25/12/2014: Unwinding Western Excesses, Squeezing Emerging Markets

Just in case you need a scary story for the holidays seasons, here's one from economics. Some time ago, we've learned that zero bound (extremely low) interest rates in the advanced economies spell quite a disaster for the emerging markets, where the economies are now suffering from triple pressures: declining commodities prices (on which many emerging markets economies often rely for exports, declining demand for their exports of goods, and declining investment inflows from the advanced economies.

But that's just the beginning. It seems that any unwinding of the QE deployed in the West is likely to hammer the emerging markets more.

Here's a World Bank paper from earlier this year on the topic: Burns, Andrew and Kida, Mizuho and Lim, Jamus Jerome and Mohapatra, Sanket and Stocker, Marc, Unconventional Monetary Policy Normalization in High-Income Countries: Implications for Emerging Market Capital Flows and Crisis Risks (April 1, 2014). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6830: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2419786

What the authors found is that as "the recovery in high-income countries firms amid a gradual withdrawal of extraordinary monetary stimulus, developing countries can expect stronger demand for their exports as global trade regains momentum, but also rising interest rates and potentially weaker capital inflows. …In the most likely scenario, a relatively orderly process of normalization would imply a slowdown in capital inflows amounting to 0.6 percent of developing-country GDP between 2013 and 2016, driven in particular by weaker portfolio investments. However, …abrupt changes in market expectations, resulting in global bond yields increasing by 100 to 200 basis points within a couple of quarters, could lead to a sharp reduction in capital inflows to developing countries by between 50 and 80 percent for several months."

Wait, we are witnessing this already, in part, as bond prices in a number of emerging economies are following oil prices down. And worse, if the above applies to corporate yields, the same will apply to government yields. Thus, 'normalisation' in the West can yield double shock to debt markets in the emerging economies.

World Bank paper has more on the subject: "Evidence from past banking crises suggests that countries having seen a substantial expansion of domestic credit over the past five years, deteriorating current account balances, high levels of foreign and short-term debt, and over-valued exchange rates could be more at risk in current circumstances. Countries with adequate policy buffers and investor confidence may be able to rely on market mechanisms and countercyclical macroeconomic and prudential policies to deal with a retrenchment of foreign capital. In other cases, where the scope for maneuver is more limited, countries may be forced to tighten fiscal and monetary policy to reduce financing needs and attract additional inflows."

So the best case scenario, sovereign wealth reserves (if any) will be exhausted on 'normalising' the US, UK, Euro Area and Japan, while if none are present, tough luck - the emerging economies are into a tailspin. They'll have to relieve the path of austerity-driven internal devaluations. Just because the West has ramped printing presses up so much, any 'normalisation' is going to be a disaster. If that is not a case of beggar thy poorer neighbour by enriching thy stock markets strategy, then do tell me what is?

And in another paper, "Tinker, Taper, QE, Bye? The Effect of Quantitative Easing on Financial Flows to Developing Countries" the same authors looked at gross financial inflows to developing countries over 2000-2013 (see: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6820: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2417518).

As above, authors found evidence "for potential transmission of quantitative easing along observable liquidity, portfolio balancing, and confidence channels. Moreover, quantitative easing had an additional effect over and above these observable channels, which the paper argues cannot be attributed to either market expectations or changes in the structural relationships between inflows and observable fundamentals. The baseline estimates place the lower bound of the effect of quantitative easing at around 5 percent of gross inflows (for the average developing economy), which suggests that of the 62 percent increase in inflows during 2009-13 related to changing global monetary conditions, at least 13 percent of this was attributable to quantitative easing. The paper also finds evidence of heterogeneity among different types of flows; portfolio (especially bond) flows tend to be more sensitive than foreign direct investment to our measured effects from quantitative easing."

So broadly-speaking, QE is impacting bond/debt flows and unwinding QE can be a costly proposition for the emerging markets.

12/6/2013: Bond Markets: Is Canary Kicking the Bucket?

I have written before about the prospect of the Fed starting unwinding of the QE operations. Here's my summary forward view.

Stage 1: the Fed will reduce the rate of QE print ('taper on'). This is inevitable and it is already driving 10-year Treasury yields up - in last 40 days, by some 50bps. The same is also inevitable for the Euro area, albeit via a different mechanism (unwinding of excess liquidity supply to the banks, plus scaling down of any expectations for OMT to kick in), driving the Bund up some 35bps.

In both cases, macro news-flows and inflationary pressures pointed to the opposite direction for yields. This is confirmed by the differences in risk pricing indices in the bond markets (MOVE index: Merrill Lynch Option Volatility Estimate (MOVE) Index on US Treasuries) as opposed to the equity market volatility index (VIX). MOVE has gone almost double from around 47-48 in early May to over 80 recently. Levels around 80 are consistent with the height of the peripheral euro area crisis back in 2012. Over the same period of time, VIX is up from around 13.0 to 16.0 and during the height of the euro area crisis it was averaging closer to 40.

Stage 2: In the follow up stage, the Fed will have to engage in more than simply scaling back new purchases. Here, the unwinding will begin in earnest and the Fed will have to sell longer-dated bonds into the market.

For now, we are just embarking on Stage 1. Emerging markets and corporate bonds, as well as euro periphery bonds are all signalling the same story: yields are pressured up. During May, US investment corporate bonds fell 2.7%, while junk bonds were down 2.3%.

Now, in the longer term,  when US gross interest rate rises relative to the euro area, forward exchange rate must rise relative to the spot and dollar will weaken forward. This covered parity relationship tends to hold over the longer periods of time under normal market conditions. In May-June so far, Dollar is 5% weaker than EUR, and over 2% weaker than CHF (linked to EUR). However, Dollar is stronger 22% than JPY and virtually unchanged on GBP, dollar strengthened with respect to the emerging currencies.

However, in the short run we are not in a normal economy. As US economy continues to improve, few things will happen:
1) The Fed will continue tapering on the QE in the short-term
2) Expected unwinding of QE (rising rates, instead of lower speed of purchasing of Treasuries as in (1)) will enter expectations in the market but in a longer term, rather than any time soon
3) Bond yields will continue rising and volatility will remain amplified. Long-term US equilibrium is for 10 years at 3.0-3.2% and short-term overshooting that range, for Bund - at current rates, around 2.5-2.8%.
4) Fed will be watching the speed of increases and manage unwinding process accordingly to keep yields from overshooting 3%-or-so target by a significant margin.

All of this means that news-flow will be crucial in months to come as it will be signalling both short-term and long-term changes to the Fed position (usual stuff about the rates), but also strategy (severity of (1) above, or switch to (2) from (1)).

In the short term, dollar will see pressures to appreciate as interest rates will remain intact at policy level and it will take time for higher Treasury yields to transmit into higher real interest rates in the US, inducing slowdown in the economy. Until that happens, economic recovery will be pushing up equities and USD.

In the longer run, however, this pattern will be altered: improved economic news will signal forward switch from (1) taper off to (2) unwinding. Yields will put pressure on real interest rates (3) and policy rates will move up. This will lead to subsequent devaluation of the USD toward equilibrium and a slamming of the breaks on the recovery.

The emerging markets and corporate bonds squeeze are not simple reallocations of liquidity. Truth be told, there is nowhere for liquidity to 'reallocate', given yields. Instead, these are early warning systems at work. Now, to see the underlying iceberg we are heading for, recall this http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/04/2242013-who-funds-growth-in-europe.html


Updated: series of very interesting interviews on the issue of monetary exit: http://www.voxeu.org/article/exit-strategies-time-think-ahead

and an interesting post on term premia due to QE:
http://www.econbrowser.com/archives/2013/06/update_on_the_y.html

6/6/2013: US House Prices: Trouble Brewing for Monetary Policy Dilemma

Now, QE seems to be feeding through into the real assets, not just financial ones, in the case of the US. Here's a chart from Pictet on CoreLogic house prices index changes and underlying house prices fundamentals:

And the same adjusting for inflation, annualised 3mo series (q/q):

CoreLogic rose 3.2% m/m in April, following a +2.2% m/m rise in March. Based on Pictet seasonal adjustments, "the increase remains surprisingly high: +1.6%, after +1.7% in March. Since the end of last year, house prices have risen by 6.4% (after seasonal adjustments), an astonishing annualised rate of 20.4%. On a y-o-y basis, the increase reached 12.1%, the highest since April 2006."

Although as the chart below shows, things are still ok in 'affordability' terms (index of house prices), with recent rises from the trough returning the index to mid-2009 levels. It would take a further 28% rise to hit pre-crisis peak of March 2006:

Lest we forget - unwinding the QE will hammer interest rates on longer maturities (see: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/05/1652013-on-that-impossible-monetary.html) which will spell trouble for debt-funded assets, like property.

30/5/2013: Future Interest Rates & the 'Impossible Monetary Policy Dilemma'

Recently, I wrote about the monetary policy exit dilemma (here) on foot of IMF research. This week, BIS published another paper on the issue of long-term interest rates problem presented by the need to eventually unwind the extraordinary monetary policy measures (including this). Do note that the dilemma also covers the problem of unwinding banking sector leverage overhang (see presentation covering, among other things, this matter here).

BIS paper is linked here.

We might want to believe in the permanence of the low (negative currently) long term rates, but, alas, that is not so. I have written about this on a number of occasions, including in my Sunday Times columns. But a reminder from BIS:

Or even at policy rates level (here), or per BIS:

I don't know about you, but any reversion to the mean will end the bond bubble like the property bust ended the REITs bubble - solidly and overnight. And when the IMF said 6% swing up on yields, they weren't kidding:

Ditto for term premium uplift on reversion:

So unless you are into 'This Time It'll Be Different, For Sure' argument, then brace yourselves for the ride - it is coming. May be not in 2013-2014, but one day it is...

The quality risk-free paper mountain has grown... just as all the ABS and RMBS and other BS... and we know even absent excel errors from R&R 2010 how that stuff ended...