4/6/15: Bank Fines Data

A handy graphic from @Reuters tallying up banks fines http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/15/bankfines/index.html?utm_source=twitter
And a full table:

Of course, in Ireland, there has never been any unwanted actions by the core banks deserving fines or other such going ons... except for Ulster Bank and that on foot the IT systems meltdown: http://www.irishtimes.com/business/financial-services/central-bank-issued-fines-totalling-more-than-5m-last-year-1.2097056.

30/5/15: The New Financial Regulation: Part 10: Legal v Operational Logistics

My post for @learnsignal blog on EU financial regulation covering operational logistics is now available: http://blog.learnsignal.com/?p=188.

15/5/15: New Financial Regulation: Part 8: An Overconfidence Bias Awaits

My latest blog post on European Union innovations in financial regulation, continuing coverage of the European Banking Union is now available here: http://blog.learnsignal.com/?p=181

18/2/15: Digital Disruption and Traditional Banks: More Value Uncertainty

My recent post for Learn Signal blog on effects of Digital Technologies disruption on the traditional banking models: http://blog.learnsignal.com/?p=156

2/1/2015: Irish Banking System: Still Reliant on Non-Deposits Funding

A handy chart from Deutsche Bank Research on sources of funding - focusing on deposits - for euro area banks.

Irish banks are an outlier in the chart, with domestic household and Non-Financial Companies deposits forming second lowest percentage of banks' funding in the entire euro area. As of Q3 2014, Irish banking system remains less deposits-focused and more funded by a combination of other sources, such as the Central Banks, Government deposits and foreign/non-resident deposits.

And the dynamics, post-crisis, are not impressive either: since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis, there has been lots of talk about increasing reliance on deposits for funding banking activities. Ireland's extremely weak banking sector should have been leading this trend. Alas, it does not:

2/10/2014: IMF Report: Risk Taking Behaviour in Banks

As some of you might have noticed, I started to contribute regularly to Learn Signal Blog last week. This week, my post there covers IMF Global Financial Stability Report update released this week, dealing with the drivers for risk taking behaviour of the banks prior to and since the Global Financial Crisis: http://blog.learnsignal.com/?p=46

29/3/2012: China's Banking Sector Analysis

A very revealing paper on Chinese banking sector - link here. A lengthy summary of some points:

The study describes "aggregate developments of the sector and compare them to the situation in other countries. ...Our results confirm that the Chinese banking sector is truly in a class of its own, especially given the level of China’s economic development. Despite significant reforms, the state and various public organizations still own controlling shares in the largest commercial banks. The state is also present on the borrowers’ side; it is estimated that about half of state-owned commercial bank lending still goes to state-controlled companies." [Note: this induces rather unique risk into China's banking sector - the risk of losses on both sides of the transaction and also quality risk to banks assets, as state-owned enterprises in China tend to be higher risk]. 

Furthermore: "More than 90% of total banking sector assets are state-owned in China (Economist, 2010), while Vernikov (2009) puts the corresponding figure for Russia at 56%. In general, reforms in the Chinese banking sector have lagged relative to other sectors of the economy."

Thus, "Chinese policy has striking parallels to the Russian experience; there has never been a major effort to privatize banking and banks today continue to be directly or indirectly controlled by the state or public institutions." Except, in Russian case, there are far fewer state enterprises and once controlled for extraction sector enterprises [less subject to traditional risks], there are even fewer state-controlled enterprises links to state-controlled banks of the lender/borrower relations side. Furthermore, "the lack of capital controls, of course, means that Russians have greater freedom in choosing providers of their financial services."

"Despite listing and the presence of foreign investors, all the large commercial banks are still majority state-owned. The share of state and state-owned entities at the end of 2010 was 83.1% in ABC, 70.7 % in ICBC, 67.8 % in BOC, and 60.1 % in CCB. The corresponding number for the Bank of Communications was 32.4 %"

"In this way, the banking system can serve as an important policy tool. (see below)

"Another distinctive feature of the Chinese banking sector is the variety of its banking institutions. New types of banking institutions, especially those serving rural areas, are emerging all the time. While equity and debt markets are still tiny relative to the banking sector and their importance as sources of financing of investment remain minor, they have evolved rapidly in recent years."

Some interesting facts: "The government’s stimulus efforts to avoid recession in 2009 resulted in a massive spike in bank lending that increased the consolidated banking sector balance sheet by approximately a third. Rather than pull back, bank lending went on to expand an additional 20 % in 2010. Lending outside the banking sector’s balance sheet has also grown strongly (García-Herrero and Santabarbara, 2011). These lending trends in themselves should be sufficient to raise concerns about the quality of bank loan portfolios and the need to curtail growth of bank lending in coming years..."

"Bank loans are the most important source of external funding for the non-financial sector in China. They accounted for 75% of all external funding sources at the end of 2010, and exceeded 80% during the crisis years of 2008 and 2009 when other external sources were difficult to obtain. As we saw in early 2009, the Chinese authorities can turn to bank lending as a policy tool when the need arises."

The unbalanced nature of Chinese banking translates into significant concentration of State power in lending: "Bank lending grew between 2006 and 2010 at the average rate of 20% a year, thanks in part to the government stimulus program in the face of the global economic re- cession. Loans to non-financial companies accounted for around 70% of new loans. State- owned commercial banks (SOCBs), traditionally the biggest loan providers, accounted for 43% of all new loans issued in 2009 (their share was 51% in 2001). SOCBs accounted for about half of the total banking sector loan stock at the end of 2010. This proportion corresponds to their share in total sector assets."

And more: "Even though the Chinese banking sector is huge for a middle-income nation, bank lending is heavily skewed to state-owned companies. Allen et al. (2008) note that the size of China’s banking system, in terms of total bank credit to non-state sectors, was 31% of GDP in 2005. This figure is not too different from the average of other major emerging economies with a weighted average of 32% of GDP. Looking at total bank credit, including loans to state sectors, the ratio of China’s bank credit to GDP rises to 110% − a level higher than even in countries with German-origin legal systems (weighted average 106%). The difference between total bank credit and private credit suggests that most of the bank credit is issued to companies that are ultimately owned by the state. Also Okazaki et al. (2011) report that bank lending in the recent years has mostly gone to large SOEs. In 2009, about 50% of SOCB loans were extended to large SOEs. Private enterprises received some 14% of total lending provided by the banking sector."

A train wreck of Irish economic policy

In managing the ongoing economic crisis, observing Irish Government policy can only be compared to watching a train wreck in slow motion. The banks re-capitalization scheme announced this week is just another example. By ignoring Ireland's impoverished and debt-overloaded consumers and companies, the latest plan will not deliver any real benefits to growth, credit flows or consumer/producer confidence.

One frame…

First, the rails buckle underneath as the Exchequer balance snaps under the weight of reckless public spending. Pop, pop – the fastenings fly off as tax line after tax line comes short. “No worries, we have a plan”, calls out the engineer. Enter the emergency budget – empty of any ideas as to how to mend the path or to lighten the load.

Then, the engine slumps oil-less. Banks hit the friction of bad corporate and household loans. The sparks of private unemployment fly. “All’s fine,” shouts the engineer, “we have insurance”. Emergency banks guarantee follows, but panic engulfs the carriages.

For what seems like an eternity the train pushes on. Dust, gravel and engine parts are shooting in all directions. Business insolvencies double year on year under the weight of the heaviest corporate debt load in the EU. Consumers crumble under the largest debt mountain in the OECD. Homes repossessions are on the rise and retail sales crash. The policy engine spins out of control: income, savings and consumption taxes go up and business rates increase. “The fundamentals are sound,” shout engineers. The rest of the world is selling off Irish shares and assets.

By the end of last week, the index of Irish financial companies shares has fallen 67% relative to the Black Monday of September 29th – the point that triggered the banks guarantee. “This will all end happily,” chirp engineers, “We’ll commission new reports, appoint new committees and issue more emergency responses.”

… to another

Enter this Sunday’s desperate ‘capitalization’ package. This promises to deliver some €10 billion to the banks in a swap for equity. The details, predictably, are sparse. Everyone expects the capital injections to be a copy-cat of those instituted by Germany and the UK – the countries hardly facing the same problems as Ireland. This implies a mixture of private and public funds to be made available to the banks with some token conditions, e.g dividends and management bonuses caps.

In a statement the Department of Finance said the plan will underpin the availability of loans to individuals and businesses.

Ooops. By-passing Ireland’s impoverished consumers and companies, the plan will not deliver any such benefits.

Elsewhere in Europe and the US, similar capitalization schemes have failed to reduce the cost of corporate borrowing or to restart lending to the households. In the UK, a £43 billion capital injection scheme has been in place for almost two months and the supply of consumer and business credit continues to fall - whether due to demand slowdown, lenders withdrawal from the market or both. In the US, massive banks’ capital supports have lowered the mortgage rates, but there is no meaningful increase in new mortgages uptake.

Three reasons for State-to-Banks recapitalization in-effectiveness

First, heavily indebted households are unlikely to take up new credit regardless of the cost. Short of the Government scheme to reduce the household debt or to increase after-tax incomes, no policy will shift consumers out of precautionary savings and into credit markets. So the retail sales will continue falling, businesses will suffer and consumers will keep on heading North for shopping. Our engineers, who two months ago raised VAT and now stubbornly refuse to back-down will see even less VAT revenue in 2009.

Second, heavily indebted Irish businesses can use new credit to either roll-over existent debts, or to finance short-term operational expenses, e.g export transactions. With exception of export credits, any new lending will simply re-arrange the deck chairs on the sinking Titanic of corporate Ireland. None of the new loans will go into capital acquisition, investment or hiring. These activities have stopped not because credit got dear, but because economic demand for goods and services has collapsed.

Third, for the banks, turning recapitalization proceeds into business loans will defeat the entire purpose of the scheme. Assuming re-capitalization is needed because bank’s capital is running too low relative to the size of the impaired or threatened loans, recapitalization must drive up the capital-to-loans ratio. Taking the money and using it to issue more loans will do exactly the opposite.

And this brings us to the issue of costs. The scheme will use the last of the remaining taxpayers’ money – the National Pensions Reserve Fund – to increase capital reserves of the banks. This means the state will no longer have any remaining capacity to inject a meaningful stimulus into the real economy. The consumers will go on cutting spending, business will go on laying off workers and the Exchequer will go on issuing new emergency responses. The more things change…