new generation of diesel vehicles coming into the market, and second, there demand has shifted in favour of smaller (and cheaper) diesel vehicles (a recession effect?).
Two charts below plot 12 manufacturers that supply the largest share of Band A vehicles relative to their overall cars supply to the market in Ireland. The rankings are dominated by smaller engine diesel suppliers. Chart below breaks down alternative fuel vehicles (including hybrids) into new vehicles purchased and used vehicles purchased. It clearly shows that for now, sales of alternative fuel vehicles are dominated by new car purchases, which, of course, means that our drivers of these vehicles are years away from realising real net emissions savings. Remember, production of every new car requires serious emissions, so unless a new car is driven significant number of miles, buying a used car in place of the new one is actually contributing less emissions, especially if the used car belongs to the same emissions band category as the new one. Thus, once again, economic efficiency argument suggests that incentives for purchase of new lower emissions vehicles should be extended to cover used lower emissions vehicles as well.
Chart below shows the demise of the petrol engine and the rise of diesel engine during the current recession. It also shows a relatively flat trend for alternative fuel vehicles. However, the alternative fuel vehicles trend line remains upward sloping through the current economic crisis. The really amazing figure is the following one. As can be seen from the chart below, even petrol-fuelled vehicles in Band A category are more prevalent than all alternative fuels vehicles, and the trend is so far driving this difference even further. Once again, a more efficient (from economics) perspective means for reducing Irish motors-related emissions is to have incentives for buying lower emissions vehicles. Not those run on alternative fuels, but ones run on diesel and petrol. As long as they fit into Band A…
The dogs are barking across Dublin’s RDS. Touring the USofA, our Taoiseach has told the nation that AIB may (oh, just ‘may’?) need further state support to meet new capital targets. That admission, of course, comes after the solemn statement by Minister Lenihan back in March that the announced measures to provide capital to AIB and BofI were final. And on the heels of numerous assertions by our banks’ cheerleaders squad in Dublin’s stockbrokerage houses that AIB will be able to raise capital on its own accord, once the taxpayers pay through the nose for ordinary shares in the bank in round 3 of recapitalisations.
Well, taxpayers did pay through the nose. And AIB still needs more than €7 billion – based on status quo scenario concerning loans quality. Should it see continued deterioration in loans going forward from Q1 2010, the bank will need more than that. How much more? Anybody’s guess. But that open ended nature of AIB’s liabilities won’t hold back our nation’s leader. Last night, Brian Cowen pledged an open ended support to AIB saying that AIB “may need some help, but we will provide that”. How much will Brian be ready to ‘provide’? Not a single word. There is no stop-loss rule operating for this Government. Then again, we know as much from the Government treatment of the Anglo.
And while on the matters of Taoiseach tour of the US, unable to sell the idea that Ireland has turned economic ’corner’ on the recession, our leader is meeting some pretty important people. NYSE CEO Duncan Niederauer and NYC mayor Michael Bloomberg are on the list of those who need to be wooed into ‘Green Jersey’ club. Presumably, they’d love to send some of their companies (listings and HQs) down to the Emerald Isle, but need Taoiseach to convince them.
Messrs Bloomberg and Niederauer will have to be satisfied with playing the second fiddle in Mr Cowen’s sonorous opus ‘Turning Over, Again’. Per Taoiseach: "The first objective will be to give a clear message to key media outlets, business figures and opinion formers that Ireland has turned the corner…"
In other words, accustomed to his own PR hype, economic management is all in the media reporting for Mr Cowen. That, plus what’s being said at business lunches and social dinners in Manhattan. In other words, if the foreigners – especially the important ones – can be made believe things are good back in Auld Dublin, then surely they must be good.
No? Who says so? Oh, those pesky 450,000 unemployed and underemployed back in Ireland? Well, we’ll have jobs for them in no time, once Micheal O'Blumberg and Duncan MacNiedehan send their NYC 'investitors' over to Upper Merrion Street to buy some of those banks shares. After all, Bertie Ahearn thinks they should be a bargain at €5 each, while with Brian Cowen's latest unconditional pledge to plug AIB's capital hole no matter what, Bertie might just be right...
But just in case you think it’s all about Brian Cowen telling the Americans how to properly read our economic stats and banks balance sheets to discern the ‘turnaround’, think twice. Per Reuters report: “Mr Cowen said he will also ask for advice from business and political leaders on how Ireland can continue its fight against the recession and create jobs.”
Oh, wait – what recession? Didn’t we turn that corner?
Does anyone find this a little bit strange? We have an elected leader of the nation whose job description is to govern the state going over to the US to 'ask business leaders for an advice' on how to do his job?
Then again, our Taoiseach can boast of his policies getting us out of the recession. So why would he ask foreigners to provide him with their own ‘get out of recession’ ideas? May be, its because he really hasn’t a policy himself or he might need external validation for his policy of having no policy, or may be it is both. You tell me. But it does seem a bit uncomfortable, in aesthetic terms, to see our head of state travelling to the US to ‘consult’ foreign business leaders on how to solve our problems. I can’t imagine Angela Merkel or Nicolas Sarkozy doing the same. At least, not in front of the media…
An interesting set of revelations from Toyota (hat tip to Seeking alpha post on this) – the most advanced electric and hybrid vehicles producer in the world and one of the largest producers of car batteries (post-acquisition of 80.5% stake in Panasonic EV Energy). See their site (here).
The range of the plug-in electric vehicle motor: Toyota is preparing to test PHV-13 for its delivery to the markets in 2012. PHV-13 will have a 13 miles-range electric drive. Why so little? Toyota explains: "… the smaller the battery in a PHV the better, both from a total lifecycle assessment (carbon footprint) point of view, as well as a cost point of view."
You’d think that electric vehicles are supposed to provide a meaningful replacement for hybrids, according to Irish Government-ESB plans? Think again. Don’t even try to reach DublinAirport from your Foxrock house in one of these.
Certainty of success in deploying electric plug in vehicles: recall that Toyota already has 2 million hybrid-electric vehicles running around the world. Yet, Toyota, with all its experience, doesn't believe it knows enough about electric vehicles: "The [electric plug in] Prius PHV will come to market in 2012. The PHV demonstration program [starting in 2010] is designed to gather real world driving data and customer feedback on plug-in hybrid technology. In addition, the program will confirm the overall performance of the first-generation lithium-ion battery technology ..." So Toyota wants to make sure it can meet customers’ demands and satisfy their needs. No such caution for the Irish Government that is putting all its faith and a hell of a lot of taxpayers’ cash into electric vehicles and ESB.
extent of plug in vehicles usability:here’s another interesting bit from Toyota – emphasis is mine: “Toyota believes that PHVs can be part of a solution to climate change and for energy security, for certain customers, in certain geographic areas, with certain grid-mixes, with certain drive-cycles, and with access to charging. There will be an important role for PHVs, but it will not be in high volume until there are significant improvements in overall battery performance…and battery cost reduction.”
Err… what was that? But what about Irish Government plans for large-scale switch to electric vehicles in Ireland? Have Toyota heard Minister Ryan speaking on Prime Time about his dreams? May be the Japanese manufacturer can do with a dose of our Green Optimism? Ironically, Richard Tol from the ESRI appearing on the aforementioned programme clearly warned that Minister’s plans for electric car fleets in Dublin will require massive breakthroughs in battery technology.
Cost of technology: Lastly, we are being told that Ireland’s electric vehicles fleets of the future will be powered cheaply (by ESB’s second highest cost electricity in Europe, one presumes). But Toyota guys are not so sure. Again from the Prius PHV site: "During [2009] testimony [at the National Academy of Science in Washington, D.C.] …Toyota said …that the very rough estimate was approximately $1200 per KWH for a complete pack ... Significant reductions in cost will require major technological breakthroughs."
Hmm… so are we going to get cheap and clean electric vehicles in Ireland? According to the world leader in this technology, the 2012 generation of electric vehicles is likely to be about 2-3 times more expensive than running a mid-range Beemer or a Merc. And that’s before we factor in our ESB’s tariffs and the cost of infrastructure to deliver their electricity to the cars’ batteries… dream on, man, of those Green pastures…
Something fishy is going on at the ECB. Having all but destroyed its own reputation (for the n-teenth time), the ECB has swung into its usual modus operandi – ‘We are tightening, tightening no matter what!’ First, in the face of clearly sluggish writedowns by the Euro zone banks, the ECB decided to close its longer-maturity lending window. Despite a clear warning from the Bank for International Settlements stating that there is a worldwide rising risk of a severe maturity mismatch on banks balancesheets.
Now, the ECB is signalling that it will cut government bond purchases – just in time for euribor climbing up and sovereign spreads shooting past their pre-Greek crisis highs. Last Friday, Jürgen Stark said that declining scale of the ECB’s bond markets interventions reflects improving market environment for sovereign bonds. In May the ECB was hovering ca €33bn in bonds per month, last week this has fallen back to €16bn in monthly purchase rates. “If the situation improves further, then there is no need to continue [with bonds purchases]”, he told FT.
Funny thing, the IMF has just urged the ECB not to discontinue bond purchases. But, to Mr Stark “The IMF has not caught up with the reality in Europe.” Oh, poor IMF, apparently a quick reprieve in some credit default swap indices last week (e.g. Markit iTraxx Financial, down 25bp, its largest decline in two months) is not exactly convincing for the IMF as far as prognosis of markets confidence in Europe goes. It looks like either the ECB is betting a house on its own forecasting prowess or setting itself up for another ‘Fool’s stumble’ through monetary policy. Expect bond purchases to resume once the summer is over and the markets re-open for business.
Oh, and just in case you might think that the IMF is really not getting the ECB’s “Europe is Great” vision, here’s the note from the WSJ blog (here) which shows that the ECB will be facing not just a steep sovereign bonds purchase curve, but will be getting more of the Euro area dodgy collateral into its vaults very soon. Apparently, the rest of 2010 through 2011, Euro area banks are facing a mind-blowing level of debt refinancing – the whooping €1.65 trillion worth of stuff. Don’t think they’ll be highlighting that in the shambolic stress-testing PR exercises that will be released July 23. I wrote about Euro zone’s banks propensity to stick their heads into sand when it comes to recognizing loans losses. But now, it also looks like they are doing the same with their funding sources – a dangerous game given the direction in which borrowing rates are going (see my earlier post on euribor).
Here is a nice pic I reproduced from the IMF GFSR database showing those dogs. The tail is wagging, noses are wet, barking mad… furry friends of ECB’s discount window.
I know, I know – Stark would say that the WSJ also ‘doesn’t get Europe’s great progress to prosperity’. But the little problem is – if the banks are to refinance these borrowings at current rates, between 2010 and 2015, Europe’s borrowers, consumers and investors will have to come up with a whooping €152-187 billion worth of interest rate cover. Yes, that’s right – while ECB is playing an outright silly game of ‘We are tough and things are great’, European economies will have to deliver almost 2% of their domestic output to plug interest rate hole alone.
But do not worry, the stress tests deployed by Europe are not designed to reckon with reality – they are simply a PR exercise. How else can one see a test that prices Greek default losses at 10% and Spanish at 3%, when the markets are pricing these at 4 times higher. Or how does one really test the banks if there are no scenarios for loans defaults and/or yield curve tests for debt refinancing?
If you need an indication just how shambolic these tests are, look no further than banks actions in refinancing markets over the last week. Clearly fearing that the investors might, just might, come to their senses and label the whole stress testing a farce, Euro banks have gone aggressively into the markets to raise €18.4bn worth of bonds last week, up from €4.8bn a week before. Do you think they are doing this because of cheaper cost of finance? Not really, costs remain high, though they are off their June peaks. So they are doing this only because they anticipate further increases in the cost going forward.
Yet, the ECB is drumming up the beat that the stress tests will reveal Euro area banks to be well-capitalized (haven’t we heard this before in Ireland? Ca 2008 from our own CB?). So the banks do not believe that the stress tests, which they all pretty much have passed already, per ECB assertions, are going to reduce risks perceptions in the markets. Why would that be the case, if the tests were honestly designed to really test their balancesheets? Last week’s survey of money managers by US-based Ried Thunberg ICAP found that 95% of the 22 survey respondents (controlling $1.39 trillion in assets) said most major European banks will receive positive test ratings.
Hmm… that, I would say, is a darn good evidence that the tests might be rigged. In which case, prepare for a rally in the banks that will turn South as soon as serious analysis of the tests assumptions comes through.
Nama New Business Plan (NBP) was published and it took me some time to dust out my old models and run through the numbers.
Let’s put it in simple terms – Nama’s latest installment in its own version of the hall of mirrors is so distorting, when it comes to representing the reality, that even a person with no education in finance would see that it simply a cover up for a scam.
Here are some points worth mentioning before we depart on the journey through numbers
NBP contains no Profit & Loss or cash flow projections. For an undertaking committing between €38.5-40.5 billion of taxpayers cash, this is simply remarkable (arrogance? Or negligence? You decide
NBP contains even fewer financial details than its old plan. The only relevant piece of new information it contains that has not been disclosed before is in the table 4 on page 25, which, given that no specific cash flow estimates linked to annual operation is provided, is a complete hearsay – or in scientific terms – an unfalsifiable conjecture. In common terms, it is known as bullsh*t
NBP states (then rolls this statement into core assumption) that 25% of loans taken over in Tranche 1 are ‘income producing’. It does not explain the extent of this ‘income’ being generated in relation to the value of the loans. Let me explain – suppose I take out a loan for €100mln at 5% per annum. My payment on interest should be €5mln per annum. Barring capital repayment, if I pay my bank €4,999,999 a year, I am in arrears and the loan is not performing. But if I pay Nama €1.00, it is an ‘income producing’ loan. Get my example? In other words, it is a leap of faith to assume that 25% ‘income producing’ loans is the same as 25% ‘performing loans’
NBP states: “the actual LTV ratios that have become evident during the Tranche 1 due diligence process have been higher than those indicated by institutions last autumn”, but never explains by how much. This is critical, since LTVs underpin the expected recovery rate in case of asset liquidation. Suppose Nama takes on a loan for €100mln that is secured against a property worth (at the time of loan issuance) €120mln to LTV of 83%. Suppose that underlying asset deteriorated in value by 60% since loan issuance and that in the long run, it is expected to appreciate by 20% to LTEV of €57.6mln. Foreclosing on this loan will mean a recovery rate of 57.6%. However, were the LTV at loan issuance at 90%, the recovery rate drops to 52.8%.
NBP omits any provisions for rolled up interest on the developers’ loans. At €81 billion face value, and taking average retail interest rates for 2004-2007 reported by the CB, we are looking at €18.8 billion of foregone interest – a direct subsidy from taxpayers to developers. In arriving at this number, I used loans depreciation schedule provided in Nama new plan page 10, the average charged rate of 4.7% (assume static over 2011-2018, despite the fact that one can safely assume that this cost of capital is (a) too low, given Irish Exchequer is borrowing currently at 5.4% and (b) is likely to rise in time with upward sloping yield curve).
Nama makes an implicit assumption that it can dispose of all properties held by it at the peak of their Long Term Economic Value. This requires something that no one in the world, short of God, possesses: (a) perfect foresight, (b) ability to fully control disposal markets and (c) incur no cost of disposal. Clearly, this assumption is simply a sign of deeply rooted inability of Nama staff and directors to think straight through their own effective costs and valuations
NBP makes no provision – at all – for the cost of ECB-linked financing of the bonds, which will have to incur the cost of at least 1% in monetization. This will add up, for the life time of Nama (again, using Nama own depreciation schedule mentioned above) to the total subsidy to the banks from taxpayers to the tune of €2.4 billion.
“The fees that NAMA will pay over its expected ten-year life amount to about €1.6 billion. A breakdown of the 2011 budget shows that a significant proportion of these fees will be incurred as payment to the participating institutions to administer loan assets on NAMA’s behalf. It is likely that there will also be significant fees incurred arising from enforcement.” Yet, in the actual estimates on page 25, Nama plan allows for just €2.5bn, in the worst case scenario, in total for the costs of its own operations, banks’ fees on administration of loans, for all legal fees to be incurred by it and all other expenses. This rises to €4.8bn in the best-case scenario. Nama already employs almost 90 officers, not counting various board members and an army of consultants. These alone will be swallowing around €250mln in salaries and perks. Legal costs can be safely put to equal about 2.5% of the loans incurred – a double of the relatively standard closing & operations legal costs, taking up over €2bn. Toss in the fees of €1.6bn provisioned and you have sums that do not add up.
There are repeated claims that Nama will pursue debtors to the full extent of the loans. This warrants understanding of Table 4 estimates as the full recovery scenarios, implying that in Scenario A, combined recovery rate on all loans is 55.2%, Scenario B 60.7% and Scenario C 49.6% relative to the €81bn face value of the loans. But these are massively exaggerated numbers. Practice in the UK in the 1990s and in Ireland in the 1980s suggests that real gross recovery cannot be greater than 40% of the face value of the loans. And this is before we take into account the present value discounts and rolled up interest (prior to Nama acquisition of the loans and after).
Page 20 of the NBP states: “Derivative transactions with a nominal value of €14bn (principally interest rate swaps) will also be transferred. A substantial number of these derivatives are nonperforming and NAMA will pay nil consideration to acquire them.” If these derivatives are nil value, then why are they a problem on the balance sheet of the banks? Answer: because they are nil value today, but have a non-zero probability of exploding in the future. This is why they are being transferred to Nama. What does this mean? If you are on a wrong side of an interest rate swap, your potential liability is unlimited (as in infinite). This is also why in the current market place, the cost of unwinding these swaps today will be around 10-20% of their face value or €1.4-2.8bn. This, of course, is an approximation, but Nama is now stuck, courtesy of taking on these derivatives, with a liability between €1.4-2.8bn at the very least and an unlimited loss at the worst. A picture of iceberg peacefully floating in the path of Titanic comes to mind. Yet, no provision for unwinding these derivatives was made in the NBP.
NBP does not address any of the concern about non-transparent governance of the core Credit, Audit and Risk Committees of Nama, which still contain no provisions for external members presence on them. Neither does it address the issues of full and automatic disclosure of all properties held, development applications lodged and funding disbursed, as should be required of such a massive public undertaking.
Now to the numbers. I took the very assumptions contained in the Nama New Business Plan and added one more scenario, with following additional assumptions to cover the holes in Nama own statements:
Loans taken on board:
(Typo corrected, hat tip to Anonymous). Note: the above estimated recovery is the basis for price appreciation in the following table.
Nama NBP scenarios reproduction and my estimates:
Assumptions, in addition to those in Nama NBP are: property uplift over the lifetime of Nama is 15% (this is 50% higher than Nama optimistic scenario of 10% uplift, thus allowing for a greater margin of error in estimates); 1% ECB discount window financing on bonds plus 25bps charge; €5bn in additional investment by Nama drawn in 2015, reducing overall cost of financing to 5 years. Net present value excludes in my scenario excludes rolled up interest on developers’ loans and discounting to present value (Nama claims that it is discounting its NPV at 5%).
All of this means that my estimated loss for Nama of €14.6bn is extremely conservative, allowing for any errors in other figures and assumptions.
Adjusting for NPV at 5% discount, as in Nama plan produces the following summary estimate:
As a reader of this blog remarked on the topic of Nama new BP, “The effortless miscalculations, the assured non-sequiturs, the lofty indifference to facts: all reveal [the new Plan] as a master copy of what Princeton philosopher Harry Frankfurt defined succinctly in his 1986 paper, On Bullshit.” I couldn’t have said it better. Thanks, Patrick.
Mortgage Arrears and Personal Debt Expert Group, Interim Report was published today. Its stated objective is to provide recommendations, "focused on actions/solutions that effectively address immediate priorities and are capable of implementation in a relatively short time frame” to deal with defaulting mortgages and rising arrears.
Apart from the report being about 18 months too late, I missed any actual solutions or actions that would help addressing these priorities. Instead, the report contains 44 pages of rather general, if lofty, talk about the need to do things, discuss things and agree to things. A handful of meaningful recommendations it contains actually set out nothing more than the best practices that all lenders should pursue regardless of the Working Group effort.
In the end, the entire report is roughly 90% rehashment of arrangements that already exist in the industry, with a call to standardize these, plus 10% relating to stronger Social Welfare protection measures. If you are a private homeowner in trouble (negative equity, fallen income, including due to higher taxes, or loss of one income without crossing means tested barrier) you are not covered by the Report.
Let's take a look at those recommendations that do contain at least some substantive proposals.
37. The Financial Regulator should amend its quarterly public report on mortgage arrears to record, amongst other things, the number of mortgages that have been rescheduled. (Page 11)
[It is mind boggling to think that there is a need for a Working Group to get to this done. One would assume that the FR could have established such a reporting system on their own.]
38. The Department of Social Protection should introduce an alternative and more equitable approach to achieving the MIS [Mortgage Interest Supplement] objectives and maintaining its sustainability in light of changes in the economic climate and the mortgage market. This should cover issues such as:
No legal action should be taken by the lender while MIS is being paid and the borrower is cooperating with the lender. [logical]
The ban on paying MIS to a couple where one person is in full-time employment should be removed and a revised means test developed. [logical]
The current rule which excludes the payment of MIS when a house is for sale should be suspended. [Logical, but there should be a strict limit for such payments – say average duration of sale, plus 3 months – to discourage ‘perpetual’ listings and unrealistic pricing. None are set.]
The State should not provide MIS where the lender is charging interest above the market rate. [This might be logical, but presents a problem for subprime borrowers who are more likely to be in distress.]
MIS should only be payable where no capital is being repaid.
MIS should be paid directly into the mortgage account of the borrower.
Lenders should agree forbearance options with borrowers for a period of six months and ensure the SFS is completed before the State shares the responsibility by providing MIS support to the borrower. [logical, but potentially too restrictive]
An overall time limit for MIS should be considered to ensure that the scheme does not act as a disincentive to seeking or retaining work. [What limit? How is it to be determined?]
The scheme should remain as a short term income support. [How short? Especially, how short relative to expected length of unemployment spells?]
Where a borrower’s situation is or becomes unsustainable, they should be facilitated, if necessary, in applying for social housing appropriate to their needs. [Errr, sure… why is this even being established here?]
In three words - largely useless fluff.
40. Urgent consideration should be given to the effective implementation, in the shortest possible timeframe, of measures for the comprehensive reform of both judicial bankruptcy proceedings and the establishment of a non-judicial debt settlement process.
[You can get this advice without paying for a working group. Just listen to any radio programme about mortgages arrears or read newspapers and you’ll hear or read someone speaking about the need for such a reform, with actually more details supplied than in the current report].
There is a really bizarre, if not outright offensive, claim in the report (chapter 3 - which incidentally provides volumes of rehashed unoriginal information on housing market bust) relating to the negative equity mortgage holders:
“Recent ESRI research estimates the number of mortgage borrowers in negative equity. House price declines to date, coupled with the anticipated price decline in 2010 would take the number of borrowers up to 250,0009. Although this represents a large number of households in absolute terms it is a small proportion of the stock of households in Ireland.”
Now, there are 791,000 mortgages in Ireland according to the same report (page 17). Which means that negative equity is expected to impact roughly 1/3 of all mortgage holders in the nation. How this can constitute a ‘small proportion’ of households, beats me.
“Lenders must not require the borrower to give up their low cost tracker or other existing product if to do so would put the borrower at a financial disadvantage.This must be publicly communicated by all lenders.” (page 19)
This introduces a bit of dilemma for the banks – if the banks are to continue subsidise tracker mortgages, especially non-performing ones, who will cover the banks’ losses? Of course, variable rate mortgage holders, who are, predominantly, at a higher risk of default, and at a higher risk of negative equity. So is this idea of preserving tracker mortgages a cure that can make the disease only stronger?
Needless to say, the working group should have done some work and estimated what would be the impact of continued tracker mortgages losses on costs of mortgages to variable rate holders. And then stress-tested the actual loans against this. But, alas, this was not performed. So hold on to your seats, folks, the working group solutions might give a rough ride in the near future, as banks hike up their mortgage rates to compensate for the working group’s well-meaning, but un-researched recommendations.
Crucially, there is nothing in the Group recommendations preventing lenders from arbitrarily forcing higher and higher repayments on people who might be currently compliant with their mortgage repayments, but are in either severe negative equity or otherwise in breach of loans covenants. In other words, being pro-active – the advice given by the Group to mortgage holders – is not something the Group itself is following.
“All lenders should publish the types of forbearance that are available under their MARP and the guidelines they are employing for decision making on which approach is appropriate for typical sets of financial circumstances. These could include one or more of the following alternative repayment measures [notice – this is really crucial – ‘one or more’, which means that none, collectively, of the below actions are required, page 27]:
An arrangement on arrears could be entered into whereby the amount of monthly repayment may be changed, as appropriate, to help address the arrears situation [Presumably this should not alter conditions to the detriment of the borrower, yet that is not explicitly specified in the statement].
Deferring payment of all or part of the instalment [sic] repayment for a period might be appropriate where, for example, there is a temporary shortfall of income [How this is to be determined remains unknown – if unemployment is deemed ‘temporary shortfall’ then ‘temporary’ might mean 12 months or 36 months].
Extending the term of the mortgage could be considered in the case of a repayment loan - although this may not make a significant difference to the monthly repayments.
Changing the type of the mortgage (e.g. to interest only) might be appropriate if this could give rise to a reduction in the level of monthly mortgage outgoings.
Capitalising the arrears and interest could arise where there is insufficient capacity over the short term to clear the arrears but where repayment capacity exists to repay the capitalised balance over the remaining term of the mortgage. This measure may be considered where a pattern of repayment has been established and where sufficient equity exists. [Does this mean equity sharing with the lender? If so, on what terms? How these terms should be set? Simply to say ‘capitalising can be allowed’ is not good enough for a Working Group report]”
So in brief, this report is hardly worth 47 pages expended on it. It is not even worth the first few pages that serve as a summary. And it certainly not something you'd expect from a really concerned Working Group labouring over it for 5 long months since February 2010.
Two interesting charts on the ratios of full-time employed and live register signees to total working age population (note, this combines quarterly data from QNHS with monthly LR data, all expressed in quarterly terms): I can't spot any turn around in either chart, yet both reflect the extent to which the burden of unemployment and under-employment is impacting this economy - on both sides of equation: for those who lost their work (the truly tragic outcome) and for those who have to cover the nation's bills while remaining in employment (also having tougher times).
Global recovery, no matter how tenuous, is poised to present a new set of challenges and opportunities for smaller open economies, such as Ireland. These challenges relate to the changing nature of economic growth and competition worldwide.
Starting with the early 2000s, there is a new ‘brain-and-creativity’ economic growth paradigm that is emerging across more dynamic globally-integrated economies. In this new paradigm, cities and larger urban-centred regions are increasingly competing for highly mobile and diversified human capital, and creativity and innovation capabilities associated with it. This trend represents a far wider change than the much-talked-about ‘knowledge’ economy. In fact, according to our research at the IBM’s Institute for Business Value, it represents a re-orientation of the core sources for future growth away from the traditional ‘bricks-and-mortar’ economy based on physical capital (e.g. buildings and equipment) and financial capital, and toward human capital or talent-intensive growth.
Last month, Dublin-based IBM’s Global Centre for Economic Development that forms a part of the Institute for Business Value (IBV) published a study titled Smarter Cities for Smarter Growth: How cities can optimise their systems for the talent-based economy. Co-authored by Susanne Dirks, Dr Mary Keeling and myself, the study looked at the changing nature of competitiveness that cities and larger urban areas around the world will be facing over the next 10-20 years.
It offers important policy and investment priorities insights not only for world’s leading cities, such as New York, London, Tokyo, Shanghai, but also for smaller open economies, such as Ireland.
The core insight from the study is that creativity, knowledge and skills, together with technological innovation are becoming the key drivers of economic growth and activity.
For example, the share of overall economic value added attributable to creativity, knowledge and skills-intensive sectors of the economy (e.g. internationally traded and other higher value-added services, design and innovation-centred manufacturing, etc) is expected to increase by 8.2% over the current decade.
Cities are natural hubs for this growth for two reasons.
Globally, leading cities have GDP shares of their national economies that are up to 5 times higher than their share of national populations. Top 100 cities worldwide accounted for roughly 25% of the world’s GDP in 2005. By 2008 this had increased to over 30%. As charts 1 and 2 in my earlier post (here) on cities weights in domestic economies illustrate, Dublin clearly falls within this category of cities that represent a leadership flank in their respective domestic economies.
Second, cities, and greater urban areas, are at the forefront of global competition in higher value-added, and creativity and knowledge-intensive sectors. Between 1999 and 2007, skills and knowledge intensities of some 350 urban economies comprising OECD member states have increased dramatically.
In 1999 average urban area in the OECD had 25% of its population holding third level degrees or higher. By 2007 this number increased to 29%. Over the same time, the degree of skills and knowledge utilization in urban economies also increased. Modern services – a sector that is at the forefront of the new economic paradigm – saw its share of overall employment rise from 34% to 38% in 8 years to 2007. With these changes, income per capita rose from the average USD27,400 to USD36,050, expressed in constant dollar terms.
A similar dynamic took place in Ireland, where Greater Dublin region, inclusive of commuter belt, saw its proportion of the workforce with tertiary or higher education rise from 25% to 39% between 1999 and 2007. Contrary to most of the commentary on Irish development model, the Greater Dublin area has moved from being average in terms of skills presence in the OECD at the cusp of the new Millennium, to above average by 2007. Over this period, the share of modern services in total regional output rose from 34% to 38% in Dublin, while per capita income rose from USD31,900 to USD46,300.
Our data analysis clearly shows that urban income per capita has been strongly positively correlated with rising importance of skills, innovation and knowledge in the economy. Our forecasts also indicate that this trend is going to strengthen over time. For example, there is a rapid change in the relationship between technological innovation and talent contribution to productivity that is emerging across all industries. Instead of technological innovation serving as a strong substitute for labour, it is becoming a supportive enabler for people and their skills. This relationship is forecast to strengthen by over 70% by the end of this decade in modern sectors and is set to become positive for the first time in over 40 years in traditional sectors as well.
For cities this transformation means new model of development and growth – a model focused primarily on the need to build a diversified, highly skilled and creative workforce capable of developing and absorbing technological, managerial and creative innovation.
Change in demand for skills in EU27 Net increases in excess of demographic factors, millions of jobs
Source: CDEFOP, 2009 and 2010, and IBV analysis
Forecasts show that demand for talent, creativity and skills is expected to accelerate dramatically over the next 10-20 years (Chart above). In the EU27 alone, growth in demand for higher skilled workers is expected to double from 10.1 million in 2007 to 20.1 million in 2020, according to the European Commission. At the same time, demand for low skilled workers is expected to contract by 28.3 million by 2020 having fallen by 8.5 million in 2007.
While pressures of rising demand for skills will be acute, the supply side – represented by demographics and higher education capacity – is going to be strained to deliver sufficient inflow of new skilled knowledge and creativity-enabled workers. Assuming current demographic trends, demand for international students in the OECD will be expected to rise from 6% of total third level student population in the mid-1990s to 30% by 2020, based on our forecasts.
Cities are increasingly competing for internationally mobile and highly diversified workers of the future. For example, between the 1990s and 2020 net international migration flows of highly skilled workers will more than triple from 29.5 million to 98.6 million, according to our forecasts. Majority of these flows will continue to be attracted to Western European and North American economies. However, in a departure from the previous decade, next ten years will see acceleration in the net demand for highly skilled international migrants from the emerging economies of Asia Pacific, India and Latin America. These developments imply that previously taken for granted inflows of talent to the advanced economies are now wide open to competition.
The entire notion of competitiveness will be reshaped by the new growth paradigm. Our research shows that in the near future cities will have to focus their attention on attracting, retaining, creating and enabling people with diversified and high quality skills and knowledge, capable of generating and absorbing creative and technological innovation.
Highly-skilled individual’s location decisions are directly influenced by the quality of core services provided by the cities. And these decisions, in turn, increasingly influence location of FDI. In 2008, according to data for OECD, 69 percent of companies have identified availability of the high quality human capital as a major determinant of their decision to invest in a specific economy. Urban centres will need to change the nature of their core services away from focusing on standardized services aimed at the homogenized populations, toward services that are more citizen-centric: tailored and individualized, green and lean in line with the demands of the internationally mobile highly-skilled employees.
Our research has identified four core services areas that will need to be prioritized for investment with the greatest expected impact on highly skilled, knowledge, creativity and innovation-enabled workers. These are Government Services and Education, Public Safety, Health and Transport.
Given the constraints on fiscal spending, faced by many Governments around the world, including the Irish Exchequer, such investments will have to deliver optimal gains in quality of life while demanding minimal public outlays. Based on our analysis of the best practices around the world, this can be achieved by deploying advanced technologies to understand, predict and intelligently respond to services systems behaviour and demand.
For example, cities like Singapore, Tokyo, Amsterdam, London and Stockholm have been able to successfully leverage real-world data generated by their public transport providers. This allowed not only to optimize the existent city services, but to simultaneously increase both capacity and demand for public transport. Several cities worldwide are currently building new modes of public transport that attempt to seamlessly integrate the concept of mass public transit across various modes of transport while delivering extensive customization of routes and modes.
In Singapore, creation of a seamless, smarter national transport fare systemhas resulted in $40 million annual savings from reduced congestion on expressways alone, as well as gains in workforce productivity equivalent to more than 5 million man-hours. Singapore’s Land Transport Authority can now optimize routes, schedules and fares based on the insights from the 20 million trip-related transactions generated each day. As the result, usage of mass public transport increased by 14.4% between 1996 and 2007.
Congestion negatively impacts on the quality of life in a city by decreasing personal and business productivity. It also imposes negative externalities on the overall quality of life. The cost of congestion ranges between 1.8% of GDP in Kuala Lumpar to a massive 4.1% in Dublin.
Smarter transport systems can integrate traffic, weather, business and traveller information to provide real time services to users to create more efficient and user-friendly services. A number of cities in Japan are now moving to new models of delivering public transport that aim to bring greater degree of routes flexibility, on-demand capacity and more organic links between daily demand changes, external factors, such as weather and seasonality of demand, and the supply of public transport.
Of course, public transport is just one area of services where the Greater Dublin area and other cities in Ireland will be facing significant competition. Health, education, government services and public safety are also important determinants of the quality of life in the city and thus city’s ability to attract, create, retain and enable the workforce of the future. And we have quite a distance to travel in these terms. If in 2007 Dublin ranked 20th in the world in terms of overall quality of living the city delivers to its citizens, this year it has slipped to the 26th place. These rankings do not reflect even poorer quality of services delivered in the commuter belt of the Greater Dublin area.
The core conclusion that emerged from our report is that cities that adopt a pro-active approach to investment in citizen-centric services will position themselves to thrive in the new age of human capital-intensive growth. Those that continue to invest in traditional infrastructure designed for mass population are set to struggle.
Based on WSJ blogs info, I pooled together a comparative table for the last three months OECD Purchasing Managers Indices. An interesting dynamics for Ireland, compared to peers and some other countries (24 in total): Note: relevant competitors are in bold.
An interesting observation on PMI levels:
In April Ireland ranked 18th in terms of its PMI reading (remember, PMI above 50 signals expansion);
In May, this rank improved to 15th;
But in June we slipped to 20th place of 24 countries.
In terms of changes mom in PMI readings, we fared much better, registering:
3rd highest gain in mom between April and May;
falling to 19th rate of change between May and June;
between April and June we recorded 12th ranked result in terms of changes in PMI
Overall, within the sample of 24 countries, it is clear that April to June changes showed 17 countries of 24 posting declines in PMIs, with only Greece, Hungary and South Africa continuing to post contractions in activity (below 50).
Most notable is stellar performance of Switzerland.
Average PMI has declined from 56.1 in April to 53.9 in June, while standard deviation has fallen slightly from 4.4 in April to 4.3 in June. This means Irish PMI drop was broadly in line with the average.
This blog represents my personal views and is not reflective of the views or opinions held by any company, contractor, client or employer I work for currently or have worked for in the past. These views are not an endorsement to take any action in the markets or of any political position, figures or parties.
This blog represents my personal views and is not reflective of the views or opinions held by any company, contractor, client or employer I work for currently or have worked for in the past. These views are not an endorsement to take any action in the markets or of any political position, figures or parties.
