Showing posts with label human capital. Show all posts
Showing posts with label human capital. Show all posts

Saturday, May 2, 2015

2/5/15: China's “Great Leap Forward” in Science and Engineering


Richard B. Freeman and Wei Huang NBER Working Paper No. w21081, April 2015 titled "China's “Great Leap Forward” in Science and Engineering" looks at how over "…past two decades China leaped from bit player in global science and engineering (S&E) to become the world's largest source of S&E graduates and the second largest spender on R&D and second largest producer of scientific papers. As a latecomer to modern science and engineering, China trailed the US and other advanced countries in the quality of its universities and research but was improving both through the mid-2010s."

The paper "...presents evidence that China's leap benefited greatly from the country's positive response to global opportunities to educate many of its best and brightest overseas and from the deep educational and research links it developed with the US. The findings suggest that global mobility of people and ideas allowed China to reach the scientific and technological frontier much faster and more efficiently."

Overall, a nice addition to the body of literature exploring internationalisation of human capital and shedding some light onto a less reported area of this development: the reverse flows of human capital from the advanced economies to emerging markets.


Full link: Freeman, Richard B. and Huang, Wei, China's “Great Leap Forward” in Science and Engineering (April 2015). NBER Working Paper No. w21081: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2593660

Thursday, April 23, 2015

23/4/15: Skills and Employment: 1950-2010 Data


A very interesting study, titled "Labor Market Polarization Over the Business Cycle" by
Christopher L. Foote and Richard W. Ryan (http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/wp/wp2014/wp1416.pdf) from the Boston Fed postulates that "Job losses during the Great Recession were concentrated among middle-skill workers, the same group that over the long run has suffered the most from automation and international trade." This is what is known as occupational polarisation - the disappearance of mid-range skills and low-end skills jobs and growth in higher skilled occupations.

The study finds "that middle-skill occupations have traditionally been more cyclical than
other occupations, in part because of the volatile industries that tend to employ middle-skill workers. Unemployed middle-skill workers also appear to have few attractive or feasible employment alternatives outside of their skill class, and the drop in male participation rates during the past several decades can be explained in part by an erosion of middle-skill job opportunities."

One hell of a chart illustrating the above across longer time horizon:

Shares of Employment for Four Occupational Groups:


Friday, April 10, 2015

10/4/15: Shared Economy of the Future: It's All About the Bandwidth Access


A very interesting chart plotting evolution of the auto markets in the current technological environment from the Morgan Stanley:
The point of convergence is the 'Shared Economy'. But the real insight here is not about the auto market. Instead it is about technologically-enabled breakdown of the barriers between:

  • Producers and consumers: as technology allows for greater and greater customisation, product offer becomes consumer/user driven in services and increasingly in physical goods;
  • Owners and users: one model of 'own-to-use' is now increasingly being replaced by a dual option: 'own-to-use' or 'contract-to-use'. Goods conversion to services (e.g. ability to extract service from the physical goods without the need for ownership) adds another dimension to this.
This is happening in auto industry, but it also happens increasingly in smaller ticket goods and services markets. And it is going to change dramatically the retail sector. Here is an interesting article on Amazon vision of the present (not even the future) in terms of purchasing (note: the issue here is to what extent can brand standardisation consolidate product offers): 


All of this, ultimately, is about the ability to create a 'shared bandwidth' around a quasi-commoditised service with some heterogeneity and customisation around it, and efficiently allocate consumer access to it. Which really means that the 'shared economy' is like a shared pipeline: someone will, in the end, have to arbitrage access to it, just as today someone has to arbitrage access to shared services (tolls, grids, etc). For now, we do so very inefficiently even crudely (very little demand-linked variability in toll pricing, long-term contracts nature of access to grids etc), but as the number of users-producers rises and their share in the overall economy grows, this arbitraging will have to become more refined, more dynamic, real time responsive.

I will be speaking about these and other longer-term trends in retail sector at an international retail sector conference in June so stay tuned.

Thursday, April 9, 2015

9/4/15: Expresso on IMF's WEO Update: Secular Stagnation is Here


Portugal's Expresso on IMF's 'secular stagnation' evidence via April 2015 WEO Update (Chapter 3): http://expresso.sapo.pt/a-receita-do-fmi-mais-infraestruturas-mais-inovacao-mais-produtividade=f918917. With my comments...

My view in full:

IMF findings on potential and long-term growth trends in the advanced economies published as a part of the April 2015 WEO update confirm what we have already known for some time: the ongoing economic growth slowdown is not only structural in natural, but is permanent, in economic terms.

More importantly, however, the IMF study shows that the structural slowdown in growth has started prior to the onset of the Global Financial Crisis and has been concentrated, in terms of drivers, in demographics of ageing, leading to decline in investment, and a fall off in the growth of the total factor productivity as advanced economies continued to exhaust growth along the technological frontier.

In simple terms, this confirms the thesis of the secular stagnation, especially as formulated by Robert J. Gordon (see http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2012/08/2882012-challenging-constant-growth.html).

From my point of view, the study documents one key trend: the trend of increasingly lower contribution of the human capital to growth over the period of 2001-2007 in the presence of slower, but still, relatively sustained growth contribution from employment.

This shows that during the pre-crisis boom, much of economic growth was derived not from intensive margin (technological progress and linking of technology to greater labour productivity) but from extensive margin (increased supply of physical capital and asset bubbles).

In the future, this imbalance in growth will require significant policy corrections in order to restore human capital growth to 2001-2003 levels. Absent these highly disruptive policy reforms (covering taxation systems, provision and distribution of key public services, restructuring of enterprise management systems etc), the world will find itself at the tail end of technological growth frontier, with low rates of return to technology and innovation and, as the result, permanently lower growth in the advanced economies.

Wednesday, March 11, 2015

11/3/15: The looming computerisation of European jobs


Two and a half years ago (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2012/08/2882012-challenging-constant-growth.html), I highlighted the research by Robert J. Gordon on the secular slowdown in economic growth awaiting the global economy, linked to the 'flattening out' of returns to technological innovation hypothesis.

Recent research from the Bruegel Institute (see: http://www.bruegel.org/nc/blog/detail/article/1394-the-computerisation-of-european-jobs/#.VQAET3EABEU.twitter) attempted to provide some estimation of the related topic: the topic of jobs displacement via technological innovation.

This represents a very important and interesting piece of work, quantifying risk exposures across the European economies to computerisation, robotisation and automation trends. The map Bruegel provides clearly shows the link between lower value-added sectors activity share of country GDP and the risk of jobs displacement due to technological innovation. However, even at the lower end of displacement scale, 47-49 percent of jobs are at risk, and this is a significant number. Worse, as authors correctly (in my view) suggest, the impact will be more pronounced for lower quality jobs, more reliant on labour and less related to human capital and complementarity between human capital and technology. In other words, already sizeable economic impact is likely to be magnified by an even larger social impact.

This topic is one of the key ones to focus on when thinking about the future economic, social and political developments. Just to give you a taster for the thinking ahead of us: in the majority of peripheral economies and indeed across the EU, jobs losses during the recent crises - the Global Financial Crisis, the Great Recession and the Sovereign Debt Crisis - were relatively concentrated in lower skills end of jobs spectrum, although this concentration was not as high as the bias expected for exult from technological displacement of jobs. Still, the relatively benign polarisation of the employment markets during the crises produced a prominent backlash in political sphere across the EU, with strengthening of the extreme political forces. Now, imagine the effect a much more socially concentrated disruption will cause to the traditional political systems.

Note: some links to related research


Monday, January 5, 2015

5/1/2015: The Value of Better Teachers


Hanushek, Eric A. and Piopiunik, Marc and Wiederhold, Simon, paper, "The Value of Smarter Teachers: International Evidence on Teacher Cognitive Skills and Student Performance" (December 2014, NBER Working Paper No. w20727: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2535179) looks at the differences in teacher quality and the impact of these differences on students' outcomes.

Per authors, "difference in teacher quality are commonly cited as a key determinant of the huge international student performance gaps." The authors "use unique international assessment data to investigate the role of teacher cognitive skills as one main dimension of teacher quality in explaining student outcomes. Our main identification strategy exploits exogenous variation in teacher cognitive skills attributable to international differences in relative wages of nonteacher public sector employees." The study also controls for parental inputs and other factors.

"Using student-level test score data, we find that teacher cognitive skills are an important determinant of international differences in student performance. Results are supported by fixed-effects estimation that uses within-country between-subject variation in teacher skills."

First table below shows basic estimation results highlighting the positive effects of teachers skills (in maths and reading) and parental skills on outcomes (in mathematics and zero effect in reading).



Second table above shows sample statistics. An interesting comparative in terms of Irish teachers' skills being very much average and ranked below average in the group of countries.

Third table below shows more advanced econometric controls for estimation, showing qualitatively similar results as above


And finally, chart below showing Ireland's relative position, compared to other countries in terms of the relationship between teacher skills and students' outcomes:


The above clearly shows below average link between teacher skills and student outcomes for Ireland (which are sub-standard relative to the average) in maths and slightly above average link between teacher skills and student outcomes in literacy (which are above average in terms of outcomes, but near average in terms of the teachers' skills effects).

The key, from my point of view, is that the paper shows a clear link between measurable metrics of teacher quality and measurable outcomes for students, while controlling for a number of other factors. This supports my view that pay-for-performance can and should be used to incentivise, support and promote better teachers, and that such system of compensation can be of benefit to our students.

Our education system pursuit of homogeneity and collective bargaining-set pay scales is outdated, outmoded and inefficient from social and economic point of view. Our teachers and students deserve better. Reforming education system should not be about reducing average wages and earnings, but realigning rewards with effort and outcomes.

Sunday, December 28, 2014

28/12/2014: Health Impact of Self-Employment


A recent paper by Zhang, Ting and Carr, Dawn, titled "Does Working for Oneself, Not Others, Improve Older Adults' Health? An Investigation on Health Impact of Self-Employment" (American Journal of Entrepreneurship, Volume 7(1), pp. 142-180, 2014. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2512600) "examines the health impact of being self-employed versus working for others among older adults (aged 50 ) and its implications".

Economic reasoning behind the study is straightforward:

  1. As authors note, "facing an aging workforce, self-employment at older ages may provide an economic benefit via an alternative to retirement.
  2. As authors do not note, self-employment is generally associated with higher levels of stress, induced by income uncertainty, volatility, lack of proper scheduling of vacations and breaks, tax-induced anxiety and other factors that can potentially adversely impact self-employed.
  3. Self-employment in older age is becoming increasingly the likeliest prospect for future employment for many workers, especially as economies gear toward services sectors with fast depreciation of skills and increased specialisation.

Despite all of the above, as stated in the paper, "little research has examined the health effects of self-employment in later life."  Zhang and Carr study "comprehensively examines health using a 29-item index to measure the impact of self-employment status on changes in older adults' overall health." The authors provide control for "potential endogeneity and simultaneity issues."

The study finds that "self-employment compared to wage-and-salary jobs result in better health, controlling for job stress and work intensity, cognitive performance, prior health conditions, socioeconomic and demographic factors. This positive self-employment impact stands out in knowledge-based industry sectors. In labor intensive industry sectors such as Durable Goods Manufacturing, self-employed older adults' more gradual retirement seems to result in a health advantage over wage-and-salary employees."

These results are quite interesting from both microeconomic and macroeconomic perspective. Self-employment as opposed to full retirement secures more significant pensions cover in older age, coincident with poorer health and greater demand for healthcare. It is also, it seems, reduces cost of healthcare in the first years of retirement. In addition, self-employment of older workers suggests that ageing demographics impact on aggregate growth and productivity growth can be mitigated in the Western societies, if there is an improved system of incentives for older workers to transition into retirement more gradually, over longer time.

28/12/2014: Unhappy Cities


According to a new paper published by NBER, "there are persistent differences in self-reported subjective well-being across U.S. metropolitan areas, and residents of declining cities appear less happy than other Americans. Newer residents of these cities appear to be as unhappy as longer term residents, and yet some people continue to move to these areas." The question is why?

"While the historical data on happiness are limited, the available facts suggest that cities that are now declining were also unhappy in their more prosperous past. One interpretation of these facts is that individuals do not aim to maximize self-reported well-being, or happiness, as measured in surveys, and they willingly endure less happiness in exchange for higher incomes or lower housing costs. In this view, subjective well-being is better viewed as one of many arguments of the utility function, rather than the utility function itself, and individuals make trade-offs among competing objectives, including but not limited to happiness."

While this sounds very plausible, an interesting follow up question is: what happens to new movers when they get better offers elsewhere or once they retire or their employment terminates? Do these newcomers leave? Do they attempt to secure new employment in the area? Do they engage in entrepreneurship whilst in their employment or after?

The reason why these questions are pivotal is that human capital is like other forms of capital: once it is mobile, it moves to higher returns on investment, but it also is footloose. Since investment in human capital does not end with current stage employment, loss of past human human via exit from the area is also a loss of future human capital increases. Securing human capital is about as important as attracting it.

For the paper quoted, see: Glaeser, Edward L. and Gottlieb, Joshua D. and Ziv, Oren, Unhappy Cities (July 2014). NBER Working Paper No. w20291. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2471184

Saturday, December 27, 2014

27/12/2014: Are Graduate Students Rational?


A fascinating study into expectations formation mechanism for career outlooks by entering doctoral students in the US. Authored by Blume-Kohout, Margaret and Clack, John, titled "Are Graduate Students Rational? Evidence from the Market for Biomedical Scientists" (PLoS ONE 8(12): e82759, December 2013, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2506810) the paper looks into whether entering graduate students make rational choices in selecting specific fields of study, given information available in the jobs markets.

The authors use increases in the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) budget from 1998 through 2003 that in turn also "increased demand for biomedical research, raising relative wages and total employment in the market for biomedical scientists." This should send a signal to incoming students that biomedical research careers prospects have been expanding. This signal is not the same as a signal of what one can expect of the biomedical careers prospects in the future for a number of reasons. Crucially, if at early stages of funding expansion wages and career promotions for those already in biomedical profession were rising fast, any future increase in supply of biomedical professions will reduce earnings and career prospects for future entrants into profession. In other words, current conditions are not identical to future conditions.

This is especially salient in professional fields where studying and research required for qualifying into profession requires a long period of time, such as biomedical field. where "research doctorates in biomedical sciences can often take six years or more to complete."

Hence, in biomedical field, "the full labor supply response to such changes in market conditions is not immediate, but rather is observed over a period of several years."

If prospective students considering entering doctoral studies were rational (in economic sense), they should not tai current conditions in the filed for granted and should instead "anticipate these future changes, and also that students take into account the opportunity costs of their pursuing graduate training."

As authors note, "prior empirical research on student enrollment and degree completions in science and engineering (S&E) fields indicates that “cobweb” expectations prevail: that is, at least in theory, prospective graduate students respond to contemporaneous changes in market wages and employment, but do not forecast further changes that will arise by the time they complete their degrees and enter the labor market."

The Blume-Kohout and Clak analysed "time-series data on wages and employment of biomedical scientists versus alternative careers, on completions of S&E bachelor's degrees and biomedical sciences PhDs, and on research expenditures funded both by NIH and by biopharmaceutical firms, to examine the responsiveness of the biomedical sciences labor supply to changes in market conditions."

They find evidence rejecting rational expectations model of students' decision making: "Consistent with previous studies, we find that enrollments and completions in biomedical sciences PhD programs are responsive to market conditions at the time of students' enrollment. More striking, however, is the close correspondence between graduate student enrollments and completions, and changes in availability of NIH-funded traineeships, fellowships, and research assistantships."

In other words, state-funded research can contribute to over-production of future doctoral graduates later in the period of increased funding, exacerbating future wages downturns for later stage doctoral graduates, and at the same time fuel increased inflows of new entrants into profession.

Thursday, December 25, 2014

25/12/2014: Skilled Immigration and Employment in the U.S.


There is a persistent debate in economics about the effects of migration of the highly-skilled workers on employment prospects and careers of the natives. Here is one interesting study looking at such effects within the context of the targeted immigration programme based on skills within the particular set of sectors - the STEM, or more commonly, Science and Technology.

Kerr, Sari Pekkala and Kerr, William R. and Lincoln, William Fabius, Skilled Immigration and the Employment Structures of U.S. Firms (see arvard Business School Entrepreneurial Management Working Paper No. 14-040: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2354963) "study the impact of skilled immigrants on the employment structures of U.S. firms … [accounting for] the fact that many skilled immigrant admissions are driven by firms themselves (e.g., the H-1B visa)." The authors "find rising overall employment of skilled workers with increased skilled immigrant employment by firm. Employment expansion is greater for younger natives than their older counterparts, and departure rates for older workers appear higher for those in STEM occupations compared to younger worker."

From the point of view of countries, like Ireland, relatively open to immigration of skilled workers, but without a specific skills-based 'filter' (Irish system is open to migrants on the basis of nationality, rather than skills, but has strong selection biases into skills-based immigration due to lack of jobs creation outside the STEM categories of jobs), the above suggests that skills depreciation in the STEM sector can be a problem for the natives. As supply of younger STEM employees from abroad rises, there can be a tendency for displacement of older workers, premature termination or flattening out of careers and, subsequently, lower supply of pensions and income provisions in later years of life.

Tuesday, November 25, 2014

26/11/2014: A Chart to Illustrate the Danger of Long-Term Unemployment


Quite a powerful reminder to us all as to the extent of the damage done by longer term unemployment. Here is the US data for the probability of regaining the job based on duration in unemployment:
Source: http://oregoneconomicanalysis.com/2014/11/10/graph-of-the-week-transition-probabilities/

Ignore the numbers on the right (for now):

  • Probability of regaining a job for those with less than 5 weeks duration of unemployment is ca 35-36% currently in the US.
  • Probability of regaining a job for those with unemployment duration of 15-26 weeks (under 6 months) is roughly 18%. That's half the rate of those at the shortest end of unemployment duration.
  • Probability of regaining a job for those in unemployment longer than 53 weeks (roughly year +) is just a notch above 10%.
Another set of regularities worth noting is:
  • For all durations, probability of regaining a job after an unemployment spell is showing a downward trend since the late 1990s.
  • The steepest decline in probability of regaining the job (trend) is evident for mid-range duration.
This is scary. In effect this suggests that unemployment in the US is becoming more structural over time, despite the claims of the rising economic systems resilience and flexibility. 

Now, onto numbers on the right: these reflect how much of the gap in probability of regaining a job between the pre-crisis high and the crisis period low has been closed to-date.  Now, the author of the post is celebrating that the gap is closing. Fine by me. except do remember - the peaks referenced in the chart go back to mid-2007. Which means we are now 7 years and a quarter, or so, that the crisis has been raging and the best the US has to show is 71% gap closure for short term unemployed. This is what we today call 'the best recovery' amongst the advanced economies. Imagine how horrific it is in the 'less impressive recoveries' of other advanced economies.

Sunday, November 23, 2014

23/11/2014: Bruegel on Human Capital Mobility


Couple of interesting charts (and links) via Bruegel relating to the issue of human capital:

First, the flow of higher quality human capital across borders:


http://www.bruegel.org/nc/blog/detail/article/1483-brain-drain-gain-or-circulation/?utm_content=buffer04864&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&%E2%80%A6

And international students participation:


http://www.bruegel.org/nc/blog/detail/article/1460-student-mobility-in-europe/

Very strong correlation in the above chart with quality of education system by country:



Tuesday, September 23, 2014

23/9/2014: EI Conference: Domestically-Anchored Globally Open Entrepreneurship


Yesterday, I was asked to say a few words on the challenges and opportunities facing Ireland's economy in the near term future for the Annual Conference held by the Enterprise Ireland. Here are my comments.

"Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to thank you for this opportunity to speak to such a distinguished group of professionals who represent the organisation that is responsible for helping Irish indigenous enterprises to grow, develop new markets and increase their value added to the economy.


Global economic environment and Ireland

Let me start by briefly outlining the global economic environment in which Ireland operates today, focusing on both the immediate challenges and opportunities in the next 12-24 months, as well as further afield, into 2017-2020. It is worth stressing beforehand that opportunities and challenges go hand-in-hand and should not be viewed as opposing concepts. An opportunity not pursued is a challenge unmet. A challenge met is an opportunity pursued.

Firstly, analysts’ forecasts generally agree that the global economy is currently moving toward the post-crisis growth trend. The worst of the Great Recession is over, but pockets of structural weaknesses and real pain of economic displacement remain.

Our two major trading partners: the US and the UK are
Delivering rates of growth consistent with those at or slightly below the pre-crisis averages of 2.5-3%
But, this growth is still excessively reliant on monetary policy supports, rather than investment, productivity expansion, external trade growth and/or domestic consumption.
The problem of private and public debt overhang still looms, like a dark shadow, over both economies, presenting a risk of a slowdown in the rates of growth toward 2%.
These risks are even more material in the context of potential effects of the monetary policy tightening that the markets currently expect to take place some time in Q2-Q3 2015.

In the euro area, growth is showing some promise of a fragile acceleration starting with Q3-Q4 2014 and into H1 2015.
However, the rates of growth achievable in Europe remain below the already less-than-impressive pre-crisis trends.
Again, looking at consensus forecasts, we can expect growth around 1.2-1.5% in 2015, rising closer to 2% in 2016.
This assumes no significant adverse shocks from either external sources or from those originating in the euro area.
As with the US and UK, lack of investment, slow productivity growth, and debt drag on consumption represent the biggest challenges alongside fragmented financial markets and sovereign debt bubble that is putting a superficial shine on the dire state of public finances.
As with the US and the UK, growth is still reliant on monetary accommodation and is subject to significant forward risks once the accommodative stance by the ECB is reversed in time.

In the rest of the world:
Commodities dependent economies of Australia and Canada are facing significant risks of unwinding large asset bubbles and economic imbalances built up in boom years. Australia is more vulnerable here than Canada, both in terms of the extent of the bubbles in its domestic economy and its exposure to the slowdown in global demand for commodities, especially to downward pressures in demand coming from China.
Amongst BRICS, Brazil, China and Russia are facing structural pressures - all arising from different driving factors, but all substantial and extremely dangerous to regional and global growth prospects.
Brazil is in a recession and is running out of the road finding sufficient credit supply sources to continue funding public investment boom that sustained the economy.
China is facing a gradual de-acceleration of growth toward 5-5.5% per annum, in a 'good' or ‘benign’ scenario, and is nursing a substantial risk of a sudden break on growth if the investments bubble collapses rapidly.
Russia is amidst a geopolitical turmoil surrounding the Ukrainian crisis, but below these immediate concerns, structural growth slowdown is working to push post-crisis longer-term growth rates closer to 2-2.5% per annum.

Overall, we are looking at the global growth rates in the region of 3-3.5% and advanced economies growth rates around 1.5-2.5%.

Ireland’s position in the global environment currently represents an outlier. Stripping out superficial boost to growth in H1 2014 achieved primarily via reclassifications of the National Accounts, our economy is, at last, showing some changes in the previous post-crisis trend. Prior to 2014, our economic growth dynamics could be characterised as flat-lining with some short term volatility around near-zero growth trend. In more recent months, we are witnessing a gentle uplift in the flat trend, which is most certainly a heart-warming experience. Much of the positive momentum today, just as positive growth supports over recent years (since at least 2011) is down to our exports performance, especially in the indigenous sectors. This performance, strong as it may be, is only partially offsetting the negative trends in multinationals-supported exports of goods (the ‘patent cliff’) and is largely obscured in the national accounts by the superficial boom in MNCs-driven ICT services exports. Nonetheless, given much higher employment and national income intensities of indigenous exports, this domestic exports growth is one of the core drivers, in my view, of the improvements in Irish economy.

Looking beyond 2014, we are likely to see continued upward momentum in the Irish economy, albeit still at subdued rates. Growth of 2.5-3%, once we strip out changes in the National Accounts methodology is possible for 2015 and 2016, should we stay the course on fiscal consolidation and reforms, and assuming we are not heading for a new credit and real estate investment bubble. Trade prospects for Irish exporters should remain relatively robust, but rates of growth in our exports to our traditional partners are likely to come under some pressures, while our exports penetration into new markets are at the risk due to the factors mentioned above.

Global trade will suffer in the 'slow burner' global growth environment. Margins are likely to fall, growth is likely to slow down or remain capped at around 3.5%, and the process of trade regionalisation will accelerate, in part driven by higher volatility in the exchange rates, regionalisation of financial services and credit markets, and by on-going shifts in global supply chains. All of the above factors will present significant challenges for our indigenous exporters.

However, the said challenges will also present some significant opportunities for Ireland. And in the longer term, gradual unwinding of the debt overhang in the advanced economies over 2015-2020 will strengthen both the traditional trade channels from Ireland into North American and European markets, while continuing to open new channels to middle income economies of Asia-Pacific, Latin America and BRICS.


What does addressing these challenges and capturing the related opportunities require from the Irish perspective?

The key issues, both on the threat side and in terms of opportunities, over the next 2-5 years will be the following:

1) Shifting economy toward more intensive indigenous growth. Currently, shares of exports and domestic consumption supplied by domestic producers are insufficient to address the threats to Ireland's FDI-based development model. In simple terms, Ireland needs to replicate the successes in the area of FDI, delivered over recent decades with the help of IDA, in a new area, the area of driving up indigenous firms growth and creating, attracting, retaining and enabling a new economy in Ireland: economy based on high quality human capital, world class open model of entrepreneurship, and increased focus on high value added strongly differentiated activities.

2) This challenge is coincident with tax regime reforms that started with G20 and G8 push last year and will continue, in my opinion, beyond the OECD's "Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” that will be unveiled in 2015.

3) Parallel to these, regionalisation of trade is shifting large-volume supply chains closer and closer to end-users. This dis-favours Ireland as a basis for real activity and requires addressing this risk by increasing our product/service differentiation.

4) Related to the above, there is an urgent need to focus on increasing value added in our indigenous agricultural, manufacturing and services sectors, both for domestic markets and exports. So far, we have pursued an early stages development strategy to deliver competitiveness - a strategy of wage moderation. This is driving down domestic demand, but also capping our ability to Create, Attract, Retain and Enable a deeply integrated base of top quality human capital. The result of racing to the bottom in wages costs is holding back indigenous innovation, but also the rate of adoption of innovation and productivity growth in the MNCs and larger indigenous enterprises sectors, reducing quality of production, specialisation and supply in the public and private sectors. It is also supporting growth in wealth inequality and suppresses our economy's ability to meet future challenges mentioned earlier. Ironically, wages competitiveness is also creating huge imbalances in the stock of human capital in Ireland, promoting accumulation/concentration of human capital in firms with superficially high (tax arbitrage-supported) productivity MNCs and restricting flow of human capital to indigenous innovators.

5) A major opportunity, yet to be fully tapped, is presented by focusing on an open entrepreneurship model that favours high value added manufacturing and internationally traded services. We are still less active in the global race for entrepreneurial talent than we should be. And we are lagging in projecting Ireland as thought- and policy-leader in this space. We must make Ireland synonymous with entrepreneurship and openness, not with tax arbitrage opportunities. And we must make Ireland’s ‘brand’ visible to would-be entrepreneurs, investors and trading partners around the world.

6) Related to the point above, there are multiple opportunities open to Ireland to compete more aggressively in developing an economy based on value added through user-experience and industrial design, product and service innovation, creativity and, yes, the perennially talked-about R&D. Ireland lags in presence in the world markets in terms of recognisable brands, products, end-user services that are ambassadors for this economy's productive capacity. With exception of Ryanair, Kerry Group and a handful of others, like Dairymaster, too few of our companies have direct reach into global supply chains with offers that are differentiated sufficiently to withstand regionalisation of trade. The added risk arising from the lack of defined differentiation for our producers in the global markets is the added exposure to the exchange rates volatility and thus to the monetary policy shifts that are likely to come over the next 12-24 months. It is heartening to know that Enterprise Ireland's work has been and remains one common support base for the majority of our most successful companies. But it is depressing to know that our policies on migration, taxation, trade facilitation, R&D and enterprise investment remain focused more on FDI and the adjoining sub-sectors, such as ICT Services, and not on a consistent building up of the entrepreneurship and human capital bases here.

7) Last, but not least, we are facing a continued challenge of growing successful early stage enterprises beyond the tipping point of EUR10-15 million revenues. Scaling up of Irish indigenous firms is neither sufficiently supported nor incentivised by our tax systems, equity and debt markets or by our policy frameworks. Hence, too many of successful Irish early stage companies are prematurely terminated via sales with a resulting loss of Irish 'brand' identity in global marketplaces. This also induces unnecessary volatility in the domestic markets for skills, talent and know-how.

The above list of 7 point is by no means exhaustive, but the key, unifying point of the above opportunities and challenges is singular: Ireland needs to move to a more domestically-anchored, globally open model of enterprise based on high value added outputs generation.

More open system of entrepreneurship and a greater focus on actual productivity, higher levels of products and services innovation, design and creativity are becoming the differentiators for our competitors, like Singapore, Hong Kong, Korea, Chile, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, Austria and even the UK and Germany. The same drivers are also being actively embraced by the newcomers to this competition, such as UAE, Slovakia, Estonia and others.


What does the above mean in practical policy terms? 

How do the above challenges and opportunities translate into tangible actions by the Government and the enterprise support agencies, such as Enterprise Ireland?

We, economists, usually talk in terms of 'first best' policies – policies that are optimal from the point of view of economic efficiency – neglecting political and social dimensions of the policies. I do not intend to break away from this tradition. But some of the policies suggestions I put forth here are currently feasible, and more importantly, the objective of achieving a more entrepreneurship-driven and value-added growth is now simply imperative.

Firstly, we need to open up our migration system to entrepreneurs. Not just the so-called identifiable high-potential entrepreneurs, but to a wider range of entrepreneurs.
This means not only issuing more residency permits for entrepreneurs coming from abroad and issuing them faster.
It also means more actively recruiting entrepreneurs from the ranks of our foreign and domestic students and by projecting our thought leadership in this area worldwide.
And it means making entrepreneurs and human capital residency here more meaningful, more closely integrated with the open-borders policies of the EU, and more reflective of the needs of modern commerce for travel, cross-border cooperation and work.

Secondly, we need to move Ireland into the position of being extremely visible internationally in the space of creating, attracting, retaining and enabling entrepreneurs and key talent. We lack international thought leadership in this area to identify this economy and society with pro-entrepreneurial culture and ambitions and not tax arbitrage opportunities.

Thirdly, we need to enhance dramatically entrepreneurial skills training and supports.
Enterprise Ireland already does very important work here, but the scale of its programmes can and should be expanded.
To free resources for more specialist, high-level training and supports, we need to move more general training into our education system. We need to start giving our children basic entrepreneurial skills earlier in their lives and provide tangible supports for younger entrepreneurs coming out of our schools, colleges, ITs and universities.
We need to clearly and visibly position Ireland as a platform for trading into the EU and North American markets for entrepreneurs from outside the EU, not just for established MNCs. Again, positive experiences of IDA (working with the MNCs) and Enterprise Ireland (working with numerous indigenous exporters) are a great encouragement and a good foundation to build upon.
But, as mentioned already, our thought leadership in this area is still lagging. And the scale of our programmes remains too shallow and too narrow to-date to deliver a game changing shift in our entrepreneurship support systems.
To compete in global markets, we will need active programmes to coach and nurse foreign and domestic entrepreneurs and SMEs on how to access foreign markets with their goods and services.
But we will also need programmes facilitating foreign entrepreneurs integration into the Irish system: from simple supports in terms of accessing basic services here, to tax supports, to legal supports and so on.

Fourthly, we need to drastically revamp our systems for accessing development and trade finance funding. We had volumes written about this in recent years by the Irish Exporters Association and other organisations and indeed by the analysts, like myself. And the Government has reacted positively to some of the proposals, despite the funding difficulties faced by the Exchequer. But, the proverbial carriage is still stuck in the same puddle of dysfunctional banking system and equity markets.

Fifthly, we need to stop penalising self-employment and sole-proprietorship in terms of income taxation and start rewarding early stage entrepreneurial endeavours. Our current model is "Higher Tax for Lower Benefits" and it is rewarding pursuit of PAYE job security and penalises pursuit of enterprise. An alternative currently on the table is a model of "Higher Taxes for Similar Benefits" which will continue to do basically the same injustice to early stage entrepreneurs. Addressing this imbalance between risk-adjusted returns to entrepreneurship and PAYE employment we need to eliminate self-employment penalty and streamline the system of tax compliance for the self-employed.

Sixth, we need to re-couple domiciling of innovation and use of innovation at business level. This applies to the MNCs trading from here, but also to Irish firms. The levels of innovation in our economy are still insufficient. The levels of meaningful utilisation of innovation, R&D and IP in this economy are still below where we would like to see them. We need to create a favourable regime for the firms that both on-shore innovation into Ireland for IP purposes, and deploy it on the ground here. This is tricky, I admit. But it is necessary.

Seventh, growth in the value-added of exports of indigenous firms cannot be contemplated in the environment where we are promoting volumes of sales over value, as, for example, in some agricultural sector outputs. We have to relentlessly drive up margins on our goods and services by pursuing higher valuations for our goods and services, even when such a drive implies increased business and investment risks.


Once again, the above are hardly an exhaustive list of things that must be done for Ireland to succeed in increasingly more competitive global environment.

The key themes that permeate the above remain, however, the same as before: Ireland needs to move to a more domestically-anchored, internationally open model of enterprise based on high value added outputs generation.

More open system of entrepreneurship and a greater focus on actual productivity, exponentially higher levels of products and services innovation, design and creativity, and more aggressive transition of enterprises to higher value added production are becoming the real differentiators for our competitors.

We must lead them, not follow.

Tuesday, September 16, 2014

Thursday, August 21, 2014

21/8/2014: Capital v Labour Taxes: Time to Scratch that Cabbage Head, Mr. Politico


Ireland, like majority of other small open economies, runs a tax regime that is punitive to highly skilled workers and benign to capital owners. This, as I explain in part here (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/08/2182014-thomas-piketty-powerful.html), spells bad news for wealth distribution. It is simply a tax transfer from one form of capital (human capital) to other forms of capital (financial, IP and physical capital). Still, majority of small economies around the world continue to argue in favour of skinning alive their human capital and subsidising (in either relative or absolute terms) other forms of capital, based on a simple argument: in modern world, financial, IP and technological forms of capital are highly mobile (tax them and they will run for the border, goes the argument), even physical capital is mobile over the long run (tax it and investment will flow somewhere else), while labour is tied to its chair by the chains of visas, work permits etc (tax workers and they have nowhere to go).

Of course, in the real world, labour is mobile and highly skilled labour is highly mobile. That is something our outdated, outsmarted and out-of-touch political classes do not comprehend. But some academics do. Here's an example: Aghion, Philippe and Akcigit, Ufuk and Fernández-Villaverde, Jesús, paper, titled "Optimal Capital Versus Labor Taxation with Innovation-Led Growth" (May 31, 2013. PIER Working Paper No. 13-025. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2272651) shows that in presence of mobile labour force, capital subsidies are suboptimal from the revenue point off view. And worse, the more innovation-driven is your growth (the more reliant it is on human capital and the more mobile that human capital is), the lower is efficiency of capital supports.

"Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) showed that, in a standard neoclassical growth model with capital accumulation and infinitely lived agents, either taxing or subsidizing capital cannot be optimal in the steady state. In this paper, we introduce innovation-led growth into the Chamley-Judd framework, using a Schumpeterian growth model where productivity-enhancing innovations result from pro.t-motivated R&D investment."

Enough of mumbo-jumbo. "Our main result is that, for a given required trend of public expenditure, a zero tax/subsidy on capital becomes suboptimal. In particular, the higher the level of public expenditure and the income elasticity of labor supply, the less should capital income be subsidized and the more it should be taxed. Not taxing capital implies that labor must be taxed at a higher rate. This in turn has a detrimental effect on labor supply and therefore on the market size for innovation. At the same time, for a given labor supply, taxing capital also reduces innovation incentives, so that for low levels of public expenditure and/or labor supply elasticity it becomes optimal to subsidize capital income."

Of course, labour supply is even more income elastic when it is related to high quality human capital (that can be marketed internationally), and worse, when it is related to innovation (the one that is sought after by dozens of advanced economies bidding over each other to attract the right talent in).

Now, give it a thought:
* Irish tax system literally destroys returns to human capital through punitive levels of taxation of returns on high skills;
* Irish labour markets are open to migration (including emigration of highly skilled);
* Irish economy competes for high skills with scores of other similar economies; and
* Irish state is subsidising in relative terms returns to physical and financial capital, while our tax codes also subsidise IP returns.

Time to scratch that cabbage head, Mr. Politico?

21/8/2014: Consumption of Technology: Revolutions to Evolutions


Neat, although out of date by now, chart showing long-run evolution of consumer utilisation of technology:


Click on image to enlarge...

21/8/2014: Shanghai Academic Rankings 2014: Ireland


Earlier this week, I promised to update historical track record of Irish Universities performance in Shanghai Academic Ranking of World Universities. The latest (2014) results are here: http://www.shanghairanking.com/ARWU2014.html

Summary of all Irish Universities rankings by 'neighbourhood':

Top-ranked TCD:

Second best-ranked UCD:

Third best-ranked UCC:

Historical evolution of Irish rankings:

Draw your own conclusions...

21/8/2014: Thomas Piketty: Powerful Questions, Questionable Answers


This is an unedited version of my article for the Village magazine, August-September 2014


Thomas Piketty's "Capital in the Twenty First Century" (Harvard University Press, 2014) has ignited both public and professional debates around economic theory of income and wealth distribution not seen since the days of the Interwar period a century ago when applied Marxism collided with the laissez faire economics.

To give the credit due to the author and his book, this attention is deserved.

Like Marx's opus, Pikkety's volume is sizeable enough to provoke an instantaneous submission of the readers to its perceived academic (meticulously factual and theoretically all-encompassing) virtues. Like "Das Kapital", "Capital in the Twenty First Century" is impenetrable to anyone unequipped with an advanced degree in political economy and understanding of economic theory. Like Marx's tome, Piketty's work is an attempted herald of a New Revolution; the one that, in the end, boils down to exactly the same Revolution that Marx foresaw: the dis-endowed against the endowed. Like Marxist debates of the 1930s, Piketty’s thesis comes at the time of a major upheaval and crisis.

Thus, Piketty's work is destined to stay with us for a long, long time. Looming at the horizon line, its thesis of the coming age of chaos rising from the chain reactions of growing wealth inequality will be fuelling activists' imagination for decades into the future.

Yet, perhaps to the surprise of the majority of non-specialists, the book has, within a month of its publication, faded into the background in the world of economics. The reason for this is the book’s comprehensive ambition at creating a unified theory of future economic development renders it an easy target for criticism, challenge and, ultimately, negation.

Before diving deeper into Piketty's work, let me state three facts.

Firstly, I admire Piketty for his audacity to challenge the orthodoxy of macroeconomics and tackle a broad-ranging set of targets. 99.9 percent of economics literature explores the minutiae of some empirical or theoretical cul-de-sac in a specific sub-division of a sub-field of economics. Piketty falls into the 0.1 percent of economists who pursue the big picture.

Secondly, witness to the vitriol with which Piketty’s book was greeted in the economic policy circles, I have defended his work in the media and on my blog.

Lastly, having read Piketty's academic publications and working papers in the past, I found his book to be inferior to his academic publications. "Capital in the Twenty First Century" is too long and stylistically un-engaging to be worth returning to it in the future.

The last fact means that you should read Piketty's thesis and be aware of his core evidence, as well as the growing evidence of its shortcomings.  The best means for acquiring this information is by reading Piketty's articles and interviews, as well as taking in the debates surrounding his book. But you should not buy "Capital in the Twenty First Century", unless you are endowed with a desperate propensity to impress your image of a couch intellectual onto the receptive minds of your friends and colleagues. In the latter case you should avail of Flann O'Brien's gentlemanly service that can get the tome thumbed, marked and annotated for you with scientifically-sounding marginalia.


Core Theses

Piketty's core thesis is based on what he defines to be the 'fundamental laws' of Capitalism. Both of these laws stem directly from his view that the economic inputs can be grouped into only two categories: capital (something that can be bought and sold, and thus accumulated without a bound) and labour (something that cannot be sold, although it does collect wage returns, and cannot be accumulated without bounds). Incidentally, beyond undergraduate economics, this division remains valid only in the literature pre-dating the 1980s.

Piketty’s First Law states that capital's share of income is a ratio of income from capital (or return to capital times the quantum or stock of capital) divided by the national income (for example, GDP).

As anyone with a basic knowledge of economics would know, this is not a law, but an accounting identity. Furthermore, any undergraduate student of economics would spot a glaring problem with the above definition: it applies to all forms of capital, including the ones that Piketty omits.

This brings us to the first major problem with Piketty's core thesis: capital itself is neither homogeneous, nor yields a deterministic and singular rate of return. Instead, capital takes various forms. There is financial capital - the one to which the rate of return is measured in form of equity returns, bond returns, financial portfolio returns and so on. There is also intellectual capital that can be traded. This generates financial returns to the holders/investors, but also yields productivity gains to its users, including workers. There is human capital - which generates (alongside other inputs into production) returns to labour (wages and performance-related bonuses), but also returns to entrepreneurship, creativity of employees and so on. There is managerial and technological know-how that can be invested in and transferred or sold, albeit imperfectly, in so far as it often attaches to labour and skills.

To measure income share of all of these forms of capital, one simply needs to divide income from the specific form of capital by total income. Ditto for labour's share and for any other input share. This is neither Piketty's discovery, nor a law of Capitalism.

The problem is that in many cases we cannot easily measure returns to the more complex forms of capital. And a further problem is that returns to one form of capital are linked to returns to other forms of capital. A good example here is urban land. Return to this form of capital is strongly determined by the returns to human capital that can be deployed on this land, as well as by know-how and technology that attaches to economic activity that can take place on it.

Piketty's second fundamental law is a theoretical proposition derived from the mainstream macroeconomic theory. The author claims that the ratio of the stock of capital to income will be equal to the ratio of the savings rate to the sum of growth the growth rates in technology and population. Together with the first law this implies that income share of capital equals to the ratio of the product of the return on capital and savings rate to the combined growth rate in technology and population.

Piketty's main thesis is that over time, as growth rates in technology and population fall, capital's share of income will rise resulting is a sharp rise in inequality.

The core corollary of this is Piketty's call for a global tax on capital (or wealth) coupled with a massive rise in the income tax on super-earners. These measures, in his view, can ameliorate the increase in the income share of capital triggered by slower growth.


Mythology of the Piketty’s ‘Laws’

There are numerous and significant problems with Piketty's analysis and even more problems with conjectures he draws out of data.

Although Piketty presents numerous factual arguments describing the rise and fall and the rise again in income and wealth inequalities, his factual arguments are tangential to his theoretical proposition. Per Krusell (Stockholm University) and Tony Smith (Yale University) pointed out that "Piketty’s forecast does not rest primarily on an extrapolation of recent trends that he has uncovered in the data..."

Krussell and Smith go on to show that Piketty’s second 'fundamental law' relies not on data, but on an assumption that the ‘net’ saving rate is constant and positive over time. This means that capital stock rises by an amount that is a constant fraction of national income.

Now, suppose that Piketty is correct. And suppose that the growth rates in population and technological progress fall to near-zero. Piketty’s assumption then implies that ever greater share of economy’s output will have to be used to maintain capital stock. This will crowd out investments in education, health or new technologies. Eventually capital formation will have to consume the entire GDP. This has never been observed in the past and cannot be true in the future.

Now, personally, I do believe we are staring into the prospect of diminished rates of growth in the advanced economies. But I also believe that savings follow growth over the long run, implying that, the gross investment - investment including replacement of capital depreciation and amortisation - is relatively constant as a ratio to national income. At times of structurally slow growth, therefore, savings are also low.

This belief is supported by historical evidence and contradicts Piketty's conjecture. Furthermore, this evidence is supported by data from individual consumers’ behaviour. In cyclical recessions, households do engage in increased savings, known as precautionary savings. But this phenomena is short-lived and does not contribute to increased investment. Over time, slower growth in income equals lower rates of savings.


Piketty’s Tax Fallacy

Aside from the above, Piketty's suggestion that a wealth tax can stem the rise of inequality is illogical.

Wealth taxes tend to decrease the quantity of capital, thus raising the scarcity and the quality of it. The result - higher returns to capital in the long run that will at least in part neuter the wealth tax effects on stock of capital. More scarce goods tend to command higher prices.

The problem with wealth inequality rests with the distortionary nature of taxation, not with tax levels per se.

To see this, take three forms of capital: financial assets, intellectual property and human capital.

Tax rates on financial assets normally run close to zero, due to availability of various off-shore schemes for tax optimisation for those well-off enough to afford legal and financial engineering services required to attain such rates. Each 1 percentage point in return to financial assets held by a wealthy Irish owner attracts a tax of under 10 percent (inclusive of costs of tax optimisation). For the mere mortals, capital gains rates run also well below income tax rates. In Ireland today, the headline rate is 30%. Intellectual property is facing an effectively near-zero tax rate.

Whereby professional or institutional investors in traditional capital collect roughly 85-90 cents on each euro of gains, intellectual property investors collect closer to 90 cents and retail investors pocket around 70 cents. On the other hand, human capital returns are taxed at an upper marginal tax. Thus a professional consultant will collect around 45 cents on each euro returned to her from added investment in education and skills upgrading.

The result of this asymmetric treatment of returns from various forms of capital is that households simply have no surplus income left to invest and accumulate wealth. Instead, wealth accumulates in the hands of those who can afford living off rents and start their lives with inherited capital.

To make things worse, Peketty also calls for raising dramatically upper marginal tax rate - to hit the high earners. This too is directly contradictory to the objectives he claims to pursue.

Upper marginal income tax rate hits those who live off the wealth of the businesses they built and skills they acquired. Capital gains tax hits those who either dispose of the businesses they built or sell capital they accumulated or inherited. Two of these groups of earners are collecting on value added they created. One is collecting on what others created for them. Treating them all with one brush will simply reduce future rates of growth and/or reduce rates of return on non-capital income. In other words, Piketty's income tax policy proposal will lead to higher wealth and income inequality in the long run under his own model.

The solution to this dilemma is not to tax all capital more, but to equalise the rates of taxation on all capital: physical, financial, technological and human. And focus on what Jacob Hacker of Yale University calls 'pre-distribution' of labour income. The latter requires simultaneously addressing three determinants of market wages: education and skills (increasing skills of the low income segments of population), focused enterprise policy (supporting demand for these skills) and improved mobility and efficiency of the labour markets (increasing returns to skills and human capital).


The Economic ‘Bad’ of Inequality

Piketty's work deserves huge credit for bringing to the fore of the economics debate legitimate concerns with inequality. However, here too the book is open to criticism for being based on occasionally thin evidence.

"Capital in the Twenty First Century" is premised on the assumption that wealth inequality is tearing societies apart, leading to violent conflicts and breakdowns of the civic and state institutions. There is very little evidence to support this assertion amongst the advanced economies. Extreme inequality, measured in absolute terms, can be exceptionally dangerous. So much is true. But relative inequality to-date has not been a major flashing point for revolutions whenever such inequality is anchored in some meritocratic foundations for wealth distribution. All of the recent disturbances in the advanced economies have referenced income and wealth inequality if one were to listen to activists involved in these events. But all have been linked to either public policies relating to income and opportunities available to the less well-off groups or to diminished growth rates in the local economies.

More importantly, current research shows that individual perceptions of relative income and wealth inequality strongly depend on which reference group one selects for benchmarking against.

For example, Daniel Sacks, Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers paper "The New Stylized Facts About Income and Subjective Well-Being (published by CESIfo in 2013) find that there is little evidence to support theories of relative income. In simple terms, if you are concerned with inequality, you should focus on increasing the rates of growth in the economy, not depressing the rates of return on capital.

Another study, by Maria Dahlin, Arie Kapteyn and Caroline Tassot, titled "Who are the Joneses?" (CESR, June 2014) shows that individuals are "much more likely to compare their income to the incomes of their family and friends, their coworkers and people their age than to people living in the same street, town, …or in the world." We reference our own wellbeing against wellbeing of those close to us socially. In this case, Piketty's policy prescription should call for taxing rich people with greater familial networks at a higher rate than those with fewer familial ties. Which, of course, is absurd.


The World is Non-Marxian

Perhaps the greatest error in Piketty's logic is the failure to account for other forms of capital – an error exactly identical to that committed by Marx.

I named these forms of capital above in the discussion of Piketty’s two Fundamental Laws. Ricardo Hausmann from Harvard ("Piketty’s Missing Knowhow", Project Syndicate) shows that Piketty's argument completely falls apart at the national accounts level in the case of advanced and emerging economies. Furthermore, his argument dovetails with my view that hiking upper marginal tax rates to combat income and wealth inequality is simply counterproductive.

Piketty's assumption that the rate of return to capital is following a historically constant trend of 4-5 percent per annum is also questionable. Dani Rodrik of Princeton University reminds us that the return to capital is likely to decline if the economy becomes too rich in capital relative to labor and other resources and the rate of innovation slows down. So if innovation were to fall, as Piketty assumes, rate of return to capital is likely to decline in line with diminished economic growth. This decline is going to be further accelerated by the rise in the quantum of capital accumulated prior to the economic slowdown.

Lastly, since capital is non-homogenous, even constant average return can conceal wide variations in returns to various forms of capital. For example: agricultural land vs industrial property, private equity vs listed shares and so on – all command different and over-time varying returns. Imposing a uniform tax on all wealth will raise cost of investing in more productive and less certain (thus 'pricier') capital associated with new technologies and new industries. In turn, this will only reduce mobility of wealth in the society, increasing, not lowering long-run wealth inequality and supporting currently endowed elites at the expense of any challengers.

Truth is, Marxian world of the epic confrontation between labour and capital has been surpassed by reality. Today, we live in a highly complex, more dynamic and less homogenous economy. This does not mean that the burdens of rising income and wealth inequality should be ignored. But it does mean that policy responses to these challenges must be based on more complex, behaviourally and macroeconomically-anchored analysis.

Piketty’s "Capital in the Twenty First Century", spectacularly succeeded in raising to prominence the debate about income and wealth distributions. But it also failed in delivering both the analytical frameworks and policy responses to these twin challenges.

Tax and reallocation measures - whether through aid or charity, force of compulsion or financial repression - are neither sufficient to restore balance between returns to physical capital, technology and human capital, nor conducive to delivering continued growth of human-centric economic systems. Instead, there is a dire need for direct, markets-based repricing of the sources of value added in the society. This repricing must recognise the simple fact of nature: people add value to capital, not the other way around, and people with skills and productive attitudes to work do so more than those without both or either.

There is a need for closing tax incentives that favour physical capital over human capital, and there is a need for rebalancing our tax system to allow for greater rewards to flow to those creating new value in the economy. But there is also a need for the state systems to stop treating workers as captives for tax purposes, whilst capital remains highly mobile and tax efficient.

Sunday, August 17, 2014

17/8/2014: Disruptive Innovation, Experimentation and Entrepreneurship


Last week I highlighted several studies relating to human capital and entrepreneurship. Here, continuing with the theme, couple more.

First, a paper by Acemoglu, Daron and Akcigit, Ufuk and Celik, Murat Alp, titled "Young, Restless and Creative: Openness to Disruption and Creative Innovations" (February 1, 2014, MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 14-07: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2392109). Per authors: the study argues that "openness to new, unconventional and disruptive ideas has a first-order impact on creative innovations" where such innovations are defined as those "that break new ground in terms of knowledge creation". The problem, of course, is not that this is something new - if anything, this is trivial - but that we (as society and managerial systems, firms, enterprise ownership structures etc) have a very hard time managing disruptive innovation to achieve 'openness' to the ideas and the generators of such ideas that deliver true disruption.

"After presenting a motivating model focusing on the choice between incremental and radical innovation, and on how managers of different ages and human capital are sorted across different types of firms, we provide cross-country, firm-level and patent-level evidence consistent with this pattern. Our measures of creative innovations proxy for innovation quality (average number of citations per patent) and creativity (fraction of superstar innovators, the likelihood of a very high number of citations, and generality of patents). Our main proxy for openness to disruption is manager age. This variable is based on the idea that only companies or societies open to such disruption will allow the young to rise up within the hierarchy. Using this proxy at the country, firm or patent level, we present robust evidence that openness to disruption is associated with more creative innovations."

All of the above is fine. All is neat and well-argued and empirically backed. But, now, try and tell your average HR manager that the firm they work for should hire someone who breaks consensus and bends rules of logic, thinking and creativity?.. Or try telling them that standard CV/interview/test metrics they employ make hiring disruptive talent actually impossible, let alone difficult… And try telling them that majority of people graduating with 'right' degrees and offering 'right' references and credentials are actually deeply conformist, rather than disruptively innovative…



The second paper of interest is by Kerr, William R. and Nanda, Ramana and Rhodes-Kropf, Matthew, titled "Entrepreneurship as Experimentation" (July 28, 2014, Journal of Economic Perspectives: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2473226) argues that "…entrepreneurship is about experimentation: the probabilities of success are low, extremely skewed and unknowable until an investment is made." The most interesting bit in the above is the unknowable nature of the probability of success ex ante actual investment. This really cuts across the entire notion of angel financing…

"At a macro level experimentation by new firms underlies the Schumpeterian notion of creative destruction. However, at a micro level investment and continuation decisions are not always made in a competitive Darwinian contest. Instead, a few investors make decisions that are impacted by incentive, agency and coordination problems, often before a new idea even has a chance to compete in a market."

Another interesting issue is that the authors "contend that costs and constraints on the ability to experiment alter the type of organizational form surrounding innovation and influence when innovation is more likely to occur. These factors not only govern how much experimentation is undertaken in the economy, but also the trajectory of experimentation, with potentially very deep economic consequences."

The reason why it is go interest from my point of view is nine years ago, I tried to formulate some of these exact fundamentals in relationship between ability to take risks, experiment, innovate and the macro-economic policy environments in the paper available here: http://www.tcd.ie/Economics/TEP/2005_papers/TEP2.pdf