28/9/2014: Euro area banks deposits: no sign of significant improvements

Courtesy of @cigolo - a nice chart summing up trends in deposits in Euro area banks from 2009 through Q2 2014:

Italy and Slovenia are two countries that managed to raise the deposit levels in their banking system from Q1 2009. Portugal suffered a decline in deposits off the peak, but stayed above 2009 levels. In every other country sampled, deposits fell from 2009 levels. Note: Ireland too suffered a decline in deposits and in fact, once we control for the reclassifications in deposits, the decline has been more dramatic than the one depicted in the chart (see details here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/09/2792014-growth-just-not-in-irish.html).

Since the Cypriot bailout, and the introduction of bail-in clause for depositors, Euro area banks deposits stayed basically flat in Italy (with slight decline in trend) and Greece, rose in Slovenia, posted a shallow increase in Portugal, declined in Ireland and Spain, collapsed further in Cyprus. While there was no immediately obvious common trend, deposits pre-Cypriot bailout trend was disrupted or failed to improve in Italy, Slovenia, Cyprus, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Greece despite numerous efforts to shore up the fallout from the bail-ins under the new systems set up for the European Banking Union.

So much for reformed banking sectors, then. Remember that funding in European banks should be shifting toward more reliance on 'organic' sources, e.g. deposits, than on interbank lending. We are yet to see this happening on any appreciable scale across the 'peripheral' economies.

04/07/2011: New Deposits in Irish Banking

Over two previous posts I examined the data for new business loans rates for households (here) and non-financial corporations (here and spreads here). This post covers the deposits – both household and corporate.

Here is what the data on new deposits telling us:

• Rates for household deposits with agreed maturity have fallen significantly between March 2011 (1.93%) and April 2011 (1.81%). The rates are now below those for the historical average of 2.366% and crisis period average (January 2008-present) of 2.394%. 12mo MA is 1.707%. The volatility of the rates has risen during the crisis from standard deviation for historical period being 0.950 to crisis period standard deviation of 1.155.
• At the same time, new deposits volumes have contracted sharply for households from €12,333 million in March 2011 to €7,873 million in April 2011. Historical monthly average is €12,636 million and crisis period average is €12,938 million with 12mo MA at €10,079 million. April level of new deposits is the lowest since January 2003 – the start of the series.
• Rates for non-financial corporations’ deposits with agreed maturity have risen from 1.41% in February and March to 1.52% in April, standing still below the historical average of 2.336% and crisis period average of 2.125%, but well ahead of the 12mo MA of 1.293%. The volatility of these rates has risen sharply during the crisis to a standard deviation of 1.319 from historical standard deviation of 1.036.
• Volumes of corporate deposits with agreed maturity have declined from €6,720 million in March 2011 to €5,170 million in April 2011. These levels compare extremely poorly against historical average of €13,739 million, the crisis period average of €11,593 million and 12mo MA of €7,277 million.
  

Lastly, consider the spreads between deposit rates available to the households and those available to corporate clients. Keep in mind that from funding perspective, households deposits are probably less volatile than corporate deposits. Note that standard deviations for the two types of deposits by volume were: historical 3,000.8 million for households against 4,198.09 million for corporates and this relationship remains relatively stable for the period of the crisis.

So the spread on deposit rates for households over and above corporate deposit rates has narrowed to 0.29 percentage points in April from 0.52 pp in March 2011. Historical average spread was 0.03 pp and crisis period average is 0.269 pp while 12mo MA spread is 0.413 pp.

13/05/11: CBofI accounts

Update: Namawinelake blog has an excellent post on the lunacy of Government treasury management exposed by the CBofI's latest accounts - read it here.


On April 7, 1775, Samuel Johnson made his famous pronouncement: "Patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel". This statement caught the chord with many other illustrious thinkers. Ambrose Bierce's The Devils Dictionary: “In Dr. Johnson’s famous dictionary patriotism is defined as the last resort of a scoundrel. ...I beg to submit that it is the first." In 1926, H. L. Mencken added that patriotism "...is the first, last, and middle range of fools.”

Whether one can separate a scoundrel from a fool or the first refuge from the last, in recent years we have seen Government officials who have exhibited all four attributes of false 'patriotism'.

No doubt, the decision by the Irish Minister for Finance to instruct NTMA to deposit €10.6 billion of state money with the Irish banks were not supposed to be amongst one of them. However, motivated by a 'patriotic' desire to provide a temporary support for the zombie institutions, artificially increasing their deposits base, this was a significant mistake from the risk management point of view.


Irish banks are experiencing a severe liquidity crisis, as the latest figures from the CBofI clearly show (Table A.2, column E). Lending to Euro area credit institutions has risen from 30 April 2010 levels of €81.25 billion to the peak of €136.44 billion by the end of October 2010 and now stands at a still hefty €106.13 billion (April 29, 2011), down €8.37 billion on the end of March. That's folks - our banks debts to the ECB. As far as banks debts to the CBofI itself are concerned, these have declined by some €12.64 billion to €54.15 billion March to April 2011. Chart below plots combined ECB and CBofI 'assets' that are loans to the Irish banks.
So the banks are still under immense pressure on the liquidity front.

As far as their solvency is concerned, BalckRock advisers estimated back in March 2011 the through-cycle expected losses in excess of €40 billion for just 4 out of 6 Irish 'banks'. Although these relate to 'potential' losses, the likelihood of these occurring is high enough for the CBofI to provision for €24 billion of these.

Either way, Irish banks are not really the counterparties that can be deemed safe.

There is an added component to this transaction - under the deposits guarantee, the Irish Exchequer holds simultaneously a liability (a Guarantee) and the asset (the deposit) when Mr Noonan approved the transaction. Before that, the Exchequer only had an asset. In effect, balance-sheet risk of this transaction was to reduce the risk-adjusted value of the asset it had.

Lastly, the entire undertaking smacks of the Minister directly interfering in the ordinary operations of NTMA which is supposed to be independent of exactly such interference.

So whether Minister's 'patriotism' of supporting Irish banks was the first or the last resort or the first and the last range, the outcome of his decision to prop up banks balance sheets with artificial short-term deposits was an example of a risky move that has cost NTMA its independence and reputation. The move achieved preciously little other than destroy risk-adjusted value of Government assets. Not exactly a winning combo...