Showing posts with label POTUS2016. Show all posts
Showing posts with label POTUS2016. Show all posts

Friday, July 24, 2020

23/7/20: Globalization and Populism: A Recent Study


I recently came across a fascinating paper by Dani Rodrik, an economist always worth reading. The paper, titled "Why Does Globalization Fuel Populism? Economics, Culture, and the Rise of Right-wing Populism" (NBER Working Paper No. 27526, July 2020) argues that "there is compelling evidence that globalization shocks, often working through culture and identity, have played an important role in driving up support for populist movements, particularly of the right-wing kind."

Rodrik carries out "an empirical analysis of the 2016 presidential election in the U.S. to show globalization-related attitudinal variables were important correlates of the switch to Trump."


  • "Trump voters were more likely to be white, older, and college-educated. 
  • "...they were significantly more hostile to racial equality and perceived themselves to be of higher social class. 
  • "The estimated coefficient on racial attitudes is particularly large: a one-point increase in the index of racial hostility – which theoretically ranges from 1 to 5 – is associated with a 0.28 percentage point increase in the probability of voting for Trump (Table below, column 1). 
  • "By contrast, economic insecurity does not seem to be associated with a propensity to vote for Trump.


"The finding that Trump voters thought of themselves as belonging to upper social classes ... largely reflects the role played by party identification in shaping voting preferences. When we control for Republican party identification (cols. 2 and 6), the estimated coefficient for social class drops sharply and ceases to be statistically significant."

"Note, however, that racial hostility remains significant, although its estimated coefficient becomes smaller (cols. 2 and 6)."

The other columns in the table above examine attitudes towards globalization (columns 2-5).

  • "All three of our measures enter statistically significantly: 
  • "Trump voters disliked trade agreements and immigration; 
  • "They were also against bank regulation (presumably in line with the general anti-regulation views of (cols. 2-5) the Republican party). 
  • "These indictors remain significant in the kitchen-sink version where they are all entered together (col. 6)."

"In none of these regressions does economic insecurity (financial worries) enter significantly. This
changes when we move from Trump voters in general to switchers from Obama to Trump (cols. 7-12). ... financial worries now becomes statistically significant, and switchers do not identify with the upper social classes. "

"Switchers are similar to Trump voters insofar as they too dislike trade agreements and immigration
(cols. 9-11). But they are dissimilar in that they view regulation of banks favorably. Hence switchers
appear to be against all aspects of globalization – trade, immigration, finance. the regression."


Rodrik postulates "a conceptual framework to clarify the various channels through which globalization can stimulate populism" on both "the demand and supply sides of politics". He also lists "the different causal pathways that link globalization shocks to political outcomes". 

Rodrik identifies "four mechanisms in particular, two each on the demand and supply sides:

  • (a) a direct effect from economic dislocation to demands for anti-elite, redistributive policies; 
  • (b) an indirect demand-side effect, through the amplification of cultural and identity divisions; 
  • (c) a supply-side effect through political candidates adopting more populist platforms in response to economic shocks; and 
  • (d) another supply-side effect through political candidates adopting platforms that deliberately inflame cultural and identity tensions in order to shift voters’ attention away from economic issues."

The full paper, accessible at https://www.nber.org/papers/w27526.pdf is choke full of other insights and is absolutely worth reading.

Friday, January 13, 2017

12/1/17: Betrayal Aversion, Populism and Donald Trump Election


In their 2003 paper, Koehler and Gershoff provide a definition of a specific behavioural phenomenon, known as betrayal aversion. Specifically, the authors state that “A form of betrayal occurs when agents of protection cause the very harm that they are entrusted to guard against. Examples include the military leader who commits treason and the exploding automobile air bag.” The duo showed - across five studies - that people respond differently “to criminal betrayals, safety product betrayals, and the risk of future betrayal by safety products” depending on who acts as an agent of betrayal. Specifically, the authors “found that people reacted more strongly (in terms of punishment assigned and negative emotions felt) to acts of betrayal than to identical bad acts that do not violate a duty or promise to protect. We also found that, when faced with a choice among pairs of safety devices (air
bags, smoke alarms, and vaccines), most people preferred inferior options (in terms of risk exposure) to options that included a slim (0.01%) risk of betrayal. However, when the betrayal risk was replaced by an equivalent non-betrayal risk, the choice pattern was reversed. Apparently, people are willing to incur greater risks of the very harm they seek protection from to avoid the mere possibility of betrayal.”

Put into different context, we opt for suboptimal degree of protection against harm in order to avoid being betrayed.

Now, consider the case of political betrayal. Suppose voters vest their trust in a candidate for office on the basis of the candidate’s claims (call these policy platform, for example) to deliver protection of the voters’ interests. One, the relationship between the voters and the candidate is emotionally-framed (this is important). Two, the relationship of trust induces the acute feeling of betrayal if the candidate does not deliver on his/her promises. Three, past experience of betrayal, quite rationally, induces betrayal aversion: in the next round of voting, voters will prefer a candidate who offers less in terms of his/her platform feasibility (aka: the candidate less equipped or qualified to run the office).

In other words, betrayal aversion will drive voters to prefer a poorer quality candidate.

Sounds plausible? Ok. Sounds like something we’ve seen recently? You bet. Let’s go over the above steps in the context of the recent U.S. presidential contest.


One: emotional basis for selection (vesting trust). The U.S. voters had eight years of ‘hope’ from President Obama. Hope based on emotional context of his campaigns, not on hard delivery of his policies. In fact, the entire U.S. electoral space has become nothing more than a battlefield of carefully orchestrated emotional contests.

Two: an acute feeling of betrayal is clearly afoot in the case of the U.S. electorate. Whether or not the voters today blame Mr. Obama for their feeling of betrayal, or they blame the proverbial Washington ’swamp’ that includes the entire lot of elected politicians (including Mrs. Clinton and others) is immaterial. What is material is that many voters do feel betrayed by the elites (both the Burn effect and the Trump campaign were based on capturing this sentiment).

Three: of the two candidates that did capture the minds of swing voters and marginalised voters (the types of voters who matter in election outrun in the end) were both campaigning on razor-thin policies proposals and more on general sentiment basis. Whether you consider these platforms feasible or not, they were not articulated with the same degree of precision and competency as, say, Mrs Clinton’s highly elaborate platform.

Which means the election of Mr Trump fits (from pre-conditions through to outcome) the pattern of betrayal aversion phenomena: fleeing the chance of being betrayed by the agent they trust, American voters opted for a populist, less competent (in traditional Washington’s sense) choice.

Now, enter two brainiacs from Harvard. Rafael Di Tella and Julio Rotemberg were quick on their feet recognising the above emergence of betrayal avoidance or aversion in voting decisions. In their December 2016 NBER paper, linked below, the authors argue that voters preference for populism is the form of “rejection of “disloyal” leaders.” To do this, the authors add an “assumption that people are worse off when they experience low income as a result of leader betrayal”, than when such a loss of income “is the result of bad luck”. In other words, they explicitly assume betrayal aversion in their model of a simple voter choice. The end result is that their model “yields a [voter] preference for incompetent leaders. These deliver worse material outcomes in general, but they reduce the feelings of betrayal during bad times.”

More to the point, just as I narrated the logical empirical hypothesis (steps one through three) above, Di Tella and Rotemberg “find some evidence consistent with our model in a survey carried out on the eve of the recent U.S. presidential election. Priming survey participants with questions about the importance of competence in policymaking usually reduced their support for the candidate who was perceived as less competent; this effect was reversed for rural, and less educated white, survey participants.”

Here you have it: classical behavioural bias of betrayal aversion explains why Mrs Clinton simply could not connect with the swing or marginalised voters. It wasn’t hope that they sought, but avoidance of putting hope/trust in someone like her. Done. Not ‘deplorables’ but those betrayed in the past have swung the vote in favour of a populist, not because he emotionally won their trust, but because he was the less competent of the two standing candidates.



Jonathan J. Koehler, and Andrew D. Gershof, “Betrayal aversion: When agents of protection become agents of harm”, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 90 (2003) 244–261: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.11.1841&rep=rep1&type=pdf

Di Tella, Rafael and Rotemberg, Julio J., Populism and the Return of the 'Paranoid Style': Some Evidence and a Simple Model of Demand for Incompetence as Insurance Against Elite Betrayal (December 2016). NBER Working Paper No. w22975: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2890079

Sunday, December 11, 2016

11/12/16: Legal Frameworks Relating to State-led Cyber Attacks


This is a blog about economics and finance, not politics. Alas, geopolitical risks do impact economic risks and they materially influence financial markets. I am trying to stay out of the political analysis and hence offer little in terms of my own thinking on the matter. But that does not mean I should not share with you other analysts' views that I find informative, interesting or thought-provoking. I do so on Twitter, without endorsing (via retweets or 'likes' or shares) any given position, so I shall be able to do the same here, on the blog.

So here is an interesting piece of analysis, from an insightful source, relating to the allegations of Russian State influencing the U.S. election 2016: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/kremlin-cyber-attacks-american-election-by-joseph-s--nye-2016-12?referrer=/xmGEziA4LU. In my opinion, this analysis is particularly valuable because it offers a calm assessment of the treaties and legal frameworks relating to cyber attacks.

Worth a read.


Update 12/12/16: Another take on the legal aspects of alleged intervention here: https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-12-12/how-u-s-could-respond-to-russian-intervention-in-trump-election

Friday, December 9, 2016

Thursday, December 8, 2016

8/12/16: Democratic Party: The Eraser of Middle Class Vote?


More of the same didn't cut it for the American middle class this November, ... and so the Obama voters went to the Republicans, as Hillary Clinton failed to impress onto the middle class any sort of vision they can relate to.

Per Pew Research, out of 57 'solidly middle-class areas' examined, "In 2016, Trump successfully defended all 27 middle-class areas won by Republicans in 2008. In a dramatic shift, however, Hillary Clinton lost in 18 of the 30 middle-class areas won by Democrats in 2008."


So the "deplorables" turned out to be middle-class voters and they clearly heard Hillary Clinton applying a new descriptive term to them. The term they did not quite embrace.

Now, if I were an adviser to the Democratic Party, I would start by putting its leaders in front of a mirror and ask them to point out every little wrinkle and crease in their faces that makes them so publicly loath middle-class as to endorse a candidate that called them 'deplorables'. Step one of the multi-year journey toward rebuilding the party will then be accomplished.

Rest of Pew Research analysis here.

Thursday, November 10, 2016

9/11/16: Bitcoin vs Ether: MIIS Students Case Study


Following last night's election results, Bitcoin rose sharply in value, in line with gold, while other digital currencies largely failed to provide a safe haven against the extreme spike in markets volatility.

In a recent project, our students @MIIS have looked at the relative valuation of Bitcoin and Ether (cryptocurrency backing Ethereum blockchain platform) highlighting

  1. Fundamental supply and demand drivers for both currencies; and
  2. Assessing both currencies in terms of their hedging and safe haven properties
The conclusion of the case study was squarely in line with Bitcoin and Ether behaviour observed today: Bitcoin outperforms Ether as both a hedge and a safe haven, and has stronger risk-adjusted returns potential over the next 5 years.



Sunday, October 23, 2016

22/10/16: U.S. Election: Can There Even Be a Winner?


Despite offering, to many people, especially those tending to think of themselves as either 'liberal left' or centre to centre-right, the upcoming U.S. Presidential vote offers one alternative: voting for Hillary Clinton. It is an undesirable alternative for many of them. And yet, given the state of her opposition, it is (allegedly) the only one.

Hence, it is rare in the current political sh*t storm (which does not qualify for a mature debate) to see reasoned, well-argued analysis of the potential outrun of Hillary Clinton. And, hence, it is very important to try to understand such an outrun.

One of the best articles on the topic I have run across (no, I do not fully agree with it in its entirety, which, of course, does not subtract from its merits) is here: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-election-debate-commentary-idUSKCN12K1IL.

There are serious and measured facts provided in the piece on, for example, Hillary Clinton's innate inability to inspire even her core constituency. And there are serious claims being made about incremental change potential from the Clinton Presidency, or at least a claim to such change as a mandate. There is a very important point of learning here for the Republican party, even though that point is not original and was, in fact, made by the previous Republican nomination contestant, Ohio Governor John Kasich.

But the most important bit remains as noted above: the devision, the gap, the chasm that separates American voters by socio-demographic lines: "White non-college-educated voters are going two-to-one for Trump, 62 percent to 31 percent, according to the ABC News-Washington Post poll. College graduates favor Clinton by more than 20 points, 55 to 34 percent. For the first time in more than 50 years, whites with a college degree are voting Democratic, 51 to 38 percent."

That is right: American society is now divided to the point of mutual aversion across the education line. And this is something that the next President will have to live with and deal with. Given that Hillary Clinton is failing to energize her own core constituency, what chance does she have in energizing two disparate demographics into finding a reconciling common ground? Recall that Hillary Clinton readily and cheerfully labeled a large strata of the American majority "as a “basket of deplorables . . . racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, Islamophobic – you name it.”" Not a hell of a lot of confidence in her ability to heal the nation can be glimpsed from this statement.

And, as the author concludes: "Each of the last four presidents – George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Obama – promised to bring the country together. They all failed. There is little prospect that either Clinton or Trump – two of the most divisive figures in U.S. politics – can heal the divide. Two Americas, two interpretations."

And that sad prospect is way more significant, more important than the actual outrun of the November 8 vote.