25/08/2011: BIS publishes a wish-list for global regulation of OTC derivativatives markets

The Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and the Technical Committee of IOSCO released a report on over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives data that should be collected, stored and disseminated by trade repositories (TRs). The market for these instruments is current estimated at over $600 trillion. Details and report are available here.

Per BIS statement: "The committees support the view that TRs, by collecting such data centrally, would provide the authorities and the public with better and timely information. This would make markets more transparent, help to prevent market abuse, and promote financial stability."

I happen to agree with the above, subject to one core caveat: collecting data is not enough. It is imperative that data collected is organically integrated into analytical frameworks that actually have a meaningful connection to supervision. This, however, is hardly an easy (and low cost) measure to achieve.

The report implies:

• minimum data reporting requirements and standardised formats
• the methodology and mechanism for data aggregation on a global basis
• these requirements and data formats will apply to both market participants reporting to TRs and to TRs reporting to the public and to regulators
• new information currently not supported by TRs is also identified as being helpful in assessing systemic risk and financial stability, including: current exposure, netting and collateralisation details on bilateral portfolios of OTC transactions; current market values of individual open OTC derivatives transactions; information on collateral assets that are applied to OTC derivatives portfolios, including the valuation and disposition of these assets
  

Back in 2009, the G20 called for OTC derivatives to be centrally cleared and transactions reported to repositories by the end of 2012. In a number of cases, national markets regulators are already setting up such facilities, for example the Trade Information Warehouse for credit default swaps and the Equity Derivatives Reporting Repository, under the US DTCC.

The CPSS and the IOSCO latest call comes as the global authorities are trying to set international minimum standards to apply to derivatives markets from the end of 2012, when a global system of Legal Entity Identifiers (LEI tags) for individual transactions should come in place.

In addition, the authorities also want to develop a standardized international product classification system to provide better sorting of transactions and underlying data, with potential links to higher level risk analytics.

IOSCO previously published a discussion paper on the role of securities regulators with regard to systemic risk which:

• Identifies transparency and disclosure as an important tool for dealing with systemic risk, including product transparency and financial sector stress tests. To meet these requirements, the authorities "would need aggregate data on, inter alia, (i) each entity's current gross exposure and exposure net of collateral (in order to assess both the absolute size of its exposures and its relative importance for the markets under consideration); (ii) each entity's current gross exposures and exposure net of collateral to each of its major counterparties (in order to quantify interconnectedness); and (iii) aggregate exposures of all counterparties in terms of specific asset classes, products, currencies, reference entities and underlying sectors." This data can help evaluate potential "knock-on effects of financial distress at any one institution and identify concentrations of risk among groups of closely related institutions".
• Measuring counterparty exposure will require data regarding bilateral positions, market values of open positions, netting arrangements, collateralisation and disposition and valuation of collateral
• Determining bilateral positions will require "data on the full set of open trades between a pair of counterparties and their economic characteristics, including all terms that are required to calculate and assign a value to a trade such as effective and termination dates, notional amounts, underlier reference data, counterparty information, coupon amounts and schedules, and other salient economic terms specific to individual types of transactions (e.g., restructuring clauses for credit default swap ("CDS") contracts and reference interest rates for interest rate swaps)"
• Determining the effect of netting arrangements will require "data on the set or sets of positions whose gains and losses can be netted against one another in determining amounts owed to any counterparty".

It is, perhaps, revealing to read in the paper candid assessment of the two panels that current reporting infrastructure simply cannot cope with the data required for risk analysis (including higher level systemic risk analysis) in relation to the overall derivatives markets.

"Existing TRs, ...do not track and report market values of open positions with regular frequency. ...existing major TRs are organised along asset-class lines while counterparty risk is managed at the bilateral portfolio level. For example, in computing current exposure, gains in a counterparty's position in one derivative product may be netted against losses in another derivative product. ...TRs as currently implemented would be unable to provide a complete set of information for determining current exposures, and ...some data gaps would still remain. For example, gathering information about collateral and reliable market value for non-cleared OTC derivatives is a challenge. Similarly, it is challenging to create an effective system for capturing information on bilateral netting arrangements."

So on the net - the consultative process launched by today's announcement should be a very interesting one and I will be covering it here. In addition, myself and industry research co-author are working on a paper for the QJ of Central Banking which will touch on some of the issues relating to the above.

25/01/2011: Just how independent is the EU's Systemic Risk Board

On January 20 there was a momentous occasion in Europe. After years of crisis, bent on preventing another financial meltdown in the future, the EU unveiled the first sitting of the new super-regulatory/supervisory body - the European Systemic Risk Board.

Here is the press release from the EU official site with emphasis and comments added by me:

"The General Board of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) held its inaugural meeting today at the European Central Bank (ECB) in Frankfurt am Main. The meeting led to a number of decisions on the set-up and functioning of the Board:
...

• Mr Marek Belka, Governor of the Narodowy Bank Polski; Mr Mario Draghi, Governor of the Banca d’Italia; Mr Athanasios Orphanides, Governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus; Mr Axel Weber, President of the Deutsche Bundesbank; were elected members of the Steering Committee for three years. [Note that all members of the Steering Committee are Central Bankers, hence not independent from the ECB]
  

• Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank was elected Chair of the Advisory Technical Committee for three years. [Again the above comment applies]

The ESRB is an independent EU body responsible for the macro-prudential oversight of the financial system within the Union. The ESRB is located in Frankfurt am Main and its Secretariat is provided by the European Central Bank.

The Chair of the ESRB is the President of the European Central Bank, Mr Jean-Claude Trichet. The first Vice-Chair of the ESRB is Mr Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England. He was elected by the members of the General Council of the ECB on 16 December 2010 for five years. The second Vice-Chair of the ESRB will be the Chair of the Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities.

The General Board consists of the following members with voting rights: the President and the Vice-President of the European Central Bank (ECB); the Governors of the national central banks of the EU Member States; one member of the European Commission; the Chairperson of the European Banking Authority (EBA); the Chairperson of the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA); the Chairperson of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA); the Chair and the two Vice-Chairs of the Advisory Scientific Committee (ASC); the Chair of the Advisory Technical Committee (ATC). The following members have no voting rights: one high-level representative per Member State of the competent national supervisory authorities; and the President of the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC)." (end quote)

So in a summary: the ESRB is composed of:

• National CBs and supervisory authorities (subject to ECB control)
• ECB members
• EU Commission representatives
• EU industry quangoes

And this is called 'independent'?

Economics 18/01/2010: Systemic Risk Regulation EU-style

Before we dive into the issue of Systemic Risk Regulation, a quick note on travel industry troubles (those who would like to do so can skip down to the second topic)

Some of the readers of this blog and of my articles in press disagree with my assertion that high charges at the Dublin Airport and the travel tax imposed on passengers matter to our travel figures. I have wrote before about:

• an independent Government group report calling for abolition of the tax, and 
• on an independent economic assessment from international transport economics consultancy linking travel tax to jobs losses and revenue collapse in the sector; and
• evidence on routes closures and aircraft cut backs that were explicitly linked by the airlines (Ryanair, EasyJet and Aer Lingus amongst them) to the charges and taxes collected in Dublin. 
• Withdrawal of BMI earlier this year from Dublin, with a loss of 30 jobs and some 300,000 passengers was also not enough.
  

This was not enough to convince some. Sadly, many continue to insist that protectionist barriers to travel (trade) are an effective means for ensuring viability of Irish tourism and domestic sectors (see last Sunday Times letters page).

Now, Irish media reports that the DAA will be offering substantial discounts to airlines that launch new short and long haul services, amounting to 25-100% cuts in charges for the first five years of a route opening.

Of course, DAA had seen a 17% year-on-year drop in traffic in December 2009, while Cork saw a decline of 15.5% and Shannon – 29.9%.

Offering deep discounts is a funny thing to do, if the charges and taxes were not the problem with traffic in the first place. Unless, that is, people like myself have been all along correct in stating that high costs of services provided by the DAA (inclusive of travel tax – which DAA had nothing to do with) act as an impediment to sustaining tourism and business travel to Ireland.

It is a basic feature of international trade theory and practice – tariff protection does not work. Not in the short run, nor in the long run. Visitors to Ireland are price-elastic, while many of us, living here with families and connections (personal and business ones) overseas are less so.

Hike tax and foreign tourists will have a greater ability to avoid coming here, while domestic travellers will have to adjust their expenditure (abroad and at home) to cover the additional cost.

What the former means is that a Spanish person deciding on where to take a city break will be less inclined to chose Dublin or Ireland in general because of a higher tax/cost.

The latter means that an Irish person going to, say, Paris, will have an added incentive to shop there more (to generate greater savings over the comparable purchases in Ireland and thus compensate herself for extra costs incurred in travelling) or equivalently – to shop less in Ireland (to avoid incurring added cost). Both effects act in the direction of reducing total revenue to businesses based here.

Ann Siebert has weighed in on the issue of systemic risk regulation in Europe in today’s voxeu column (here):

"Any committee dealing with assessment of systemic risks “should be small and diverse. …ideally it should be composed of five people: a macroeconomist, a microeconomist, a financial engineer, a research accountant, and a practitioner. …As the size of a group increases so does the pool of human resources, but motivational losses, coordination problems, and the potential for embarrassment become more important. The optimal size for a group that must solve problems or make judgements is an empirical issue, but it may not be much greater than five. The reason for diversity is that spotting systemic risk requires different types of expertise. A board composed of entirely of macroeconomists might, for example, see the potential for risk pooling in securitisation, whereas a microeconomist would see the reduced incentive to monitor loans.”

Needless to say, these are not the principles taken on board by Nama and the Irish banks. Nor is it an approach even being discussed for the Irish Financial Regulator or the Government. Why? Why not?

“The committee should be composed of researchers outside of government bodies and international organisations; career concerns may stifle the incentive of a bureaucrat to express certain original ideas. It is of particular importance that the board not include supervisors and regulators. [Again, look at Nama – virtually the entire top management of this organization is composed of  people unqualified to deal with the task of spotting structural risks]. This is for two reasons. First, it is often suggested that supervisors and regulators can be captured by the industry that they are supposed to mind, and this may make them less than objective and prone to the same errors. Second, a prominent cause of the recent crisis was supervisory and regulatory failures, and these are more apt to be spotted and reported by independent observers than the perpetrators.” [No illusions here - Nama is captured by the industry, and to boot - by the worst parts of the industry, not the best.]

"Finally, it is important that the board be made sufficiently visible and prominent that a member’s career depends on his performance. Given the importance of the task, pay should be high to attract the best qualified, and the members should not have outside employment to distract them.” [Good luck to anyone who thinks that Nama board or any of its risk structures will come close to these parameters, except one - they will be handsomely remunerated for their work].

Alas, this dreamy transparent and professionally sound proposal is too late, even in the EU case, for: “The Eurozone has already swung into action, creating the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), set to begin this year. Unfortunately, this board, responsible for macro-prudential oversight of the EU financial system and for issuing risk warnings and recommendations, is far from the ideal. It is to be composed of the 27 EU national central bank governors, the ECB President and Vice-President, a Commission member and the three chairs of the new European Supervisory Authorities. In addition, a representative from the national supervisory authority of each EU country and the President of the Economic and Financial Committee may attend meetings of the ESRB, but may not vote. This lumbering army of 61 central bankers and related bureaucrats is a body clearly designed for maximum inefficiency; it is too big, it is too homogeneous, it lacks independence, and its members are already sufficiently employed.”

Pretty much on the ball, I would say.