Showing posts with label populism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label populism. Show all posts

Friday, November 13, 2020

13/11/20: The economy has two chronic illnesses (and neither are Covid)

My column for The Currency this week covers two key long-term themes in the global economy that pre-date the pandemic and will remain in place well into 2025: the twin secular stagnations hypotheses and the changing nature of the productivity. The link to the article is here; https://thecurrency.news/articles/28224/the-economy-has-two-chronic-illnesses-and-neither-are-covid/


 

Friday, July 24, 2020

23/7/20: Globalization and Populism: A Recent Study


I recently came across a fascinating paper by Dani Rodrik, an economist always worth reading. The paper, titled "Why Does Globalization Fuel Populism? Economics, Culture, and the Rise of Right-wing Populism" (NBER Working Paper No. 27526, July 2020) argues that "there is compelling evidence that globalization shocks, often working through culture and identity, have played an important role in driving up support for populist movements, particularly of the right-wing kind."

Rodrik carries out "an empirical analysis of the 2016 presidential election in the U.S. to show globalization-related attitudinal variables were important correlates of the switch to Trump."


  • "Trump voters were more likely to be white, older, and college-educated. 
  • "...they were significantly more hostile to racial equality and perceived themselves to be of higher social class. 
  • "The estimated coefficient on racial attitudes is particularly large: a one-point increase in the index of racial hostility – which theoretically ranges from 1 to 5 – is associated with a 0.28 percentage point increase in the probability of voting for Trump (Table below, column 1). 
  • "By contrast, economic insecurity does not seem to be associated with a propensity to vote for Trump.


"The finding that Trump voters thought of themselves as belonging to upper social classes ... largely reflects the role played by party identification in shaping voting preferences. When we control for Republican party identification (cols. 2 and 6), the estimated coefficient for social class drops sharply and ceases to be statistically significant."

"Note, however, that racial hostility remains significant, although its estimated coefficient becomes smaller (cols. 2 and 6)."

The other columns in the table above examine attitudes towards globalization (columns 2-5).

  • "All three of our measures enter statistically significantly: 
  • "Trump voters disliked trade agreements and immigration; 
  • "They were also against bank regulation (presumably in line with the general anti-regulation views of (cols. 2-5) the Republican party). 
  • "These indictors remain significant in the kitchen-sink version where they are all entered together (col. 6)."

"In none of these regressions does economic insecurity (financial worries) enter significantly. This
changes when we move from Trump voters in general to switchers from Obama to Trump (cols. 7-12). ... financial worries now becomes statistically significant, and switchers do not identify with the upper social classes. "

"Switchers are similar to Trump voters insofar as they too dislike trade agreements and immigration
(cols. 9-11). But they are dissimilar in that they view regulation of banks favorably. Hence switchers
appear to be against all aspects of globalization – trade, immigration, finance. the regression."


Rodrik postulates "a conceptual framework to clarify the various channels through which globalization can stimulate populism" on both "the demand and supply sides of politics". He also lists "the different causal pathways that link globalization shocks to political outcomes". 

Rodrik identifies "four mechanisms in particular, two each on the demand and supply sides:

  • (a) a direct effect from economic dislocation to demands for anti-elite, redistributive policies; 
  • (b) an indirect demand-side effect, through the amplification of cultural and identity divisions; 
  • (c) a supply-side effect through political candidates adopting more populist platforms in response to economic shocks; and 
  • (d) another supply-side effect through political candidates adopting platforms that deliberately inflame cultural and identity tensions in order to shift voters’ attention away from economic issues."

The full paper, accessible at https://www.nber.org/papers/w27526.pdf is choke full of other insights and is absolutely worth reading.

Monday, February 3, 2020

3/2/2020: Demographics and Support for the EU: Populism Base


Rising populism in politics, demographics and the financial crisis aftershocks are linked. Intuitively and empirically. And thus says a new study, published in the Journal of European Public Policy. The study by Fabian Lauterbach and Catherine e. De Vries, titled "Europe belongs to the young? Generational differences in public opinion towards the European Union during the Eurozone crisis" tackles the "...notion that younger people hold more favourable attitudes towards the European Union (EU) is prevalent in both academic and popular discourse." The authors shows that "Younger cohorts in debtor countries have become significantly more sceptical of the EU than their peers in creditor states" after the crisis. At the same time, "Older generations are more supportive of the EU in debtor countries compared to creditor states."

Marginal means by cohort, Euro-debtor, Euro-creditor and other EU member states


Full paper: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13501763.2019.1701533

Friday, August 16, 2019

16/8/19: Post-Millennials and the falling trust in institutions of coercion


A neat chart from Pew Research highlighting shifting demographics behind the changing trends in the U.S. public trust in core institutions:

Source: https://www.people-press.org/2019/07/22/how-americans-see-problems-of-trust/

Overall, the generational shift is in the direction of younger GenZ putting more trust in scientists and academics, as well as journalists, compared to previous generations; and less trust in military, police, religious leaders and business leaders. Notably, elected officials have pretty much low trust across all three key demographics.

Friday, November 30, 2018

30/11/18: The Myth of Social Mobility and Wealth Inequality


Three charts, related topics.

Global wealth inequality has been a much-discussed problem these days, with both longer-term economic and social, not to mention political, impacts being assigned to it across both the Advanced Economies and the Emerging Markets. Setting aside the causes and drivers for this development, here is the latest evidence on the wealth distribution around the world from Credit Suisse:


The 3.211 billion people, accounting for 63.9% of the total estimated world population are holding USD6.2 trillion worth of wealth (1.9% of the world total value of assets). Another 26.6% of population or 1.335 billion people, hold 13.9% of total global wealth. Thus, 90.5% of population hold combined 15.8% of the total global wealth. In the top 10 percent category, those with wealth of USD100K to 1 million account for 8.7% of global population and hold 39.3 percent of total global wealth. The 0.8% of population (42 million people) have combined holdings of wealth around USD142 trillion or 44.8% of total global wealth.

This is striking and it is problematic. Even if most of our own wealth inequality referencing is done across the adjoining class of comparatives, the gap between the top of the pyramid and the bottom is so insurmountably vast, that any idea that there is some sort of meritocratic division of wealth in our global society flies out of the window. The problem is not so much income inequality, but the inequality arising from inherited wealth, which generates income returns from invested assets that cannot be offset or diluted by merit of effort, talent and work, no matter how hard one works. Even stripping out luck effects of self-made millionaires and billionaires, the pyramid above is the evidence to the endurance of inter-generational wealth transfers.

The dynamics of evolution in wealth inequality that got us here are presented in the following charts via Goldman Sachs Research:


These figures are for the U.S. economy and they are frightening, just as much as the wealth pyramid above is frightening. Share of wealth held by the top 1% wealth-holders grew from just above 21% in the late 1970s-early 1980s to closer to 37% in 2014. Since then, it has increased more. Share of wealth held by the remaining top 10 percenters declined from ca 44% in the early 1970s to around 35% from the late 1990s on. But the share of wealth held by middle America collapsed to below 27% since the high of around 36% in mid-1980s. Things were never brilliant for the bottom 50 percent of Americans to begin with, but since the Global Financial Crisis, lower middle of America has had negative net wealth through 2014. even though it might have risen since then somewhat, at no time in modern history have the middle and lower-middle class Americans enjoyed holding more than 2 percent of the total wealth.

This is a double-ugly conclusion, because it simultaneously runs against two key propositions on which the American society rests: the proposition of social cross-class mobility upwards from lower wealth classes to middle class, and the proposition that social progress in the American society is distinct from the ‘basket cases’ dynamics in the larger emerging economies (the likes of India and China). In a way, America replicates the world in terms of both, wealth inequality and its dynamics. And that is not a good thing for a society based on exceptionalism values.

The added dimension to this is that, given the above dynamics and the degree of elites entrenchment / capture within the political establishment, we are facing an impossible task of rebalancing the above wealth inequalities without triggering some serious political discontent. Worse, we have no tools for doing so, other than traditional socialist tools (expropriation via taxation of income), which are not effective in dealing with this problem. One of the reasons why these tools are ineffective is that broad-based income tax measures impact more adversely those who work for living (higher income earners) and do not touch those who experience wealth appreciation through capital gains on inherited wealth (as long as they re-invest their wealth-generated income). Another reason, is that higher income earners, on average, can claim merit as a source of their income more than those who hold inherited wealth. A third reason is that redistribution through taxation is highly inefficient: the funds flow to the politically-empowered, not to merit-deserving, and the losses on tax funds are high due to the cost of Government bureaucracy.

Which leaves us with the unpleasant dilemma: tax inherited wealth (during inheritance transfer in the future, and retro-actively, via tax on existent wealth, in the past). Which in itself is highly problematic for the following reasons: (1) wealth is mobile across borders, and financialized wealth is especially so; (2) a significant tax on wealth is likely to trigger repricing of all assets to the downside (liquidation of wealth to cover tax liabilities), adversely impacting wealth acquired by the first generation of entrepreneurs and investors; and (3) inducing a sizeable decline in the life-cycle expected wealth of the current younger generations, resulting is a large scale re-leveraging of these generations.

Neither of these effects is easy to address.


Sunday, September 9, 2018

9/9/2018: Corporate Power, Charity, and Social & Policy Impacts


In an important discussion, titled "Tax-exempt lobbying: Corporate philanthropy as a tool for political influence", Marianne Bertrand, Matilde Bombardini, Raymond Fisman, and Francesco Trebbi (02 September 2018, https://voxeu.org/article/corporate-philanthropy-tool-political-influence) argue that as "special interests use donations to influence the political process", "...philanthropic efforts in the US are targeted, at least in part, to influence legislators. Districts with influential politicians receive more donations, as do non-profits with politicians on their boards. This is problematic because, unlike PAC contributions and lobbying, influence by charity is hard for the public to observe." The resulting conclusion by the authors is that the case of corporate-charity interlinks "amounts to a taxpayer subsidy of corporations expressing their political voice". In other words, concentration of market power causes concentration push in lobbying and, thus, potentially forces policy formation to more closely reflect the interests of the corporate donors at the expense of the taxpayers and ordinary voters.

This is a very important issue in any analysis of the functioning of our democratic processes. But it also raises another 'adjoining' issue, not covered in the paper: American corporations are increasingly relying on other channels to alter social (and related policy) outcomes today. This channel is the companies increasing financial and other commitments to Corporate Social Responsibility and Social Impact (or even broader ESG) targeting. Whilst benign in its core values and ethos, the channel can be open to potential abuse by corporate powers. In addition, like charity status channel, the CSR and SI/ESG channel also avails of public funding link ups to corporate balance sheets (via tax incentives, subsidies, co-financing of projects, etc). The question worth asking, therefore, is the following one: To what extent do modern SI/ESG and CSR strategies of major corporations align with their lobbying objectives? In other words, do corporates use SI/ESG/CSR strategies to promote self-interest beyond purely societal interest?

Surprisingly, very little research in the Social Impact or ESG analysis has been devoted to the potential for corporations to 'game the system' in their favour.

9/9/18: Populism, Middle Class and Asset Bubbles


The range of total returns (unadjusted for differential FX rates) for some key assets categories since 2009 via Goldman Sachs Research:


The above highlights the pivot toward financial assets inflation under the tidal wave of Quantitative Easing programmes by the major Central Banks. The financial sector repression is taking the bite out of the consumer / household finances through widening profit margins, reflective of the economy's move toward higher financial intensity of output. Put differently, the CPI gap to corporate costs inflation is widening, and with it, the asset price inflation is drifting toward financial assets:


This is the 'beggar-thy-household' economy, folks. Not surprisingly, while the proportion of total population classifiable as middle-class might be stabilising (after a massive decline from the 1970s and 1980s levels):

 Incomes of the middle class are stagnant (and for lower earners, falling):

And post-QE squeeze (higher interest rates and higher cost of credit intermediation) is coming for the already stretched households. Any wonder that political populism/opportunism is also on the rise?

Monday, May 21, 2018

21/5/18: Italian Sovereign Risks Are Blowing Up


As I noted in my comment to ECR / Euromoney and in my article for Sunday Business Post (see links here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2018/05/21518-risk-experts-take-flight-over.html and http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2018/05/21528-trouble-is-brewing-in-euro.html), the ongoing process of Government formation in Italy represents a fallout from the substantial VUCA events arising from the recent elections, and as such warrants a significant (albeit delayed) repricing of country sovereign risks. This process is now underway:

Source: Holger Zschaepitz @Schuldensuehner

Per chart above, Italy's 10 year bonds risk premium over Germany jumped to 181 bps on markets concerns with respect to fiscal dynamics implied by the new Government formation. This, however, is just a minor side show compared to the VUCA environment created by the broader dynamics of political populism and opportunism. And in this respect, Italy is just another European country exposed to these risks. In fact, as the latest data from the Timbro's Authoritarian Populism Index, Europe-wide, political populism is on the rise:



21/5/18: Risk experts take flight over Italy's political risk


Euromoney and ECR are covering the story of Italian political risk, with my comments on the rise of populism in Italy and its effects on sovereign risk with respect to the Italian Government formation negotiations: https://www.euromoney.com/article/b187w50chyvhbl/risk-experts-take-flight-over-italys-political-shock


Tuesday, May 15, 2018

15/518: Four macro charts that explain Trumpvolution


The current growth cycle has been the second longest on record:

Source: FactSet

But it has been much shallower than the previous cycles: "real GDP growth in the current expansion lags the other three expansions—by a lot. As of the first quarter of 2018, real GDP has expanded by 21% since the beginning of the current expansion; this is far lower than the 36% compound growth we saw at this point in the 1991‑2001 expansion. The chart also shows that the growth path for the longest expansions has continued to shift lower over time; the 1961‑1969 expansion saw real GDP grow by 52% by the end of its ninth year, while the economy had grown by just 38% by the end of year eight of the 1982‑1990 expansion."

Source: FactSet

And here's a summary of why loading risks of recession onto households is not such a great idea: "Real consumption has grown by 23% since the summer of 2009, compared to growth rates of 41% and 50% at the same point in the expansions of 1991‑2001 and 1961‑1969, respectively. The reluctance of consumers to spend in this expansion is not surprising when you consider how much of the brunt of the last recession was borne by this group."

Households' net worth collapse in the GFC has been more dramatic and the recovery from the crisis has been less pronounced than in the previous cycles:

Source: FactSet

Hey, you hear some say, but the recovery this time around has been 'historic' in terms of jobs creation. Right? Well, it has been historic... as in historically low:
Source: FactSet

So, despite the length of the recovery cycle, current state of the economy hardly warrants elevated levels of optimism. The recovery from the Global Financial Crisis and the Great Recession has been unimpressively sluggish, and the burden of the crises has been carried on the shoulders of ordinary households. Any wonder we have so many 'deplorables' ready to vote populist? As we noted in our recent paper (see: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3033949), the rise of populism has been a logical corollary to (1) the general trends toward secular stagnation in the economy since the mid-1990s, and (2) the impact of the twin 2008-2010 crises on households.

Saturday, April 15, 2017

15/4/17: Naughty and Not Very Nice: French Presidential Hopefuls


A neat summary (ignore polls numbers at the top - these are dated) of political platforms behind the key Presidential election candidates in France:




Saturday, November 12, 2016

11/11/2016: Europe's 'Convincing' Recovery


Europe's strong, convincing, systemic recovery ... the meme of the European leaders from Ireland all the way across to the Baltics, and save for Greece, from the Mediterranean to Arctic Ocean comes to test with reality in the latest Pictet Quarterly and if the only chart were all you needed to see why the Continent is drowning in populist politics, here it is:


As Christophe Donay and Frederik Ducrozet explain (emphasis is mine):

"Since 2008, the world’s main central banks have used a vast array of transmission channels: currency weakening to reboot exports; reflation of asset prices to boost confidence; a clean-up of banks’ balance sheets to boost the credit cycle. But, ultimately, all these measures have failed as economic growth remains subdued. Indeed, the belief that countries have become trapped in suboptimal growth and that developed economies, especially in Europe, look set to complete a
‘lost decade’ of subpar growth (see graph) since the financial crisis forms the third strand of criticism of monetary policy."

Whatever one can say about the monetary policy, one thing is patently obvious: since the introduction of the Euro, the disaster that is European economy became ever more disastrous.

Enter Trumpist successors to characterless corporatist technocrats... probably, first for worse, and hopefully later, at least, for better...

Friday, June 17, 2016

17/6/16: Forget Brexit. Think EUrisis


Swedish research institute, Timbro, published their report covering the rise of political populism in Europe. And it makes for a sobering reading.

Quoting from the report:

“Never before have populist parties had as strong support throughout Europe as they do today. On average a fifth of all European voters now vote for a left-wing or right-wing populist party. The voter demand for populism has increased steadily since the millennium shift all across Europe.”

Personally, I don’t think this is reflective of the voter demand for populism, but rather lack of supply of pragmatic voter-representing leadership anywhere near the statist political Centre. After decades of devolution of ethics and decision-making to narrow groups or sub-strata of technocrats - a process embodied by the EU systems, but also present at the national levels - European voters no longer see a tangible connection between themselves (the governed) and those who lead them (the governors). The Global Financial Crisis and subsequent Great Recession, accompanied by the Sovereign Debt Crisis and culminating (to-date) in the Refugees Crisis, all have exposed the cartel-like nature of the corporatist systems in Europe (and increasingly also outside Europe, including the U.S.). Modern media spread the information like forest fire spreads ambers, resulting in amplified rend toward discontent.

Again, per Timbro:
“No single country is clearly going against the stream. 2015 was the most successful year so far for populist parties and consistent polls show that right-wing populist parties have grown significantly as a result of the 2015 refugee crisis. So far this year left-wing or right-wing populist parties have been successful in parliamentary elections in Slovakia, Ireland, Serbia, and Cyprus, in a presidential election in Austria and in regional elections in Germany. A growing number of populist parties are also succeeding in translating voter demand into political influence. Today, populist parties are represented in the governments of nine European countries and act as parliamentary support in another two.”

Net: “…one third of the governments of Europe are constituted by or dependent on populist parties.”

And the direction of this trend toward greater populism in European politics is quite astonishing. Per Timbro, “discussions on populism too often focus only on rightwing populism. Practically everything written on populism, at least outside Southern Europe, is almost entirely concerned with right-wing populism. Within the political sciences the study of right-wing populist parties has even become its own field of study, while studies on leftwing populism are rare.”

This skew in reporting and analysis, however, is false: while “…it is the right-wing populism that has grown most notably, particularly in Scandinavia and Northern Europe. However, in Southern Europe the situation is the opposite. If the goal is to safeguard the core values and institutions of liberal democracy we need a parallel focus on those who challenge it, regardless of whether they come from the right or the left. It is seriously worrying that seven per cent of the population in Greece vote for
a Nazi party, but it is also worrying that five per cent vote for a Stalinist one. The second aim of this report is therefore to present an overview of the threat of populism, both right-wing and left-wing, against liberal democracy.”

Here are some trends:


The chart above shows that authoritarian left politics are showing a strong trend up from 2010 through 2014, with some moderation in 2015, which might be driven more by the electoral cycle, rather than by a potential change in the trend. The moderation in 2015, however, is not present in data for right wing authoritarianism:


So total support for authoritarian parties is up, a trend present since 2000 and reflective of the timing that is more consistent with the introduction of the euro and subsequent EU enlargements. An entirely new stage of increase in authoritarianism tendencies was recorded in 2015 compared to 2014.


Save for the correction downward in 2007-2009 period, authoritarian parties have been on an increasing power trend since roughly 1990, with renewed upward momentum from 1999.


You can read the full study and reference the study definitions and methodologies here: http://timbro.se/sites/timbro.se/files/files/reports/4_rapport_populismindex_eng_0.pdf.


What we are witnessing in the above trends is continuation of a long-running theme: the backlash by the voters, increasingly of younger demographics, against the status quo regime of narrow elites. Yes, this reality does coincide with economic inequality debates and with economic disruptions that made life of tens of millions of Europeans less palatable than before. But no, this is not a reaction to the economic crisis. Rather, it is a reaction to the social, ideological and ethical vacuum that is fully consistent with the technocratic system of governance, where values are being displaced by legal and regulatory rules, and where engineered socio-economic system become more stressed and more fragile as risks mount due to the technocratic obsession with… well… technocracy as a solution for every ill.

While the EU has been navel gazing about the need for addressing the democratic deficit, the disease of corporatism has spread so extensively that simply re-jigging existent institutions (giving more power to the EU Parliament and/or increasing member states’ voice in decision making and/or imposing robust checks and balances on the Commission, the Eurogroup and the Council) at this stage will amount to nothing more than applying plasters to the through-the-abdomen gunshot wound. Brexit or not, the EU is rapidly heading for the point of no return, where any reforms, no matter how structurally sound they might be, will not be enough to reverse the electoral momentum.

For those of us, who do think united Europe can be, at least in theory, a good thing, time is to wake up. Now. And not to oppose Brexit and similar movements, but to design a mechanism to prevent them by re-enfranchising real people into political decision making institutions.