9/2/16: We've Had a Record Year in M&As last... next, what?

Dealogic M&A Statshot for the end of December 2015 showed that global M&A volumes have increased for third year running, reaching USD5.03 trillion in 2015 through mid-December. Previous record, set in 2007, was USD4.6 trillion.

• 2015 annual outrun was up 37% from 2014 (USD3.67 trillion) 
• 2015 outrun was the first time in history that M&As volumes reached over USD5 trillion mark.
• 4Q 2015 volume of deals was the highest quarterly outrun on record at USD1.61 trillion, marking acceleration in deals activity for the year
• There is huge concentration of deals in mega-deal category of over USD10 billion, with 69 such deals in 2015, totalling USD1.9 trillion, more than double USD864 billion in such deals over 36 deals in 2014.
• Even larger, USD50 billion and over, transactions accounted for record 16% share of the total M&As with 10 deals totalling in value at USD798.9 billion.
• Pfizer’s USD160.0 billion merger with Allergan, officially an ‘Irish deal’, announced on November 23, is now the second largest M&A deal in history (see more on that here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/01/28116-irish-m-not-too-irish-mostly.html)

The hype of M&As as the form of ‘investment’ in a sales-less world (see here http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/02/9216-sales-and-capex-weaknesses-are-bad.html) is raging on and the big boys are all out with big wads of cash. Problem is:

• M&As are not that successful as a strategy for corporate growth (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/05/21515-global-m-and-economic-fundamentals.html), 
• They are pretty terrible deal for organic capital investment (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2015/11/141115-more-evidence-us-capex-cycle-is.html), and
• They are usually jobs subtractive, rather than jobs additive. 

The former, however, is trouble for investors, not management. The latter two are trouble for us, mere mortals, who want well-paying jobs. which brings us about to 'What's next?' question.

Given lack of organic revenue growth and profitability margins improvements, and given tightening of the corporate credit markets, one might assume that M&As craze will abate in 2016. Indeed, that would be rational. But I would not start banking on M&A slowdown returning companies to real capital spending. All surplus cash available for investment ex-amortisation and depreciation and ex-investment immediately anchored to demand growth (not opportunity-creating investment) will still go to M&As and share support schemes. And larger corporates, still able to tap credit markets, will continue racing to the top of the big deals. So moderation in M&As will likely be not as sharp as moderation in corporate lending, unless, of course, all the hell breaks loose in the risk markets.

9/2/16: Sales and Capex Weaknesses are Bad News for U.S. Jobs Growth

In a note from February 4, Moody Analytics have this two key messages about the U.S. economy, none pleasant:

• Business sales are ‘mediocre’ outside energy sector, so that jobs growth singled by business sales outside energy sector should be slowing; and
• Capex slowdown is about to smack jobs growth even further to the downside.

Take their numbers with a gulp of some oxygen.

Point 1: Business sales

The old-fashioned statistics don’t quite fudge stuff as well as the more modern hoopla about users, unique visits and signups deployed in the ICT sector. So here we go:

“Don’t fall into the trap of believing all is well outside of oil & gas. According to Bloomberg News, the 52% of the S&P 500 that has reported for 2015’s final quarter incurred over-year setbacks of -4.9% for sales and -5.7% for operating income. To a considerable degree, the declines were skewed lower by annual plunges of -34.2% for the sales and -64.2% for the operating profits of the latest sample’s 18 energy companies. For the 53% of the S&P 500’s non-energy companies that have reported for Q4-2015, sales barely rose by 0.6% annually, while the 2.6% increase by operating income fell considerably short of long-term profits growth of 6.5%.”

You’ve heard it right: in a recovery the U.S. is having, sales are up 0.6% y/y. Know of any real business that lives off something other than sales? I don’t.

Based on the Commerce Department broad estimate of business sales “that sums the sales of manufacturers, retailers and wholesalers. …even after excluding sales of identifiable energy products, what I refer to as core business sales posted annual increases of merely +2.1% for 2015 and +1.0% for Q4-2015”.

“…payrolls have been surprisingly resilient to the slowest growth by business sales excluding energy products since Q4-2009.” But, based on 3-mo average payrolls correlation with 12-mo average business sales data (estimated by Moody’s at 0.87), 2015 figures for sales suggest “…the average increase of private sector payrolls may descend from 2015’s 213,000 new jobs per month to 42,000 new jobs per month. Unless core business sales accelerate, 2016’s macro risks are most definitely to the downside.”

A handy chart:

Point 2: Capex headwind for jobs growth

“Business outlays on staff and capital spending are highly correlated. Over the past 33 years, the yearly percent change of payrolls revealed a strong correlation of 0.84 with the yearly percent change of real business investment spending.”

So, based on 2015 yearly increase in capital spending private sector payrolls “should have approximated 0.8% instead of the actual 1.9%. In other words, Q4-2015’s 1.6% yearly increase by real business investment spending favored a 91,000 average monthly increase by 2015’s payrolls, which was considerably less than the actual average monthly increase of 221,000 jobs.”

All of which puts into perspective what I wrote recently about the U.S. non farm payroll numbers here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/02/5216-three-facts-from-us-labor-markets.html

You really have to wonder, just how long can the U.S. economy continue raising the bar on additional bar staff hiring before choking on shortages of sales and capital investment?

9/2/16: Echoes of 2011 at Deutsche?

Almost 4 and a half years ago, I wrote about the systemic weaknesses in the Deutsche Bank balancesheet: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2011/09/13092011-german-and-french-banks.html, And now we are seeing these weaknesses coming to the front.

It is not quite Europe's Lehman Moment, yet, but if Deutsche goes to the wall at the rates implied by its CDS, we are into more than Lehman-deep pool of the proverbial...

Source: @Schuldensuehner 

7/2/16: You Gotta Have Some Heart: Baltic Dry Index

As the global growth prospects are apparently and allegedly improving, and the world is busy printing money left right and centre with currency devaluations rounds stimulating the fabled 'competitiveness', the world trade indicators are no longer flashing red. They are, frankly, in a free fall.

Remember Baltic Dry Index? The one that reflects volumes of goods trade flows? And the one that was testing new record lows almost daily around the end of December 2015 through January 2016?

Behold the latest record: Baltic Dry is now below 300

H/T to @soberlook

Time for IMF eagles to fly some forecasting models to tell us things are just going fine at 5% annual global growth click... Yes, yes... that is, to repeat gain, Baltic Dry at its lowest level in its history.

PS: Ireland's exports are, of course, insulated from all this global nonsense... because when times get tougher in the markets, tax optimisation becomes even more important to MNCs.

6/2/16: Down the Ruble Hole? Russian Opinions & Russian Economy

Latest Russian figures on wages and earnings, rounding up 2015, are pretty horrific. In USD terms, average wage is now down more than 30 percent in a year through December, falling to around USD560 per month at year end.

Wages Woes?

In Ruble terms, things are more palatable. Nominal wages are up 4.5 percent to RUB34,000, which means that real wages have fallen roughly 9.5 percent in 12 months through December. The average salary was down to RUB30,311 (USD381) per month, from end of September average of RUB32,911 (USD463). Rate of real wages decline accelerated in December compared to full year averages to 10 percent compared to December 2014.

However, average real incomes excluding wages, but including private business income and state payments, were down 4% y/y in 2015. One sign of the fiscal policy direction is that President Putin signed off on a minimum wage hike for 2016 that raised (as of January 1st) the minimum wage to RUB6,204 (USD87) a month, up on RUB5,965 or USD84 per month in 2015.

Beyond this, underlying labour markets trends, despite sharp cuts to employment reported in all surveys of PMIs for Services and Manufacturing over the last 24 months, official unemployment remains benign at 5.8 percent. This masks vast regional variation. In the Central Federal District, which includes Moscow, unemployment is below 4 percent, against, per BOFIT data, 12 percent in North Caucasus. BOFIT reports figure for Inigushetia at  30 percent. Unemployment rate for under-20 years of age is at around 20 percent.

2016 is expected to be another hard year for wage earners, as Korn Ferry — Hay Group forecast that Russian companies will increase salaries on average by only 7 percent in 2016. Given expected inflation in 14.6 percent range this will entail another 7.5 percent cut to real wages.

Feeding Rising Cutbacks by Households

Notably, economy, salaries and inflation have been identified as the main economic concerns in this week’s survey by state-run pollster VTsIOM. Low salaries were raised as concern by 13 percent of respondents in January survey. 12 percent of Russians were concerned about rising inflation in December 2015 and this rose to 20 percent in January data. Another 12 percent of respondents said they were concerned about unemployment.

These trends are feeding into decline in consumer demand. Based on state-run VTsIOM poll published earlier this week, as of the end of December 2015, some 63 percent of Russians have cut back purchases of goods over the last 6 months. 59 percent are substituting in favour of cheaper goods and 26 percent are dipping into personal savings to make ends meet.

In another poll, published at the end of December, covering the period of mid-December, VTsIOM, Russians are reporting lower social well-being with the welfare Self-Estimate Index reporting own conditions of the respondents falling to the lows of 2009 and 24 percent of Russians estimating their own financial situation as being “bad”. The Social Optimism Index was showing that only 27 percent of Russians think their lives are going to improve in 2016, and 33 percent of Russians said the economic situation in the country was bad.

That said, for now at least, 45 percent of Russians positively assess country’s overall development path and only 17 percent of respondents disagree with this view.

Still, based on yet a third poll (also from December and also by VTsIOM), if in August 2014 introduction of the food imports embargo against the Western countries was opposed by only 9 percent of Russians, by mid-November 2015, some 20 percent of respondents expressed opposition to the embargo. Still, as shown by the poll results, the majority of Russian citizens continue to support the ban on food imports, although the number of those supporting it falling from 84 percent to 73 percent since the introduction of the embargo. In line with this, fewer Russians consider the food embargo to be an effective measure: down from 80 percent in August 2014 to 63 percent mid-November 2015.

And Touching the Values Systems

In a way, all of this translates into some serious fodder for political analysts (apart from us, economists). You see, much of Russian system legitimacy rests on two factors: immense economic gains over the period of 2000-2012 or 2013 (depending on timings of the crisis) and national (not quite nationalist) aspirations for a historical revival.

Back in July 2015, Levada Centre - probably Russia’s most reputable polling organisation - found that 42 percent of Russians said they preferred "decent" wages and pensions over the freedom of speech and the opportunity to travel abroad. 49 percent, though said they won’t. The results in July 2015 (data was collected in June) were similar to those in 2013 survey (43 percent preferred financial stability over the opportunity to travel abroad and the right to free speech, against 46 percent who opposed such  trade off). But this still marked a big change on 2008 when only 35 percent of Russians were willing to trade freedoms for income and 54 percent of Russians opted for freedom of speech and travel ahead of pensions and salaries.

While the above figures suggest that large share of population is closely anchored to financial and economic fortunes of the country, there are preciously few signs that those adversely impacted by the crisis are willing to take up the issue with authorities. Levada Centre July poll found that 69 percent of Russians would tend to avoid any interactions with the authorities and only 23 percent were determined to press authorities to deliver on promises. Not surprisingly, 60 percent of Russians do not believe that people can hold authorities to account and 22 percent believe they can. Subsequently, only 18 percent of the Russian population thought that mass protests are likely to arise as the result of the ongoing crisis and only 14 percent of respondents expressed willingness to participate in protests.

Yet, for all their imperfections, opinion polls are showing some tremors in the facade of the public support for state policies and institutions.

Obshchestvennoye Mnenie Foundation poll published on February 5th showed that 54 percent of Russians see economy as being in a crisis. 41 percent said the economic situation in Russia is satisfactory and only 3 percent of the participants said that the economy is in a good state. The number of Russians that have a negative view on the state of the economy is increasing, and rapidly so: just 43 percent of the respondents in December last year felt the economy was in bad shape and only 30 percent did so in May of 2015. And 58 percent now think that the economic situation in the country is worsening, while a month ago this answer was given by 41 percent of people. Which flies in the face of many analysts and the Government view that the economic crisis has bottomed out. Note: it is worth noting that in general, public opinion on timing of bottoming out of the recessions lags actual underlying numbers. Still, for a ’stabilising’ economy, only 9 percent of Russians currently believe that the economic situation is improving.

Levada Centre poll published at the end of January found that 45 percent of Russians believed that the country was “moving in the right direction”, down from 64 percent in June 2015, and from 56 percent in December 2015. January marks the first time for over a year that the state policy approval rating fell below 50 percent mark. Meanwhile, those who feel that the country was on a “wrong route” rose to 34% in January poll compared to 22 percent back in June 2015 and to 27 percent in December 2015.

President Putin's personal approval rating fell to 82 percent in January, compared to a record high of 89 percent in June 2015 and to 85 percent in December 2015. The proportion of respondents who named him among the politicians they trust also declined. This currently stands at 58 percent, down on 64 percent in June 2015 and 60 percent in December 2015.

What Does All of This Mean?

All of the above adds up to a picture in which the country is sliding gradually toward becoming un-anchored from the key driver for social cohesion: economic normalisation (compared to the 1990s) delivered during the so-called Putin Era. While the ongoing geopolitical revival still compensates for the negative economic momentum, that compensation is starting to fade.

One reason for it - cumulative losses on the economy front. Key responses to the crisis have been: devaluation of the Ruble, push toward imports substitution and conservative push back against the pressures on capital account side. All were necessary and rather successful. But all of them also transferred large amounts of pain onto the shoulders of the households and SMEs working in the private sector. Public sector employment and wages have been better shielded from the crisis, but there too, strains are starting to appear. As the result, real, tangible and compounded pain is now feeding through to the ordinary folks.

The other reason is the weakening of the geopolitical dividends perceived by the ordinary Russians. Crimea was the high point of 'return to roots' in Russian psyche - a point of reversal of perceived historical injustice inherent from the Soviet times and a point of a payback for years (since 1991) of virulent anti-Russian rhetoric across the majority of the former USSR states, including Ukraine. These were perceptions of the average Russian (do not confuse them with my own views). The conflict spillover into Eastern Ukraine was already a step away from the Crimean narrative, but it was a proximate one. And hence it had weaker, but nonetheless significant, support on the ground in Russia. But Russian push into Syria has completely divorced the country geopolitical strategy from the hearts-and-minds of the Russians on the ground. Syria is a foreign land, with alien religious strife and probably more reminiscent of Chechnya to an average Russian, than of the traditional spheres of Russian interest.

The twin factors: increased economic pressures and weakening geopolitical dividends, are now working through public perceptions. The outcome of these is far from predictable. Current lack of serious discontent is likely to persist over time: Russia is not Ukraine and it will not opt (socially) for the convulsions of knee-jerk 'revolutions' . But, if the economic crisis continues unabated, there will be political 'blood'. One way or the other.



A note to the above: Surveys in Russia — even those conducted by reputable pollsters such as Levada Center — need to be taken with a pinch of salt. Reliance on polls is a tricky thing, especially for polls in societies highly skeptical of social researchers and authorities, like Russia. Here is a good article on some problems identified in some recent polls: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/what-do-russians-really-think-the-truth-behind-the-polls/558537.html.

5/2/16: Ifo Economic Climate Index for Euro area: 1Q 2016

Ifo Economic Climate Index in the Euro Area has posted another contraction at the start of 1Q 2016 marking the third consecutive quarter of declines and reaching the lowest level since 1Q 2015. IFO Economic Climate Index (the headline index for the series) for the Euro area fell to 118.9 in 1Q 2016 from 122.0 in 4Q 2015. Activity signalled by the index, however, remains above the historical average at 107.5 an well above downturns-consistent average of 84.8.

The chart below shows index trends:

As highlighted in the chart above, EU Commission own sentiment index for economic activity is also pointing to weakening growth conditions in 1Q 2015. The EU Commission Sentiment Index was un a divergence to the Ifo index since the start of 2015.

Two core components of the Index also moderated in 1Q 2016. Present Situation sub-index fell from 153.8 for 4Q 2015 to 151.0 in 1Q 2016, marking the first quarter of contraction after four consecutive quarters of increases. The sub-index remains firmly ahead of the historical average of 127.5.

Perhaps the most worrying is the decline in Expectations for the next 6 months sub-index which fell from 103.3 in 4Q 2015 to 100.0 in 1Q 2016. This marks third consecutive quarter of declines in expectations and the index level currently is closer to the historical average of 95.8.

Overall, the gap between expectations forward and present conditions assessment has declined. Gap index (my own calculation) is now at 66.2 for 1Q 2016 against 67.2 in 4Q 2015. This suggests that weaker expectations are now starting to feed through to weaker present assessments.

A chart below illustrates the trends for sub-indices:

Per Ifo release: “Assessments of the current economic situation were most negative in Greece and Finland, but the current economic situation also remains strained in France, Italy and Cyprus. The situation was only slightly better in Spain, Portugal and Austria; but assessments for Austria were far less negative than last quarter. The sharpest recovery was seen in Ireland, where survey participants assessed the current economic situation as very good. In Germany the economic situation is considered to be good, although assessments were somewhat less favourable than last quarter.

The six-month economic outlook remains positive nearly everywhere. Economic expectations brightened in Austria, France, the Netherlands, Estonia and Latvia. In the other countries the outlook either remains unchanged, or is somewhat less positive. WES experts were only slight pessimistic about Greece, Portugal and Spain.”

5/2/16: Three Facts from the U.S. Labor Markets & Reality of the U.S. Economy

Three interesting snapshots of the U.S. economy: Non-Farm Payrolls, Initial jobless claims and Labour Productivity. Individually - they are important to traders. Jointly, they are important to investors.

But, first, what has been happening.

Let’s start with jobless claims. Initial jobless claims rose in the last week of January by 8,000 to a (seasonally-adjusted) 285,000. This was worse than consensus forecast by some 5,000 jobs. And worse, 4-week average rose to 284,750 at the end of January, up 2,000.

For history wonks, numbers below 300,000 are considered a sign of tight labour market, so no surprise here that claims can rise with a bit greater volatility when the labour markets are running some overheating.

But last two weeks of January also marked something that has not happened in the markets in some three years - they marked two consecutive weeks of y/y increases in new claims. As always, weather is being blamed, and as always, two weeks are just two weeks. So far, nothing hugely significant. Just a hiccup.

Which brings us to today’s release of NFP. Going into it, consensus forecast was for a ca 180,000 new jobs print (Marketwatch) and ca 190,000 (Bloomberg & Reuters) for January, to compensate for a large 292,000 print in December. What was delivered? Revised December Non-farm payroll figure to 262,000 and January figure of 151,000. Revision to December was large, but smaller than under-shooting in January. January preliminary estimate came as third weakest preliminary figure printed in the last 13 months.

Yes, everyone is running around with 4.9% unemployment figure - sub-5% expected. Good news. However, U-5 unemployment (Total unemployed, plus discouraged workers, plus all other persons marginally attached to the labor force, as a percent of the civilian labor force plus all persons marginally attached to the labor force) rose on seasonally-adjusted basis from 6.1% in November and December 2015 to 6.2% in January. And U-6 Unemployment (U-5, plus all employed part time for economic reasons) was static at 9.9% for the third month in a row, having previously been at 9.8% in October 2015.

And average hourly earnings up 2.5% y/y (same as previous month growth) and m/m growth of 0.5% (better than 0.3% consensus forecast and way better than 0% growth in December). These look like positives. Another positive is labour force participation - up to 62.7% in January, against 62.6% in December. But this positive is questionable: not seasonally adjusted participation rate in January 2016 was 62.3% which is lower than same for January 2015 at 62.5%.

So now we have: wages up, unemployment rate down, claims down by a lot less than expected, and participation rate is virtually flat. All at high levels of employment. 

Which gets us around to the last bit: productivity. Per U.S. latest data, non-farm labour productivity has fallen a whooping 3% y/y in 4Q 2015 - third biggest decline in productivity for any period since 1Q 2007 and the largest 4Q decline in productivity over the same period. Consensus was for 1.8% drop on foot of 2.2% rise in 3Q 2015. The Unit labour costs went up 4.5% over the same period of time (against consensus forecast of 3.9% rise and up on 1.8% increase in 3Q 2015). Labour costs were up in three quarters of 2015.

Problems with productivity growth have been plaguing the U.S. recovery - in 2015, non-farm productivity was up only 0.6%, which is massively below historical averages (more than x3 2015 rate of expansion).

Here’s the real problem, folks: U.S. economy is struggling to sustain growth absent real investment and absent new technological improvements. It is that simple. And the jobs markets are starting to show the strains of this. Productivity growth being weak, while employment rising and remaining high amidst rising labour costs means only one thing: the U.S. is currently running above its potential rates of growth. It is, in other words, overheating. And that at roughly 2% annual growth rates against pre-crisis averages above 3%. One of two things will have to happen:

• One: employment moderates and labour costs growth abates; or
• Two: business investment has to rise (note: explicitly not public investment, because raising public investment in these labour markets conditions will simply exacerbate the twin problem of tighter labour markets and low productivity growth).

Good luck taking an investment strategy on one. Which leaves us with taking a strategy on two… or going defensive on an expectation that stagnation will be setting in...

4/2/16: Tear Gas v Lagarde’s Tears: Greece

Here’s Greece on pensions reforms:

Source: https://www.rt.com/news/331265-greece-tear-gas-protet/#.VrN56JItCdA.twitter

Here’s IMF on same:

Note: to watch the video comment by Mme Lagarde on Greek situation, please click on this link: http://www.imf.org/external/mmedia/view.aspx?vid=4739363229001 (answer on Greece starts at 22’:22”). Otherwise, here’s official IMF transcript of it:

“I have always said that the Greek program has to walk on two legs: one is significant reforms and one is debt relief. If the pension [system] cannot be as significantly and substantially reformed as needed, we could need more debt relief on the other side. Equally, no [amount of debt relief] will make the pension system sustainable. For the financing of the pension system, the budget has to pay 10 percent of GDP. This is not sustainable. The average in Europe is 2.5 percent. It all needs to add up, but at the same time the pension system needs to be sustainable in the medium and long term. This requires taking short-term measures that will make it sustainable in the long term.

“I really don't like it when we are portrayed as the “draconian, rigorous terrible IMF.” We do not want draconian fiscal measures to apply to Greece, which have already made a lot of sacrifices. We have said that fiscal consolidation should not be excessive, so that the economy could work and eventually expand. But it needs to add up. And the pension system needs to be reformed, the tax collection needs to be improved so that revenue comes in and evasion is stopped. And the debt relief by the other Europeans must accompany that process.  We will be very attentive to  the sustainability of the reforms, to the fact that it needs to add up, and to walk on two legs. That will be our compass for Greece. But we want that country to succeed at the end of the day, but it has to succeed in real life, not on paper.”

Yep. Lots of good words and then there are those ungrateful Greeks who are just refusing to understand:

1. How can Mme Lagarde insist that there’s a second leg (debt relief) where the EU already said, repeatedly, there is none? and
2. How there can be sustainability to the Greek pensions reforms if there are actually people living on them day-to-day who may be unable to take a cut to their pay? Who's going to feed them? Care for them? On what money? Where has IMF published tests of proposed reforms with respect to their impact on pensioners?

Strangely, Mme Lagarde seems to be not that interested in answering either one of these concerns.

4/2/16: Smal v Large Cap Stocks: Recession Cycle Performance

Credit Suisse did an interesting exercise recently in a note to clients. They took U.S. equities indices for large cap (S&P500) and small cap (Russell 2000) stocks and computed an average downside to each index across all U.S. recessions from 1980 on and then to the upside from the post-recession trough. The episodes averaged over are: 1980, 1981-1982, 1990-1991, 2001, and 2007-2009. As a caution, there is no survivorship bias (index composition risk) adjustment to the resulting data.

So per CS: “Measuring the average peak-to-trough performance of the Russell 2000 and S&P 500 from one year before the start of each recession to the end of the downturn, the bank found that large caps were more resilient than small caps across the five slumps: the S&P 500 fell by an average of 32 percent, while the Russell 2000 dropped 37 percent. But it was a different story on the way back up. The Russell 2000 averaged returns of 86 percent from the start of each recession to one year after its end, while the S&P 500 posted returns of just 51 percent.”

So over the part of the cycle covered by CS, Russell 2000 was up, net, 17 percent, while S&P was up, net, only 3%.

4/3/16: Irish PMIs for January: Growth Is Up at Year Start

Irish Manufacturing and Services PMIs for January were published earlier this week and are worth looking into as a signal for the underlying economic activities at the start of 1Q 2016.

Irish Manufacturing PMIs rose for the second month in a row in January, reaching 54.3 from 54.2 in December. This is the highest level of activity since July 2015 and confirms some reversal of PMIs dynamics from slower growth recorded from August 2015 through November. Of course, when we are talking about ‘slower growth’ we are talking about still very high rates of expansion as singled by PMI. 3mo average through January 2016 is at blistering 53.9, which is up on scorching 53.7 3mo average through October 2015 and down on scorching 56.1 3mo average through January 2015. These telephone numbers compare extremely well against the historical average of 51.0 and even post-crisis average of 53.0.

Per Markit: “Business conditions in the Irish manufacturing sector improved solidly at the start of 2016, as had been the case at the end of 2015. A sharp and accelerated expansion in new orders was the key driver of strengthening conditions, with output and employment also continuing to rise. Lower raw material costs led to the sharpest fall in input prices in three months, while output charges decreased for the first time since last October… The health of the sector has now strengthened in each of the past 32 months.”

Notably, per Markit: “The decrease in output prices ended a two-month sequence of inflation” which is suggesting that Irish producers are now contributing to downward pressures in Euro area markets.

Meanwhile, Irish Services PMI also rose robustly in January, reaching 64.0 against 61.8 in December 2015. Again, these are unbelievably strong  numbers that raise some serious questions about the survey methodologies and/or coverage, but more on this later. 3mo average Services PMI for Ireland was at 61.5 in 3 months through October 2015 and rose to 63.1 in 3mo period through January 2016, up on already unbelievable 62.2 for the 3 months through January 2015. Historical average of 54.9 - again, extremely strong by any measure - is in the dust.

Per Markit, Services PMI “signalled the sharpest expansion in services output since June 2006. Activity has now risen in each of the past 42 months. Companies expect further improvements in economic conditions over the coming 12 months to lead to growth of activity. Business sentiment picked up slightly at the start of 2016. The rate of expansion in new business also quickened in January, and was the joint-fastest since August 2000. New orders have risen continuously throughout the past three-and-a-half years. As has been the case throughout the past four-and-a-half years, new export business rose in January. Moreover, the rate of expansion accelerated from that seen in December. … Consequently, employment rose at a substantial pace during January and one that was sharper than seen in the previous month. A further sharp rise in input costs was recorded in January, as the effect of higher wages and salaries outweighed the downwards impact of lower fuel costs. The rate of inflation across the service sector ticked up marginally, remaining above the series average.”

As per chart above, both Services and Manufacturing sectors are now in a massive expansion, with rates of growth in the underlying activity well in excess of those historically anchored in the pre-crisis period. Services divergence toward higher growth is still being contrasted by lagging growth in Manufacturing, but signs of possible catching up in Manufacturing to the upside are also present.

Per chart above, we can confirm new growth trend in Services and the potential for sustained growth acceleration in Manufacturing (albeit no new trend yet).

Per chart above, both sectors of the Irish economy are operating at the margins of economy’s potential (judging by historical trends). This is hard to interpret as an organic shift in potential rates of growth, so most likely, we are going to witness some growth moderation in months ahead.

Still, current performance raises serious questions as to where this data is coming from. It has long been suspicion of this author that the surveys dynamics have been driven by multinational enterprises operating in both sectors. We have no confirmation of this nor denial of this from Markit and we do not know the quality of their coverage across two sectors. However, one has to be aware of the simple fact - as shown on this blog in the past, survey results have been (in the past) deeply out of line with actual underlying activity registered in the sectors. Currently, both Services and Manufacturing indices are running fairly closely correlated with the reported activity in these sectors, but past low correlations with GDP and GNP and sectoral value added metrics suggests that the survey base can be skewed in favour of unweighting MNCs.

4/2/16: BRIC Composite PMIs: January

In two recent posts, I covered

• Services PMIs for BRIC economies http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/02/3216-bric-services-pmis-for-january.html and
• Manufacturing PMIs for BRCI economies http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/02/1216-bric-manufacturing-pmi-january.html

Now, let’s take a look at the Composite PMIs.

As noted in a more in-depth analysis, here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/02/3216-russian-services-composite-pmi.html, Russia’s Composite Output Index remained in contraction territory in January, posting a reading of 48.4, up on 47.8 in December 2015. The Composite index was helped to the upside by the Manufacturing PMI which was also in a contractionary territory at 49.8, but above the very poor performance levels of the Services PMI. January marked second consecutive month that both Manufacturing and Services PMIs for Russia were below 50.0. Last time that this happened was in December 2014-January 2015 and in February-March 2015 - in other words, at the dire depth of the current crisis. Overall, Russia is once again (second month in a row) ranks as the second lowest BRIC performer in terms of Composite PMI reading, ahead of only a complete basket case of Brazil.

As also noted in an in-depth analysis here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/02/2216-china-services-composite-pmis-for.html due to a substantial improvement in the Services PMI, China’s Composite PMI signalled stabilisation in overall economy-wide business activity in January, with Composite Output Index registering fractionally above the no-change 50.0 value at 50.1, up from 49.4 in December. However, overall, Composite PMI of China has been above 50.0 in only two of the last 6 months and on both occasions, index readings were not statistically distinguishable from 50.0. 3mo average through January for Composite PMI stood at 50.0 (zero growth) against 48.9 average through October 2015 and 51.3 average through January 2015. In other words, the economy, judging by Composite PMI might be closer to stabilising, but growth is not exactly roaring back.


India’s Composite PMI rose from 51.6 in December to an 11-month high of 53.3 in January. Per Markit, “Lifting the index were a rebound in manufacturing production as well as stronger growth of services output.” 3mo average for Composite reading is now a5 51.7, slightly down from 52.3 3mo average through October 2015 and compared to 52.8 3mo average through January 2015. With manufacturing and services order books now in an expansionary territory, “growth of new business across the private sector as a whole was at a ten-month high… Higher workloads encouraged service providers to hire additional staff in January, following a stagnation in the prior month. …Meanwhile, manufacturing jobs rose at a marginal rate.” While overall Indian economy has clearly returned to robust growth, underlying conditions remain relatively weak by historical standards. 3mo average Composite index at current 51.7 is well below the historical average of 54.8. India remained on track to being the strongest economy in the BRIC group overall for the 7th month in a row.

In the case of Brazil’s Composite PMIs, the index registered continued rate of contraction rate of contraction for 11th month in a row - a record that is worse than that for Russia. Over the last 24 months, Brazil’s Composite PMI has managed to reach above 50.0 on only 5 occasions, against Russia’s Composite PMI’s 7. Over the last 12 months, Brazil’s Composite PMI was above 50.0 only once, with Russian counterpart rising above 50.0 in 4 months. On a 3mo average basis, Brazil’s Composite PMI stood at 44.5 in January 2016, slightly better than 43.4 reading for the 3mo period through October 2015, but below 49.3 reading attained in January 2015. Per Markit: “January saw Brazil’s economic recession weighing on the private sector for another month …the seasonally adjusted Composite Output Index remained in contraction territory, highlighting a further sharp drop in activity. Moreover, the current sequence of continuous downturn has been extended to 11 months, the longest in almost nine years of data collection.” Both Services and Manufacturing sectors order books posted contractions, meaning that “the private sector as a whole posted an eleventh successive monthly decline in new business. Firms reported tough economic conditions and a subsequent fall in demand.” Once again, Brazil retained its dubious title as the worst performing BRIC economy - a title it has been holding for the last 11 months.

Charts and table to illustrate:

As shown in the above charts, Russia is now exerting a downward momentum on overall BRIC growth dynamics for the second month in a row. However, due to improvements in India and China, BRICs as a whole are now adding positive support for global growth. That support is relatively new and still fragile enough not to call a change in trend in the series.

3/2/16: BRIC Services PMIs for January: Some Rays of Hope

In the previous two posts, I covered

• Russian Services and Composite PMIs: see detailed discussion here http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/02/3216-russian-services-composite-pmi.html and 
• China Services and Composite PMIs here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/02/3216-russian-services-composite-pmi.html

Now, let’s take a look at the Services PMIs for all BRIC economies, followed by a post on their Composite PMIs.


Russian Services PMI for January 2016 came in with a hugely disappointing reading of 47.1 from already poor 47.8 recorded in December. On a 3mo average basis, the index is now at 48.2, worse than already poor 49.4 average for the 3 months through October 2015, although, as expected - well above the abysmal 44.7 average for the 3mo period through January 2015. The Services sector has now posted sub-50 PMI readings in 4 consecutive months, with deteriorating readings in 3 consecutive months, signalling no respite to the Services sector contraction.


China Services PMI came in at a surprising uplift in January, reaching 52.4 - the highest reading since August 2015, and up on 50.2 in December. This move was surprising since Chinese services PMI has been deteriorating every month from October 2015. As a reminder, the downturn in the manufacturing sector hit Chinese Manufacturing PMI hard with index falling to a 3-mo low in January and staying below 50.0 line of zero growth for 11 months in a row.


Brazil Services PMI remained the weakest of all BRIC economies at 44.4 in January up on a truly abysmal 43.5 in December. 3mo average for Brazil Services PMI was at 44.5, which is somewhat better than 43.2 average for the 3mo period through October 2015, but worse than 48.7 3mo average through January 2015. Brazil’s Services PMIs have now been below 50 line for 11 months in a row.

According to Markit: “Current downturn longer than 08-09 crisis… Activity decreased in all six monitored categories, with the quickest contraction seen at Renting & Business Activities. Leading services output to fall was another decline in incoming new work. Inflows of new business dipped at a softer pace, but one that remained sharp.” As in the case with Russian economy, inflationary pressures, primarily driven by currency devaluations, have created adverse headwinds for Services sector firms in Brazil. “January data pointed to a build-up of inflationary pressures in Brazil’s service economy. A weaker currency (particularly against the US dollar) combined with higher utility bills had reportedly resulted in an overall increase in cost burdens. The rate of inflation climbed to a three-month high and was well above the long-run series trend. As a consequence, service providers raised their average tariffs again, and at the fastest pace since October.”

Brazil’s economy not only continuing to contract, but remains the weakest of all BRIC economies, in Services sector terms since April 2015.


India Services PMI posted an impressive rise from already rather robust 53.6 in December to 54.3 in January 2016. The 3mo average has reached 52.7 in the period through January 2016, which is stronger than 52.1 recorded for the period through October 2015 and ahead of 52.0 3mo average through January 2015. Overall, this was the highest Services PMI reading for India since January 2013 and marks second consecutive month of PMIs acceleration. With this, Indian economy clearly has shaken off some of the downward momentum on growth that was building up in May-September 2015 and again roared it’s head in November 2015.

Per Markit: “Posting a 19-month high… Services Business Activity Index pointed to a marked and accelerated expansion of activity across the sector. Growth was noted in four of the six monitored categories, the exceptions being Hotels & Restaurants and Transport & Storage. Underpinning the overall increase in services output was a seventh successive monthly expansion of new business inflows. Having accelerated to the joint-fastest since June 2014, the growth rate was marked. Anecdotal evidence highlighted strengthening underlying demand and improved weather conditions.”

Overall, January marks the second month of India’s Services PMI leading other BRIC economies to the upside.

Chart and summary table to illustrate: