5/5/15: IMF, Greece & Europe: More Bickering, Less Tinkering?

An interesting article on Greece in FT: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/72b8d2ae-f275-11e4-b914-00144feab7de.html#ixzz3ZFOAlR4B suggesting that the IMF is now actively drifting into fall-out management mode for Greek crisis.

According to the FT: "Greece is so far off course on its $172bn bailout programme that it faces losing vital International Monetary Fund support unless European lenders write off significant amounts of its sovereign debt, the fund has warned Athens’ eurozone creditors." And this means that Greece is at a risk of failing to secure release of EUR3.6 billion worth of bailout funds - the IMF share of the EUR7.2 billion of Troika funds - that still remain to be disbursed to Athens.

Absent these funds, Greece is insolvent, full stop.

Basically, per IMF projections, debt sustainability in Greece requires 3% primary net lending / borrowing balance in 2015 (up on estimated surplus of 1.5% in 2014) and this is required to rise to 4.5% in 2016-2017 and 4.24% in 2018-2020. In Euro terms, 2015 primary surplus required is EUR5.49 billion. Instead, the IMF now estimates that the country will be running a primary budget deficit (not surplus) of 1.5%.

Primary balance is Government balance excluding interest on debt.

If true, the deterioration in Greek finances so far this year is massive. And there is no way of correcting for it, unless either Greece imposes much more severe austerity or there is a formal and significant debt restructuring for debts held by the 'official sector' - aka Troika.

Per FT report, sources close to the Eurogroup claimed that “The IMF thinks the gap between the two realities is very large right now,” said one senior official involved in the talks. A stand-off between the IMF and eurozone creditors over Greece is not unprecedented. Three years ago, the IMF refused to disburse its portion of the aid tranche because of similar fears Greek debt was not falling fast enough. The IMF only signed off after eurozone ministers agreed to consider, but never implemented, writing down their bailout loans to reduce Greece’s debt to “substantially lower” than 110 per cent of GDP by 2022. It currently stands at 176 per cent." So in other words, the IMF appears to be pushing for a debt restructuring for Greece.

In a separate report: http://www.ifre.com/imf-not-insisting-on-further-debt-relief-for-greece-schaeuble/21197177.fullarticle Germany Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble denied the IMF is pressuring the Eurogroup to restructure Greek debts.

As I noted in January (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/01/512015-imf-on-debt-relief-for-greece.html), this is by far the most often repeated disagreement between Greece, Europe and the IMF. And it comes as the Eurogroup attempts to structure another bailout package for Greece. So far, rumours have it, the Eurogroup outlook for Bailout 3.0 needs are pitched at EUR30-50 billion. But, as FT notes, "rising deficits could change that calculation."

Meanwhile, Greece continues to stumble from one payout to next - on a weekly basis - http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/05/1515-good-news-may-hide-bad-news-when.html

And now we have a smell of napalm in the morning - some signs of bond markets repricing peripheral risks for the euro area:

5/5/15: BRIC Manufacturing PMI: Further Growth Slowdown in April

BRIC manufacturing PMIs (Markit) are out for April, and the signs are poor in terms of economic growth prospects for the block of the four largest emerging economies.

• Brazil manufacturing PMI came in at 46.0 in April, down from already abysmal 46.2 in March, singling deepening and accelerating contraction. This the the third consecutive month of Manufacturing PMI below 50.0. 3mo average is at 47.3 and previous 3mo average (through January 2015) is at 49.9. The weakness in Brazil manufacturing sector performance is not new: in 3mo through April 2014 the index reading was just 50.1. Weak growth or contraction (below 51.0) has been recorded every month since March 2013. As of April, Brazil has posted the lowest monthly and 3mo average readings for Manufacturing PMIs for all BRIC countries.
• Russian Manufacturing PMI posted a slight improvement in April, rising to 48.9 from 48.1. Nonetheless, April was the fifth consecutive month of sub-50 readings and the 'improvement' is reflective of a slowdown in the rate of contraction, not a reversal of contraction. 3mo average through April is at 48.9 which is still worse than the 3mo average through January 2015 (49.4) and only marginally better than 3mo average through April 2014 (48.4). Last time Russian manufacturing PMI reading was in healthy territory was November 2014 when it posted a surprising reading of 51.7, but overall, weak performance can be traced back to July 2013.
• Chinese Manufacturing PMI continued to post contraction in the sector coming in at 48.9 in April, marking worsening in the growth conditions compared to 49.6 reading in March and the second consecutive month of sub-50 readings. 3mo average is now at 49.7, marginally weaker than 49.8 3mo average through January 2015. Current 3mo average is, however, stronger than 48.2 average for the 3 months through April 2014.
• India was the only BRIC economy that managed to sustain above-50 reading for the Manufacturing PMI. However, at 51.3 in April, the PMI is still down on 52.1 in March. This marks 18th consecutive monthly above-50 reading for the series.

Overall, April data indicates significantly adverse conditions in BRIC manufacturing, with Brazil being by far the worst performer in the group both in terms of monthly reading and 3mo average. As the chart above shows, excluding India, BRIC Manufacturing PMIs trend to the downside from mid-2014 levels with Brazil readings at the worst levels since September 2011, Russia continuing to perform at the levels consistent with the worst economic slowdown since October 2008-July 2009, China showing renewed weaknesses consistent with overall zero growth trend present since around Q2 2013. India bucked the BRIC pattern by posting a positive growth trend since Q4 2013.

2/5/15: China's “Great Leap Forward” in Science and Engineering

Richard B. Freeman and Wei Huang NBER Working Paper No. w21081, April 2015 titled "China's “Great Leap Forward” in Science and Engineering" looks at how over "…past two decades China leaped from bit player in global science and engineering (S&E) to become the world's largest source of S&E graduates and the second largest spender on R&D and second largest producer of scientific papers. As a latecomer to modern science and engineering, China trailed the US and other advanced countries in the quality of its universities and research but was improving both through the mid-2010s."

The paper "...presents evidence that China's leap benefited greatly from the country's positive response to global opportunities to educate many of its best and brightest overseas and from the deep educational and research links it developed with the US. The findings suggest that global mobility of people and ideas allowed China to reach the scientific and technological frontier much faster and more efficiently."

Overall, a nice addition to the body of literature exploring internationalisation of human capital and shedding some light onto a less reported area of this development: the reverse flows of human capital from the advanced economies to emerging markets.


Full link: Freeman, Richard B. and Huang, Wei, China's “Great Leap Forward” in Science and Engineering (April 2015). NBER Working Paper No. w21081: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2593660

2/5/15: IMF to Ukraine: Pain, and More Pain, and Maybe Some Gain

A very interesting IMF working paper on sustainability and effectiveness of fiscal policy in Ukraine that cuts rather dramatically across the official IMF policy blather.

Fiscal Multipliers in Ukraine, by Pritha Mitra and Tigran Poghosyan, IMF Working Paper, March 2015, WP/15/71 looks at the role of fiscal policy (spending and investment) in the Ukrainian economy.

As authors assert, "since the 2008-09 global crisis, which hit Ukraine particularly hard, the government relied on fiscal stimulus to support recovery. In reality, it was the main lever for macroeconomic management… Today, even after the recent float of the Ukrainian hryvnia, fiscal policy remains key to economic stabilization." In particular, "Over the past five years, the government relied on real public wage and pension hikes to stimulate economic activity, sometimes at the expense of public infrastructure spending. Many argue that this choice of fiscal instruments undermined private sector growth and contributed to the economy falling back into recession in mid-2012."

Since the IMF bailout, however, fiscal adjustment is now aiming for a reversal of long term imbalances on spending and revenue sides. In simple terms, fiscal adjustment now became a critical basis for addressing the economic and financial crisis. As the result, the IMF study looked at the effectiveness of various fiscal policy instruments.

The reason for the need for rebalancing fiscal policy in Ukraine is that current environment is characterised by "…the severe crisis, its toll on tax revenues, and financing constraints, necessitate fiscal consolidation. But the challenge is to minimize its negative impact on growth."

In other words, the key questions are: "Will tax hikes or spending cuts harm growth more? Does capital or current spending have a stronger impact on economic activity?"

Quantitatively, the paper attempts to estimate "…the fiscal multiplier – the change in output, relative to baseline, following an exogenous change in the fiscal deficit that stems from a change in revenue or spending policies."

The findings are: "Applying a structural vector auto regression, the empirical results show that Ukraine’s near term fiscal multipliers are well below one. Specifically, the impact revenue and spending multipliers are -0.3 and 0.4, respectively. This suggests that if a combination of revenue and spending consolidation measures were pursued, the near-term marginal impact on growth would be modest", albeit negative for raising revenue and cutting spending.

"Over the medium-term, the revenue multiplier becomes insignificant, rendering it impossible to draw any conclusions on its strength. The spending multiplier strengthens to 1.4, with about the same impact from capital and current spending. However, the impact of the capital multiplier lasts longer. Against this backdrop, the adverse impact of fiscal consolidation on medium-term growth could be minimized by cutting current spending while raising that on capital."

The risks are unbalanced to the downside, however, so the IMF study concludes that "Given the severe challenges facing the Ukrainian economy, it is important that policymakers apply these results in conjunction with broader considerations – including public debt sustainability, investor confidence, credibility of government policies, public spending efficiency. These considerations combined with the large size of current spending in the budget, may necessitate larger near- and long-term current spending cuts than what multiplier estimates suggest."

In simple terms, this means that, per IMF research (note, this is not a policy directive), Ukrainian economy will need to sustain a heavy duty adjustment on the side of cutting public spending on current expenditure programmes (wages, pensions, purchasing of services, provision of services, social welfare, health, etc) and, possibly, provide small, only partially offsetting, increase in capital spending. This would have to run alongside other measures that will raise costs of basic services and utilities for all involved.

The problem, therefore, is a striking one: to deliver debt sustainability, current expenditure and price supports will have to be cut, causing massive amounts of pain for ordinary citizens. Meanwhile, infrastructure spending will have to rise (but much less than the cuts in current expenditure), which will, given Ukrainian corruption, line the pockets of the oligarchs, while providing income and jobs to a smaller subset of working population. Otherwise, the economy will tank sharply. Take your pick, the IMF research suggests: public unrest because of cut-backs to basic expenditures, or an even deeper contraction in the economy. A hard choice to make.

In the end, "More broadly, fiscal multipliers are one of many tools policymakers should use to guide their decisions. Given the severe challenges facing the Ukrainian economy – including public debt sustainability, low investor confidence, and subsequent limited availability of financing – it may be necessary for policymakers to undertake stark consolidation efforts across both revenues and expenditures, despite the adverse consequences for growth."

1/5/15: Good News May Hide Bad News When it Comes to Greece

Greek 5 year CDS (Credit Default Swaps) continued to tighten dramatically today:

Source: CMA
Note: CPD refers to Cumulative Probability of Default (5 years)

Per Bloomberg, this is down to Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras stepping up "efforts to clinch a deal that would unlock financial aid… The ASE Index of stocks jumped the most since September 2012 from a two-year low on April 21. It ended up 6.1 percent in April, the biggest rally in western Europe. Bonds returned 13 percent, while securities in the rest of the region fell. Investors put money into Greek assets in April, betting the rally may have more to go if a default is averted. The nation and its creditors hope to reach a preliminary agreement by Sunday, ahead of a scheduled meeting of euro-area finance ministers on May 11, according to three people familiar with the matter." More on this here: http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/greece-debt-imf.10za.

One factor unmentioned is sidelining of Greek Finance Minister in leading the negotiations with the Troika. Another factor is growing discontent within the Greek ruling coalition - a move that increases pressure on Tsipras to get a new deal. My sources in Greece claim there are big disagreements within the Government and main parties. Much of this is focused on hard left's view that Syriza is abandoning its Programme promises. But, as common, much of it also about individual personalities.


Greece is a recurring nightmare - for Europe and for Greece itself.

The country had to be bailed out twice already, borrowing EUR240 billion from the European partners and the IMF. Its Government debt stands at 177% of GDP. The economy is down 25% since 2010 and unemployment rate is at 26%.

It is crunch time for the country:

• European position is that there is no question that Greece is responsible for the mess the economy is in. The problems - with external and fiscal imbalances - started with misguided policies, dishonest accounting and reporting of the fiscal environment, and this continued over many years. The problems were exacerbated by structural weaknesses in the Greek economy. So from the European perspective, a member state, like Greece, simply cannot continue endlessly violating rules. Which means that Greek debt write down via official channels is impossible. And since the banks and private investors have already taken a 50%+ write down on their claims, further debt relief is not on the cards.
• The Greek view is the exact opposite. And it has some reasonable ground under it too. Greeks see their situation as being forced onto them by Europe and, rightly, recognise that the country simply cannot repay the debts accumulated. Worse, the economy, in its current state, can't even fund these debts. We are now witnessing weekly liquidity squeezes, the latest being over the tiny EUR200 million interest payment this week.

Greece is being squeezed on liquidity front much more seriously than the immediate pressure points suggest.

Banks are losing deposits - probably over EUR5bn in April, on top of some EUR27 billion in 1Q 2015 which marked a 16% decline. These are being replaced by weekly increases in ELA by the ECB. In April alone, ECB hiked ELA by EUR5.6 billion.

Government is also running out of money. In first two weeks of May, Greece will need to refinance EUR2.8 billion of Treasury T-bills, repay EUR800 million on IMF loans. In June - EUR1.5 billion of IMF debt, EUR3.2 billion in T-bills. So there are big bills coming due.

Meanwhile, the Government is having difficulty paying pensions and public sector wages. The Government have already drained the local authorities funds, requiring their transfers to the Central Bank. Which provided somewhere between EUR1.6 and EUR1.9 billion in deposits. Not enough to cover May liabilities.

Beyond that: big redemptions are due in 2016: total of just over EUR5 billion, 2017 - over EUR6 billion, and 2019 - just under EUR11 billion. These are completely unfunded at this stage, as Greece needs to negotiate a new support package with the EU, IMF, and ECB - the so-called Institutions.

And things are still very trigger happy.

• "Panic descended in Athens on Thursday as Greece’s 2 million pensioners were hit with delays to their monthly state stipend. Pensioners raided their accounts and broke into a board meeting, according to reports."
• And quoting from the EUBusiness news linked above: "...the Greek government, ...insists it will not back down from 'red lines' on labour protection and wage cuts. A Greek government source on Thursday said Athens wanted a deal without austerity "crimes" against the Greek people. ...would not back down on labour issues, income cuts, the sale of state assets at whatever cost and a hike in VAT.""
• And the external environment remains also volatile. As Reuters described this scenario: "“We’re going bust.” “No, you’re not.” “You’re strangling us.” “No we’re not.” “You owe us for World War Two.” “We gave already.” The game of chicken between Greece and its international creditors is turning into a vicious blame game…" The problem, as anyone familiar with the game theory knows, that in the game of chicken, switching into unstable strategies may lead to a worse outcome if expected payoffs from non-cooperation (head-on-collusion) are raised. When you start publicly accusing the other side of being intentionally damaging and/or dishonest, you are getting the cost of stepping down from brinkmanship only much higher.

Three options are open:

• Structured write down of official sector debts : EFSF, ESM, and ECB. But not the IMF, leading to no Grexit and a path toward repaired economy;
• Hard default with resulting Grexit and massive mess across both the EU and Greece; and
• Kicking the can down the road once again by securing another bailout agreement to take Greece through 2015-2016. The problem here is that unless Greek economy starts a dramatic recovery, 2017-2020 will see renewed pressures of default and Grexit.

All in, the third option is currently the most likely one. Welcome to Europe's Groundhog Day, Season 8.

1/5/15: Three Strikes of the New Financial Regulation – Part 6: Banking Dis-Union

My latest post on the ongoing developments in financial regulation in the EU is now available on Learn Signal blog: http://blog.learnsignal.com/?p=177. This week, I am continuing coverage of the European Banking Union system.

1/5/15: Russian Economy: Latest Forecasts and Debates

Russian economy has been surprising to the upside in recent months, although that assessment is conditioned heavily by the fact that 'upside' really means lower rate (than expected) of economic decline and stabilised oil prices at above USD55 pb threshold. On the former front, 1Q 2015 decline in real GDP is now estimated at 2.2% y/y - well below -3% official forecast (reiterated as recently as on April 1) and -2.8% contraction forecast just last week, and -4.05% consensus forecast for FY 2015. It is worth noting that contraction in GDP did accelerate between February (-1.2% y/y) and March (-3.4% y/y). 2Q 2015 forecast remains at -3%.

In line with this, there have been some optimistic revisions to the official forecasts. Russian economy ministry has produced yet another (fourth in just two months) forecast with expected GDP decline of 2.8% this year. Crucially, even 2.8% decline forecast figure still assumes oil price of USD50 pb. Similarly, the Economy Ministry latest forecast for 2016 continues to assume oil at USD60 pb, but now estimates 2016 GDP growth at +2.3%

These are central estimates absent added stimulus. In recent weeks, Russian Government has been working on estimating possible impact of using up to 80% of the National Welfare Fund reserves to boost domestic infrastructure investment. This is expected to form the 3 year action plan to support economic growth that is expected to raise domestic investment to 22-24% of GDP by 2020 from current 18%. The objective is to push Russian growth toward 3.5-4% mark by 2018, while increasing reliance on private enterprise investment and entrepreneurship to drive this growth.

An in line with this (investment) objective, the CBR cut its key rate this week by 150bps to 12.5%. My expectation is that we will see rates at around 10%-10.5% before the end of 2015. From CBR's statement: "According to Bank of Russia estimates, as of 27 April, annual consumer price growth rate stood at 16.5%. High rates of annual inflation are conditioned primarily by short-term factors: ruble depreciation in late 2014 — January 2015 and external trade restrictions. Meanwhile, monthly consumer price growth is estimated to have declined on the average to 1.0% in March-April from 3.1% in January-February, and annual inflation tends to stabilise. Lower consumer demand amid contracting real income and ruble appreciation in the recent months curbed prices. Inflation expectations of the population decreased against this backdrop. Current monetary conditions also facilitate the slowdown in consumer price growth. Money supply (M2) growth rate remains low. Lending and deposit rates are adjusted downwards under the influence of previous Bank of Russia decisions to reduce the key rate. However, they remain high, on the one hand, contributing to attractiveness of ruble savings, and, on the other hand, alongside with tighter borrower and collateral requirements, resulting in lower annual lending growth."

There is an interesting discussion about the ongoing strengthening in Russian economic outlook here: https://fortune.com/2015/04/29/russia-economy-resilience/. Here's an interesting point: "Russian-born investment banker Ruben Vardanyan pointed out that the collapse of the ruble left much of the economy untouched, with roughly 90% of the population not inclined to buy imported goods. And that population, Vardanyan points out, has only increased its support for Vladimir Putin in the months following the imposition of sanctions." I am not so sure about 90% not inclined to buy imports, but one thing Vardanyan is right about is that imports substitution is growing and this has brought some good news for producers in the short run, whilst supporting the case for raising investment in the medium term.


Meanwhile, The Economist does a reality check on bullish view of the Russian economy: http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21650188-dont-mistake-stronger-rouble-russian-economic-recovery-worst-yet.

The Economist is right on some points, but, sadly, they miss a major one when they are talking about the pressures from USD100bn of external debt maturing in 2015.

Here is why.

Russia's public and private sector foreign debt that will mature in the rest of this year (see details here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/04/14415-russian-external-debt-redemptions.html) does not really amount to USD 100bn.

Foreign currency-denominated debt maturing in May-December 2015 amounts to USD68.8 billion and the balance to the USD100bn is Ruble-denominated debt which represents no significant challenge in funding. Of the USD68.8 billion of foreign exchange debt maturing, only USD2.01 billion is Government debt. Do note - USD611 million of this is old USSR-time debt.

Corporate liabilities maturing in May-December 2015 amounts to USD45.43 billion. Of which USD12.46 billion are liabilities to direct investors and can be easily rolled over. Some USD963 million of the remainder is various trade credits and leases. Also, should the crunch come back, extendable and cross-referenced. Which leaves USD32.07 billion of corporate debt redeemable. Some 20% of the total corporate debt is inter-company debt, which means that - roughly-speaking - the real corporate debt that will have to be rolled over or redeemed in the remaining months of 2015 is around USD26-27 billion. Add to this that Russian companies have been able to roll over debt in the markets recently and there is an ongoing mini-boom in Russian corporate debt and equity, and one can be pretty much certain that the overall net burden on foreign exchange reserves from maturing corporate debt is going to be manageable.

The balance of debt maturing in May-December 2015 involves banks liabilities. All are loans and deposits (except for demand deposits) including debt liabilities to direct investors and to direct investment enterprises. Which means that around 25-33% of the total banks liabilities USD26.57 billion maturing is cross-referenced to group-related debts and investor-related liabilities. Again, should a crunch come, these can be rolled over internally. The balance of USD19.9 billion will have to be funded.

So let's take in the panic USD100 billion of foreign debt claimed to be still maturing in 2015 and recognise that less than USD50 billion of that is likely to be a potential (and I stress, potential) drain on Russian foreign exchange reserves. All of a sudden, panicked references in the likes of The Economist become much less panicked.

Meanwhile, Russian economy continues to post current account surpluses, and as imports continue to shrink, Russian producers' margins are getting stronger just as their balance sheets get healthier (due to some debt redemptions). It's a tough process - deleveraging the economy against adverse headwinds - but it is hardly a calamity. And The Economist, were it to shed its usual anti-Russian biases, would know as much.

That said, significant risks remain, which means that a prudent view of the Russian economy should be somewhere between The Economist's scare crow and the Fortune's and the Economy Ministry's cheerleading. Shall we say to expect, on foot of current data and outlook, the 2015 GDP growth to come in at -3.5-4%, with 2016 economic growth to come in at +1.5-2%?

1/5/15: Irish Manufacturing PMI: April 2015

Irish Manufacturing PMI is out today for April (compiled by Markit, sponsored by Investec), posting another strong reading at 55.8,

As the chart above indicates, current 12mo average is at robust 56.1 and 3mo average is 56.7. In 3mo through January 2015, the indicator averaged 56.1, which suggests the latest 3mo performance was stronger then the previous one. 3mo average through April 2015 is well ahead of the same period average for 2014 (54.8) and 2013 (49.4). Overall, these are strong numbers, although much of the spectacular growth is probably accounted for by the fabled Contract Manufacturing schemes that are used by some MNCs to book value added for production taking else where into Ireland for tax purposes.

April reading continues the period - 20 months and counting - of continued readings that are statistically significantly above 50.0. However, momentum growth is weakening and remains static from around August 2014. Still, this is the second order derivative, with the overall rate of growth being signalled by the PMI remaining robust.

30/4/15: Consumer Confidence Boom in April... or Hopium by Pints

Ah, that slightly delirious Consumer Confidence data from Ireland keeps getting more and more delirious. April reading for the ESRI-compiled, KBC-sponsored, Consumer Confidence indicator was 98.7, up on 97.8 in March and the second highest reading since January 2005. The highest was in January 2015.

So now we have: on a 3mo average basis, 3 months through March, retail sales shrunk 0.2% in value terms and rose by 1.07% in volume terms. But in 3 months through April 2015 consumer confidence was up 5.7% (we have data lags here, so looking at latest data). And it gets worse: compared to January 1, 2015, retail sales by value are up 1.4%, down by 0.74% in volume, and consumer confidence is up 9.1%.

Hopium deliveries going strong nowadays...

29/4/15: China's Debt Pile is Frightening & Getting Worse

Just catching up on some interesting data on China, courtesy of @AmbroseEP, showing debt to GDP ratios for China's real economy:

Now, note that the comparatives are all advanced economies that can carry, normally, higher debt levels. Which makes China's 282% estimated total debt pile rather large.

The chart references as a source data presented in this (see scone chart) http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/03/5315-troika-tale-of-irish-debt.html but adjusted to reflect RBS estimates. which pushes McKinsey point for China horizontally to the levels close to Greece.

As someone else pointed out, nominal GDP growth in China is apparently now lower than interest on debt.

Meanwhile number of stock market accounts has gone exponential in recent days - using borrowed money (Chinese residents borrowed over Yuan 1 trillion or Euro150 billion worth of cash to pump into stock markets):

Economy is clearly slowing down in China, with conflicting reports and estimates of 1Q 2015 growth suggesting possible contraction in the real economy and domestic demand. (See http://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/china-equity-markets-boom-while-economic-growth-stutters-1.2182547).

At the top of debt chain are local authorities: latest official data shows borrowings by the local authorities were up by almost 50% since the start of H2 2013 to c. 16 trillion yuan. Local authorities debt growth accounts for a quarter of changes in overall domestic debt since 2008. Recently, the IMF warned China that the country overall economic debt is expanding at a faster pace than debt in Japan, South Korea and the U.S. grew before the onset of the Global Financial Crisis.

My view: when this pile of Chinese debt blows, things will get spectacularly ugly, globally.

29/4/15: Irish Retail Sales 1Q 2015

As I mentioned in a related post (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/04/28415-irish-retail-sales-march-2015.html), covering monthly data for Irish retail sales, last night, we can take a look at Q1 data comparatives for the sector based on 3mo averages for each corresponding quarter.

Here are the results y/y:

Good news is that overall only two sectors posted declines in Value of retail sales index in 1Q 2015 compared to 1Q 2014. These are both related to the decline in prices of fuel and wholesale prices declines for the Department Stores sales. All categories posted increases in volume of sales.

Large y/y increase in sales were recorded in 1Q 2015 in:

• Motor Trades: up 22.7% in volume and up 20.6% in value of sales
• 'Other sales': up 15.8% y/y in volume and up 6.8% in value
• Books, newspapers, stationery & other: up 13.8% y/y in volume and up 5.7% in value
• Household equipment: up 11.8% in volume and up 7.1% in value
• Electrical goods up 11.8% in volume and 6.1% in value

As the result of this, Non food, ex-motors, auto fuel & bars sales rose 8.3% in volume and were up 3.6% in value terms compared to 1Q 2014. Food posted weaker sales growth at 4.2% y/y in volume and 2.3% in value.

Note: Retail Sales Activity Index is a simple average of Value and Volume indices

As chart above shows, in broader categories terms,

• All Retail sales index of value of sales rose 6.1% y/y in 1Q 2015, while volume of sales index was up 9.9%. Strong showing driven heavily by the motor sales.
• Core retails sales (ex-motors) were up 1.3% y/y in value terms and up 5.2% in volume terms in 1Q 2015.
• Stripping out motors, automotive fuel and bars, retails sales rose 2.8% in value terms and were up 6.0% in volume terms. Again, strong showing over the quarter.

Chart below presents 1Q 2015 index reading against pre-crisis peak for 1Q period:

As the chart above clearly shows, the problem of weak retail sales, compared to pre-crisis levels, remains. Only three categories of sales have regained their pre-crisis peaks as of the end of 1Q 2015 in volume of sales terms. No category of sales has managed to regain pre-crisis peaks in value terms.

In discretionary spending categories terms, relating to normal consumption (stripping out auto fuel, food and motors), things remain under water in both volume of sales and value of sales terms. So things are getting better, but remain ugly in the sector.

The picture for 1Q 2015 is consistent with weak, but improving demand side in the economy.

This positive side of the National Accounts story is at risk, as it reflects deflationary environment where households are experiencing improved real incomes on stagnant wages and disposable nominal incomes. Any uptick in inflation can easily derail the recovery in the sector in terms of volumes of sales, if consumers start withdrawing their demand on foot of reduced opportunities for value shopping. Any uptick in inflation coupled with a rise in interest rates will present a double squeeze on consumer demand through reduced real incomes and reduced incomes available to fund consumption after housing and debt financing costs are taken into account.

28/4/15: Irish Retail Sales: March 2015

So the Spring Statement (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/04/28415-there-is-spring-there-was.html) put quite an emphasis on domestic demand growth, while the retail sales data published today is not exactly encouraging.

Stripping out motor sales, and focusing on core retail sales:

• Seasonally adjusted index for value of retail sales fell from 98.0 in February 2015 to 97.1 in March 2015. March reading is now the lowest  for 6 months and below the 3mo average (1Q 2015 average) of 97.7.
• Seasonally-adjusted index for volume of retail sales also fell from 107.6 in February to 106.6 in March, posting the lowest reading in 4 months.
• Meanwhile, Consumer Confidence indicator from the ESRI was up in March at 97.8 compared to February reading of 96.1.

Some more longer-range comparatives: in 4Q 2014, value index was up 0.2% compared to 3Q 2014, but in 1Q 2015 it was down 0.48% on 4Q 2014. In 4Q 2014, volume index was up 0.69% compared to 3Q 2014, but in 1Q 2015 it was down 0.25% on 4Q 2014. Again, as with monthly changes, 1Q 2015 3mo average for consumer confidence index was up 2.54% which is below 3.9% increase in the index for 4Q 2014 compared to 3Q 2014.

Looking at unadjusted series gives us year on year comparatives basis. So again, for core retail sales (ex-motors):

• Value of retail sales was up 2.34% y/y in March 2015, having previously posted a 0.77% rise in February. A large chunk (just around 1/3rd) of March 2015 increase was down to March 2014 y/y drop of 0.77%. But 2/3rds of March 2015 rise were due to organic growth. Which is good.
• Volume of retail sales rose robust 6.1% y/y in March 2015, having posted growth of 5.04% y/y in February.
• On 3mo average basis, 1Q 2015 value index is at 91.2 which is up 1.3% y/y - again, good news, as value index performance has been weak due to weak prices. Volume 1Q 2015 index was up 5.2% y/y. As usual, Consumer Confidence broke the back of both retail sales indicators, rising 15.1% in 12 months through 1Q 2015.

Summary: People are hopping mad with confidence, buying rather more stuff in volume, but only on foot of finding value in prices. This is not too boisterous, but on the net not too bad either. Monthly trends are a bit more concerning with declines in both March figures and 1Q 2015 averages.

I will look at sectoral comparatives in the next post.