Showing posts with label Irish Government. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Irish Government. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 23, 2009

Economics 24/06/2009: SMEs feeling the heat

Yesterday's business conditions survey from ISME paints a picture of dire operating conditions for Irish SMEs.

Q2 2009 survey results "confirm that smaller companies are still in the throes of economic despair with employment levels, investment and sales remaining extremely negative. Despite this harsh environment business optimism has improved for the second quarter running, albeit from historically low levels." The survey was based on 600 companies responses shows both that there is no 'green shoots' improvement and that expectations for 12 months ahead are not offering much hope of an upturn "with companies further readjusting downwards their employment and investment levels."

Business confidence "has improved since the previous quarter with a net 56% of companies less optimistic in comparison to a net 71% in the previous quarter. The most negative sector is Construction with a net 73% less optimistic, followed by Retail at 71%, Distribution (70%), Manufacturing (51%) and Services at 48%." In contrast, "74% of companies, up from 69% in the previous quarter, viewed the current business environment as being either ‘poor’ or ‘very poor’." Only 23% expect business conditions to improve over the next 12 months, up from 16% in Q1 2009. 66% of companies said viability of their businesses was under threat over the next 12 months, if present conditions remain.

Employment conditions continue to deteriorate dramatically:
"Nearly two thirds (62%), (56% in the previous quarter), of companies employing less than this time last year and only 6% employing more. These figures are the worst ever recorded and confirm that there has been no slowing down in job losses in the sector, with evidence suggesting that this trend is to continue over the next number of months. The Construction sector was worst affected with 83% of companies letting people go in comparison to 72% of Distributors, 61% of Retailers and Manufacturers, and 43% of Service firms."

Furthermore, "employment prospects remain bleak with 43% of companies anticipating letting people go over the next 12 months, with only 7% planning to increase employment numbers. Distribution companies are the most pessimistic with a net 52% expecting to let people go, in comparison to 40% in the Construction sector, 35% Retailers, 32% Manufacturers and 28% of service businesses."

Clearly distribution services are feeling the squeeze of higher excise duties, VAT and other consumption damaging taxes and retail sector collapse. Construction sector, despite having bled jobs at the fastest rate of all segments of Irish economy in the past still remains one of the focal points of jobs destruction. Ditto retailers. The spread between these sectors and services is narrow enough signifying that we are indeed heading for the second wave of layoffs in the higher wage sectors.

"Sales continue to fall off a cliff with a net 77% of companies reporting lower sales in comparison to a net 72% in the previous survey. To put this in context there has been an eight fold increase in the number of companies reporting reduced sales in comparison to the same period last year. Only 23% of companies expect to increase sales over the next 12 months. Not surprisingly profit levels are badly affected with a massive 73% of companies anticipating a reduction in net profits, while 61% expect revenues to decline over the next 12 months, down from 69% in the previous quarter."

A massive 81% of companies said their sales/order books are down in comparison to last year. But only 33% of companies reported that their stock levels are down for the year, in comparison to 24% in the previous quarter, suggesting that overcapacity is still plaguing this economy and putting more pressure ahead on employment levels.

Credit crunch is also getting worse: "26% of companies have orders, production capacity and markets unserviced for want of working capital."

And new orders are being pressured by existent orders cancellations (implying even more pressure on employment in the short term) as "54% of companies have encountered cancellation of orders in the last quarter." Interestingly (the level of detail supplied in the survey is remarkable), cancellations were from,
  • Locally Based Multinationals 16%.
  • Export Destinations 7%
  • Local Indigenous Firms 77%
This means only one thing - domestic economy is still in a free fall and exporters are the last line of defense we have left. It is Stalingrad time for Brians & Mary and they are still in denial that the winter has arrived.

SMEs continue to reduce "investment in their businesses with 32% having done so in comparison to 30% in the previous quarter. 19% indicated they increased investment, down from 25% in the previous 3 months. Only 16% of companies anticipate an increase in investment over the next 12 months."

This puts to an end any arguments the Government might have had about aiding the investment cycle through 'knowledge' economy programmes and tax changes they 'introduced' in December 2008. It ain't working, folks.

Although our Government economists are keen on talking about deflation, "firms continue to experience inflationary pressures, with increases of 5% plus being reported for transport, energy, raw materials, Insurance and waste. However, there is evidence of reductions in wage costs and rents." So in the nutshell - the Government and its cronies in the unionised, state-controlled and priced sectors are still ripping-off consumers and producers, while ordinary workers are taking a pay hit.

Finally, "47% of companies apportion blame to the Government for the current economic crisis, with a significant number of SMEs concerned at the lack of direction being provided."

I don't have much to add to this one.

Friday, June 5, 2009

Economics 05/06/2009: PMI, Live Register & Why Brian Cowen is simply wrong on economy

So things are getting better, say Comrade ‘Surreal Economist’ Cowen. Translated into human language (any human language short of North Korean) this really means that we have a terrible crisis that is getting worse at a decreasing (for now) rate. What do I mean?


Exchequer returns were bad, but they were not worse than in April. Hmmm – it only took thousands of families drowned in fresh taxes to get us this far. And add to it a ‘slowdown’ in the rate of growth in expenditure. Mr Cowen calls this ‘the right policy that is supported by the majority of economists and the ESRI’. About the only part of this assessment that I would agree with is the one which separates ESRI from economists – being a nearly purely state-paid ‘group-think tank’, ESRI is not about economics, it is about kissing the… you know what.


Back to the ‘greening’ shoots of this week… Irish PMI figures came in with a slowdown in the rate of decline… same as with the Exchequer results… again – things are not getting better, they are getting worse, but worse at a slower pace. Now, services sectors in Ireland, per PMI, shrank for the consecutive 16th month in May, as NCB’s PMI rose from 32.2 in April to 39.5 in May. If this is a glimmer of hope, it is a smile from the bottom of the ocean. Future expectations are up to 50.8 in May, which is good news, when compared to the reading of 46.6 in April, but what this means exactly, given that we are heading into summer doldrums is highly unclear. One brighter star at the bottom of the barrel was Technology, Media & Telecos (TMT) – most upbeat of all sectors. Apparently, contraction is over in the sector, per May data. I am sceptical here, since this sector just got a boost from political advertising spend, and it has contracted at an extremely fast pace in December 2008-February 2009. Furthermore, most of the spend for the TMT sector for 2009 has already been allocated, so the contraction might have overshot the target before, with a slight bounce to the low flat trend expected about now.


Manufacturing PMI came virtually with the same results as services PMI, delivering a rise to 39.4 in May from 36.1. In other words – still no expansion, or 16 straight months of contraction. Export component of PMI rose, but remains below expansion reading. “With the domestic economy so weak, look for the new export orders component of the PMI to breach the 50 mark before the headline PMI will follow suit”, NCB’s Brian Devine told The Guardian. I agree. So where does this leaves Mr Cowen’s ‘right’ policies? Oh, not far from the proverbial ‘hole’. If Mr Cowen’s policies were right, we should not be expecting our economy to be rescued by exports or in other words, if our policies were to work, they would have positive effect on domestic economy. Instead, Mr Cowen is now positioning himself to claim completely undue credit for any upturn in the global economy… after having spent last 10 months blaming the world for Irish economic troubles.


Going forward, my expectation is for a flat trend for both PMI reports with some volatility in months to come. Autumn 2009 can potentially yield another round of relatively shallow (compared to 2008) contractions, especially in services.


The real issue from now on will be what can we do with an army of unemployed, bankrupt families that is amassing in the country and how can we get out of the hole that Mr Cowen and his predecessor have forced us into.


Today’s Live Register data does not provide much of hope that the task will be easy. In May there was another 13,500 increase in numbers claiming benefits in May. It might have been the lowest monthly rise since September 2008, but we now have 402,100 on the Live Reg and we are still on track for reaching 500,000 before we can toast the New Year.


Dynamics are tough to gauge. May’s monthly rate of increase was 3.5%, down for the fourth consecutive month and the slowest pace of growth since May 2008. But there is no indication that we are not going to see another bout of accelerating growth in unemployment comes June and then September-October. One reason to note – males are still dominating the firing line (65% of all new additions to the LR in May), so at some point in time, there will be new entry by women. How do I know? Simple – since December, layoffs have been moving off the construction sector into other, more ‘gender balanced’ sectors. I many cases, employers there offered voluntary redundancies with rather generous pay-offs. Women were the most likely to take such for a number of reasons:

· Women are more willing to switch into part-time employment;

· Women are more likely to go into continued education than men;

· Women are more likely to undertake family work than men etc

So this means that there a many ‘hidden’ layoffs working their way through redundancy packages that will surface once money becomes extremely tight.


Just in case you still believe in Mr Cowen’s economic assessment, give the following fact a thought. It comes courtesy of the Ulster Bank economics team and I agree with them wholly:


The Live Register estimate of the unemployment rate increased from 11.4% in April to 11.8% in May, a rate last seen in May 1996. Our unemployment rate forecast of 14% by the end of this year therefore continues to look realistic. While today’s figures were certainly a welcome improvement on preceding months, the numbers signing on will continue to rise in coming months, as job losses in the services sector, most notably in wholesale and retail and hotels and restaurants, in addition to layoffs in construction, are ongoing. We therefore continue to forecast that the unemployment rate will peak at 16% by the end of 2010, before falling back gradually when the economy starts to recover.”


So Brian’s policies are working, then… too bad he can’t even tell us which policies he has in mind…

Thursday, June 4, 2009

Economics 04/06/2009: Exchequer returns for May

First order of business today is to say "Happy Birthday, Jen" to my (much) better half - "I miss you here in Moscow!"

Second order of business is the Exchequer release from yesterday. As my access to data and software is somewhat more restricted here, it is a short analysis:

January-May 2009 tax receipts are in and they are down €3.6bn y-o-y – 21%, slightly better than –24% decline in January-April. Uncork that vintage Dom, Brian? Not yet…

Budget expectations are for 15.6% decline in the entire 2009. Not likely at the current rate. So far we have: 5 months receipts accounting for 39% of the total of projected annual intake of €34.4bn. Annual projection from here suggests that we are going to see around €32-33bn assuming all goes as planned.

Good news, in 2007 we also had 39% collected by the end of May. Bad news is – we had a very robust flow of business for SMEs and self-employed – all of whom force tax payments into the end of the year. Now, recall that we are going to see two things around October-November: (1) tax returns reconciled for 2008, (2) tax returns estimates for 2009. On (1) we can assume that estimates made, say in October 2008 did not fully take in the carnage of November-December, so estimated payments back in October 2008 will be erring on higher side, implying that the actual returns filed in autumn 2009 might be much weaker. On (2), given the current tax measures in place, businesses and self-employed will do everything possible to reduce and delay payments, so estimates will be erring on a lower side and tax deductions will be used to the max. I am not sure that a combination of (1) and (2) will not provide for relatively poor showing in autumn returns.

Current moderating is most likely reflective of the fact that the first half of 2008 was relatively buoyant, so the corresponding period in 2009 is going to register steeper declines. This will moderate into the second half of 2009, naturally, but it will mean preciously little, because any decline on the debacle that we witnessed in H2 2009 is going to be a disaster reinforced.

Another issue to keep in mind: current figures include two rounds of tax increases – Budget 2009 and, partially, Supplementary Budget 2009 – some €230mln added in 5 months. So one can expect further push on tax receipts side. The fact that it is not very impressive is telling me that tax measures are not working and tax substitution and minimization are now working their way through the economy.

To see how bad the new tax measures are at raising revenue – consider the fact that tax receipts in April were 1.7% below the tax profile published on April 28. In other words, within days, the receipts have already slowed down 1.7% relative to what DofF expected. May figures were 1.9% ahead of the profile: Corpo Taxes came in €155mln ahead of profile, Excise and Income taxes were ahead by €48mln and €39mln, respectively. VAT was down €139 million on profile in the month. So, ok – we are now bang on the target when it comes to profile.
Note: the source for the above table is Ulster Bank, with minor adjsutments by me.

But Income tax receipts were driven by new taxes, as are Excise duties, and the two will see some new pressure per optimising households and businesses. Corpo tax can surprise on the upside, assuming the US MNCs continue to book profits here – that is the big unknown in my view. CGT is also a candidate for downgrades as investors are shifting out of Ireland, booking losses here. In general, apart from income tax, other revenues were down 27% in May – a moderation of sorts on 32% decline in April, but the flattening out of the tax decreases curve is not anything to cheer about – it is simply the nature of any asymptotic dynamics: the closer you get to absolute zero, the slower the pace.

So back to income tax measures: €48mln monthly gains in May suggest that the income tax measures to date are yielding: 48mln*5/0.39=615mln in revenue, assuming that income tax follows the same path over the year as total tax receipts. A far cry from €1.5-2bn envisioned and very much close to what myself and other observers were expecting back in April.

In the mean time, spending races ahead: current expenditure was up 4.3% (in April it was up 4.5% but the latest ‘moderation’ is still placing current spending at an insolvency levels and the decrease was due to factors other than demand for social welfare and public sector wages). Capital spend continues to fall - down 6.3% year-on-year. Some suggested that there are timing issues delaying capital spending boost, but we are now 5 months into the year and this leaves me wondering – what sort of timing are we talking about?

On the net, therefore, May figures are no real improvement: receipts are flattening at a very slow rate, we might be closer to target here than before, but this only means a difference of €1-2bn on revenue side – a chop-change for our public sector wasters. On expenditure side, we are now 10 months past the July 2008 promises by the Government to introduce real savings, and… zilch, nada, none, nyet, can’t find any no matter how hard I am looking… If a rapidly decaying alcoholic were to be the allegory for the Exchequer balance sheet, we are past the gulp stage and into a burp moment. The hand with a bottle is rising once again, drawing closer and closer to the mouth. How long can this last? Your guess is as good as mine, but a friend today suggested that 6 weeks from now the Government will say, “Whoops, due to international economic conditions (WHICH HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH THE LAST 12 YEARS OF FIANNA FAIL RULE) our readiness for rebound which was most certainly there when we said so has now disappeared. Not our fault, mate.”

Sounds about right…

Tuesday, May 26, 2009

Economics 26/05/2009: US Confidence, NAMA-pack lunacy

I am back from the fabled Russian 'dacha' - the world so close to Moscow, yet so far away that no email can reach you there (assuming you have O2 for your I-phone service provider charging monopoly rip-off rates for data roaming). Sunny last two days and lovely 21 degrees weather. Good fishing. Missing Luca and his Mama, though.

I spotted few stories worth mentioning. First - from the US, then - about NAMA (scroll to the end of the post to read this one)

First, the US Consumer Confidence pick up from 40.8 in April to 54.9 in May - a fourth largest jump in the series in history. Basically, the drivers of expectations rise are business conditions, labour market and personal income, which means the rise is broadly defined. This is good news, as this time around we have a combination of twin factors underpinning the improvement: not only Consumer Confidence rose itself, but the 'Misery Index' components, short of house markets (see Case-Shiller latest data analysis here), are also stabilising. But, should we read to far into the 'resurgent consumer' story or is the US consumer simply catching the same fever as the US (and other countries') politicians who are all too eager to sound the bells of an impeding recovery?

There is a rising sense of denial of the fact that the crisis is far from being over in the US Administration. So much so, that the Tim Geithner managed to simply forget the causes of the current US Housing crisis (see here) in his interview with Washington Post:

Washington Post: "...When you look at the collapse of the housing market, who do you think bears the greatest responsibility? Is it the banks for pushing these loans? Is it the consumer for borrowing over their means? The regulators?"
Geithner: "For something this big and damaging to happen it takes a lot of mistakes over time. ...Interest rate here and around the world were kept too low for too long. Investors ...took a bunch of risks without understanding the risks. ...Rating agencies failed to rate these products adequately. Supervisors failed to underwrite loans with sufficiently conservative standards. So those basic checks and balances failed. And people borrowed too much."

So no regulators faults? No Billy Clinton 'empowering the poor to homeownership' policies fault? No financial services authorities overseeing securities and financial markets (and thus securitization, wholesale lending, etc) fault? Given this state of denial coming from the Treasury top man in office, what can one expect from the poor Fannie & Freddie - late last week, Federal Housing Agency (FHA), the primary tool for Bill Clinton's ill-fated attempt to financialise subprime borrowers has noted that Fannie Mae's HomeSaverAdvance (HSA) programme, launched in February 2008 in an attempt to provide aid to the homeowners who fell behind on their mortgage repayments has produced an increase in re-defaults. FHA director James Lockhart said in a Congressional report last week that “Performance on the February through April [HSA] offerings shows a redefault rate of almost 70%.” Well, I bet. You give bloated mortgages to those who can never repay them, then the proverbial S***T hits the fan and they default. You, thus, give them another unsecured loan to delay the inevitable foreclosure and, guess what, once the dosh runs out, they default again...

Of course, Geithner can take solace that there are plenty of even less enlightened political leaders and regulators out there. I mean Brian 'The Saviour' Cowen (here and here) is simply in such a deep denial, that Geithner's statements read like a sign of lucidity.

And Brian is not alone: NAMA-own Peter 'The Wise' Bacon and Brendan 'The Sleeping-Pill' McDonagh appeared before the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Finance & Public Service (note the irony of putting together Finance and Public Service) today. Per Irish Times and RTE reports:

Mr McDonagh: “We believe the Government is basically interested in keeping banks listed and relies on Nama to trigger a change of market sentiment”.

This clearly indicates that the Government is planning to overpay for the assets transferred to NAMA in order to avoid a much more transparent recapitalization call from the banks post-NAMA. In response, JPMorgan Chase analysts wrote that he sees "sizeable chances of a smaller haircut to avoid further capital needs”. Well, DOUGH, as Homer would reply. The beef here is that the taxpayers are now being set up by the Government to take the fall instead of the banks and developers. Again, all of you know I have nothing against either the banks or the developers, but I am adamantly against my bank account and income being raided by Lenihan to rescue his cronies. And, when the state overpays for assets to avoid future re-capitalisation the taxpayers do not get shares in the banks we re-float.

RTE: "The details of loans furnished to NAMA yesterday from the six covered institutions will show for the first time the exposure of individual developers. Mr McDonagh said a number of borrowers had loans of more than €1bn across all the institutions. Up to a 1,000 borrowers have loans greater than €10mln."

That is a sign of a heavily concentrated market. Which means that foreclosing on some of these 'systemic' borrowers will not be a problem for the country - take a straight hit on assets side and see no ripple effect. But no,

McDonagh said (also per RTE) "NAMA was not in the business of liquidation, but developers who did not comply with NAMA would face the full legal consequences. Finance Minister Brian Lenihan told the committee some liquidations, receiverships and bankruptcies would have to take place."

Now, here are few things to consider:
  1. If NAMA will not be liquidating non-performing assets, how big is the downside it will accept? If downside were to be limited, how can foreclosures, liquidations or receiverships (flr) be avoided?
  2. What 'full legal consequences' does Mr McDonagh have in mind if not flr?
  3. What does Mr McDonagh mean by complying with NAMA?
  4. If NAMA were to have fixed life span, how will NAMA deal with assets that are not performing at the end of such period? Just pretend they do not exist?
  5. What is the difference between NAMA and a Japanese-styled hyper-zombie bank if NAMA cannot liquidate assets?

Mr McDonagh said that claw back levy to address losses from NAMA will not be decided "until the agency completed its work in 10 years' time and the amount realised by assets was clear". Hold on a minute -

  • we now have a date: 10 years. Given that the life-span of NAMA has been cut from 15 years to 10 years, questions 1-5 above just became so much more important as in effect the zombie bank will have to be wound up sooner, rather than later;
  • how does Mr McDonagh see the claw back uncertainty impacting banks operations over the next 10 years? How does he see it impacting risk pricing for NAMA bonds? Does Mr McDonagh actually have a clue what he is talking about? It appears not, for he sees no problem with any of the above issues.

Per RTE: "Finance Minister Brian Lenihan said the levy could not be included in the NAMA legislation for legal reasons but it could be added to a future Finance Act. But he said it would be made clear when NAMA was set up that the levy could be applied in the future."

This is truly amazing. Lenihan also does not understand issues of risk pricing for banks, investors, bond holders, state bond buyers and the Exchequer. Furthermore, I fail to comprehend how will the legal reasons that prevent the Irish Government today from publishing details of the clawback vanish in the future? By some magic FF wand?

Dr Peter Bacon, said (per RTE) "it was important to take all development loans into the agency, including performing loans, in order to give certainty to investors. He said it did not matter whether the loans resided in the banks, overseen by NAMA, or whether they transferred fully to NAMA. The critical point is that NAMA provides the strategic direction, he said".

What 'certainty to investors' does he have in mind? Investors in the banks? Investors in development project? Investors in state bonds? Certainty of return? Certainty in a specific level of return? Certainty that NAMA is not a pure zombie bank? Certainty that the banks will not be saddled with the full NAMA bill in the future?

Perhaps the most astounding feature of the entire reported discourse between Mr Bacon, Mr McDonagh and Brian Lenihan on NAMA is that not a single one of them is concerned with the taxpayers' money significantly enough to discuss the risks of losses to the ordinary people from NAMA operations. Given that, you can't tell me that NAMA is not a pure rescue scheme for the cronies of our political elites...

Friday, May 22, 2009

Economics 23/05/2009: Is Ireland next Finland?

A recent (April 2009) paper by Gorodnichenko, Medoza and Tesar (IZA DP4113) titled “The Finnish Great Depression: From Russia with Love” provides some very interesting analysis of the causes and dynamics of the Finnish economy collapse in 1991-1993 period that contains insights into the current Irish experieince.

During the 1991-93 period, Finland experienced the deepest economic slump in an industrialized country since the 1930s. Between 1990 and 1993 real GDP declined by 11%, real consumption declined by 10% and investment fell to 45%. Unemployment rose from slightly under 4% to a peak of 18.5%, and the stock market fell 60%.

Gorodnichenko, Medoza and Tesar argue that the collapse of trade with the Soviet Union played a major role in causing the 1990s Great Depression in Finland, “since it caused a costly restructuring of the manufacturing sector and a sudden, significant increase in the cost of energy. The barter-type trade arrangements between the USSR and Finland skewed Finnish manufacturing production and investment toward particular industries, and effectively allowed Finland to export non-competitive products in exchange for energy imports at an overvalued exchange rate.” Furthermore, the study also suggests that “downward wage rigidity observed in Finland played a key role in the amplification of the downturn produced by these shocks.”

This is an interesting result. Obviously, trade shock described by Gorodnichenko, Medoza and Tesar does not directly translate to Ireland in current conditions. But some similarities are also evident.

First, just as the Finnish industries exports to the USSR were subsidised by the importing partner via particular pricing mechanisms, so are Irish exporting sectors – especially those dominated by the MNCs are ‘subsidised’ by the presence of the advantageous tax regime and transfer pricing. In other words, if Finnish exporters had to rely on Soviet benevolence in pricing their trade via oil-goods barter arrangements, so are Irish exporting sectors reliant on tax arbitrage. Neither one has a natural (productivity-driven) comparative advantage in trade when compared to other countries.

Second, the same wage rigidity that cost Finland dearly is also present in Ireland. Suffices to say, wage rigidities were also found to be important determinants of the severity and the length of the Finnish crisis by other studies. In particular, labor tax hikes and negative productivity shocks may have been the culprit (Conesa, Kehoe and Ruhl, 2007). Once again, the parallel to Ireland today is striking. By hiking income taxes, Irish Government in effect made it virtually impossible for workers to accept pay cuts, implying that our Government’s reckless policies are amplifying wage rigidity in Ireland. More on this below.

“Finland and the USSR had a series of five-year, highly regulated trade agreements, similar to the agreements between the USSR and its East European allies. These agreements established the volume and composition of trade between the two countries, and by the late 1980s they had evolved into a barter of Finnish manufactures for Soviet crude oil. Roughly 80% of Finnish imports from the USSR in the early 1980s were in the form of mineral fuels and crude materials. More than 90% of imported oil and 100% of imported natural gas came from the USSR.” Sounds familiar? Well, 90% of Irish exports are delivered via tax arbitrage-driven MNCs. Not exactly a ‘Curse of Oil’, but a curse nonetheless.

In a survey of the structural effects of Soviet trade on the Finnish economy, Kajaste (1992, p. 29) concludes that “[Soviet] exports seem to have been exceptionally profitable.” Kajaste (1992) estimated that the prices of exports to the Soviet Union were at least 9.5% higher than those for exports to western markets. Gorodnichenko, Medoza and Tesar found an even larger 36%markup which “suggests that if a Finnish industry redirected its Soviet trade to other countries, its goods would be competitive only if sold at a 10% to 36%discount. Hence, the Finnish economy was subsidized by overvalued prices of Finnish manufactures bartered for Soviet oil so that the effective price of Soviet oil was at least 10% cheaper than its market price.” Well, in Ireland’s case we know that transfer pricing runs ca 15%-18% differential between GDP and GNP. This is, at the very least, a lower bound estimate to the subsidy Irish economy receives from the tax arbitrage-driven exporting activities of our MNCs.


Just as Irish economy decline has been spectacularly fast, Finnish economy collapse was “quick and deep. Imports of oil from the USSR fell from 8.2 million tons in 1989 to 1.3 million tons in 1992. Exports tumbled down by 84% over the same period. …The loss of Soviet exports caused total exports to fall, suggesting that the goods were not redirected to other counties. After the collapse of trade with the USSR in December of 1990, entire industries had to be reorganized throughout the early 1990s.” Hmmm, you would say that Ireland is a different case in so far as we are not facing a possibility of an abrupt collapse in demand for our (MNC’s) exports. True. But we might see a total collapse in supply of exports by MNCs, should our tax arbitrage advantage be eroded by:
1. Higher domestic costs f production;
2. Higher domestic taxes leading to more rigid and inflationary wage processes;
3. Lower cost of production elsewhere;
4. Lower taxes elsewhere; and so on…

Per Gorodnichenko, Medoza and Tesar, “to fully understand the reaction of the Finnish economy to the collapse of the Soviet trade, it is important to examine the Finnish labor market because of its very high degree of unionization. In 1993, approximately 85% of workers belonged to unions and almost 95% of workers were covered by collective agreements (Böckerman and Uusitalo, 2006). Since most employers are organized in federations, the wage bargaining normally starts at the national level. If a federation or union rejects the nation-wide agreement, it can negotiate its own terms. Typically, agreements allow upward wage drift if firms perform well. Although the government does not have a formal role in the bargaining process, the government usually intermediates negotiations.8 Not surprisingly, Finland is often classified as a country with highly centralized wage setting (e.g., Botero et al 2004).


Just as in the case of Ireland’s public sector since 2008, Finnish “unions did not agree to cut nominal wages in 1992-1993, which were the peak years of the depression. Instead, wages were frozen at the 1991 level.” Irony has it, Mr Cowen is doing exactly this, except, unlike Finland, Ireland is currently running deflation, which means that public sector wages are rising in real terms through the downturn. In Finland, “given that inflation was quite moderate in the 1990s, real wages fell only to a limited extent. These findings are consistent with Dickens et al (2007) who cite Finland as the country with one of the greatest downward wage rigidities… Rigid wages amplify the contraction in demand in the short run. As consumers purchase fewer goods, firms demand less labor which entails further contraction of demand and the spiral continues. In summary, a combination of higher costs of producing goods, as well as a fall in demand magnified by rigid wages leads to large short-run multiplicative effects on the initial shocks.”

What is even more interesting is that Gorodnichenko, Medoza and Tesar show that output and economic activity in Finland during the 1990s crisis was, in the short run, sensitive to changes in the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour (loosely speaking a measure of relative labour productivity in the sectors where capital and labour are substitutes). When changing the degree of wage stickiness, the study “found that wage stickiness plays a very important role. In particular, the key parameter governing the response of the macroeconomic variables to the [crisis] is the persistence of real wages”. More specifically, “in the case with fully flexible wages, the recession is short and shallow. For example, output, employment, investment and consumption fall only by 2-5% and there are hardly any dynamics after the first year. Thus, the response of investment, output, consumption and employment is small when compared to the response of these variables in the data.”

Now, “when wages are rigid, the shock reduces the marginal product of labor and firms would like to hire less labor at the current wages or to keep employment fixed but cut wages. If wages are rigid, the adjustment occurs via quantities and the model can capture sizable decreases in output, consumption, investment and labor. The recession is considerably deeper when wages are inflexible.” Guess what: this is exactly what is happening in Ireland today, so next time you see Brian Cowen talking gibberish about his policies delivering for Ireland, remember – per Gorodnichenko, Medoza and Tesar (and per all conventional economics) not cutting public sector wages leads to higher private sector unemployment and deeper recession.

One would expect someone with Alan Ahearne’s grasp of basic economic theory to make an argument against Mr Cowen’s insistence not to reduce public sector wages, but hey – when you are being paid some serious dosh, you might forget economics for a while…

Economics 22/05/2009: Tumbleweed Brain?

Imagine a high desert scene outside Los Angeles - vast expanse of nothingness, sandy patch of a road and a massive, prickly and menacingly fast advancing tumbleweed rolling at you, kicking up dust of sand every time it bumps over a rock or a hillock. Thus, the picture of devastation complete, the sense of stable equilibrium achieved, the landscape is all but a sign of devastation.

Would you call it an image of hope?

Well, Brian Cowen does.

Today reports claim that Mr Cowen told FF gathering that the Government had taken necessary decisions to ensure the Irish economy could bounce back next year. So what can go wrong? Jobless and about to lose your home? Pay-up to the Revenue and shut up, for FF has taken the necessary decisions. We are but the roadkill for Cowen and Co on the road to his recovery.

Mr Cowen also decided that the high cover achieved in the last auction for 5-year bonds was a sign of investors regaining confidence in Ireland Inc.

This blog has long argued that the demand for Irish bonds is similar to a Ponzi pyramid due to Irish banks rolling over Government debt to the ECB and monetizing it. Yesterday's Irish Times editorial finally bowed to the facts and agreed. Last week, Michael Somers of NTMA has "pointed out that 85 per cent of Ireland’s debt is held abroad but that in recent bond sales, Irish banks were significant buyers of Government debt" to be used as collateral to borrow from the ECB. This was not, he said, “a genuine end investor result". How much did the latest bond auction success depend on investment by Irish banks which have already received some €7 billion from the Government to help secure their survival? The NTMA should ease investor concerns and set out the details," said the Irish Times.

I think it is time we ask a hard question about our bond market revolving door to the ECB. Is it true that:
  • as Brian Lenihan takes our taxes, we are hit once; then
  • as Brian Lenihan issues bonds, we are hit again with the debt to be repaid in the future; and
  • as the banks buy these bonds and go to the ECB to borrow against them, we are saddled with the banks-held debt that will have to be repaid to the ECB at some point in time and which is, in the end, our - taxpayers - liability too? so that
  • the entire scheme requires continuous borrowing to sustain itself...
And what is all of this Ponzi pyramid used for? To finance early retirements of the civil servants and to pay their increments? This, indeed, is what Mr Cowen calls 'the necessary decisions'.

Cowen also stated that "we have a way out that is working". Remember the brilliant German movie Downfall about the last days of the Third Reich? (See a reminder/spoof here). Say no more... our unbeloved leader is in a state of delusion that is equivalent to awaiting the arrival of a miracle weapon (which does not exist) as the real enemy tanks are crushing your city.

What plan does Mr Cowen have? Brian Cowen claimed that economic recovery will be based on 4 pillars:
  1. Banking crisis resolution;
  2. Public finances gap closure via revenue increases and spending cuts;
  3. Jobs protection; and
  4. Investing in the unemployed to return them to work.
Brian Cowen has produced not a single policy to address any of the four pillars. Not a single one.

The entire country now is aware that NAMA cannot be made to work. Brian Cowen is in denial of this.

The entire country knows that he has not cut public spending (his own Government Budget shows increasing public current expenditure in every year through 2013). Brian Cowen is in denial of this.

The entire country knows that his Government is drawing blood out of taxpayers to raise revenue and that it is not working. Brian Cowen is in denial of this.

The entire country sees jobs being lost in thousands week, after week, as Brian Cowen and his Government choke enterprises, workers, investors and entrepreneurs with higher and higher taxes and charges. Brian Cowen is in denial of this.

The entire country knows that it was Brian Cowen as Minister for Finance who raised our social welfare rates to such a level that no programme that FAS can run will ever turn former construction workers off the welfare. The entire country knows that FAS should be renamed FARCE because it is one of the most wasteful and least productive Government organizations. Brian Cowen is in denial of this.

It is my sincere hope that his own party colleagues stop listening to the man for two reasons:
  1. Brian Cowen no longer speaks for the people, about the people and with the people; and
  2. No one listens to Brian Cowen anymore.
Brian Cowen is in denial of reality.

Friday, May 8, 2009

Finance Bill 2009: Economically-illiterate and jobs-destroying

Finance Bill 2009 published yesterday confirms a simple fact Lenihan and Cowen are hell-bent on pillaging this economy and destroying private growth and wealth.

I will focus on far less-discussed Explanatory Memorandum:
  • confirms that "the income levy rates in force in the first four months of the year will apply to redundancy payments made up to 30 April 2009" - so DofF has venally gone after people who lost their jobs and was forced to step back. No worries, they'll get you in some other ways. But this means that the DofF projections for €754mln in 2009 due to be raised out of income levies is now looking more like my predicted (here) €714mln.
How? Well, we had some 384,400-268,600=115,800 people joining the Live Register since November 2008, this is probably ca 80% of those laid off in the period and so the numbers of those getting redundancies since January 1 (there is a lag in redundancy payments for quite a few workers due to cash flow problems in many businesses) are close to the above number. Statutory redundancy is 2 weeks pa, so say on average we have around 4 weeks of pay pa of service, for median salary of the laid off of, say €35,000 pa. Average tenure in the job is 5 years. Redundancy total paid since January is around €1.55bn mark. At 1% foregone levy, flat, that is €15.5mln. Annualized - €46.5mln. Ouch! Yet, it does not stop there - those 115,800 workers aren't going to get a job any time soon, so their income taxes (and levies) are now NIL. Foregone levies? Ouch, €41.5mln odd for the rest of 2009 income... And that is before we get to factor in the Laffer Curve effect of levies on the rest of us...

Yes, Brian, you should have sent Lenihan to Economics 101...

  • "Section 5 amends section 97 of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 in relation to the extent to which interest on borrowed money used to purchase, improve or repair a rented premises can be deducted in computing the amount of taxable rental income. Where the borrowed money is used to purchase, improve or repair a residential premises, 75% of the interest on the borrowings can now be deducted instead of the normal 100%".
Now, I am not the biggest fan of buy-to-let investors, but... this is absolutely arbitrary. If I invest in a business - to increase that business' earning capacity, I can write it off against my earnings. Well, rental properties are business too. This measure is arbitrary in so far as it applies to a relative penalty to specific businesses. It is also idiotic, for it discourages improvements in properties, or in other words reduces efficiency of the existent housing stock in the country.

Yes, Brian, you should have sent Lenihan and DofF to Economics 101... preferably not taught by Alan Ahearne...

  • "Section 6 amends section 644A of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 (which deals with the income tax treatment of income arising from dealing in residential development land) by providing for the abolition of the 20% incentive rate of income tax on such income, with effect from the 2009 tax year. From 2009 onwards such income will be taxed under normal income tax rules. The section also inserts a new section 644AA into the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 [on] certain trading losses arising from a trade of dealing in residential development land where if profits had been earned the profits would have qualified for the 20% incentive rate of income tax. Under normal income tax rules, a loss sustained in a trade may be set ... against the person’s other income. In the case of losses sustained in a trade of dealing in residential development land, ...such losses (sustained in a trade in which if profits had been made would have been taxed at 20%) could be set against the person’s other income taxable at the higher 41% rate. The new section provides that such losses must first be converted into a tax credit, valued at 20% of the loss, and then allows the tax credit to be set sideways in the year the loss is sustained
    against tax payable on the person’s other income."
Brian-the-Genghis-Khan of Irish finances is now doing the following: you can earn income and pay a tax of 41%, plus levies, but if in the process you incur a loss, you can only write it off at 20% tax rate. This is patently business retarding. Application of this Zimbabwean-like measure to residential development land is not the point. The point is that the tax charge is more than twice the loss write-off charge. Of course, Zanu-FF will never pass this onto the entire economy - because our MNCs and large domestic vested interests will never allow this to occur, but... drop-by-drop he will start extending this in the next Budget to other parts of business.

But again, an added here is a bonus insight into Brian's economic illiteracy. The banks and corporates are overloaded with bad loans at this time. Much of it is collateralized on or lent on development land. If we were to force the banks to take serious writedowns and to see developers do so as well, why are we introducing a 50% penalty for them to do this? Brian is creating zombie land banks in return for a couple of hundred of euros he might claw back from a handful of forced sales of land. This is (a) going to haunt us for a long period of time, and (b) bodes poorly for the prospect of NAMA not generating the same...

  • Finally, where a claim for terminal loss relief (i.e. on the permanent cessation of a trade) has not been made to and received by Revenue before 7 April 2009, the new section restricts the relief so that any part of the terminal loss that relates to a loss sustained, before 1 January 2009, in a trade of dealing in residential development
    land is ‘‘ring-fenced’’ and can only be set against income arising in that trade, or in that part of a trade, in prior years.
So no booking of losses after January 1, 2009 on development land. This is a penalty on those going bust in 2009 - a venal act, given that some developers tried their best to stay afloat before then and are now facing back taxes on business losses. Again, not being enamoured with land speculation myself, I just don't think this is a good way of reducing such activity in the future, but rather a way to kick in the sensitive area those who are already down. Well done, Brian.

In contrast, Section 8 allows for a close-off period for nursing homes incentives scheme phase-out. Why not for development land, Brian? After all, what's more toxic and needs to be written off faster and in a more orderly fashion?

In further contrast, here is a fair treatment:
  • Section 11 abolishes the effective 20% rate applied to trading profits from dealing in residential development land with effect from 1 January 2009. An accounting period that straddles that date is treated for this purpose as two accounting periods. Profits or gains on dealing in residential development land will now be charged at the general rate of corporation tax that applies to dealing in land, which is 25%.
The only question to be asked here is why on earth did we have this exemption in the first place?
  • Section 7 amends section 372AW of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 which relates to the Mid-Shannon Corridor Tourism Infrastructure Investment Scheme. One of the conditions of this tax incentive scheme is that the Mid-Shannon Tourism Infrastructure Board must grant approval in principle for investment projects in advance of expenditure being incurred. At present an application for such
    approval in principle must be made within one year of the commencement of the Scheme, i.e. by 31 May 2009. This amendment extends the period during which such applications can be made from one year to two years so that the latest date for the submission of applications is now 31 May 2010. Under the Scheme, the current period within which expenditure must be incurred for capital allowances purposes is the three-year period commencing on 1 June 2008 and ending on 31 May 2011. To cater for any projects that may avail of the new date for the submission of applications for approval in principle, this period is also being extended and will now end on 31 May 2013.
So all is fine in the land of wasted resources - Mid-Shannon development incentives scheme is being extended... Typical FF regional subsidies waste before the local elections.


Down to the part where Brian extorts the money out of the ordinary folks:
  • Section 9 increases Deposit Interest Retention Tax by two percentage points with effect from 8 April 2009. Section 10 increases the rates of tax applying to life assurance policies and investment funds by two percentage points with effect from 8 April 2009. Section 14 gives effect to the proposal announced in the Budget statement to increase the rate of capital gains tax from 22% to 25% in respect of disposals made from midnight on 7 April 2009. Section 15 confirms the Budget increase in the rate of Mineral Oil Tax on auto-diesel which, when VAT is included, amounts to 5 cent on a litre. Section 16 confirms the Budget increases in the rates of Tobacco Products Tax which, when VAT is included, amount to 25 cent on a packet of 20 cigarettes with pro-rata increases on other tobacco products.
  • Section 22 provides for an increase in the current non-life insurance levy by 1 per cent to 3 per cent and for a new 1 per cent levy on life assurance policies. The increase in the non-life levy applies to premiums received on or after 1 June 2009 in respect of offers of insurance or notices of renewal of insurance issued by an insurer on or after 8 April 2009. The new levy on life assurance policies applies to premiums received on or after 1 August 2009 in respect of life assurance policies whenever entered into by an insurer.
As expected, the issue of legality of these measures didn't phase DofF. I certainly hope insurers are going to take this state to the ECJ and trash these measures as an arbitrary infringement by the state onto the conditions of the private contracts.

  • Section 23 gives effect to the proposal announced in the Budget statement to reduce the current tax-free thresholds from \542,544 (Group A — broadly speaking, from parent to child), \54,254 (Group B — broadly speaking, between siblings, from children to parents, from grandparents to grandchildren, and from uncles and aunts to nephews and nieces) and \27,127 (Group C — all cases not covered by Group A and Group B) to \434,000, \43,400 and \21,700 respectively. The section also increases from 22% to 25% the rate of tax in respect of gifts or inheritances taken after midnight on 7 April 2009.
This is clear hand out to the trade unionists - you work all your life, you save and invest, you pass it over to your children and you get milked by the state on assets which were acquired from after-tax income. This is a signal that Brian Lenihan wants to send to us, wealth-creators, and to the rest of the world.

I certainly hope that during his ''road show' selling Ireland Inc, at least one prospective foreign investor stands up and asks him: "Minister, if you can raid your own peoples' wealth in an arbitrary and unilateral fashion such as this, what guarantees can you give us, foreigners, that you will not turn Ireland into a Zimbabwe, where property rights are adhered to only as long as it is convenient for your Government?"

And watch him avoid your gaze...

Friday, April 24, 2009

Daily Economics 25/04/09: John McGuinness & Alan Ahearne

For my comment on John McGuinness' story, scroll to the bottom.

Alan Ahearne, the newly minted adviser to the Government, has gone into an overdrive mode, tackling the 20 dissenters (including myself) who dared to challenge NAMA as a taxpayers' nightmare waiting to happen (in the Irish Times: here) and striking at criticism against his masters in the Leinster House (Irish Independent report today: here).

Per Ahearne's musings in the Times
It is indeed sad to read an article that so flatly denies itself a chance at having an argument, as Alan's treaties on What's wrong with nationalization. Alan spent some time studying our earlier Times piece (see more on this here), but it is also obvious that he had hard time coming up with arguments against its main points.

Let us start from the top.

"The recommendation that nationalisation of the entire Irish banking system is the only way we can extricate the banks and the economy from the serious difficulties we are experiencing risks diverting the debate away from issues that are much more central to the success of the ...Nama proposal." Alan follows up with a list of such 'central issues' from which our article was allegedly diverting the debate. Alas, all are actually covered in our article. As an aside, we never argued for nationalization of "the entire banking system", but of the systemically important banks alone.

"As in other advanced economies, bank nationalisation is seen very much as a last resort." Our article states that: "We do not make this recommendation from any ideological position. In normal circumstances, none of us would recommend a nationalised banking system. However, these are far from normal times..." We clearly were not advocating nationalization as some sort of a good-fun measure.

"It is important to recall that there is an overwhelming international consensus that the so-called good-bank/bad-bank model on which Nama is strongly based presents the opportunity for achieving an enduring long-term solution to the banking crisis." Actually, there is no such 'consensus'. And even if there was one, just because many other Governments have been working with this specific model does not mean that (a) the model actually works, (b) Ireland should follow in their footsteps and (c) this is the best option for resolving the crisis. The model does not work, as in the US, for example it has managed to absorb vast resources (which Ireland does not possess) and had come under heavy criticism as not delivering.

The fact that Ireland should not blindly follow in others footsteps is apparent. But it is also rather amusing, for the Indo (see below) reports today Alan's own insistence that we should not follow the US in stimulating our economy. No tax breaks to the suffering workers, says Alan, because we are different from the US in fiscal policies. NAMA and no nationalization, says Alan, because we want to follow the US lead in financial markets policies. Same Alan, two divergent points of view...

"One of the main issues identified in the article is the need to restore bank lending. This is a central objective of the Nama initiative. Nationalisation, on the other hand, creates a significant risk of undermining the capacity of the banks to raise funds internationally for domestic lending." Two things worth mentioning.
  1. Alan clearly contradicts here his own statement that our article risks 'diverting' national attention from the core issues relating to NAMA. Obviously it did not: restoring bank lending is "a central objective of the NAMA" (per Alan) and it was identified in our original article as "one of the main issues".
  2. The argument that nationalization undermines banks capacity to borrow internationally is a pure speculation. Firstly, our banks have little capacity to borrow internationally as is. Secondly, when they regain such capacity their ability to do so will be underpinned by public guarantees. Third, why a state-owned (and thus a fully state-insured) bank wouldn't be able to borrow from other banks and the markets? What would prevent, say London- based investors buying BofI bonds when these bonds carry a much stronger default protection under state guarantees than the one afforded to them by the half-competent current management?
"Investors would surely give the Irish market a wide berth in the future – not just in the banking sector – if the State undertook such an extreme step." No they won't, Alan. Banks and public finance in Ireland are in a mess. Investors have already priced these factors in. The markets understand the difference between a healthy, albeit not necessarily extremely profitable company like Elan or CRH and the nationalization-bound banks or economically illiterate Exchequer policies. Such are the basics of investment markets.

Nationalizing banks with clear privatization time line and disbursing privatization vouchers to the taxpayers will send strong signals to the markets that Ireland is:
  • serious about the banking crisis;
  • ready to support household balance sheets in crisis;
  • can creatively stimulate its economy without destroying it fiscal position;
  • will not waste privatization revenue in a gratuitous public spending boost, thus supporting long term fiscal health; and
  • will have a transparent and fixed downside on its banking rescue commitments (i.e no repeated rounds of post-NAMA recapitalizations).
Which one of these points contributes to the international investors shying away from Irish stocks?

"It is difficult to see a credible exit strategy from wholesale bank nationalisation." Read our article on the topic in Business & Finance magazine, Alan. Also, the original Times article, stated in plain English: "...nationalisation offers an opportunity, should the Government see such a need, to share directly with the taxpayers the upside in restoring banking sector health. Such an opportunity could involve a voucher-style reprivatisation of the banks and could be used to provide economic stimulus at a time of scarce resources, at no new cost to the exchequer." So no real mystery as to how a credible exit strategy can be devised, Alan.

But NAMA without nationalization offers no exit strategy at all (credible or not). In fact, it offers no strategy for ending the rounds of repeated bailouts of the banks either.

"Under the Nama initiative the taxpayer is protected from unforeseen losses through the Government’s commitment to levy the banks for any losses incurred." This is simply wrong! Once NAMA owns the assets, what recourse onto banks will the state have should the quality of the assets bought fail to match the price paid? As far as I can see - none. But under nationalization, the state owns all - good and bad assets, and it can price these assets on the ongoing basis as more information on the quality of loans arrives.

"The State has already, under the recapitalisation programme, potential for benefiting from the upside in terms of the recovery in the share prices of the two main banks. The State has an option to purchase at a very low price 25 per cent of the existing ordinary shares in Bank of Ireland, and will soon have a similar claim on AIB." I am sorry, Alan, the 25% shares in BofI and AIB relate to the €5bn that we, the taxpayers have already paid for these banks recapitalization. These shares are wholly independent from NAMA liability and from the future liabilities we will incur under NAMA-triggered second round of recapitalizations. Whichever way you twist it, Alan, the state will have to spend additional cash buying the shares of the banks after we have paid for NAMA!

About the only statement in the entire article I find myself at least in a partial agreement with is: "Empirical evidence strongly suggests that private banks perform better than nationalised banks. International studies have shown that too much “policy-directed” lending by wholly state-owned banks has retarded economic growth. The simple truth is that nationalisation creates a significant risk of a political rather than a commercial allocation of credit." However, the problem here is three-fold:

  1. NAMA is at the same, if not even the greater, risk of becoming politicised;
  2. Banks are going to be majority state-owned post-NAMA (if only at double the cost to the taxpayers), so Ahearne's musings do not resolve the problem he posits; and
  3. We are not in the normal times when empirical evidence holds...
we are in a mess! and Alan's confused rumblings on the topic illustrate the extent of this mess well enough for me.

Per Ahearne's economic policy musings in the Indo
US-styled fiscal "stimulus wouldn't work well anyway in a small, open economy, and, of course, the budget position is such that it just doesn't allow it," Dr Ahearne told Engineers Ireland conference.
Of course he is right on this, but him being right on the technicality does not mean that:
  • It is right to raise taxes on ordinary workers and businesses, as the Budget did, amidst the recession;
  • It is right not to cut public spending by an appreciably significant amount, as the Budget did;
  • It is right to continue awarding public sector wage hikes, as the Government is doing with consultants;
  • It is right to rely on senile plans for Irish-styled 'stimulus' that will waste money on unproven projects, as the Government did;
  • It is right to continue resisting reforms of the public sector, as the Government is doing.

Ahearne further said that 'if the US and the global economy improves next year and Ireland continues to get its public finances in order, then Ireland would be in a position to make a "strong recovery"'. Really, Alan? How so? Through a miraculous return of Dell jobs, Google engineers jobs? Waterford jobs? Tralee jobs? By reversing our losses in exports competitiveness? By scaling down the atrociously high cost of doing business here? Dr Ahearne is so far removed from reality of economic environment that he believes the entire economy can be rescued by the IDA efforts alone?

"Ireland is regaining its competitiveness "very quickly" because of rapidly falling wages, he said", as the Indo reports. "Of course, those declines are painful but they will price a lot of people back into the labour market and, therefore,they are setting the foundations for the recovery." This amazingly callous statement comes from a person who is secure in his own public sector job with high salary. It also comes from an official of this Government.

Wage declines have been borne out by the private sector alone, Alan. Unemployment increases have been borne by the private sector alone, Alan. And most of the real income loss to those still in the jobs has come courtesy of your masters policies - the Budget. How is this restoring any sort of competitiveness vis-a-vis other economies where the Governments are putting in place tax cuts?

Here is a lesson that Dr Ahearne failed to learn in all his years of studying economics:

  • Higher tax rates amidst the most generous welfare system in Europe mean that marginalized workers will not have an incentive to return to the labour market.
  • Higher taxes in a restricted labour market (with high costs of hiring and firing workers and high minimum wage rate) hamper jobs creation.
  • Higher taxes on already debt-loaded households mean that more and more families are facing the ruin and precautionary savings are rising, reducing our internal economy growth potential.
  • But most importantly, higher taxes on human capital mean that productivity growth is going to be constrained for years to come.

It is that simple, Alan, any recovery will require productivity growth in this economy outpacing the cost of living rises and the cost of doing business growth. Your policies have just hiked the latter by some 10% - courtesy of taxes and levies increases in the Budget, while restricting productivity growth by failing to provide any real support for businesses or incentives for workers to get off the dole. You are travelling in exactly the opposite direction to the one that has to be taken if we are to get productivity-driven recovery.




John McGuinness' appearance on the Late Late Show tonight was a logical conclusion of months of pinned up rage that this country is feeling toward the Cabinet - and primarily to Mr Cowen, Mr Lenihan and Mrs Coughlan - towards the public sector at large and towards the scores of mostly nameless, faceless (but sometimes publicly visible) 'advisers' who have systemically destroyed the prosperity of this country and its chances of coming out of the recession as a competitive and growth-focused economy.

McGuinness avoided offering direct examples of gross incompetence and outright insubordination that are so often exemplified by some of our public sector departments and quangoes. This was his choice, but the country needs to know of these acts and it needs to know the names of those who carry on their duties in such a manner. He also avoided placing the blame for the mess we are in where it really belongs, at the feet of:
  • the participants in the Social Partnership that managed to squander billions of our money to finance wasteful 'investment' and social cohesion programmes and to set this economy into the rigid infrastructure of inflexible labour laws, senile minimum wage restrictions, mad political correctness and corrupt local governance. Some of the Social Partnership members were the reluctant parties to this outrage - brought in under the threat of union violence against businesses and entrepreneurs. Others made it their life-long ambition to get their organizations to the feeding trough. Roles of all should now be questioned and the entire Partnership model must be scrapped;
  • the Government that has for the last 6 years chosen to take no serious policy action to reign in its own employees and their unions and that has retained inefficient and often markets-retarding monopolies. The Government that simply bought its way through the elections, policy conflicts and minor reforms;
  • the political culture that promotes mediocrity and punishes statesmanship. Our academic and policy debate systems that promote complacency, competition for public funding, anti-entrepreneurial ethos, social welfarism and provide philosophical and ethical foundations for systematic moral and financial debasing of the taxpayers, wealth creators, jobs providers and consumers, promoting instead the unquestioning support for NGOs, quangoes and public sector;
  • some business elites that, in exchange for state contracts handouts looked the other way as the political and social elites of this country carved our wages and earnings to their own benefits. It is a telling sign of the depreciation of the entrepreneurial spirit in this country that faced with a wholesale destruction at the hands of incompetent (and often outright malicious) policymakers, our business leaders remain largely silent, uncritical of the Government.
This should not be held against the person who has now become the first man from inside the FF tent to voice his honest and informed opinion. Instead, there should be firm focus on completing the task he started - the task of recognizing the fact that we are currently being ruled by the three 'leaders' who have shown over the last year complete inability to run the country in crisis. It is time for us not to ask them to go, but to tell them that they must go.

Blunders of Mary: I would encourage the readers of this blog to submit any publicly documented evidence of Mary Coughlan's incompetence at the helm of DETE or indeed of her incompetence at the previous ministerial appointments.

Here is the first one: on April 2 Mary Coughlan has publicly displayed the lack of knowledge as to the existence (let alone the details) of the new Social Welfare Bill put forward by her own Government and already scheduled for a full debate in the Dail in late April. As the bill provides for adjustments in unemployment benefits and conditions, the bill would be at least partially linked directly to Mary Coughlan's ministerial brief. Responding in the Dail to the question concerning this bill, Mary Coughlan said she had no knowledge of any such legislation.

There was, of course, her infamous failure in the Lisbon Treaty debate (here); and an equally spectacular flop during her tenure as Minister for Agriculture, when an ordinary farmer's question exposed her lack of knowledge concerning her ministerial brief.

She earned herself a nickname of 'Sarah Palin of Donegal' after she told radio listeners on April 11th that Irish shoppers go to Northern Ireland only to buy cheap booze (here). This showed such monumental disrespect for ordinary families her Government has squeezed out of savings, pensions and earnings, that she should have been sacked on the spot for such proclamations.

The rumor mill in the public sector if full of accounts - that are yet to be documented - of her undiplomatic behaviour at foreign missions, outrageous antics at the meetings with international business leaders and arrogant statements in addressing top corporate brass. This is far from being a hallmark of an independently-minded politician - it is a direct result of her gross unsuitability for the position of responsibility that she occupies.

Saturday, April 18, 2009

Daily Economics 18/04/09: Nationwide fall(bail)out

Nationwide - systemic importance?
In today's Irish Times (here), Mr Cowen makes a ludicrous assertion that Irish Nationwide - or as we can call it - Irish Nationvile. How, Mr Cowen? Care to explain?

Irish Nationvile is not a systemically important organization. It is a mutually-owned closed shop (officially) or Fingleton's fiefdom (unofficially) that has done much good to this economy in the past as a safe-house for dodgy directors loans from the Anglo, a default bank for the most speculative developers, and an exemplary case study for corporate mis-governance. By its size, it is roughly equivalent to 10% of the property loans held by the two laregst banks, or just 6.4% of the property-related loans of our 6-banks system. It has virtually no productive net assets outside property sector so should the society go under, the economy of Ireland will hardly notice if, say, €8-10bn in performing loans were to be bought at a discount by the likes of HSBC or Barclays or Ulster Bank or NIB or whoever steps to the plate. Even BofI and AIB might want to step in and pick up depositors and good lending assets from the ruin.

But letting Nationvile sink - publicly and swiftly - will send two important signals to the international markets and to domestic voters. The first one will be to tell the world that Irish Exchequer is starting to manage its downside risk - throwing Nationwide out of the umbrella of state bailouts will make the case for judging Irish Government banks policies as being informed by economic efficiency rationale, not political expediency that Mr Cowen is so skilled in. The second one will be to tell the voters that there is at least some bound to the recklessness with which the Government is willing to use taxpayers hard earned cash to help its own cronies.

So, in my view, let it sink. Now!


ESB - another systemically important waster?
The Royal Bank of Scotland is toning down its flash headquarters to bring the building down to the early realities of the crisis. Many banks and large companies (including some Irish) are turning away from the posh offices they were planning to move to, but not ESB. The state monopoly that has milked its customers for years (and still does) with the second highest cost of electricity in Europe is planning to 'renovate' its (admittedly ugly) headquarters in Dublin as a package of 'stimulus' economics. To create jobs, so to speak. This amazing fact did not trace across Irish official media (Irish Times and RTE) reporting on the arrogant, in-your-face monopoly's last week's announcement.

Tuesday, April 14, 2009

A quintessence of Lenihan's economics

Hat tip to Linda - here is a descriptor of the logic of 'shared pain' policies that ask us all - ordinary me and you, a lavishly paid Secretary General of Department of Somethingness, a patrician head of some Quango in charge of Everythingness etc - to make sacrifices in the name of the country - to go that extra step beyond our already up-to-my-ears-in-work existence...

So what makes 100%? What does it mean to give MORE than 100%?
If: A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
is represented as:1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26.

Then:
H-A -R -D-W-O -R -K 8+1+18+4+23+15+18+11 = 98%
and
K -N -O -W-L -E-D-G-E 11+14+15+23+12+5+4+7+5
= 96%
and
A-T -T -I -T -U -D-E 1+20+20+9+20+21+4+5 = 100%

But

B -U -L -L -S -H-I -T
2+21+12+12+19+8+9+20 = 103%
and

A-S -S -K -I -S-S -I -N-G
1+19+19+11+9+19+19+9+14+7 = 118%

So, one can conclude with mathematical certainty, that

While Hard Work and Knowledge will get you close, and Attitude will get you there, its the Bullshit
and Ass Kissing that will put you over the top - all the way to Brian Lenihan's national sacrifice economics...

Tuesday, April 7, 2009

Mini-Budget 2009: A 'Fail' Grade

To summarize, mini-Budget failed to deliver the substantial public expenditure savings promised. As a result of destroying private wealth and failing to cut public sector waste, instead of reducing the Gen Government Deficit to 10.75% of GDP as claimed in the Budget (Table 5), Minister Lenihan has left a Deficit of -12.5% to -13.0% of GDP in 2009. Details below.

The mini-Budget 2009 Part 1 is in and the Government has done exactly what I've expected it to do - soaked the 'rich'. This time around, the 'rich' are no longer those with incomes in excess of €100K pa, but those with a pay of €30K pa. We are now in the 1980s economic management mode, full stop.

Microeconomic Impact: Households
  • The heaviest hit are the ordinary income earners and savers: Income levies up, thresholds down. Impact: reduce incentives for work at the lower end of wage spectrum and generate more unemployment through adverse consumption and investment effects. Before this budget, it would have taken a person on welfare living in Dublin ca €35-37,000 in annual pre-tax wages to induce a move into job market. Now, the figure has risen to over €40,000. PRSI ceiling is up a whooping 44.2% to €75K pa. This is jobs creation Lenihan-style;
  • DIRT is up from 23% to 25% and levies on non-life and life insurance are up. CGT and CAT are up from 22% to 25%. The CGT is a tax stripping off the savers/investors protection against past inflation, so Mr Lenihan is simply clawing back what was left to the investors after his predecessors generated a rampant inflation. This is savings and investment incentives Lenihan-style;
  • Mortgage interest relief is cut and will be eliminated going forward (Budget 2010) - I hope people in negative equity losing their jobs will simply send their mortgage bills to Mr Lenihan. Let him pay it;
  • Interest reliefs on investment properties and land development are down. The rich folks who bought a small apartment to rent it out in place of their pension (yes, those filthy-rich Celtic Tiger cubs who saved and worked hard to afford such 'luxury' as a pension investment) are getting Lenihan-styled treatment too.These measures, adopted amidst a wholesale collapse in the housing sector, are equivalent to applying heavy blood-letting to a patient with already dangerously low blood pressure.
Microeconomic Impact: Businesses
  • Providing no measures to support jobs creation or entrepreneurship, Lenihan managed to mention only his Government's already discredited programme for 'knowledge and green' economy creation from December 2008 as a road map for what the Government intends to do to stimulate growth;
  • No banks measures announced or budgeted for, implying that an expected budgetary cost of ca €4-5bn in 2009 due to potential demand for new banks funds is simply not factored into our expenditures. Neither are there any costings or provisions for the 'bad' bank;
  • No credit finance resolutions, PRSI cuts for employers, minimum wage reductions etc;
  • CAT and CGT taxes up, income of consumers down, insurance levies up... Lenihan-styled treatment for business support is so dramatic that it is clear we have a Government that only knows how to introduce pro-business and pro-growth policies for their own cronies.
Microeconomic Impact: Public Sector
The only clear winners in the Budget were public sector workers. They face no unemployment prospect, no imposition of any new levies or charges, no cuts in salaries or indeed no changes to their atavistic, inherently unproductive, working practices.

Yet, they can retire earlier with a tax-free lumps sum guaranteed. And no actuarial reduction for shorter work-life, implying that the cost of the Rolls-Royce pensions to all of us has just risen by a factor of at least 1/3! Happy times skinning the taxpayers to pay the fat cats of the public sector elites? Lenihan-styled sharing of pain.

Pat McArdle of the Ulster Bank in an excellent late-night note on the Budget said: "Our main quibble with the Budget is with the split of the burden between tax and spending. ...contrary to the recommendation of practically every economist in the country, they opted for a 55% to 45% split in favour of taxes".

This is correct. On the morning of the Budget day, Mr Lenihan told the nation that not a single economic adviser was suggesting that the Budget impact should fall onto expenditure side. Clearly, he was either incapable of listening or simpy arrogantly ignorant.

Adding insult to the injury, Lenihan also ensured that majority of cuts were to befall the already heavily hit middle classes. Microecnomically speaking, Minister Lenihan has just dug the private sector grave a few feet deeper. It was at 6ft before he walked into the Dail chamber. It was at 10ft once he finished his speech.

Macroeconomic Impact: When Figures Don't Add Up
In Macroeconomic terms, we are no longer living in Ireland. We are living in Cuba where numbers are fudged, forecasts are semi-transparent and the state knows better than the workers as to what we deserve to keep in terms of the fruits of our labour. Mr Lenihan has torn up any sort of social contract that could have existed between the vast majority of Irish people and this Government.

All data is from DofF Macroeconomic & Fiscal Framework 2009-2013 document.
More realistic assessment of the GDP collapse in 2009 is being met with a relatively optimistic assumption that GDP contraction will be only 2.9% in 2010. Even more lunatic is the assumption that Ireland will return to a trend growth of ca 4% in 2012-2013. So my assumptions are: -8-8.5% fall in GDP in 2009, -3.5-4% fall in 2010, +1% growth in 2011, +2% in 2012 and +2.2% in 2013. This will be reflected in my estimate of the balance sheet below.

Another thing clearly not understood by the Government is the relationship between income, excise and import duties. Imagine a person putting together a party for few friends. She had before the Budget €100 to spend on, say, booze. Now she has €90. Her VAT, excise, import duties on €100 of spend would have been ca €66. Now she goes off to Northern Ireland with her €90. Does the Government lose €66? No. It also looses other (complimentary) goods shopping revenue. Say that the cost of party-related goods is €250 worth of purchases at 21% VAT, 10% duties. Total cost of a €10 generated by Lenihan in income tax levies is a loss of over €140 in revenue. Good job, Brian. Your overpaid economic policy advisers couldn't see this coming?

Notice investment figures in the table above? Other sources of GDP growth? Well, DofF did apply a haircut on its projections in January 2009 update, but these corrections are seriously optimistic on 2011-2013 tail of the estimates. This again warrants more conservative estimates.
Judging by the inflation figures estimates, the DofF believes that the era of today's low interest rates is simply a permanent feature of the next 5-year horizon. Again, this is too optimistic and should it change will imply much deeper economic slowdown in 2010-2013 period.

Now to the estimates Table below summarizes the estimated impact of the measures.
Per DofF estimates, the Exchequer deficit drops, post mini-Budget-1, by ca €2.7bn in 2009 or 2% of GDP. This is rather optimistic. In reality, this estimation is done on a simple linear basis, assuming no further deterioration in receipts and a linear 1-to-1 response in tax revenue to tax measures. This also assumes the macro-fundamentals as outlined in the Table 2 discussed earlier.

Now, building in some of my outlook on the budget side and GDP growth side, Table below reproduces DofF Table 5 and adds two scenarios (with assumptions listed): From the above table, we compute the General Government Deficit (the figure that is the main benchmark for fiscal performance) as in the following Table:
This speaks volumes. The Government promised in January 2009 the EU Commission to deliver 9.5% deficit in 2009. It has subsequently reneged on this commitment, producing an estimated Gen Gov Deficit of 10.75% today. However, stress-testing the DofF often unrealistic assumptions provides for the potential deficit of 12.5-13.0% for this year.

But there is a tricky question to be asked. Has Lenihan actually gone too far on the tax increases side? Note that the estimated gross impact of the overall budgetary measures is €3.3bn for the remaining 8 months of 2009, implying an annual effect of €4.95bn in fiscal re-balancing. This is ca 2.9% of GDP - a sizable chunk of the economy. From that figure, per Table 5 above, the implied net loss to the economy from the Government measure (estimated originally at -1% of GDP) should be closer to 1.5-1.7%. This in turn implies that instead of an 7.7% contraction in GDP, the DofF should have been using a 9.2-9.4% contraction. In today's note, Ulster Bank economics team provides a revised estimate of GDP fall for 2009 at 9.5% for exactly this reason.
Mr Lenihan and his advisers simply missed the point that if you take money out of people's pockets, you are cutting growth in the economy. Of course, our Ministers, their senior civil servants and advisers would not be expected to know this, given they lead such sheltered life of privilege.

If the above estimates were to reflect this adjustment, we have: 2009 GDP of €168.2bn;General Government Deficit of 11% for DofF estimates, and 12.7-13.25% for my scenarios. I will do more detailed analysis for 2010-2013 horizon in a separate post, but it is now clear that the Government has not achieved its main objective of an orderly fiscal consolidation to 9.25% deficit. Neither has it achieved an objective of supporting the economy through the downturn.

Conclusions
Today's Budget delivered a nuclear strike to the heart of the private sector economy in Ireland. It furthermore underscored the Government commitment to providing jobs and pay protection for public sector workers regardless of the cost to the rest of this economy. We are in the 1980s scenario facing years of run-away, unsustainably high public spending and no improvements in public sector productivity amidst severe contraction in demand and investment at home and from abroad.

Minister Lenihan has promised to go on a road show selling Ireland Inc. I wish him good luck and I wish his audiences a keen eye to see through the fog of demagoguery this Government has produced in place of sensible economic policies. If they do, their response to Mr Lenihan's approaches is likely to be "Thank you, Minister. We don't need to invest in the economy that taxes producers, savers and consumers to protect public sector waste. Thank you and good by."
From an investment case point of view - they will be right.

PS: As the first fall-out from the Budget, Moody's downgraded Irish banks (here)... More to come.