28/2/16: Every Little Hurts: U.S. Consumers and Inflation Perceptions

I have written quite a bit about the wobbles of time-space continuum in the U.S. economic growth universe in recent months. But throughout the entire process, the bedrock of U.S. growth - consumer sentiment - appeared to be relatively stable as if immune to the volatility in the fortunes of the broader economy.

This stability is deceptive. Here is a chart plotting sub-series in the University of Michigan surveys of consumer confidence:

The above shows several things, some historical, others more current.

Firstly, the impact of the crisis of 2008 and subsequent second dip in the economic crisis fortunes in 2011. These were sizeable and comparable in terms of the magnitude to the abysmal late 1970s-early 1980s period.

Secondly, a steady decline in inflationary pressures on households since the early 2012. A trend bending solidly the Fed narrative of well-anchored inflationary expectations post-QE. A trend that accelerated since mid-2014 to flatten out (without a solid confirmation) toward the end of 2015.

Thirdly, a longer view of the things: despite low by historical standards inflation, the share of U.S. households still concerned with its impact on their well being is... err... high and sits well above the average for 1993-2004 golden years of the first 'Great Moderation'.

All of which, in my view, continues to highlight the utter and complete failure of traditional fiscal-monetary policies mix deployed since 2008 by the U.S. Fed and richly copied by the likes of the ECB. It also reflects a simple fact that inflation (even at near-zero bound) remains a concern for households who experience decades of weak income growth.

If, per Tesco adds, every little helps, then, when it comes to the household wealth destroying economic policies, every little also hurts...

23/2/16: Moody's on Russian Banks & Ruble

A recent Moody's report on Russian banks makes an interesting point, linking capital buffers in the banking system to ruble valuations

Per Moody's: "We expect Russian banks' capital ratios and loan performance to bear the brunt of the country's falling currency and economic contraction. We also envisage a detrimental impact on bank profitability as rising problem loans will likely lead to higher loan-loss provisioning expenses for banks."

The rouble dropped a further 3% in January 2016, after falling 23% versus the dollar in the second half of 2015. At the same time, the Russian economy contracted by 4% real GDP for 2015 and Moody's forecasts further GDP contraction of at least 2% in 2016.

By Moody's estimate, "close to a third of the banking sector's loan book is denominated in foreign currency and the falling rouble will likely inflate the value of these loans in the calculation of risk-weighted assets (the denominator of the capital ratio) pushing it higher and, consequently, capital ratios lower. Without accounting for additional loan growth, a 10% rouble devaluation could lead to a 30 basis point negative impact on capital ratios..."

This is not as dramatic as the headline risks occupying Moody's, but material. Worse, this risk is coincident with the broader recessionary pressures on Russian banks. Thus, "Moody's expects the recession, with the added burden of currency depreciation, to lead to rising problem loans for Russia's banks. The rating agency estimates the stock of nonperforming and impaired loans in the banking system to rise to 14%-16% over the next 12 months, from an estimated 11% as of year-end 2015."

The third coincident factor is the Central Bank policy space: "Currency depreciation may also prevent the Central Bank of Russia from lowering its key interest rates (currently at 11%), which sets the benchmark and influences the rates which banks pay for customer deposits and the rates at which they borrow on the interbank market."

Final pressure point for the banks is deposits composition "...if corporate and retail depositors decide to protect themselves from the falling currency and switch to FX deposits. Trends so far show rouble deposits stagnating while FX deposits have increased. The percentage of FX deposits to total deposits rose to 39% as at end of December 2015, compared to 29% as at end of March 2014."

March-December comparative is significant, as it sheds some light on longer term trends beyond December 2014 - March 2015 period when forex deposits of major corporates were driven down on the foot of Moscow urging de-dollarization of the deposits base, reducing cash reserves held in forex to January 2015 levels.

19/2/16: OECD Data Sums Up the 'Repaired' Advanced Economies State of Disaster

Just because everything has been so thoroughly repaired when it comes to the Advanced Economies, growth of real GDP in the OECD area has been falling for three consecutive quarters through 4Q 2015. Of course, you wouldn't know as much if you listen to exhortations of Europe's leaders, but... per OECD latest statistical update, in 2Q 2015, q/q real GDP growth across the advanced economies was 0.6%, falling to 0.5% in 3Q 2015 and to 0.2% in 4Q 2015. Which puts 4Q 2015 growth of 0.2% at lowest level since 1Q 2013.

In the U.S., economic growth slowed to 0.2% in the fourth quarter, against 0.5% in the third quarter, marking second consecutive quarter of growth slowdown. Small uptick in UK growth to 0.5% in 4Q 2015 still puts end of 2015 growth rate at below 1Q 2010-present average and at joint second lowest reading since 1Q 2013.

And there has been no acceleration in growth in the euro area's Big 4 for two consecutive quarters now, with both Italy and France dancing dangerously closely to hitting negative growth and Germany posting lacklustre growth since 1Q 2015.

Per OECD release, "Year-on-year GDP growth for the OECD area slowed to 1.8% in the fourth quarter of 2015, down from 2.1% in the previous quarter. Among the Major Seven economies, the United Kingdom (1.9%) and the United States (1.8%) continued to record the highest annual growth rates, although both down from a rate of 2.1% in the previous quarter. Japan recorded the lowest annual growth rate, 0.7% compared with 1.6% in the previous quarter."

About that 'normalised' and 'repaired' global economy, thus... 

18/2/16: Lack of Support for 'Refugees --> Growth' Link in German Survey

As a separate matter, the same survey of 'some 220' German economists by CESIfo found that...

"A relative majority (40 percent) of participants expects the asylum-seekers to have a negative impact on the country. Only 23 percent see them as benefitting the country. The remainder was undecided. The majority of German economics professors therefore do not share the optimism of the Deutsche Bank’s Chief Economist, David Folkerts-Landau. He described the flood of refugees as Germany’s biggest economic opportunity since its reunification.

The majority of economics professors (56 percent) believes that the minimum wage should be lowered to facilitate the integration of asylum-seekers with poor skills into the German labour market. 37 percent, however, does not support this view. Some economists feel that this could lead to tensions between Germans and new arrivals. “I am no advocate of the minimum wage,” writes Prof. Dr. Erwin Amann of the University of Duisburg-Essen in the survey. “But a reduction in the minimum wage would prompt a debate over German workers being crowded out,” he warns."

So much for that "Keynesian growth stimulus" from immigration, then...

18/2/16: Europe's Problem is Not Germany...

CES-Ifo just released their survey results for the regular poll of some 220 German economists. And if you think that professionals are at any odds with Schäuble on monetary policy of the ECB, think again.

Which, of course, is absolutely correct. For German economy, ECB's policy is too loose. For French economy, about right. For Italy and Spain - probably somewhat too restrictive, although who on Earth can tell with any degree of confidence what 'about right' policy for these two can even look like...

Still, the key point remains: Euro is still a malfunctioning currency that cannot reconcile differences between various economies. In other words, Europe's problem is not Germany. It is not France, nor Spain, nor Italy. Europe's problem is not even Euro. Instead, Europe's problem is Europe.

18/2/16: Fiscal Space By Numbers: Village Magazine January 2016

This is an unedited version of my column for Village Magazine, December 2015.

Two recent events highlight the true nature of the ongoing Irish economic recovery.

Firstly, ahead of the infamous Ireland-Argentina Rugby World Cup match, the press office of the main Irish governing party, Fine Gael, produced a rather brash inforgraphic. Charting projected growth rates in real GDP for 2015 across all Rugby World Cup countries, the graph put Ireland at the top of the league with 6.2 percent forecast growth. “FACT: If the Rugby World Cup was based on economic growth, Ireland would win hands down,” shouted the headline.

Having put forward a valiant performance, Irish team went on to lose the game to Argentina, ending its tour of the competition.

Secondly, within weeks of publication, Budget 2016 – billed by the Government as a programme for the ‘New Ireland’ – has been discounted by a range of analysts, including those with close proximity to the State as representing the return of the fiscal policy of electioneering. Worse, judging by the public opinion polls, event the average punter out there has been left with a pesky aftertaste from the political wedding cake produced by the Merrion Street on October 13^th.

Tasteful or not, the public gloating about headline growth figures and the fiscal chest-thumping that accompanied the Budget 2016 did not stretch far from reality. Official growth is roaring, public finance are in rude health, and the Government is back in business of handing out candies to kids on every street corner. The air is so filled with the sunshine of recovery, the talk about the Celtic Tiger Redux is back on the chatter menu for South Dublin partygoers.

Ireland by the numbers

Irish Government is now projecting full year 2015 inflation-adjusted growth to come in at 6.2 percent followed by 4.3 percent in 2016. Less optimistic, the IMF puts 2015-2016 growth forecasts for the country at 4.9 percent and 3.8 percent, respectively. Still, this ranks Ireland at the top of the advanced economies growth league, with second place Iceland set to grow by 4.8 percent and 3.7 percent over 2015 and 2016, respectively. The only other advanced economy expected to post above 4 percent growth in 2015 is Luxembourg. Which is a telling bit: of all euro area member states, the two most exposed to tax optimization schemes are growing the fastest. Though only one has a Government gushing publicly about that fact. No medals for guessing which one.

The problem is: the headline official GDP growth for Ireland means preciously little as far as the real economy is concerned. The reason for this is the composition of that growth by source and, specifically, the role of the Multinational Corporations trading from Ireland. We all know this, but keep harping about the said ‘metric’ as if it mattered.

Based on the figures for the first half of 2015 (the latest available through the official national accounts), Irish economy grew by EUR6.4 billion or 6.9 percent in terms of real GDP compared to the first half of 2014. Gross National Product, or GDP accounting for the officially declared net profits of multinational companies, expanded by a more modest 6.6 percent over the same period.

Other distortions arising from this structural anomaly at the heart of Irish economic miracle are the effects of foreign investment funds and companies on capital side of the National Accounts. Back in 2014, the European Union reclassified R&D spending as investment, superficially inflating both GDP and GNP growth figures. Since then, our investment has been booming, outpacing both jobs creation and domestic public and private sectors’ demand. In more recent quarters, capital investment has been outperforming exports growth too. Which begs a question: what are these investments about if not a tail sign of corporate inversions past and the forewarning of the changes in the economic output composition in anticipation of our fabled ‘Knowledge Development Box’?

Beyond this, the legacy of the financial crisis adds to artificial growth statistics. Irish ‘bad bank’, Nama, and its vulture funds’ clients are aggressively disposing of real estate loans and other assets bought at a cost to the taxpayers. Any profits booked by these entities are counted as new investment here. Once again, GDP and GNP go up even if there is virtually nothing happening to buildings and sites being flipped by these investors.

And while we are on the subject of the old ways, last month Ireland became a domicile of choice for an upcoming merger between Pfizer and Allergan – two giants of the global pharma world. Despite numerous claims that Ireland no longer tolerates so-called ‘tax-driven corporate inversions’ (a practice whereby U.S. multinationals domicile themselves in Ireland for tax purposes), it appears that  we are back in the same game. Just as we are apparently back into the game of revenue shifting (another corporate tax practice that sets Ireland as a centre for booking global sales revenues despite no underlying activity taking place here), as exemplified by the Spanish Grifols announcement earlier in October.

All of these growth sources also benefit from weaker euro relative to the dollar and sterling, courtesy of the ECB printing presses.

Looking at the national accounts for January-June 2015, Gross Fixed Capital Formation accounted for EUR3.8 billion or almost 60 percent of total GDP growth over the last 12 months, or nearly 3/4 of all growth in GNP.

In simple terms, the real economy in Ireland has been growing at closer to 3.5 or 4 percent annual rate in 2015 – still significant, but less impressive than the 6 percent-plus figures suggest.

Kindness for the Exchequer

Still, the above growth has been kind for the Irish Government. In the nine months though September 2015, Irish Exchequer total tax receipts rose strong EUR2.75 billion, or 9.5 percent year-on-year. Just over 45 percent of this increase was due to unexpectedly high corporate tax receipts that rose 45.7 percent year-on-year. Vat receipts increased EUR742 million or 8.3 percent year-on-year, while income tax posted a more modest rise of EUR677 million up 5.7 percent. While both VAT and Income Tax receipts came in within 1-2 percentage points of the Budgetary targets, Corporation Tax receipts over-shot the target by a massive EUR1.21 billion or 44.2 percent.

As chart below shows, in the first nine months of 2015, Corporation Tax receipts have not only outperformed the previous period trend for 2007-2014 and the historical average for 2000-2014, but posted a massive jump on the entire post-crisis ‘recovery’ period.  Both the levels of tax receipts and the rate of annual growth appear to be out of line with the underlying economic performance, even when measured by official GDP growth.

CHART: Corporation Tax: Cumulative Outrun, January-September, Euro Millions

Source: Data from Department of Finance

                              

This prompted the by-now-famous letter from the outgoing Governor of the Central Bank, Professor Patrick Honohan to the Minister for Finance in which Professor Honohan politely, almost academically, warned the Government that a large share of the current growth in the economy is accounted for by the “distorting features” – a euphemism for tax optimising accounting. Per letter, “Neglecting these measurement issues has led some commentators to think that the economy is back to pre-crisis performance”.

Professor Honohan’s warning reflects the breakdown in sources of growth noted earlier, with booming multinationals’ activity outpacing domestic economic expansion. The same is confirmed by the recent data from labour markets. For example, whilst official unemployment in Ireland has been declining over the recent years, labour force participation rates have remained well below pre-crisis averages and are currently stuck at the crisis period lows.  In simple terms, until very recently, jobs creation in Ireland has been heavily concentrated in a handful of sectors and professional categories.

Of course, this column has been saying the same for months now, but for Irish official media, the voice of titled authority is always worth waiting for.

The Revenue attempted to explain the Exchequer trends through October, but the effort was half-hearted. Per Revenue, the UER800 million breakdown of Corporation Tax receipts outperformance relative to target can be broken into EUR350 million of the “unexpected” payments; EUR200 million to “early” payments; and EUR200 million to ‘delayed’ repayments. Which prompted a conclusion that the surge in tax receipts was “sustainable”.

Turning back to fiscal management side of accounts, Irish debt servicing costs at end of 3Q 2015 fell EUR296 million or 5.9 percent compared to January-September 2014. The key driver of this improvement was refinancing of the IMF loans via market borrowings and, of course, the ECB-driven decline in bond yields. Neither are linked to anything the Government did.

Spurred by improving revenue side, however, the Government did open up its purse. Spending on current goods and services (excluding capital investment and interest on debt) has managed to account for just under one tenth of the overall official economic growth in the first half of 2015. In other words, even before the Budget 2016 was penned and the print of improved revenues was visible on the horizon, Irish austerity has turned into business-as-usual.

Talking up the future

As the result of the tangible – albeit more modest than official GDP figures suggest – economic recovery, Budget 2016 unveiled this month marked a large scale U-turn on years of spending cuts and tax hikes.  Even though the Government deficit is still running at 2.1 percent of GDP and is forecast to be 1.2 percent of GDP in 2016, the Government has approved a package of tax cuts and current spending increases worth at least EUR3 billion next year. The old formula of ‘If I have it I spend it’ is now replaced by the formula of ‘If I can borrow it I spend it’.

Which means that in 2016, Ireland will run pro-cyclical fiscal policy for the second year in a row, breaking a short period of  more sustainable approach to fiscal management. Another point of concern is the fact that this time around, just as in 2004-2007, expansionary budgeting is coming on foot of what appears to be one-off or short-term boost to Exchequer revenues. Finally, looking at the composition of Irish Government spending plans, both capital and current spending sides of the Budget and the multi-annual public investment framework include steep increases in spending allocations of questionable quality, including projects that potentially constitute political white elephants and electioneering.

In short, the Celtic Tiger is coming back. Both – the better side of it and the worst.

18/2/16: Is the U.S. About to Slip into a Recession?

This is an unedited version of my article for Manning Financial. Final version is available here: https://issuu.com/publicationire/docs/mf_magazine_spring_2016_17022016_ne?e=16572344/33514016

In almost every sharp downshift in economic activity, and more frequently than that, in almost every economic recession, there are several regular predictors or leading indicators of tougher times ahead. These include sharp drops in corporate profits, and acceleration in yields on lower rated corporate bonds, usually followed by significant declines in industrial production indices and subsequent downward corrections in stock markets and services activities indices.

While these sequences of events repeat with regularity, in many cases, forward signals of recessions can involve a slight variation in timing and permutations of these shocks.

Another regularity that happens when it comes to business cycles is that, traditionally, the U.S. leads Europe into the downturn.

Trouble is, judging by all factors mentioned above, the U.S. is currently heading into a recession. Fast. And with some vengeance.

The Bad News

Let’s start with corporate profits. The latest data from the U.S. Federal Reserve shows that year-on-year 3Q 2015 growth in corporate profits for non-financial corporations was sharply negative - at -4.26 percent. Furthermore, corporate profits growth slowed down from 7.72 percent in 1Q 2015 to 1.83 percent in 2Q 2015. The rate of decline in corporate profits growth in the U.S. is now sharper than during the last GDP wobble in 1Q 2014 and sharper than in 3Q 2008. The latest growth figure also marks the fastest rate of decline in profits since 3Q 2009.

CHART 1: Non-Financial Corporate Profits and Nominal GDP

Growth Rates, Percent per annum

Source: Author own calculations based on data from the Federal Reserve Bank

Chart above shows clear pattern of correlation between corporate profits growth rates and subsequent growth rate in nominal GDP. It also shows that U.S. corporate profits growth rates have been on a declining trend since 3Q 2010.

Meanwhile, corporate debt yields are shooting straight up. Added to this dynamic is another troublesome sign: yields volatility is also on the rise. In other words, the markets are not only nervous about individual issuers, but are appearing to be scared of the entire asset class. I wrote about this phenomena in previous newsletter, here. Behaviourally, international and U.S. investors have been running for the hills for some time now, despite the extremely risk-supportive monetary policies not just by the Fed, but also by major carry trade-sustaining central banks (Bank of Japan and ECB). In normal conditions, carry trade drivers should moderate risk aversion effects. Except they are not doing so today.

As noted in a recent research note by J.P. Morgan Cazenove in general, credit spreads lead equities and the former “are not giving a positive signal” to the latter (see: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/01/24116-high-yield-bonds-flash-red-for.html).

So that puts two recession-beaconing stars into a perfect alignment.

What about the U.S. Industrial Production? From over 2015, U.S. industrial output posted declines, based on monthly growth rates, in ten months out of twelve, with December 2015 production levels down almost 2 percent on December 2014 peak. In annual growth terms, output growth rate started at a brisk 4.48 percent pace in January 2015 and ended the year with a contraction of 1.75 percent - the sharpest rate of decline since December 2009. That’s a swing of some 6.23 percentage points in 12 months.

CHART 2: U.S. Industrial Production Index

Monthly growth rates, percent

Source: Author own calculations based on data from the Federal Reserve Bank

Like with corporate bonds and profits, some of this is down to a combination of commodities recession and Emerging Markets woes.

The former is pretty apparent to all concerned. Between the start of 2014 and the end of 2015, the weighted average price of oil across three key grades (Brent, WTI and Fateh) fell 51.1 percent. Non-fuel commodities went down 21 percent.

The latter also was subject to my earlier contributions to this newsletter. To update you with the latest news, while Emerging Markets continued to contribute some 70 percent of overall global growth in 2015, the rate of growth in key BRICS economies (including Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) has been tanking.Per latest IMF forecasts, released earlier this month, Emerging Markets are still expected to grow by 4.3 and 4.7 percent in 2016 and 2017. However, this puts their growth rates below the 2011-2014 average of 5.3 percent and the 2000-2007 average of 6.5 percent. Amongst the BRICS, all but China and India are either already in a recession or one quarter away from a recession. China is expected to post official growth of 6.9 percent in 2015, with forecast for 2016-2017 for 6.3 percent and 6.0 percent, respectively. Even if trust Chinese official statistics, this represents a big drop. For example, 2015 has been the slowest year in terms of GDP growth in 25 years, and the fourth slowest in 36 years.

But beyond these two factors, U.S. output growth is also being pushed down by stronger Dollar and collapsing global trade. Global trade has been tracking the declining fortunes of global demand since 2012. Over the last four years, global trade volumes growth underperformed post-crisis average and historical average, pushing growth rates to their lowest readings for any decade on record. In line with this, Baltic Dry Index – the cost indicator for hiring cargo vessels to ship goods around the world – has been hitting historical lows almost on a daily basis since the second part of December 2015.

All of the above factors, from falling profits, to falling production growth rates, to underlying commodities recession, global demand weaknesses and international currencies re-valuations, have undoubtedly contributed to falling equity prices. Since the start of 2016, some forty major equity markets around the world have entered bear territory. While on the corporate side of the U.S. economy, oil and commodities prices recession has been a dominant driver for aggregate equities indices movements, underlying equity price swings are much broader currents. For example, equities sell-offs around the world did not concentrate on commodities producing sectors and companies, or on highly leveraged corporates alone. Instead, the bear markets have been broad.

The Good News

Which brings us to last piece of a puzzle, yet to fall into its place: consumer demand. Or put into the above context – the good news bit.

Falling equity and bond prices, as well as rising retail interest rates are capable of triggering - if sustained over time - drops in consumer confidence, followed by households’ pulling back from consumption and investment. So far, stronger dollar (improving U.S. consumers’ purchasing power), lower energy prices (improving their disposable incomes) and falling unemployment (improving household pre-tax incomes) have sustained consumer confidence at healthy levels.

CHART 3: Index of the U.S. Consumer Sentiment

Source: University of Michigan

However, current levels of consumer confidence are barely touching pre-crisis averages and have declined since local peak in January 2015 through 3Q 2015. There is no crisis at the moment, but given the strength of household finances, 2015 index performance was hardly spectacular.

Whatever resilience we do see in consumer surveys, it is most likely underpinned by the positive jobs prints. Based on historical figures, over each recessionary episode in the U.S. history since the end of the World War II, employment was one of the key casualties, declining with every recession by at least 1 percentage point. U.S. added 2.597 million new private sector jobs over the course of 2015 and average weekly earnings are rising in both goods-producing and services-providing sectors.

The Latest Official Forecasts

This is precisely why despite the leading indicators flashing bright warning signs of the potential incoming recession, the IMF continues to forecast rather robust – by comparatives to the Euro area, UK and Japan – for the U.S. in 2016 and 2017. Per January update to its forecasts, the IMF now expects U.S. economy to grow at 2.6 percent in both 2016 and 2017. This comes against the Fund forecast for 2.2 percent growth in 2016 and 2017 in the UK, 1.7 percent real growth in the Euro area over the same period, and 1 percent and 0.3 percent growth in Japan in 2016 and 2017, respectively. However, IMF’s latest forecast represents a sizable downgrade for the U.S. compared to previous forecasts. Thus, compared to October 2015 outlook, IMF expectations for U.S. economic expansion are now 0.2 percentages lower for both 2016 and 2017.

Still, IMF references the U.S. as one of the four core risks to its global outlook for 2016. Specifically, the IMF cites the risk arising from “tighter global financing conditions as the United States exits from extraordinarily accommodative monetary policy”.

This risk, along side growing uncertainty about overall health of the U.S. economy, are material factors for Irish and European markets and investors. Ireland benefited significantly from the U.S. recovery and subsequent devaluation of the Euro vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar. These factors underpinned our exports of goods to the U.S. and Canada rising by EUR6.85 billion for the first eleven months of 2015 compared to the same period in 2012. This growth is more than double the rate of expansion in our trade in goods with the EU (including the UK). From Irish investors perspective, our domestic assets performance – across both equities and bonds – owes a lot to the resilience of the U.S. economy. Likewise, our investors’ access to diversified portfolios of internationally-listed and traded assets cannot be imagined absent the U.S. equity and debt markets.

All of this is currently at risk when it comes to the U.S. economic and markets performance forward. And more ominously, our own European economic and investment fortunes are tied closely to the North American economies. Whenever you hear any political leader – be it Enda Kenny or Jean-Claude Juncker – extoling the virtues of Ireland’s or Europe’s firewalls against international shocks, remember the old adage: when America sneezes, Europe catches the cold.

  

17/2/16: The Four Horsemen Of Economic Apocalypse Are Here

Recent media and analysts coverage of the global economy, especially that of the advanced economies has focused on the rising degree of uncertainty surrounding growth prospects for 2016 and 2017. Much of the analysis is shlock, tending to repeat like a metronome the cliches of risk of ’monetary policy errors’ (aka: central banks, read the Fed, raising rates to fast and too high), or ‘emerging markets rot’ (aka: slowing growth in China), or ‘energy sector drag’ (aka: too little new investment into oil).

However, the real four horsemen of the economic apocalypse are simply too big of the themes for the media to grasp. And, unlike ‘would be’ uncertainties that are yet to materialise, these four horsemen have arrived and are loudly banging on the castle of advanced economies gates.

The four horsemen of growth apocalypse are:

1. Supply side secular stagnation (technology-driven productivity growth and total factor productivity growth flattening out);
2. Demand side secular stagnation (demographically driven slump in global demand for ‘stuff’) (note I covered both extensively, but here is a post summing the two: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2015/10/41015-secular-stagnation-and-promise-of.html)
3. Debt overhang (the legacy of boom, bust and post-bust adjustments, again covered extensively on this blog); and
4. Financial fragility (see http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/01/19116-after-crisis-is-there-light-at.html)

In this world, sub-zero interest rates don’t work, fiscal policies don’t work and neither supply, nor demand-side economics hold any serious answers. Evidence? Central bankers are now fully impotent to drive growth, despite having swallowed all monetary viagra they can handle. Meanwhile, Government are staring at debt piles so big and bond markets so touchy, any serious upward revision in yields can spell disaster for some of the largest economies in the world. More evidence? See this: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2015/10/101015-imf-honey-weve-japanified-world.html.

To give you a flavour: consider the ‘stronger’ economic fortress of the U.S. where the Congressional Budget Office latest forecast is that the budget deficit will rise from 2.5 percent of GDP in 2015 to 3.7 percent by 2020. None of this deficit expansion will result in any substantive stimulus to the economy or to the U.S. capital stocks. Why? Because most of the projected budget deficit increases will be consumed by increased costs of servicing the U.S. federal debt. Debt servicing costs are expected to rise from 1.3 percent of GDP in 2015 to 2.3 percent in 2020. Key drivers to the upside: increasing debt levels (debt overhang), interest rate hikes (monetary policy), and lower remittances from the Federal Reserve to the U.S. Treasury (lower re-circulation of ‘profits and fees’). Actual discretionary spending that is approved through the U.S. Congress votes, excluding spending on the entitlement programs (Medicaid, Medicare and Social Security) will go down, from 6.5 percent of GDP in 2015 to 5.7 percent of GDP by 2020.

Boom! Debt overhang is a bitch, even if Paul Krugman thinks it is just a cuddly puppy…

Recently, one hedgie described the charade as follows: ”I like to use the analogy that the economic patient is riddled with cancer — central banks are applying a defibrillator, but there's only so much electricity the patient can take before it becomes a burnt-out corpse.” Pretty apt. (Source: http://www.businessinsider.com/36-south-four-horsemen-2016-2?r=UK&IR=T)

My favourite researcher on the matter of financial stability, Claudio Borio of BIS agrees. In a recent speech (http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp160210_slides.pdf) he summed up the “symptoms of the malaise: the “ugly three”” in his parlance:

• Debt too high
• Productivity growth too low
• Policy room for manoeuvre too limited

Source: Borio (2016)

The fabled deleveraging that apparently has achieved so much is not dramatic even in the sector where it was on-going: non-financial economy, for advanced economies, and is actually a leveraging-up in the emerging markets:

Source: Borio (2016)

And these debt dynamics are doing nothing for corporate profitability:

Source: Borio (2016)

Worse, what the above chart does not show is what the effect on corporate profitability will interest rates reversions have (remember: there are two risks sitting here - risk 1 relating to central banks raising rates, risk 2 relating to banks - currently under severe pressure - raising retail margins).

Boris supplies a handy chart of how bad things are with productivity growth too:

Source: Borio (2016)

The above are part-legacy of the Global Financial Crisis. Boris specifies: Financial Crises tend to last much longer than business cycles, and “cause major and long-lasting damage to the real economy”. Loss in output sustained in Financial Crises are not transitory, but permanent and include “long-lasting damage to productivity growth”. Now, remember the idiot squad of politicians who kept droning on about ‘negative equity’ not mattering as long as people don’t move… well, as I kept saying: it does. Asset busts are hugely painful to repair. Boris: “Historically there is only a weak link between deflation and output growth” despite everyone running like headless chickens with ‘deflation’s upon us’ meme. But, there is a “much stronger link with asset price declines (equity and esp property)”, despite the aforementioned exhortations to the contrary amongst many politicos. And worse: there are “damaging interplay of debt with property price declines”. Which is to say that debt by itself is bad enough. Debt written against dodo property values is much worse. Hello, negative equity zombies.

But the whole idea about ‘restarting the economy’ using new credit boost is bonkers:

Source: Borio (2016)

Because, as that hedgie said above, the corpse can’t take much of monetary zapping anymore.

Hence time to wake up and smell the roses. Borio puts that straight into his last bullet point of his last slide:

Source: Borio (2016)

Alas, we have nothing to rely upon to replace that debt fuelled growth model either.

Knock… knock… “Who’s there?” “The four horsemen?” “The four horsemen of what?” “Of debt apocalypse, dumbos!”

17/2/16: Markets Do Come Back... But Not ISEQ

Back in 2008, when the Irish markets were tanking, one of the managing partners in a large Irish stock brokerage issued an infamous research note, telling clients that while things were bad, things will be good again.  The main point of the note was that "markets do come back" no matter what.

As evidence of such "comebacks", the author of the note offered an anecdote of his relative trying to sell property prior to the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis at the end of the 1999. The sale, having fallen through due to the crisis hitting hard, was completed at 2/3rds of the original offered price some 8 years ago. This was the analyst's evidence for the 'inevitability of recovery'.

Back at the time the note was issued, I pointed out to the said analyst that he missed a major problem: inflation. By the time his relative did conclude the sale, the price he/she got for the property was down 80% or more, not 33%, because 8 years of inflation chewed through his/her returns.

Ever since then, I have been tracking (occasionally - usually once a year) Irish stock exchange broadest index, ISEQ, for the signs that "markets do come back". Here is the latest update: we are still waiting for when they "come back".

In nominal terms, things are dire:

Even though ISEQ no longer contains the hardest hit, by the crisis, equities - a little cheat trick used by Irish Stuffbrokers to sell ISEQ 'returns' is never correcting them for survivourship bias, but let us indulge them on this - ISEQ is still massively below pre-crisis peak. It has not 'come back', but instead, on its peak-to-trough way, in nominal terms, it was falling 972.6 points per month on average and on its 'coming back' way from the trough it has been averaging gains of just 46.2 points per month. Which means the market drop rate was 20 times faster than the market's 'coming back' rate.

However, in real (inflation-adjusted) terms, ISEQ is in a horrific shape. even though inflation has been extremely low, it has been present nonetheless. And chart below shows ISEQ in inflation-adjusted terms:

The freak show of Irish stocks is self-evidently not in a rude health. The 'coming back' of the Irish markets is so bad, that if you invested in them during October 1997-December 1999 period, today you would have lost, on average 10% of your investment, and if you invested in ISEQ back in 1Q 1998, you would be down 15.8% once inflation is factored in.

Worse, compared to pre-crisis peak, we are nowhere near that 'come back' territory, some 8 years and 9 months after reaching the peak, the index is still 41.4% down in real terms. Current level (using last 3 months average) of the index is below all period averages for the index, save for the period of post-dot.com crash, but using latest ISEQ reading (instead of a 3mo average), the market now is below even that abysmal period average.

Thus, overall, at current position, ISEQ offers us not the lesson of a market that "comes back", but a market that goes nowhere over the last 18 years. And that, folks, is the combined power of inflation and nonsense that is Irish Stuffbrokerage research... err... marketing.

17/2/16: EU Commission Analysis of the Irish Economy Own Goal

In a recent assessment of the economic outlook for Ireland for 2016, the DG for Economic and Financial Affairs of EU has heaped praise on the country (see full list of country-specific assessments here: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu/forecasts/2016_winter_forecast_en.htm?utm_source=e-news&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=e-news132). Much of it - justified.

However, a glaring miss in the analysis was a truthful representation of the balance of sources for growth in the economy.

Per EU Commission: “The Irish economy grew again strongly in the third quarter of 2015 although more moderately than earlier in the year. …However, survey indicators point to … GDP growth for 2015 as a whole to 6.9%. In 2016 and 2017, the moderation in GDP growth is expected to continue towards more sustainable rates of about 4% and 3% respectively.”

All of which is fine.

Then the assessment goes on: “While the recovery started in the external sector, domestic demand is now driving GDP growth. It expanded by more than 8% (y-o-y) in the first nine months of 2015, with household consumption growing by 3.5% and investment by over 25%.” I covered the latest figures for Irish national accounts in a series of posts here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2015/12/131215-irish-national-accounts-3q-post.html, and in particular, domestic demand growth drivers here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/12/111215-irish-national-accounts-3q-post.html. And as I noted in my analysis, the problem is that Domestic Demand printed by CSO no longer actually reflects purely indigenous economy activity.

EU assessment hints at this: “…as developments in some companies and sectors are boosting investment and imports in the economy. Multinationals have been transferring a number of patents to Ireland. In the first nine months of 2015, these transfers generated a growth in investment in intellectual property of over 100% (y-o-y) and an equivalent increase in services imports. In 2016 and 2017, the fees for the use of these patents are expected to benefit the current account balance and lead to more company profits being booked in Ireland. Conversely, the purchase of airplanes by international leasing companies based in Ireland collapsed in the third quarter of 2015, leading to a large fall in equipment investment. Excluding intangibles and aircraft, core investment was strong, growing by over 11% (y-o-y) in the first three quarters of 2015, despite the delayed recovery in construction activity. The growth in core investment is forecast to continue more moderately in 2016 and 2017.”

All of which goes to heart of the argument that so-called domestic demand-reported ‘investment’ is heavily polluted by MNCs and aircraft purchases. In other words, stripping out effects of MNCs on domestic demand, actual growth has once again been heavily (around 1/2) concentrated in the external (MNCs-led) sectors. And worse, going forward, transfers of patents signal that Irish economy is likely to become even more unbalanced in the future, with tax arbitrage inflows from the rest of the world to Ireland making us ever more dependent on remaining a corporate tax haven in the face of globally changing taxation environment.

Politically correct public communications from the EU Commission won’t put it this way, but we know that behind the scenes, our shenanigans, like the introduction of the ‘Knowledge Development Box’ tax loophole are unlikely to go unnoticed… especially when it leads to a 100% growth in patents offshoring.

17/2/16: Another Germanic policy straightjacket

My comment on the Germany's "Sages" proposal for sovereign bonds bail-ins rule for Portugal's Expresso: http://expresso.sapo.pt/economia/2016-02-16-Risco-de-um-ataque-especulativo-as-dividas-dos-perifericos.

In English unedited:

The proposed 'sovereign bail-in' mechanism represents another dysfunctional response to the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area. The mechanism de facto exposes sovereigns locked in a currency union to the full extent of monetary and fiscal risks that reside outside their control, while reinforcing the risks arising from their inability to control their own monetary policies.

Under the current system, a run on the sovereign debt in the markets for any individual state can be backstopped via ESM as a lender of last resort. In a normally functioning currency union, such a run can be backstopped also via monetary policy and fiscal mechanisms.

In contrast, within the proposed bail-in system, both the ESM and the monetary policy become unavailable when it comes to securing a backstop against a market shock. The full extent of a run on Government bond for a member state will befall the fiscal authorities of the member state - aka the taxpayers who will end up paying for bonds bail-ins through higher yields of Government debt and fiscal squeeze on expenditure and taxation.

In theory, a bail-in mechanism for sovereign debt can be implemented in the presence of three key conditions:

• firstly, the implementing country must have control over its own monetary policy; 
• secondly, the implementing country must have benign debt levels and low reliance on concentrated holdings of its debt, especially in the systemically important institutions (for example by a handful of larger banks); and 
• thirdly, the implementing country must have strong fiscal balancesheet to absorb shocks of risk-repricing during the period of bail-in rule introduction. 

None of these conditions are satisfied by the Euro 'periphery' states today, nor are likely to be satisfied by them in the foreseeable future. At least two of the three necessary conditions are not satisfied by the vast majority of the Euro area states at the moment and are also unlikely to be satisfied by them in the foreseeable future.

In a sense, we are witnessing another attempt to put Euro area into a Germanic policy straightjacket in a hope that this time around, the outcome will be different and that bail-ins rules will fix the unresolvable dilemmas inherent in the Euro design. It is a vain hope and a futile exercise that is creating more risks in exchange for no tangible gain.

14/2/16: Ifo WorldEconomic Climate Index: 1Q 2016

Global growth leading indicators are screaming it, Baltic Dry Index is screaming it, PMIs are screaming it, BRICS are living it, and now Ifo surveys are showing it: global economy is heading into a storm.

The latest warning is from the Ifo World Economic Climate Index.

Per Ifo release: “The Ifo Index for the world economy dropped from 89.6 points to 87.8 points this quarter, drifting further from its long-term average (96.1 points). While assessments of the current economic situation brightened marginally, expectations were less positive than last quarter. The sharp decline in oil prices seems to be having no overall positive economic impact. Growth in the world economy continues to lack impetus.”

In numbers, thus:

• Headline World Economic Climate Index is now averaging 88.7 over the two quarters through 1Q 2016, which is statistically below 97.7 average for the 2 quarters through 3Q 2015 and 93.2 average for 4 quarters through 1Q 2016. Current 2 quarters average is way lower than 8 quarters average of 98.4. Historical average is 94.9, but when one considers only periods of robust economic growth, the index average is 98.9. Again, current 2 quarters average is significantly below that.
• Present Situation sub-index 2 quarters average is at 87.0, which is woefully lower than 2 quarters average through 3Q 2015 at 91.6 and is well below 96.0 average for the historical series covering periods of robust economic expansions.
• Expectations for the next 6 months sub-index is at 90.4 on the 2 quarters average basis, down from 103.5 2 quarters average through 3Q 2015 and below historical (expansion periods only) average of 101.5.


Geographically, per Ifo release: “The economic climate deteriorated in all regions, except in Oceania, Asia and Latin America. In Oceania the climate index stabilised at a low level, and in Asia and Latin America it edged upwards. The indicator is now below its long-term average in all regions, with the exception of Europe. The climate in the CIS states and the Middle East clouded over, especially due to poorer economic expectations. In Europe WES experts are slightly less positive about future economic developments than in October 2015. In North America and Africa, by contrast, the slightly less favourable economic situation led to a deterioration in the economic climate.”

You can see my analysis of the European index data here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/02/5216-ifo-economic-climate-index-for.html.