17/7/2012: Euro area debt crisis timeline

One hell of an infographic via The Financialist here summarizing the time line for the euro area debt crisis.

2/7/2012: 16 issues with ESM 'deal'

This is the second post for this blog on the latest Euro area ‘deal’ struck early morning last Friday – the ‘deal’ that is thin on details (see statement here http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2012/06/2962012-deal-preliminary-reaction.html) and even thinner on actual commitments (as in ‘new commitments’ not ‘repeated old commitments’).

(1) The core ‘commitment’ in the deal is the possibility that – once “effective single supervisory mechanism is established” (which may or may not take long – depending on whether the already existent EBA structure can be seen as ‘effective’ and whether it can be enhanced with real supervisory powers to oversee EA17 states, who are yet to agree such enhancements and such oversight) “the ESM could, following a regular decision, have the possibility to recapitalize banks directly” (so on top of establishing a common supervisory structure and endowing it with sufficient powers, the member states are yet to endow ESM with ‘regular decision’ powers to recap banks).

Assuming that such possibility is indeed delivered upon, this would allow banks recapitalizations via ESM instead of directly via sovereign funds and thus will – for accounting purposes – prevent banking debt being counted directly as Government debt. This is the positive and it is a significant positive, for Europe.

However, it has limitations, although it also delivers some potential positives. A mixed bag overall for Europe.

(2) Irish experience shows that – with Nama debt not officially counted as Exchequer debt, while Promissory Notes to IBRC and interest on them is counted as such. Both are fully backed by Government and both have economic implications, but only one (Promo Notes) has implication for sovereign finances. In other words, removing for accounting purposes debt off Government balancesheet does not remove the costs and burdens of this debt off the balancesheet of the economy as a whole. What this means is that the ‘deal’ does not share responsibility for debt across the Euro zone, as long as there remain Government guarantees. Instead it spreads debt into the economy (as banking system will still have to repay them), putting taxpayers into the second line of fire.

Incidentally, Nama – that vehicle which absorbed some of the banks bailouts – is highly unlikely to be featured in any potential/theoretical/rumoured/alleged retroactive restructuring of the banks-related sovereign debt.

This also means that the deal does not fully break the link of contagion from banks bad debts to Government balancesheet, but makes this link more opaque.

(3) There is no retrospection in the deal, although the Irish Government claims there is. We hope there can be such retrospection, but it is difficult to see how that can be delivered given that

a) Retrospection would open ESM to some €200 billion worth already committed Governments’ funds from the peripheral and other states (including Germany), effectively erasing 40% of ESM capacity before it gets to lend to any new states (e.g. Italy and Spain).

b) Retrospection in any case would not apply to non-debt funds committed by the Irish state (some €21 billion in NPRF cash paid in already).

c) Retrospection could challenge some of the requirements for conditionality (as it cannot be covered by any new conditions) and any potential requirements for collateralization (see below).

The Irish Government is so convinced that retrospective deal is possible, it has set the target of 17% of GDP for debt writedown (see: http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/breaking/2012/0702/breaking4.html) which will require a restructuring of €34 billion and if achieved will be a significant help to the Exchequer, although doubtful in value to the economy at large.

(4) The deal clearly states that the banks bailouts will be subject to the "appropriate conditionality, including compliance with state aid rules, which should be institution-specific, sector-specific or economy-wide and would be formalized in a Memorandum of Understanding." In other words, the conditions will not be universal for all states, but will be granular – specific to individual environments. Render onto… comes to mind, and the Caesar – Italy, Spain, any other large member state, is not the same as Ireland, Cyprus, Portugal, Greece et al.

(5) The ESM itself is, at this stage, still not set up and, more importantly, has not raised any funds. When operational it will have capacity to raise €500bn which is highly unlikely to be sufficient to cover sovereigns’ own needs, let alone underwrite any significant banks bailouts. If current EFSF participants were allowed to roll into ESM their banks’ exposures along with Spain, the ESM will have to allocate some €200 billion or so of funds to existent programmes, leaving €300 billion or so to fund other banks bailouts that might arise and fund Exchequers’ needs outside banks bailouts. Thus, ESM will be faced with a dilemma – either it acts as a somewhat credible banks bailout fund or a somewhat credible support for Government bonds. So far, under any of the existent proposals, it cannot do both. Were such proposals to be put in place in the future (e.g. leveraging via ‘banking license’ etc – explicitly excluded from the ‘deal’), the ESM will have to balloon well past €1 trillion mark.

Absent such proposals for ESM structure, the ‘deal’ says that ESM will be allowed to directly intervene in the markets to purchase Government debt. This is not new – in fact it was always supposed to do so.

(6) ESM structure remains unchanged under the deal, so the fund will go to the funding markets with a backing of collective guarantees of the member states. The internal backing of credit flows within ESM is that of the guarantees by the borrowing states to the fund – same as in the EFSF – except absent subordination. This can mean two things:

a) ESM will have to pay more for borrowing in the markets, and

b) ESM might face severe difficulties, similar to those experienced by the EFSF, in raising funds.

The things are getting so tight with the ESM (even before it is launched) that within the ESM set-up, the combined "guarantees" by the peripheral states borrowers from the EFSF/ESM plus Italy to ESM creditors are proportionately in excess of the guarantee provided by Germany.

However, on the positive side here, removal of subordination clause from ESM lending affirms to private lenders to national Governments the equal treatment of their bonds with supra-national ESM debt. In the long run, therefore, this should reduce risk premia for those member states still capable of tapping the private markets for debt. Thus, making things harder for ESM might make things easier for Germany & Co.

(7) ESM structure of guarantees is itself a troubling scheme. When Spain receives the bailout funding, its share of ESM funding and guarantees will be reallocated to other member states. Germany’s share will move from 29% to 33%, Italy’s share from 19% to 22%, France’s from 22% to 25% and so on. Two weaker Euro area states – Italy and Belgium – will become larger guarantors of ESM. And France, which wants effectively to expand ESM and to grow the overall euro area debt pile to finance own agenda. More fun? Unwilling participants to the scheme – Finland, Austria, the Netherlands – all are getting more ‘voting’ power in the ESM too. Which, of course, should make the whole ESM proposition even more risky in the eyes of external investors.

(8) ESM structure under the ‘deal’ is reinforced by the compulsion of the borrower state to comply with strict and specific conditions. To maintain credibility, therefore, ESM will require these conditions to be at least as stringent as those imposed under the EFSF (Troika) deals. The problem, alas, is that no country, save Ireland, to-date has been able to comply with the previous conditions and the entire mess we are in today was triggered (not caused) by Greece and Spain refusing to comply with these conditions.

This means that either ESM will have to offer its own funders much lesser security (higher risk of borrowers from ESM not being able to deliver internal adjustment programmes necessary for repayment of ESM funds) or it will have to avoid buying Spanish and Greek debts. Alternatively, the ESM lending will have to come with even stricter conditions to compensate for the lack of subordination, which is clearly unviable in current political environment.

(9) To secure ESM funding, the member state applying for the funds will be required to sign an agreed Memorandum of Understanding (as with Troika) which then will have to be approved by other member states. In the past, Finland, the Netherlands, Austria and Slovakia, not to mention Germany, have opposed to some conditions that would have allowed easier access to ESM funds. Specifically, some countries on the list have demanded use of collateral to secure lending even with assumed (under previous ESM plans) and actual (under EFSF) super-seniority conditions. What these and other countries might demand from the ESM funding recipient state is, thus, completely unclear and uncertain. The same applies to ESM lending to the banks, with an added caveat – conditions for banks will have to be even more strict.

We are now, therefore, facing a possibility that the collateral for loans debate can be reignited.

(10) Pretty much everyone agrees that the only lasting resolution to the crisis will have to arrive via ECB. Yet, to-date, ECB has been reluctant to engage even with the crisis spinning out of control. If the latest agreement de facto injects more funds in support of the banking and sovereign balancesheets, the current deal can actually result in even lower willingness of ECB to engage. In other words, the ECB might play a wait-and-see game, allowing the ESM to become fully engaged and only thereafter, assuming the crisis remains acute, stepping in. In other words, instead of deploying monetary policy upfront, we might see Euro area first increase its overall level of indebtedness via ESM and only after that move for the aggressive deployment of the monetary policy. As we know, this has happened in Japan and it has shown the weakness of the monetary policy at the time of elevated debt crisis.

(11) On a positive side, we must recognize that the deal explicitly recognized two things:

a) Germany no longer holds total power over the Euro area decisions,

b) A Euro area state should not be forced to accept bankruptcy level debts in order to underwrite banking system solvency (although there is yet to be a realisation on the side of same happening to the economy)

(12) Also on a positive side, it appears that likely outcome of common supervision regime will include deposits guarantee and banks insolvency resolution regime. Both are net positives and both are consistent with my long-held views on what should be done to repair Euro area banking system. Alas, the resolution regime will have to come ex post already adopted measures, so it is unlikely to make material difference to the banking system we currently have.

(13) A unified banking supervision itself might be a tight spot. Suppose it is set up. And suppose it is functional. In this case, any Euro area banking regulator will be faced with a problem – banks under his/her supervision holding massive and increasing exposures to the sovereign debt of their own governments, some of which are in ESM. There is a clear-cut case here to be made that this situation cannot be sustained. However, should the Euro area regulator move to curtail, say Italian or Spanish banks buying more of their Governments debts, there will be effectively an end to these countries participation in the funding markets and a larger call on ESM. Alternatively, should the regulator ignore the problem of accumulating risks, the regulatory system itself can be undermined.

(14) The deal – and especially the path that it took to arrive at – is the example of European policy brinkmanship, not cooperation. All accounts show that the meeting was broken by Mario Monti with support of Rajoy and that Hollande provided back up. There is absolutely no argument to make that any other member state was explicitly on their side, although most likely Ireland and Portugal were only happy to ride on the coattails of the opposition. Either way, the whole process of deriving the deal was not a cooperative solution, but a stand-off. This is not a break from the established pattern of past summits. But equally ominously, the latest success of brinkmanship is underpinned not by the change in the Euro area leaders’ positions, but by changes in the electoral landscape in Europe, with opposition to the status quo growing on the side of the ‘rebels’ in Greece (Syriza), Italy (Five Star), France (recent lections shift toward more extreme parties support), Finland (the True Finns), Germany and so on.

(15) In the end, ESM will not resolve the problem of too much debt accumulated on the shoulders of European sovereigns and dysfunctional banking system. The economies involved – Spain, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Cyprus, and potentially Italy – are simply incapable of repaying these debts (please, do consider that even under the rosy Irish Government scenarios – the best performer in the group – Government debt reductions envisioned post 2014 are minor and mostly driven by economic growth, not repayment of actual debts). With this, the ESM can become a perpetual lender, with the requirement to continue raising funds well past the envisioned 10-15 years period. Any cyclical recession before then or after will derail repayments and the ESM debt will have to simply rise, risking a debt spiral that we are experiencing today replaying at some point in the future. Not a pretty thought and certainly a risk that the ‘game changer’ of the ‘deal’ might end up being the ‘end-game’ losing move.

(16) The deal does provide some room for ECB to claim that now there is a realistic progression toward more centralized oversight over banking sector and thus it can engage more actively in monetary easing. The signal to watch for is the ECB 1% repo rate, which can be lowered, implicitly signalling ECB willingness to long-term tolerate inflation over 2%. Thereafter, 4% inflation becomes feasible and ECB can start priming the pump. In turn, devaluation of the euro will compensate German economy by boosting exports and will put even more pressure on internal devaluations in peripheral states (imports costs up, exports largely non-existent to benefit from cheaper euro, etc).

Today’s PMI figures showing broad euro zone-wide and sharp contraction in activity in June should make the ECB move this Thursday a ‘no-brainer’.

29/6/2012: The 'deal' - preliminary reaction

Overnight statement from the EA [emphasis mine]:

"We affirm that it is imperative to break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns. The Commission will present Proposals on the basis of Article 127(6) for a single supervisory mechanism shortly. We ask the Council to consider these Proposals as a matter of urgency by the end of 2012. When an effective single supervisory mechanism is established, involving the ECB, for banks in the euro area the ESM could, following a regular decision, have the possibility to recapitalize banks directly. This would rely on appropriate conditionality, including compliance with state aid rules, which should be institution- specific, sector-specific or economy-wide and would be formalised in a Memorandum of Understanding. 

The Eurogroup will examine the situation of the Irish financial sector with the view of further improving the sustainability of the well-performing adjustment programme. Similar cases will be treated equally.

We urge the rapid conclusion of the Memorandum of Understanding attached to the financial support to Spain for recapitalisation of its banking sector. We reaffirm that the financial assistance will be provided by the EFSF until the ESM becomes available, and that it will then be transferred to the ESM, without gaining seniority status.


We affirm our strong commitment to do what is necessary to ensure the financial stability of the euro area, in particular by using the existing EFSF/ESM instruments in a flexible and efficient manner in order to stabilise markets for Member States respecting their Country Specific Recommendations and their other commitments including their respective timelines, under the European Semester, the Stability and Growth Pact and the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure. These conditions should be reflected in a Memorandum of Understanding. We welcome that the ECB has agreed to serve as an agent to EFSF/ESM in conducting market operations in an effective and efficient manner.
We task the Eurogroup to implement these decisions by 9 July 2012."

I note that there is NO retrospection in the above - a negative for Ireland. So far we have a statement from some Irish Government members not present at the summit who claim there is retrospective applicability, but as far as I am aware, this is NOT confirmed in any documentary evidence.

I also note that transfers to ESM from EFSF will be carried out "without gaining seniority status" de jure, although it will most likely still be de facto super-senior debt - a positive for Ireland.

It is worth noting furthermore that countries entering ESM without first obtaining funding via EFSF might be able to avoid facing a Troika-imposed set of conditionalities, but will be required to comply only with the internal EU rules (see here). This, however, does not seem to apply to countries like Ireland who will enter ESM from EFSF and, potentially (based on reading of the official statement) to countries that have obtained funding not solely for the purpose of recapitalizing their banks 9again, precluding Ireland from softening of conditionalities).

Per Enda Kenny (via RTE):

• Ireland's government debt (not only banks-related) will be 're-engineered' in other words - it will be restructured (effectively a soft default). "Mr Kenny said the new deal means Ireland's overall debt burden, including the bank debt, can be re-engineered in a way which will give Ireland equal treatment to Spain and any other countries which avail of the new system."

• "where funding is made available through the EFSF it will later be transferred to the ESM" so it is now the Government position that we will have a second bailout. 

So the Irish Government is de facto 'defaulting' and welcomes this. And it is going into the second bailout despite repeated claims that it will be funding itself via markets post 2013. And it welcomes this too. Reverse gear has not been used as much for some time on Merrion St.


I have consistently called both events as inevitable for Ireland. Hence, in my view, the 'deal' is a net positive. However, we cannot tell how positive it is yet.

One area of concern will be the treatment of the banks debt under ESM - with respect to seniority and any attached Government guarantees. In particular, in my view, if ESM were to assume directly unsecured banks debt, even with an attached explicit sovereign guarantee, such debt will have to adversely impact ESM cost of funding.

The biggest issue with the above statement is that it will NOT reduce overall economic debt carried by the EU states, including Ireland. The potential reduction in the cost of financing this debt is good news. The fact that this economy (not banks or some rich uncle in America) - aka us - are still on the hook for debts of insolvent banks remains.

Ditto for Euro area as a whole. You might call it 'Government Debt related to the banks', you might call it 'quasi-Government Debt related to the banks' or 'Non-Government Debt guaranteed by the Government to the super-senior lender related to the banks' or indeed a 'Pink Teddy Bear that stinks up the room' - the debt is... err... still there and there will be more of it post this 'deal'.

Update 1: some interesting thoughts - it appears from the EU statement that any euro area member state in compliance with fiscal constraints can apply for ESM funding of the banking sector measures. Now, if - as the Irish Government are claiming - such funding can be applicable to restructuring past sovereign exposures to banking sector, then:

• As Belgium is already starting to signal, it can be applied  to €4 billion spent on Dexia Banque Belgique plus €54 in guarantees extended to the bank (link covering more current exposures potential), plus €6 billion in Franco-Belgian assistance the bank received back in 2008 (link).
• Germany's €150 billion 'rescues' of Hypo and other banks via FMS (link here)
• Austria - same Hypo (link here) but peanuts so far
• Dutch Government pumped some €32 billion into its banks (link)
• and so on...

Now, give it a thought - ESM is supposed to run at €500 billion absorbing existent EFSF up to €700 billion. So even if Spain just caps EFSF and it transfers to ESM, we have - before Italy comes waltzing in - ESM full capacity potential left after the banks bailouts are retrospected into it - of what? Some €200 billion max?.. or absent EFSF - at the announced running volume - nil.


This sort of suggests there is serious problem with an idea of allowing retrospective roll-backs of banks-related debt and measures to ESM...




Update 2: It appears that Enda Kenny's alleged contribution to the summit ('winning the deal for Ireland') is not a part of the record of the summit, at least as far as I can see (one example - here).


Update 3: H/T to Brian Lucey: this is just in - Germany apparently/allegedly wants ESM bank aid to be tied to acceptance of the Financial Transactions Tax. I suppose compliance with a harmonized corporate tax will be the condition too. In the end, the 'Enda deal' might just become a seismic event... So the logic of FTT link is therefore, in Irish context will be:
Step 1: EA leaders use Irish taxpayers to rescue own speculators and banks from Anglo/INBS etc default on bonds.
Step 2: EA leaders use FTT to demolish jobs in Dublin IFSC, so they can finance their 'growth package'?
The sort of the 'deal' we've been waiting for from our 'European partners'?

Update 4:  Citing Spiegel source, Global Macro Monitor blog states [emphasis is mine]: "What happens to the countries that have already received money from the temporary rescue fund, the EFSF? Officials in Brussels said that the new decision did not change anything about the programs for Greece, Portugal and Ireland. All the agreed goals will continue to apply and be monitored by the troika. But those countries might also start clamoring for the terms of their deals to be relaxed. The summit’s decision gives the Greek government in particular more ammunition for renegotiating the terms of its bailout, a step that new Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras has already said he wants to take."

25/6/2012: Thinking outloud: Euro Area Banks Levy

Latest reports suggest the EU leaders are pushing for a 'banking levy' to finance common deposit insurance scheme, a banks resolution fund and joint supervision authority.

It has been my view all along that the former two are required for the financial sector future health and to break the onerous link between the banks and the sovereigns. Alas, I must point out the reality of what such a proposals will mean.

To start with, let's us ask a question: What happens when economy enters a recovery stage from even a cyclical downturn?

Answer: surplus savings built during normal downturn alongside accommodative monetary policies result in an increased supply of capital to finance capex expansion in the private sector. This leads to rising cost of capital on demand side (as demand for capex quickly outstrips supply) and on supply side (as monetary authorities tighten rates into upswing cycle).

But here's a problem, Roger, and it's Europe: suppose the economy is about to take off onto capex growth path:

• Savings nowhere to be seen as deleveraging of households will be still ongoing
• Deleveraging of banks, including in anticipation of LTROs expiration means no supply of new credit
• Policy rates might stay low, but retail rates will remain higher than normal as banks balancesheets remain weak and state or EU-held (via 'resolution' vehicle) equity remains high
• In the mean time, five years of the crisis have created a massive penned up demand for capital, so market rates will be even higher
• Equity capital will be scarce, as global recovery will most likely be ongoing, sapping capital into more growth-generative regions, and
• There's that EU levy as an icing on the cake to add to costs and shrink the margins.

Now, posit the above against the following environment scenario:

• Households debts are still high, but incomes are now undermined by five years (plus) of a recession and stagnation
• SMEs and many corproates balancesheets are weak (due to stagnation in exports and internal demand, plus deleveraging costs)

What do you get? Oh, rapid increase in credit costs, leading to more households and business insolvencies. So, go ahead, as Clint The Market would have said, make my day, punk. Raise some more levies...

23/6/2012: Sunday Times 10/6/2012

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from June 10, 2012.

Last week, the Irish voters approved the new Euro area Fiscal Compact in a referendum. This week, the Exchequer results coupled with Manufacturing and Services sectors Purchasing Manager Indices have largely confirmed that the ongoing fiscal consolidation has forced the economy into to stall. Irish economy’s gross national product shrunk by over 24% on the pre-crisis levels and unemployment now at 14.8%. The most recent data on manufacturing activity shows a small uptick in volumes of production offset by significant declines in values, with profit margins continuing to shrink. Deflation at the factory gates is continuing to coincide with elevated inflation in input prices. In Services – accounting for 48 percent of our private sector activity – both activity and profitability have tanked in May. The Exchequer performance tracking budgetary targets is fully attributable to declines in capital investment and massive taxation hikes, with current cumulative net voted expenditure up 3.3% year on year in May.

On the domestic front, the hope for any deal on bank debts assumed by the Irish taxpayers, one of the core reasons to vote Yes advocated by the Government in the Referendum, has been dented both by the German officials and by the ECB. Furthermore, on the domestic front, the newsflow has firmly shifted onto highlighting the gargantuan task relating to cutting our deficits in 2013-2015 and the problem of future funding for Ireland.

Per April 2012 Stability Programme Update, Ireland’s fiscal consolidation path will require additional cuts of €5.55 billion over the next three years and tax increases of at least €3.05 billion. Combined, this implies an annual loss of €4,757 per each currently employed worker, equivalent to almost seven weeks of average earnings. This comes on top of €24.5 billion of consolidations delivered from the beginning of the crisis through this year. The total bill for fiscal and banking mess, excluding accumulated debt, to be footed by the working Ireland will be somewhere in the region of €18,309 per annum in lost income.

This has more than a tangential relation to the Government’s main headache – weaselling out of the rhetorical corner they put themselves into when they solemnly promised Ireland’s ‘return to the markets’ in 2013 as the sole indicator for our ‘regained economic sovereignty’.

Even assuming the Exchequer performance remains on-target (a tall assumption, given the headwinds of economic slowdown and lack of real internal reforms), Ireland will need to raise some €36 billion over 2013 and 2014 to finance its 2014-2015 bonds rollovers and day-to-day spending. In January 2014 alone, the state will have to write a cheque for €8.3 billion worth of maturing bonds. The rest of 2014 will require another €7.2 billion of financing. Of €36.5 billion total, €19.3 billion will go to fund re-financing of maturing government bonds and notes, plus €6.9 billion redemptions to Troika. Rest will go to fund government deficits.

At this stage, there is not a snowball’s chance in hell this level of funding can be secured from the markets, given the losses in economy’s capacity to pay for the Government debts. Which means Ireland will require a second bailout. And herein lies the second dilemma for the Government. Having secured the Yes vote in the Referendum of the back of scaring the electorate with a prospect of Ireland being left out in the cold without access to the ESM, the Government is now facing a rather real risk that the ESM might not be there to draw upon. In fact, the entire Euro project is now facing the end game, which will either end in a complete surrender of Ireland’s economic and political sovereignty, or in an unhappy collapse of the common currency.

The average cumulative probability of default for the euro area, ex-Greece, has moved from 24% in April to 27.5% by the end of this week. For the peripheral states, again ex-Greece, average cumulative probability of default has risen from 45% to 52%.

Euro peripherals, ex-Greece: 5-year Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and cumulative probability of default (CPD), April 1-June 1

Source: CMA and author own calculations

These realities are now playing out not only in Ireland and Portugal, but also in Spain and Cyprus.

Spain has been at the doorsteps of the Intensive Care Unit of the euro area for some years now. Yet, nothing is being done to foster either the resolution of its banking crisis, nor to alleviate the immense pressures of it jaw-dropping 24.3% official unemployment rate. Deleveraging of the banks overloaded with bad loans has been repeatedly pushed into the indefinite future, while losses continue to accumulate due to on-going collapse of its property markets. At this stage, it is apparent to everyone save the Eurocrats and the ECB, that Spain, just as Greece, Ireland and Portugal, needs not loans from the EFSF/ESM funds, but a direct write-off of some of its debts.

Spain’s problems are immense. On the upper side of estimated demand for European funds, UBS forecasts the need for €370-450 billion to sustain Spanish banking sector and underwrite sovereign financing and bonds roll-overs. Mid-point of the various estimates is within the range of my own forecast that Spanish bailout will require €200-250 billion in funds, a move that would increase country debt/GDP ratio to 109.9% in 2014 from current forecast of 87.4%, were it to be financed out of public debt, as was done in Ireland or via ESM.

Overall, based on CDS-implied cumulative probabilities of default, expected losses on sovereign bonds of the entire EA17 ex-Greece amount to over €800 billion, or well in excess of 160% of the ESM initial lending capacity.

Europe is facing three coincident crises that are identical to those faced by Ireland and reinforce each other: fiscal imbalances, growth collapse, and a banking sector crisis.

Logic demands that Europe first breaks the contagion cycle that is seeing banking sector deleveraging exerting severe pressures and costs onto the real economy. Such a break can be created only by establishing a fully funded and credible EU-wide deposits insurance scheme, plus imposing an EU-wide system of banks debts drawdowns and debt-for-equity swaps, including resolution of liabilities held against national central banks and the ECB.

Alongside the above two measures, the EU must put forward a credible Marshall Plan Fund, to the tune of €1.75-2 trillion capacity spread over 7-10 years, with 2013 allocation of at least €500 billion. This can only be funded by the newly created money, not loans. The Fund should disburse direct monetary aid to finance private sector deleveraging in Spain, Ireland and to a smaller extent, Portugal. It should also provide structural investment funds to Greece, Italy and Spain, as well as to a much lesser extent Ireland and Portugal.

The funds cannot be allocated on the basis of debt issuance – neither in the form of national debts, nor in the form of euro bonds or ESM borrowings. Using debt financing to deal with the current crises is likely to push euro area’s expected 2013 debt to GDP ratio from 91% as projected by the IMF currently, to 115% - well above the sustainability threshold.

The euro area Marshall Plan funding will require severe conditionalities linked to long-term structural reforms. Such reforms should not be focused on delivering policies harmonization, but on addressing countries-specific bottlenecks. In the case of Ireland, the conditionalities should relate to reforming fiscal policy formation and public sector operational and strategic capabilities. Instead of quick-fix cuts and tax increases, the economy must be rebalanced to provide more growth in the private sectors, improved competitiveness in provision of core public services and systemic rebalancing of the overall economy away from dependency on MNCs for investment and exports.

Chart: Euro Area: debt crisis still raging

Source: IMF WEO, April 2012 and author own calculations

The core problem with Europe today is structural policies psychosis that offers no framework to resolving any of the three crises faced by the common currency area. Breaking this requires neither harmonization nor more debt issuance, but conditional aid to growth coupled with robust resolution mechanism for banking sector restructuring.

Box-out:

This week’s decision by the ECB to retain key rate at 1% - the level that represents historical low for Frankfurt.  However, two significant developments in recent weeks suggest that the ECB is likely to move toward a much lower rate of 0.5% in the near future. Firstly, as signalled by the euro area PMIs, the Eurozone is now facing a strong possibility of posting a recession in the first half of 2012 and for the year as a whole. Secondly, within the ECB governing council there have been clear signs of divergence in voting, with Mario Draghi clearly indicating that whilst previous rates decisions were based on a unanimous vote, this time, decision to stay put on rate reductions was a majority vote. A number of national central banks heads have dissented from previous unanimity and called for aggressive intervention with rate cuts. In addition, monetary dynamics continue to show continued declines in M3 multiplier (which has fallen by approximately 40 percent year on year in May) and the velocity of money (down to just under 1.2 as opposed to the US 1.6). All in, the ECB should engage in a drastic loosening of the monetary policy via unsterilized purchases of sovereign debt and cutting the rates to 0.25-0.5%, with a similar reduction in deposit rate to 0.25% to ease the liquidity trap currently created by the banks’ deposits with Frankfurt. The ECB concerns that lower rates will have adverse impact on tracker mortgages and other central bank rate-linked lending products held by the commercial lenders is misguided. Lower rate will increase banks’ carry trade returns on LTROs funds, compensating, partially, for deeper losses on their household loans.

19/6/2012: Euro area - flawed from design through execution

Here's the article on euro's flawed construct from Canada's The Globe&Mail citing myself (among others). And here is the full comment on the topic:

The core mistake within the entire architecture of the euro is the creation of the common currency in the first place. 

Absent organic, democratically-anchored federal union, common currency zone is simply non-viable even at the level of the 'strong Nordic' euro, let alone at the level of the euro that binds together vastly divergent - politically, economically, culturally and institutionally - states. 

The comparison of divergences present within the euro with those present amongst the states of the US - the common argument that divergences are not the systemic weak point of the euro construct - is missing the core point. That point is that divergence within the euro area are demographically, historically and institutionally anchored and no amount of 'top-to-bottom' siloed integration and harmonization of policies will deliver on breaking these divergences. Only organic, bottom-up and horizontal integration first of political systems, alongside human capital mobility and capital mobility, with trade liberalization, stretched over a number of generations can result in the emergence of the shared platforms that can unify the systems and instituions of vastly differing demographics that represent Europe.

By foregoing flexibility of diverse currencies and monetary policy systems, by forcing superficial convergence of policies and institutions onto the economies with no developed competitive advantages suitable to the current constantly and rapidly changing world (and often even against the already existent competitive advantages), the euro has weakened, not strengthened the core economies, making it virtually inevitable that the less advanced economies of the euro area will develop an asset bubble of one type or the other as the sole driver for growth, absent real organic drivers.

The crisis of the euro does not stem from the lack of monetary fitness. The lack of such fitness is itself is the symptom of the deeper problems within the euro architecture. Instead, the crisis was caused by the failure of the European economic model that first relied on public debt and subsequently, having run out of the road on public debt financing of growth in early 2000s, on private debt. Now, like Japan of the early 1990s, Europe is a debt-ridden economy with no catalyst for growth. Like Japan, it eliminated social and entrepreneurial mobility and pursued self-preservationism at all levels of its economy for far too long. 

Alas, unlike Japan, Europe is neither an R&D, nor exports, nor modern infrastructure powerhouse in the world that is much more advanced than it was in the 1990s. Which makes euro area a Japan2.0 with far fewer options and user friendliness. 

Good luck selling that as a 'vision' to global investors.

27/3/2012: Two Sovereign Debt Crisis charts

Two interesting charts on the fundamental sources of risks relating to sovereign crises of the 2009-present. No comment needed, really...

12/3/2012: Summary of latest CDS moves

A neat summary from 9/3/2012 note by markit for 5-year CDS:

And let's leave it without a comment.

H/T to @EconBrothers 

23/1/2012: Extreme Events

Going through 2 charts and mapping the big themes of the ongoing crises, one has to be in awe of the volatility. Here are the maps of extreme (3-Sigma-plus) events with 'directionality' reflected:

Lovely, aren't they? But the trick in the above is: we are not at the decay stage of volatility on the sovereigns re-pricing stage. This, to me, suggests that once the sovereign crisis re-pricing draws to conclusion (whenever that might happen - isa different story), there will be the need for finding that 'new normal' (reversion-to-the-trend target) for the markets valuations overall. And that is the whole new game, dependent less on the previous equilibrium that should have followed the Great Bursting period, but more on the future risks and trends in post-debt economies. Which, itself, really depends on whether any given market can sustain growth without endless supports (implicit and explicit) from the Government borrowings.

Just thought I'd throw few thoughts out there...

22/1/2012: 'Markets are crazy', says market economy Ireland

So we used to have an 'Innovation Island' here that was run by the Deputy PM who confused Einstein with Darwin. She was directly in charge of Innovation policies.

Now we have a 'Competitive Market Economy' that 'Is Open for Business', as we constantly remind our potential foreign investors (domestic investors we have simply taxed into oblivion already and are even expropriating their wealth through Minister Noonan's 'levy' on pensions), run by the Minister responsible for the following statements (source here HT to @brianmlucey for flashing this one out):

"Michael Noonan, Ireland's finance minister, criticised the involvement of private creditors in the [Greek PSI] talks, arguing that it had made the crisis worse. Mr Noonan told the German newspaper Sueddeutsche Zeitung it had been a "fatal" mistake to involve the private creditors and this had "driven the markets crazy". He said that markets would only calm when they were convinced that eurozone countries were making serious efforts to solve their debt problems."

So, 'markets are crazy' and proper risk sharing with private investors in the case of insolvency is a 'fatal mistake'.

Does Minister Noonan believe in slavery? Because if he doesn't then there is no alternative in the case of Greek crisis resolution options to PSI. Of course, Minister Noonan believes in slavery - the modern variety of it - slavery that subjugates those who do not emigrate from Ireland to decades of involuntary repayment of privately accumulated debts they did not contract to accumulate. Minister Noonan has no problem with the Government of Ireland simply undertaking all private debts of a private insolvent banks and forcing ordinary people - not shareholders or lenders to these banks who were paid to take the risks in the first place - to repay them. Just like that. Without any consent: "Give us your money, granny, or else!"

But there's more to the statement above, which shows Minister Noonan in an equally unpleasant light. You see, Minister Noonan swears by the wisdom of the IMF and the ECB and the European 'partners' when it comes to his domestic policies. He did so officially earlier this week when he used Troika endorsement of Ireland's 'progress' in the programme as the reflection of their support for his policies. Yet, it is the very same Troika he so blindly follows into Ireland's economic oblivion which deemed Greek debt levels unsustainable - aka non repayable even were the modern day debt slavery terms (as imposed in Ireland) deployed in Greece as well.

So, for all our Irish concerns about the sanity of the Troika 'solutions' for Ireland, there's an even greater concern that should be preoccupying our minds - concerns for the positions taken by our own national leaders. And for all those would-be foreign investors into Ireland - please remember, you are about to invest in the economy run by those who think that 'markets are crazy' and contracts for risk pricing are 'fatal mistakes'.


PS: Never mind, Minister Noonan's only plan for Ireland is to attempt, asap, borrowing in the 'crazy' markets to finance his 'sane' fiscal management strategies.