Economics 08/04/2010: AIB first Nama loans

Earlier this week, Nama had completed the first transfer of loans from AIB. Per official report, Nama bought loans with a nominal value of €3.29bn for €1.9bn in NAMA bonds, implying a discount of 42.2%. This was below the discount of 43% announced by the Minister for Finance last week.

But what do these figures mean? Without knowing exact nature of the loans, it is hard to tell just how much did Nama over pay for the loans. Here is an averages-based estimate, however.

First, let us reproduce the original claimed discount of 42.2% using averages. Table below does exactly this:
In the above, I assume:

1. Vintages of loans transfer running between 2005 and 2007;
2. 2 year roll up on interest maximum allowed in the loan covenants;
3. Roll up of interest commencing at a new rate in year 2008 and running through 2009;
4. 2 scenarios of average interest rates applied (Scenario 1: 5% pa, Scenario 2: 6% pa) – as you shall see below, these are optimistic rates;
5. Declines in values affecting different vintages as follows: loans of 2007 vintage – decline of 50% in value of the loan; loans of 2006 vintage – 40% and loans of 205 vintage – 35%.

As the last row shows, taking a simple average across all scenarios and vintages yields a discount on the loan face value of 41.7%, which, factoring in 0.5% Nama-reported risk margin yields the effective rate of 42.2% - bang on with the desired.

Having matched Nama numbers, let’s examine the assumptions and bring them closer to reality:

1. Let us use the actual average annual lending rates for non-financial corporations reported by the Central Bank Table B2 (here)
2. Let us also adjust the loans for security of collateral claims – remember, per official statements from Nama many loans (in the Anglo case up to 20%) are non-secured, with effective claims against the underlying assets of nil) – to do this, we induce the following security risk adjustments to value: 6% for vintages of 2005, 9% for vintages of 2006 and 12% for vintages of 2007. So the average is 9.9%. Although these are significant, remember – reports of 20% for Anglo loans are based on untested cases. It remains to be seen how higher these will go should other lenders contest Nama take over of the claims.
3. Since Nama valuations were carried out through November 2009, we must factor in further declines in value, so let us push up value discounts to 35% of 2005 vintages, 45% on 2006 vintages and 55% on 2007 vintages. Again, these are conservative, given evidence presented in the commercial courts.
4. Instead of running alternative interest rates scenarios (remember – I am taking actual rates reported by the Central Bank), take two different scenarios on vintages compositions: Scenario A assumes uniform distribution of loans across three vintages, Scenario B assumes a 20% for 2005 vintage, 30% for 2006 vintage and 50% for 2007 vintage split.
5. Finally, let us estimate two other alternative scenarios: Scenario 1 has no mark ups charged on average lending rates, Scenario 2 has a set of mark up reflective of higher risk perception of loans, especially in 2008-2009 period. Remember, lenders became unwilling to provide funding for property investments in 2008-2009, which means they would be expected to charge a higher interest rate (risk premium) on loans related to property than those reflected in the average corporate lending rates.

Tables below show the results of model estimation:
Alternative scenario 1: Nama overpayment over the current market value ranges between 42% and 51% or €561-638 million.
Alternative scenario 2: Nama overpayment over the current market value ranges between 48% and 57% or €617-688 million.

So averaging across two tables: Nama overpayment on AIB tranche 1 loans is estimated at between 42% and 57% or between €561 million and €688 million. At a lower estimate range, this suggests that Nama is at a risk of overpaying some €26 billion for the loans it purchases, should this type of valuations proceed.


Of course, some would say this overpayment reflects the expected long term economic valuation of these loans. Fine. Suppose it does – how long can it take for the LTEV to be realised to break even (real terms) on Nama assets then?

Let’s make two assumptions:

• suppose that Irish property markets see price increases of 150% of expected economic growth,
• suppose that expected long term economic growth will average in real terms between 2% and 3% per annum.

If Nama overpays 48% on the current value of the assets (lower range of my estimate), Nama will break even – absent its own costs of operations and funding – and assuming full recovery of the loans per their value – by the end of 2027 if the growth rate average 3% pa or by the end of 2035 if the growth rate averages 2% pa in real terms.

If Nama overpays at the top of the estimates range – 57%, then real recovery will take up to the end of 2039 if the average annual growth rate is 3% or up to 2053 is the average growth rate is 2% per annum.

Again – notice that these figures do not include:

• Legal costs of running Nama;
• Losses that might occur on the loans since November 30, 2009 valuation cut off date;
• 3 years long roll up interest holiday built into Nama;
• Operating costs of running Nama (inclusive of very costly advisers it contracts);
• Cost of Nama bonds financing
• Cost of actual working through the bad loans

Still thinking Anglo is the worst case scenario for us?

Economics 27/03/2010: Breaking News: AIB and FF/Government

Major news breaking in the media rooms:
AIB (the first story below)
RedC Poll (the second story below)


Story 1:

The first story is about the leaks reported by Newstalk (see here) that AIB will announce before opening of trading on Monday that the state will be taking a 65% stake in the bank.

Per senior source in the Dail (hat tip to B) - the reason for AIB guiding 65% ownership now is that in addition to Nama haircuts, they are, allegedly, seeing significant deterioration in the sub-€5mln loans (the loans below Nama-eligible threshold).

This is hardly surprising. Since May 2009 I have consistently supplied estimates as to the eventual state ownership in both AIB and BofI. Depending on various scenarios:

• assumed Nama haircuts,
  
• the actual current risk weighting on the loans being transferred,
  
• share price at the time of announcement and
  
• the willingness of the banks and the Government to recognize future expected losses on the loans not transferred to Nama

RVF approach to valuing AIB and BofI balancesheets suggests that at the end of the current crisis, the state will outright own around 85-90% of equity in AIB and 50-60% in BofI. This eventual outcome, for political reasons, will come in two stages:

• post-Nama injection of capital (with AIB placing around 60-70% of its equity with the State and BofI placing around 40-45%), plus
• second stage recapitalization to correct for continued deterioration in the books over 2010-2011 (adding another 20-30% of equity for AIB and 10-15% for BofI)

The problem with this two stage recapitalization is that the taxpayer will end up paying three times for the same equity:

• Having injected €7 bn into two banks at the time when they were worth less than €2.5 bn for the entire lot,
  
• we are now be left on the hook for some €20 bn worth of largely worthless loans - to be purchased at ca 30-40% discounts (against the real market discount of 65-90%),
  
• plus €7-8 bn in fresh capital post-Nama
• plus the margin of ca 10-15% for further deterioration in non-Nama loan books (requiring another €7-9 bn of fresh capital).

Thus the Irish state is now likely to use up to €20 bn to buy up equity and loans from a bank that is currently worth around €1.5 bn... In the world of finance, even the most reckless bankers never managed such margins.

Alternative: force banks to acknowledge the full extent of their expected losses (as Swedes did in the 1990s), then force them to take the bondholders and equity holders to the cleaners (as Swedes did in the 1990s), and only then take equity - or in effect, take full equity in the banks. The cost for AIB would be around €10-12 bn, depending on how deep of a haircut on senior bondholders the banks can impose.

Story 2:

Tomorrow's RedC poll

Here is a preview - as was supplied to me by my sources (a disclaimer is due here: these are as provided by the source, so check tomorrow's papers for actually confirmed figures). Parties support:
The poll was conducted on Monday-Tuesday, so it does not reflect change of opinion in the wake of Cabinet reshuffling and the dissident TDs comments. Both factors can be expected to contribute to further decline in FF ratings, speculatively pushing core FF support post-Thursday to 21-22%.

Some specific questions:
“Brian Cowen understands people like me” - 31% agree
“Brian Cowen is a good Taoiseach” - 27% agree
“Brian Cowen is a safe pair of hands” - 31% agree
“Brian Cowen is the man to lead us out of recession” - 29% agree

Hat tip to NN.

I wonder what the same punters would say about our leaders now, after the reshuffle debacle and the open dissent amongst the back-benchers.