Economics 26/12/2009: Irish banks - twinned by crisis

A picture worth a thousand words:
Let me quickly explain - these are close price correlations (1 month moving) for AIB and Bank of Ireland. I divided the entire time horizon into 4 zones:

• Zone 1: through December 2004 - the tail end of the pre-credit bubble conditions, when Irish economy still had some residual Celtic Tiger growth in it. And, aptly, the banks were still financing growth in real economic activities. Thus, we clearly have periods where correlations fall below 0.3 levels, signaling some differences between the two banks. And they occasionally were reaching below zero, signaling substantial differences between the banks.
• Zone 2: January 2005-July 2007 - the credit bubble. During this period, the two banks worked hard on erasing any significant differences. One went to the UK, another followed. One landed in 100% mortgages, another followed. One started to throw money after cowboy developers. The other followed. And so on. If in the previous period, min-min correlations envelope (the extent of diversification offered by the shares pair) ranged from -33% to -37% and to -47% (implying occasional flight to hedge opportunities of substantial degree and rising though out the period), in the Zone 2 period, min-min envelope ranged from -28% to -6.4%, shrinking the flight to hedge opportunities. In other words, the two shares were much poorer diversification instruments against each other.
• Zone 3: August 2007 - January 2009 - the credit bubble bursting period. Here, the two shares converged to telling virtually an identical story. It was, indeed, true that by the end of this period, BofI and AIB became virtually indistinguishable. One's own risk was matched by the other risk. And the min-min envelope shrunk from 37% to 41%, getting dangerously close to that 50% mark.
• Zone 4: Since February 2009, the min-min envelope has contracted to 79.3% signaling that in effect the two shares have no substantial differentiation between them. In other words, from the point of risk hedging or risk-return consideration (e.g. under mean-variance criterion-based models) there is no reason to hold both stocks in a diversified portfolio. The surprising, indeed amazing, stability of these correlations since February 2009 suggests that the markets have reached the new equilibrium - or the New Long Term, where the markets no longer are caring for separating BofI from AIB.

One more thing is worth adding. You'd think that a look at pairwise correlations between two largest banks in this country would be warranted for our technically apt and smart stockbrokers... You'd be wrong - as far as I know, none seemed to have been bothered to send their clients a simple chart on correlations between the two banks.

Economics 21/12/2009: Nama - perpetuum mobile of ethics and objectives

For those of you who missed my Sunday Times article yesterday - here is the unedited version of the text.

But before we begin on Nama - here is a superb article on the prospects of potential sovereign defaults in Europe (read: Baltics, Greece and Ireland) from the FT today.

And here is a fantastic compendium of Brussels-imposed costs to the UK economy as estimated by the UK Government own assessments studies. One wonders if Irish Government bothered to do the same exercise and what its outcome might be. In the UK, the cumulative present value cost of these measures is ca £184 billion through 2020. If the same apply to Ireland, proportional to the overall size of the Irish economy, the combined cost of these Brussels directives could be around €18.6 billion - more than 77% of our annual deficit.



In the real world economics there is one Newtonian-level certainty: what can’t go on, doesn’t. We should have learned this some years ago, following the 1980s economic debacle and the 2001 collapse of the tech bubble. We had another opportunity to understand it last year. But in Ireland, real economics is reduced to the domain of an eccentric hobby. The real business of the nation leadership is preservation of the status quo – first at the state level, then political, and now – in banking.

Nama is a focus of all three. Through it, even in the midst of the current historic crisis, our political and executive elites continue to inhabit a parallel universe where responsibility and accountability are for the commoners, and transparency and governance are decorations for EU summits.

Aptly, in its current form, Nama reigns supreme as the most non-transparent financial institution in the developed world. Its ‘independent’ directors are being selected behind the closed doors by those who presided over the systemic failures of our regulatory and supervisory regimes. Its risk, audit and strategy functions will be fully contained within the secretive and unaccountable structure of the organization itself.

Nama will not publish a register of properties against which it will hold the right of seizure. This, we are being told, is done to protect privacy of the developers involved. But a register does not have to declare the names of the borrowers – property location, purchase price, vintage, LTV ratio and valuation by Nama would do just fine.

Nama accounting and audit functions will not comply with the requirements imposed by our regulators on public companies. Its directors, management and consultants will enjoy a blanket indemnity that is unparalleled by the standards of any public office or company law. Their remuneration will not face even the farcical constraints that senior banks executives face.

Nama owner – the SPV – is a bogus shell entity with ghost investors and a minority shareholder (the state) in charge. That this scheme has been concocted not in a distant off-shore location, but by our own state in our name and with our money adds insult to the injury.

As if the existent shortfalls of the legislation establishing Nama were not enough, even after the entity approval by the Dail, the goalposts for its operational performance continue to shift. Just weeks after the TDs voted to approve it Nama is now a different beast altogether.

Take the issue of discounts. Throughout the approval process, the Government doggedly refused to accept the need for realistic writedowns on the loans. Hence, all official estimates for Nama were incorporating an extremely optimistic 20-23% average discount. A handful of independent analysts, including myself, Professors Karl Whelan (UCD) and Brian Lucey (TCD), and an independent banking expert Peter Mathews, kept on showing analytically and factually that the final discount must be closer to 35-40% if Nama were to become anything but the skinning of the taxpayer.

The latest revelations from the banks and our stockbrokers, who insisted earlier this year that a 12-15% discount would be just fine, put an average Nama discount at over 30%. Nama cheerleaders now admit that applying a low discount is simply bonkers. This week, international agencies – Fitch and Moody – also waded back to the shores of reality. Both highlighted the fact that going forward Irish banks will remain in their current insolvent state. Nama won’t repair their balancesheets and it will not change their ability to raise capital privately.

With this change in direction, Nama became an exercise in racing to the top of recapitalization heap, as banks scrambled to issue new estimates of their expected demand for additional capital.

Two months ago I estimated in a public note that Bank of Ireland will require up to €2.6bn in capital after Nama loans are transferred, AIB will demand close to €3.5bn, Anglo €5.7bn and the rest of the pack will need approximately €1.2bn. The total demand for recapitalization costs post-Nama – none of which is factored into that work of fiction known as Nama Business Plan – will be €10-13 billion.

All of these figures could have been glimpsed from the banks balancesheets, but the Department of Finance, NTMA, and an army of advisers have opted for creative accountancy in place of realistic estimates.

Over the recent months, virtually every vested analyst in the country has confirmed the above figures for the banks. In one case – that of INBS – the analysts actually exceeded my worst case scenario projections. The result of this delayed admission is the current bear run on Irish banks stocks.

Now, recall that consensus estimates prepared by the independent analysts show that in the end of its operations, the ‘bad bank’ is likely to yield net losses to the taxpayers of between €11 billion and €17 billion. Not a single estimate, short of the fictionalized official Nama accounts, shows the entity breaking even on the loans.

Do the maths: expected losses of €11-17 billion, plus recapitalization costs to date of €11 billion, plus expected post-Nama recapitalization costs of €10-13 billion (only partially reflected in the expected losses estimates). The total bill for this bogus ‘rescuing’ of the Irish banking system is likely to be in the neighbourhood of €29-40 billion.

And, judging by the public pronouncements from the top bankers of AIB, Bank of Ireland, Anglo, permanent TSB and EBS – there is not a snowballs’ chance in hell Nama will repair lending to Irish companies or households. Instead, as the US experience with TARP shows – a liquidity trap is awaiting our economy. Put in simple terms, no rational banker would forego an opportunity of borrowing from the ECB and lending at ca 5% to the state instead of providing capital to SMEs and households.

Contrary to the hopes of restarting the lending cycle, what we have to look forward to in 2010 is the strengthening of the margins by the banks. A combination of the ‘risk sharing’ scheme built into Nama legislation, costlier interbank funding markets (courtesy of reduced liquidity supply from the ECB), falling corporate deposits base and the deterioration in the capital reserves of the banks will mean that the cost of existent loans and future borrowing will rise. And it will rise dramatically.

The first taste of this was the implementation by permanent TSB of a rate hike on adjustable rate mortgages. ESB preannounced the same move some months ago. Bank of Ireland, AIB and the rest of the pack will follow. When this happens, even absent ECB rates hikes (anticipated by the market in mid-to-late 2010), the retail lending rates will rise, triggering a wave of defaults by households on credit cards debt, consumer loans, car loans and ultimately home loans.

Short term lending facilities for businesses and export supports will also come under pressure as banks address the twin problems created by Nama – the deficit of capital and the uncertain nature of risk sharing scheme. The lack of exports supports either in the form of state-backed export credit insurance for indigenous exporters or the currency risk offset scheme in the Budget 2010 will further exacerbate the problem.

All of this is fuelling the current run on the banks shares. Even with their wings clipped, stock markets investors are indirectly ‘shorting’ Irish banks by withdrawing their cash from the AIB, Bank of Ireland and Irish Life & Permanent valuations. The markets are shouting: ‘We are not buying your story that Nama will work for Irish economy!’ The Government is not listening.

Box out:
A study based on the Standard & Poor’s data released this week shows that over the last 5 years, active funds managers have managed to under-perform broader market indices in four out of four asset categories. Thus, only 37% of active funds managers with large cap strategy orientation beat S&P500 large cap index to July 1, 2009. Only 32% of funds specializing on small cap equities outperformed S&P Small Cap 600 index, and abysmal 13% of funds with international (as opposed to US) orientation have managed higher returns than S&P700 index of global equities. Just 20% of bonds funds beat Barclays Intermediate Government/Credit index. And that is before we factor in cost differentials between actively managed funds and plain vanilla index-linked ETFs. Ouch…

Economics 13/12/2009: Nothing exceptional

Last couple of weeks, there have been some pretty severe news flowing from the Irish economy and Irish banks. Is the current bear market in Irish banks shares a temporary adjustment / profit taking or is it a long overdue fundamentals-driven correction?

Here are few charts and my view of the story.
The general trend, per chart above, has been down since 2007 peaks, but also - convergence of the two banks to the same trading range. By 2009 beginning, the investors were no longer willing to significantly distinguish between BofI and AIB shares, preferring to treat them as a single sick puppy, rather than two different banks with different management styles, business models and investment exposures.
And guess what - they still do. The entire 2009 trading was still based on the story of Irish Banks, rather than individual stories of AIB and BofI. Now, over a short period of time, say during general market panic, this can be explained by a temporary loss of fundamentals clarity, implying that investors might see both banks as being the same. We are no longer in this period, as global markets willingness to take risks has improved significantly in H2 2009. But the same markets that are now willing to differentiate Goldman Sachs from Bank of America are still unwilling to differentiate AIB from BofI.

Another interesting feature of the data is that Nama effect (a positive push for shares of AIB and BofI) has now been fully exhausted. And this is pretty impressive - we approve €54bn in funds, nearly bankrupting the entire economy, and in return we get the markets sending banks' share price back to where they were in May 2009, prior to the Nama approval.

So in terms of absolute prices, neither Nama, nor the latest Budget, seem to be working. But what about the risks in actual trading positions on the banks?
Well, if anything intraday volatility in AIB is down, not up, in the last 12 months. And that shows once again that the markets are not buying into AIB story. There is now less heterogeneity in investors' assessment of AIB value proposition than before:The same is true for BofI:The same story for a broader IFIN index

And there is nothing out of the ordinary in terms of volumes either:
Still relatively heavy, but not as heavy as in late 2008 - early 2009.

But now look as spreads (high-low) and monthly volatility: calmer, much calmer seas than over 2008. Again, no panic - just calm and measured trading here.
One can't really say here that investors are treating Irish banks shares in some idiosyncratic way, with an abnormally high sensitivity to risk. There is actually much less sensitivity to risk in the markets today than in 2008 and even 2007. So the current bear trend in Irish banks shares is driven by the markets assessment of fundamentals. In other words, markets are doing the job - spotting the 'dog' and pricing it down...
Any doubt? The above chart confirms that there is no abnormally heightened sensitivity to risk when it comes to AIB and BofI shares. The only outline events of 2009 in these shares relate to the bear rally that has just ended. The downtrend, therefore, is the norm.

Economics 01/12/2009: Irish Banks - something stirring in the dark

An interesting, but at this stage purely theoretical conjecture that can play out in the next couple of days.

I will posit it after I go over the facts that led me to this conjecture:

1. Today's reporting on BofI and the banks in general has been focusing on the possible conversion of preference shares into ordinary shares to plug in capital holes. Considering that (a) such a conversion will de facto spell near nationalization of the banks; (b) it will destroy Government's case (supported by the stockbrokers and the banks) that preference shares represent significant cash flow positive back to the taxpayers in exchange for recapitalizations to date; and (c) such a conversion will amount to a swap of a guaranteed asset (preference share dividend) in exchange for of a falling asset (as ordinary shares are tanking and are bound to continue to tank if conversion takes place), the statement is alarming. In fact, the statement is extraordinary in nature, similar to the Banks Guarantee Scheme announcement back in September 2008;
   
2. The RTE has completely failed to explore the very core idea of what effect the conversion will have on both capital reserves at the banks and the value of taxpayers' shareholdings in the banks. This might suggest that the story was potentially heavily 'managed' as a staged release as RTE business editors and correspondents should have been aware of such consequences;
3. The extent of demand for capital post-Nama has been approximately estimable from the sheer size of impairments faced by the banks against banks balancesheets (loans to deposits ratios) and did not come as surprise for, say Anglo earlier this month. Why such a hype then all of a sudden? Did Nama haircut change dramatically? Not, Bloxham note today in the morning explicitly worked its estimates from the assumed Nama-signalled haircut of 30%. No change spotted here, then.
4. Core tier 1 capital already includes preference shares, so conversion will only aid the banks balancesheets if and only if it will allow the banks to keep the preference shares dividend. This means that taxpayers get nothing from these shares. And it also means that things are getting so desperate in the banks that they are having trouble (potentially?) repaying these dividends to the state. What can the impetus for such deterioration be, given both banks already guided recently on expected impairments? Why did RTE reporters never bothered to ask about this issue.
5. The whole mess of demand for post-Nama recapitalizations was predicted by some, and publicly aired in the media. In fact, my estimates from one month ago (here) accurately predicted the numbers involved. While some 'experts' from stock brokerages interviewed today by RTE's flagship News at Nine programme might have been unaware of such estimates back then, their arriving at the same numbers one month later is not really that much of a market-making news. So, again, why the hype today?
   
6. RTE stated tonight that the markets anticipated 20% haircut (here). This is simply not true:

• Per today's Davy note: "This has been reviewed by NAMA and the Department of Finance and on the basis of interaction with both and the minister's estimate of €16bn of eligible bank assets, 'the directors believe that the average discount on disposal applicable to these assets should not be greater than the estimated average discount for all participating institutions of 30%'."
• Bloxham are working off 30% assumption.
  
• Goodbody's note was a bit more volatile on assumptions: "As per BOI’s recent interim results and a November’s IMS from AIB, both banks highlight that a number of uncertainties exist as to the specific quantum and timing of loans which may transfer, the price, the fees due and the “fair value” of the consideration. In its statement, AIB refers to the previously highlighted industry average discount of 30% to the gross value of the loans and indicates - as it did at the time of its IMS - that the board’s view is that “there is no reason to believe that the average discount applicable to AIB’s NAMA assets will fall significantly outside of this guidance”. When we wrote on this at the IMS stage, we highlighted that the language here was more vague than previous utterances and note our haircut applied is 28%. Similarly, in the case of BOI, the references in the release today are all based off the generic 30% industry figure referred to be the Minister, though that the discount will vary by institution, with the Court believing this industry figure to be the “maximum loss likely to be incurred on the sale of loans to NAMA”. We are of the view though that BOI’s haircut will be closer to 18%." I'll explain in human language: AIB itself believed that average Nama discount (30%) or something close will apply, while Goody believed 28% will do. For BofI, the management believed before that 30% will apply. But Goody's believed 18% will do (why, beats me). So no evidence on 20% market consensus anywhere here, then.
  
• NCB applied 30% model to both BofI and AIB in today's note. And so on.
  
• Taken over all brokers and banks themselves, AIB assumed discount averages at 29.5%, not 20%, BofI assumed discount averages at 27%. Now, forgive me, but where is RTE taking its 20% market expectation from?
  

So now, let us summarise the evidence:

• Banks announcement today was out of line with ordinary business;
• Banks announcement was never probed or challenged by the official media;
• Banks announcements were not queried by the the brokers to the full extent of conversion implications to the balance sheets;
• Three components can have a dramatic fast impact on bank core tier 1 capital - equity collapse (not the case - banks shares are down by less than 5% today, plus the statements were released in the morning before market prices were revealed); loans collapse on a massive scale (unlikely, given that both banks guided very recently on new impairments and also unlikely given that both banks appear to be impacted simultaneously); or deposits falling off dramatically (there is no way of confirming this unless banks publish their data, but do recall September-December 2008 when deposits flight exposed Anglo to nationalization).
  

So something really strange is happening around the BofI and AIB in the last few days. I do not know what this might be, but some fast moving deterioration in hitting banks balancesheets.

Watch tomorrow's ticker.

Economics 10/11/2009: Our Unique Path to Solvency

Updated: FX outlook (below)

And so two things come to pass in the last few days that will have a significant bearing on Ireland in years to come.

Issue 1: the ECB has firmly set its sight on exiting from money printing business sooner rather than later. Per ECB's statement last week, the bank will close off its 1 year discount window, cutting maturity of the loans available to the banking sector in the euro area from 1 year long term maturity to 3 months traditional maturity. This will mean two things for Irish banks who are the heaviest borrowers from the ECB by all possible measures (see here):

1. Irish banks will face much faster transmission of any rates increases into their cost of borrowing increases;
2. Irish banks will see higher cost of borrowing directly due to them being unable to access 3-12 months maturity instruments outside the interbank lending markets (currently they are collecting a handsome subsidy from the ECB’s discount window by borrowing at rates well below those offered in euribor).

And all of this will mean that our banks will once again see their margins squeezed by the credit markets, implying an even greater incentive for them to go after their paying customers with higher mortgage rates, credit cards rates and banking fees and costs.

Issue 2: earlier this week, the EU produced an estimate that the Union members’ total public debt could reach 100% of GDP by 2014 up from 66% in 2007. Last month, the Commission forecast that EU debt levels will rise to 84% in 2010 and 88.2% in 2011. Now, it says that not only the debt will top 100% of GDP in 2014, but that it will keep on rising after that. And the Commission named the row of culprits most responsible for fiscal debacle: Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Spain and the UK. This is linked to the earlier paper from the Commission that looked at long-term demographic challenges to deficit financing, where Ireland and other countries were presented as basket cases in terms of pensions liabilities and expected healthcare costs associated with ageing population.

This, of course means the following two things for Irish economy:

1. Despite all extension for 2013 deadline for Mr Cowen to deliver SGP-compliant budget for Ireland, the EU is going to put more pressure on Ireland to bring its house in order. Not doing so will risk derailing of stimulus exits and deficits rollbacks by the likes of Italy, followed by Austria, Spain, Portugal and France. This simply cannot be allowed for the fear of undermining euro’s credibility and with it any plans Brussels might have for the tidy earnings from reserve currency seignorage in the future;
2. Brussels will be pushing harder and harder for own tax revenue source – some sort of a unified federal tax – in order to divorce itself from the precarious and uncertain (i.e volatile) sources of state-level revenues.

The net effect of all of this – taxes will go up. To put this into perspective, should the EU allow us the deadline of 2014 to sort out our deficit, this will mean our debt will be up by another €20-22bn and our cumulative interest bill will rise (by the end of 2014) by another €5.5-7bn.

Alternatively, consider the annual bill for this debt – at 4.7-6% per annum (a reasonable range starting from today’s low rates and reaching into rates consistent with ca 1.75-2.0% base ECB rate), the new, shall we call it ‘delay the pain SIPTU’-debt, will cost us every year something to the tune of €940-1,320 million, or just about what Mr Cowen is now promising to shave off the public sector pay bill.

So do the math – accumulation of liabilities (interest only) of up to €1.3bn per annum and political process delivering promises of savings of €1.3bn after two years of the crisis… Path to solvency indeed.


Now, per one reader's request, here is my view on what this means for the euro:

Macro side: unwinding of deficits will mean a steep fall off in Government consumption and investment, so both - short term and longer term demand for euro will fall. This will be offset by the simultaneous unwinding of quantitative easing, so supply of euro will also decline. Three scenarios and paths are possible from there:

1. If the two offset each other, we are down to interest rate differences to drive currency pairs against the euro (more on this below);
2. If monetary tightening will be lagging fiscal constraints, then euro will be heading south vis-a-vis dollar but not by much as it is highly unlikely that Obama Administration will be able to sustain its own deficits for much longer;
3. If monetary tightening leads fiscal tightening, then euro might head further north vis-a-vis the dollar.
4. Interest rates effects are most likely to drive euro up for several reasons: the US Fed is likely to continue easing as fiscal stimulus runs out; the ECB has reputation building (re-building?) to do; US has higher tolerance for inflation.
5. Last issue to watch over is the financial sectors demand for liquidity. Here, the US is more likely to face smaller demand for liquidity than euro area and this will imply a net positive to the dollar upside.
   

So my view is that dollar-euro pair will remain volatile over some time, with some limited upside to the dollar in the medium term. Carry trades in dollar will be continuing especially as the BRICs and the rest of the world launch into a new investment cycle in early 2010. Depending on whether this will coincide with monetary/ fiscal tightening in the euro area, we might see temporary testing of $/€1.65 barrier.

Euro-sterling story is a different story. The UK will be unwinding fiscal stimulus, while continuing monetary easing (banks are still in need of capital and writedowns will remain pronounced), which means we shall see plenty excess supply of sterling. The pressure is to the downside here and parity can be approached once again (remember that 0.98 moment in December 2008?).