Showing posts with label exports-led growth. Show all posts
Showing posts with label exports-led growth. Show all posts

Monday, February 16, 2015

16/2/15: Current Account, Growth and 'Exports-led Recovery': 1999-2014


There is one European economic policy/theory fetishism that stresses the importance of external balance in 'underpinning sustainable' growth. The theory works the following way: countries with external imbalances (e.g. current account deficits) need to enact 'reforms' that would put their economies onto a path of external surpluses. More commonly, this is known as achieving an 'exports-led recovery'.

Set aside the Cartesian logic suggesting that if someone runs a current account surplus, someone else must run a current account deficit. Or in other words, if someone achieves 'sustainable' growth, someone else must be running an 'unsustainable' one.

Look at the actual historical relationship between current account position and growth in income per capita, measured in real (inflation-adjusted terms).

Take the sample of all advanced economies (34 in total, excluding those that we do not have full data for: San Marino and Malta). Take total growth achieved in GDP per capita from the end of 1999 through 2014. And set this against the average current account surplus/deficit achieved over the same period of time.

Chart below illustrates:

Note: there is no point, given the sample size, to deal with non-linear relationship here.

Per chart above, there is, statistically-speaking no relationship between two metrics. Multi-annual growth GDP per capita (in real terms) has basically zero (+0.019) correlation with multi-annual average current account balance. The coefficient of determination is a miserly 0.00036.

Now, cut off the 'outliers' - four countries with lowest GDP per capita: Estonia, Latvia, Slovak Republic and Slovenia. Chart below shows new relationship:


Per chart above, there is a very tenuous relationship between multi-annual growth GDP per capita (in real terms) and multi-annual average current account balance, highlighted by a rather weak, but positive correlation of +0.41 between two metrics. The coefficient of determination is around 0.17, which is relatively low for the longer-term averages relationship across the periods that capture both - a slowdown in growth in the 2002, a boom-time performance for both the advanced economies and the global economy during the 2000s and the global crises since 2008.

I tested the same relationship for GDP per capita adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity and the results were exactly identical. Furthermore, removing the three Asia-Pacific growth centres: Taiwan, Korea and Singapore from the sample leads to a complete breakdown of the stronger relationship attained by excluding the Eastern European outliers, with coefficient of determination falling to ca 0.05. Removing these three economies from the sample with Eastern European outliers present results in a negative (but statistically insignificant) relationship between the current account dynamics and growth.

Lastly, it is worth noting that the sample is most likely biased due to policy direction: during economic slowdowns and in poorer performing European economies in general, there is a strong policy bias to actively pursue exports-led growth strategies, while in non-euro area economies this is further reinforced by the pressure to devalue domestic currencies. Which, of course, suggests that the above correlation links are over-stating the true extent of the current account links to growth.

The conclusion from this exercise is simple: there is only a weak evidence to support the idea that for highly advanced economies, rebalancing their economic growth over the longer term toward persistent current account surpluses is associated with sustainable economic growth. And if we are to consider a simple fact that many euro area 'peripheral' economies (e.g. Greece, Cyprus, Portugal and Spain, as well as Slovenia) require higher upfront investments in physical and human capital to deliver future growth, the proposition of desirability of an 'exports-led' recovery model comes into serious questioning.

Thursday, January 23, 2014

23/1/2014: Remember that 'upbeat' IMF Growth Outlook?..


A quick note on the IMF update to the World Economic Outlook, released earlier this week. Here are some charts showing core forecasts progressions for growth and other global economy's performance metrics, with brief comments from myself.

The core point in the below is where does one exactly find the 'good news' relating to the IMF upgrading growth conditions expectations? The answer is that, contrary to media reports, the upgrades evaporate when once compares January 2013 forecasts against January 2014 ones, although there are some improvements in comparative for October 2013 against January 2014 forecasts. Materially, however, the upgrades are minor.

First for Advanced Economies:


The above chart shows evolution of real GDP growth for 2013 from the most recent forecast (January 2013) to the latest estimate (January 2014). The notable feature of this is the deterioration in underlying economic conditions over 2013, with forecast from January 2013 overestimating expected outrun for Global Economy growth and for all major advanced economies, save Spain, Japan and the UK. In case of Spain, forecast and outrun differ in terms of shallower expected decline in real GDP now expected for Spanish economy, compared to January 2013 forecast. In the case of Japan and the UK, the difference in higher estimated growth rates compared to forecast.

Moving on to 2014 forecasts for real GDP growth:


Much has been said in the media on foot of the IMF upgrade of its forecasts for global growth for 2014. This analysis is solely based on the comparing IMF outlook published in October 2013 against the forecast published this month. However, looking at January 2013 forecast against January 2014 forecast shows that the IMF outlook for the global economy has deteriorated since a year ago, from 2014 real GDP growth forecast of 4.1% to 3.7%. The same applies to all major advanced economies, save Germany, Italy, Japan and the UK.

Another important note here is that in the case of Italy and Germany, the difference between January 2013 and January 2014 forecasts is well within the margin of error. And that for the Advanced Economies as a whole, the forecast between two dates has not moved at all.

Thus, overall, the news analysis of 'greater optimism' from the IMF with respect to growth is really unwarranted - there is very little significant change to the upside in the IMF latest outlook.

Things are a little better for 2015 outlook:


However, we only have two points for comparing these forecasts: October 2013 and January 2014, so the above analysis (12 months span between forecasts) is not really available. Nonetheless, there is a significant marking up of global growth expectations between two forecast dates (from 2.9% to 3.9%), and  small downgrade in Advanced Economies growth forecast from 2.5% to 2.3%.

In addition, only Spain and the UK received a significant (statistically) growth upgrade, with the Euro area, Germany and Italy upgrades being within the margin of error.

The matters are actually far worse for the Emerging and Developing economies. 2014 forecasts are shown below:


With exception of Sub-Saharan Africa, all other major emerging and developing economies and regions have been downgraded in January 2014 forecast compared to January 2013 forecast.

When it comes to 2015 forecasts: there are more upgrades to growth forecasts:

But none - save for Developing Asia, China and MENA - are within statistically meaningful range.


The really devastating - the thesis of 'improved IMF outlook' - evidence comes from looking at the IMF forecast for Global Growth (controlling for FX rates):


Summary of the above chart is simple and ugly:
  • Lower growth estimates for 2013
  • Lower growth forecast in 2014, compared to the forecast published a year ago
  • Lower growth forecast in 2015

And now, recall the 'salvation by trade' argument for Europe and Ireland? The 'exports-led recovery' story? Here are IMF latest forecasts for global trade volumes growth, and for imports by the advanced economies (AE) and emerging and developing markets (EM & developing):



Summary of the above chart is also simple and ugly:
  • Lower trade growth in 2014 and 2015
  • Lower imports growth in Advanced Economies in 2014 and 2015
  • Lower imports growth in EMs in 2014 and 2015
So basic question is: Who will be buying all the exports that are supposed to grow across all European states?.. Martians?

Tuesday, July 2, 2013

2/7/2013: Sunday Times June 23, 2013: G8 and Ireland


This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from June 23, 2013


As G8 summits go, the latest one turned out to be as predictable as its predecessors – an event full of reaffirmations of well-known conflicts and pre-announced news. In terms of the former, the Lough Erne meeting delivered some fireworks on Syria. On the latter, there was a re-announcement of the previously widely publicized Free Trade pact between the US and Europe. Another pre-announced item involved the EU, UK and US push for corporate tax reforms.

The two economic themes of the Logh Erne Summit agenda are tied at the hip in the case of our small open economy heavily reliant on FDI attracted here by the opportunities for tax arbitrage. As such, the G8 meeting agreement poses a significant threat for Ireland's model of economic development. Although it will take five to ten years for the shock waves to be felt in Dublin, make no mistake, the winds of uncomfortable change are rising.


The trade agreement, first announced by the Taoiseach months before the G8 summit, promises to deliver some EUR120 billion in net benefits for the EU economy. Roughly 90% of these are expected to go to the Big 5 economies of the EU, leaving little for the smaller economies to compete over. Behind these net gains there are also some regional re-allocations of trade that will take place within the EU itself.

In the short term, Ireland is well-positioned to see an increase in exports by the US multinationals operating from here and to some domestic exporters. The uplift in trade flows between Europe and the US may even help attracting new, smaller and more opportunistic US firms' investments. While tens of billions in trade for Ireland, bandied around by various Irish ministers, are unlikely to materialize, a small boost will probably take place.

However, over time, the impact of the EU-US trade and investment liberalisation can lead to sizeable reductions in MNCs activity here. Under the free trade arrangements, longer-term investment and production decisions will be based on such factors as cost considerations, as well as concerns relating to access to the global markets, and taxes.


Consider these three drivers for future trade and economic activity in Ireland in the context of the G8 summit and other recent news.

On the cost competitiveness side, we have had some gains in terms of official metrics of labour productivity and unit labour costs. Major share of these gains came from destruction of less productive jobs in construction and domestic services. Increase in revenues transferred via Ireland by some services exporters since 2004-2007 period further contributed to improved competitiveness figures.

Once when we control for these temporary or tax-linked 'gains' Ireland is still a high cost destination for investors compared to the majority of our peers.  As reflected in Purchasing Managers Indices, since the beginning of the crisis, Irish producers of goods and services have faced rampant cost inflation when it comes to prices of inputs. Earnings and wages data for 2009-2012, released this week, show labour costs rising across the exports-oriented sectors. Lack of new capital, R&D and technological investments further underlines the fact that much of our productivity gains are related to jobs destruction and transfer pricing by the MNCs.

When the tariffs and other barriers to EU-US trade come down, some multinationals trading into Europe will have fewer incentives to locate their production in Ireland. This effect is likely to be felt stronger for those MNCs which trade increasingly outside the EU, focusing more on growth opportunities around the world. Based on experiences with other free trade areas, such as NAFTA and the EU, this can lead to increased on-shoring of FDI back into the US and into core European states, away from smaller economies that pre-trade liberalization acted as entrepots to Europe.


The tax dimension of the G8 agreement will be the most significant driver for change in years to come.

The G8 clearly outlined the reasons for urgency in dealing with the issues of both tax evasion (something that does not apply in Ireland's case) and tax avoidance (something that does have a direct impact on us). These are structural and will not dissipate even when the G8 economies recover.

All of the G8 economies are struggling with heavy public and private debt loads and/or high domestic taxation levels. All are stuck in a demographic, social security and pensions costs whirlpools pulling them into structural insolvency. In other words, not a single G8 nation can afford to lose corporate revenues to various tax havens.

In line with the longer-term nature of the drivers for tax reforms, G8-proposed agenda can also be seen in the context of quick, easier to implement changes and longer-term structural realignment of tax systems.

The first wave of tax reforms outlined in principle by the G8 Summit will focus on tightening some of the more egregious loopholes, usually involving officially recognised tax havens. On the European side, this will spell trouble for the likes of Gurnsey and Jersey. The first round will also target easy-to-spot idiosyncratic tax arrangements, such as the Double Irish scheme and similar structures in Holland. Shutting down Double Irish will impact around a quarter of our trade in services, or roughly EUR13-15 billion worth of exports – much more than the EU-US Free Trade Agreement promises to unlock. The cut can be quick, as much of this trade involves electronic transactions - easy to shift and costless to re-domicile.

Over time, as changes in tax systems bite deeper into the structure of European tax regimes, losses of exports and FDI are likely to mount. To raise substantive new tax revenues, the EU members of G8 will have to severely cut back tax advantages accorded to countries like Ireland by their competitive tax rates.

Free Trade zones are notorious for amplifying the role of comparative advantage in determining where companies choose to domicile. Thus, to achieve a level the playing field for trade-related investments within the EU, either the effective tax rates will have to be brought much closer to parity across the block, or the basis for taxation must be redistributed more evenly across producers and consumers of goods and services.

Forcing all EU countries to harmonise the rates of tax would be politically difficult. Instead, there is a ready-to-use solution to the problem of redistributing tax revenues available since 2009 - the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB).

Under this mechanism companies selling goods and services from Ireland into European markets will report separate profits by each country of sales. These profits will then be reassigned back to the countries where each company has operations on the basis of a complex formula taking into the account company sales, employment levels and capital structure on the ground. The re-allocated profits will then be subject to a national tax rate. The end game from the CCCTB for Ireland will be effective end to the transfer pricing that goes along with the current system.

The EU Commission analysis claimed that with full cooperation, the enhanced CCCTB implementation will lead to an 8% rise in tax revenues across the EU. The main beneficiaries of these gains will be the Big 5 member states. The total net impact of CCCTB on all EU member states is expected to be nearly zero.

This suggests some sizeable reallocations of economic activity and tax revenues away from the smaller member states, like Ireland, in favour of the larger member states. January 2011, study by Ernst & Young for the Department of Finance concluded that Ireland can sustain one of the largest drops in tax revenues in the euro area due to CCCTB implementation. The estimates range up to 5.7% Government revenue decline, with our effective corporate tax rate rising to 23%, GDP falling by 1.6%-1.8%, and employment declining by 1.5%-1.6%.

The Ernst & Young report was compiled based using data for 2005. Since then, Irish economy's reliance on services exports grew from EUR 49.5 billion or under 31% of GDP to EUR90.7 billion or close to 56% of GDP. With services exports being a prime example of a tax-sensitive sector in the economy, we can safely assume that the above estimates of the adverse impact of CCCTB on Irish economy are conservative.

The CCCTB matches nearly perfectly the G8 Action plans relating to the issues of tax avoidance. It also fits the objectives of the OECD plan on addressing taxation base erosion and profit shifting which the OECD is preparing for the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of the G20 in July.

While much of the impact of this week's G8 summit remains the matter for the future, there is no doubt that the G8 push toward curtailing aggressively competitive tax regimes is real.  In my view, Ireland has, approximately between five and ten years before our competitive advantage is severely eroded by the EU and the US efforts to coordinate the effective rates of taxation and consolidate reporting and payment bases for corporate profits. We must use these years wisely to build up our technological capabilities and develop a skills-based high-value added and highly competitive economy.



Box-out:

The latest data on the duration of working life (a measure of the number of years a person aged 15 is expected to be active in the labour market over their lifetime) shows that in 2000-2002, on average, European workers spent 32.9 years in employment or searching for jobs. This number rose to 34.7 years by 2011. In Ireland, the same increase in duration of working life took Irish workers from spending on average 33.3 years in labour market activities in 2000-2002 to 34.0 years in 2011. The increase in years worked in the case of Ireland was the third lowest in the euro area. In 2011, duration of working life ranged between 39.1 and 44.4 years in the Nordic countries and Switzerland – countries with much more sustainable pensions costs paths than Ireland. The significance of this is that given our pensions, housing and investment crises, Irish workers can look forward to spending some four-to-five years more working to fund their future retirement. Aside from a dramatic greying of our working population this means that even after the economic recovery takes hold, there might be no jobs for today's younger unemployed, as the older generations hold onto their careers for longer.

Sunday, April 21, 2013

21/4/2014: Exports-led recovery? Not that promising so far...

Regular readers of this blog know that since the beginning of the crisis, I have been sceptical about the Government-pushed proposition that exports led recovery can be sufficient to lift Ireland out of the current crises-induced stagnation.

Over the recent years I have put forward a number of arguments as to why this proposition is faulty, including:

  1. A weakening link between our GDP, GNP and national income,
  2. A worrisome demographic trend that is structurally leading to lower labour markets participation, alongside the renewed emigration,
  3. Structural weaknesses in the economy left ravaged by some 15 years if not more of bubbles-driven growth,
  4. Taxation and state policy structures that favor old modes of economic development and which are incompatible with high value-added entrepreneurship, employment creation and growth, 
  5. Substitution away from more real economy-linked goods exports in favor of the superficially inflated exports of services in the ICT and international financial services sectors, etc
But the dynamics of our exports are also not encouraging. 

Here's a summary of some trends in Irish exports since 1930s, all expressed in relation to nominal value of merchandise trade (omitting effects of inflation). Based on 5-year cumulative trade volumes (summing up annual trade volumes over 5 year periods):
  • Irish exports grew 147.8% in 1980-1984 and 86.7% in 1985-1989 - during the 1980s recession. This did not lift Irish economy out of the crisis, then.
  • Irish exports grew 56.3% in 1990-1994 period and 56.4% in 1995-1999 period. Thus, slower  rate of growth in exports during the 1990s than in the 1980s accompanied growth in the 1990s. This hardly presents a strong case for an 'exports-led recovery'.
  • Irish exports expanded cumulatively 148.0% in 2000-2004, before shrinking by 0.4% in 2005-2009 period and is expected to grow at 4.6% cumulatively in 2010-2014 (using 2010-2012 data available to project trend to 2014). 
The last point above presents a problem for the Government thesis on exports-led recovery: the rates of growth in merchandise exports currently expected to prevail over 2010-2014 period are nowhere near either the 1980s crisis-period rates of growth or 1990s Celtic Tiger period rates of growth.

Ok, but what about trade surplus? Recall, trade surplus feeds directly into current account which, some believe almost religious, is the only thing that matters in determining the economy's ability to recover from debt-linked crises. Again, here are the facts:
  • During the 1980-1984 Ireland run trade deficit that on a cumulative basis amounted to EUR5,969mln. This gave way to a cumulated surplus of EUR8,938mln in 1985-1989 period. So attaining a relatively strong trade surplus did not lift Irish economy from the crisis of the 1980s.
  • In Celtic Tiger era, during 1990-1994 period, cumulated surpluses rose at a robust rate of 155.7% on previous 5 year period, and this increase was followed by a further improvement of 113.9% in 1995-1999 period. 
  • During Celtic Garfield stage, in 2000-2004 period Irish trade surplus increased by a cumulative 245.4%. However, in 2005-2009 period trade surplus shrunk 10.9% cumulatively on previous 5 years. Based on data through 2012, projected cumulated growth in trade surplus (recall, this is merchandise trade only) grew by 43.6%.
Again, trade surplus growth is strong, currently, but it is nowhere near being as strong as in the 1990s. Worse, current rate of growth in trade surplus is well below the rate of growth attained in the 1980s.

Charts to illustrate:


Oh, and do note in the above chart the inverse relationship between the ratio of merchandise exports to imports (that kept rising during the Celtic Tiger and Garfield periods as per trend) and the downward trend in exports growth. 

Monday, March 26, 2012

26/3/2012: QNA Q4 2011 - Part 6

In the first post on QNA results for 2011 I covered data for annual GDP and GNP in constant prices terms. The second post focused on GDP/GNP gap and the cost of the ongoing Great Recession on the potential GDP and GNP. The third post focused on quarterly sectoral decomposition of GDP and GNP in constant prices terms. And a short digression from QNA results here showed how difficult it is, really, to reach any consensus on some of Ireland's economic performance parameters. Following these, Part 4 of QNA analysis focused on nominal (current prices) quarterly data. Part 5 of the analysis focused on decline in capital investment in Ireland during the crisis.

In this, last, post onQNA results for 2011, I will focus on the idea of the 'exports-led' recovery.



We are all familiar with the thesis that exports will drive this economy out of the recession. This has been the leitmotif of the Irish Governments since 2008 and it remains to be the core conjecture still. And there are some reasonable logical grounds for believing this proposition:

  • In real terms, Irish exports of goods and services have posted a spectacular run up since the beginning of the Crisis, rising from €142.03bn in 2006 to €161.47bn in 2011. Year on year exports grew 4.11% in 2011 and that follows on 6.31% growth in 2010.Compared to 2007 total exports in constatant prices terms stood at €7,491mln higher (an uplift of 4.86%). This increase can be broken into €4,987 million uplift in exports of services and €2,504 mln uplift in exports of goods.
  • Adding to the strength of exports impact on GDP and GNP, imports collapsed. Total imports fell to €123.45bn in 2011, down 0.7% yoy after rising 2.7% in 2010. Imports of goods and services are now down 10.23% on 2007 levels - a saving, in terms of national accounts - of €14,075mln on 2007 (broken down to a reduction in goods imports of €19,623mln and increase of €5,549mln in services imports).
  • Trade balance has been going from strength to strength on the back of divergent swings in exports and imports. In 2011 our trade balance was €38,027mln in real terms (composed of €41,671mln surplus on goods side and a deficit of €3,644mln on services side). This is more than three times the trade surplus achieved in 2006 and is 131% ahead of the 2007 levels of trade surplus. Compared to 2007, our trade surplus is now €21,566 mln higher (composed of an increase in trade surplus on goods side of €22,127mln and a deterioration in trade deficit on services side of €562mln).
Alas, of course, as noted in the previous posts, much of these surpluses and exports are due to transfer pricing and outflows of factor payments to the rest of the world have been rampant. Net factor income (in constant prices terms) outflows to the rest of the world from Ireland have reached €33,824mln in 2011, up 18.62% on 2007 levels.

In reality, of course, whatever one says about trade performance, international trade, once we net out imports of intermediate inputs into exports production and transfers abroad as a payment of profits by the multinationals, is by far not as huge as the Government would love to claim. And international trade-supported employment is also relatively small. Pair that with the fact that our economy had experienced a massive collapse of domestic activity and you get the picture: there will be no recovery from the crisis unless domestic economy regains growth momentum.

But here's a more worrisome picture, folks:


It turns out that there is zero statistical relationship between levels of exports and GDP and GNP growth, while there is (as a check on data) strong relationship between exports and imports. More worryingly: higher exports are associated with lower GDP and GNP (albeit there is no, as I said, statistical significance).

How can that be, you ask? Simples: if you think of it, higher exports are delivered primarily by the MNCs operating in Ireland. And during the crisis this delivery has been associated with:
  • Virtually no net jobs creation and falling earnings (IDA brags about the latter as a 'positive' sign of improved competitiveness) - which means that employment & personal spending & household investment effects of record exports is negligible (if not negative)
  • Virtually no new investment (or at least not enough new FDI to offset massive collapse in investment described in the previous post) - which means that gross fixed capital formation part of GDP and GNP is out as well
  • Massive profits repatriation and transfer pricing - which means that Irish economy has only a tiny (less than corporate tax rate-sized) claim on these record exports (corporate tax revenues are not booming, are they?)
Where would the huge links between economic well-being and exports, required to compensate for steep declines in domestic spending and investment activities, come from, then?

Now, don't take me wrong - exports do provide huge support for our economy and real benefits and jobs. I wrote about this time and again. But these are not nearly enough to keep this economy afloat. What Ireland needs to get out of this mess are - very broadly speaking - two sets of outcomes:
  1. Most important short-term - restoration of domestic economic activity (especially starting with domestic investment)
  2. Most important longer-term - diversification of our exports base away from the MNCs toward domestic exporters.
In both - Irish policies are currently failing us and record-busting exports as we know them today are not providing the rescue vehicle we require.

Friday, December 16, 2011

16/12/2011: QNA for Q3 2011: 'exports-led recovery' myth

In the first post on Q3 Quarterly National Accounts, we looked at the data on real rates of growth in the Irish economy based on sectoral decomposition (linked here). Now, let's take a look at the expenditure-based data. Please keep in mind - Q3 2011 was the record-busting quarter in terms of exports growth for Ireland, with the latest data pointing to falling growth rates in Irish external trade for Q4 2011 (see here). In addition, keep in mind that unlike the DofF that projects Irish GDP growth to be 1.3-1.6% in 2012, most of the euro zone is factoring in contractions for H1 2012 (see details here).

So down to data now.

In nominal terms,

  • Personal consumption continued its precipitous fall in Q3 2011, declining €291mln (-1.4%) qoq and €283mln (-1.4%) yoy. Relative to Q3 2007, personal consumption is now down €3,085mln or 13.3%.
  • Net expenditure by central and local government, is down €61mln (-1.0%) qoq and €110mln (-1.7%) yoy. Compared to Q3 2007, net government spending is down 12.1% or €869mln.
  • Exports of goods and services are up €373mln (+0.9%) qoq and €1,025mln (+2.5%) yoy. Exports are also up on Q3 2007 by some €3,849mln (+10.2%)
  • Imports of goods and services are down €192mln (-0.6%) qoq but up €1,033mln (+3.3%) yoy.
Thus, GDP at current market prices is now down €703mln qoq in Q3 2011 (-1.8%) and down €1,011mln (-2.5%) yoy. Compared to Q3 2007, GDP is down €7,030mln (-15.4%) in current market prices.

In current market prices, value of profits expatriated abroad net of profits inflowing from abroad has risen €189mln (+2.4%) qoq and is up €1,076mln (+15.5%) yoy.

As the result, GNP is now down €612mln (-1.9%) qoq and down €2,063mln (-6.3%) yoy. GNP in current market prices is down €9,092mln or 22.8% on Q3 2007.

Personal consumption in nominal terms now stands close to the level of Q3-Q4 2005. Fixed capital formation is at the level roughly 1/3 of the Q1 2005.

Things are pretty dire in constant market prices terms as well:

  • Personal consumption fell €182mln (-0.9%) qoq and €822mln (-3.9%) yoy. Relative to Q3 2007, personal consumption is now down €2,744mln or 12.1%.
  • Net expenditure by central and local government, is down €88mln (-1.4%) qoq and €259mln (-3.9%) yoy. Compared to Q3 2007, net government spending is down 13.9% or €1,035mln.
  • Gross domestic capital formation also continued falling in Q3 2011, with qoq decline of €1,234mln (-27.1%) and yoy fall of €955mln (-22.2%). Relative to pre-crisis level in Q3 2007, Q3 2011 investment in this economy came in at €5,754mln less (a decline of 63.2%).
  • Value of stocks of goods and services has contracted €173mln in Q3 2011 qoq (-26.7%). 
  • Exports of goods and services are up €786mln (-1.9%) qoq and €947mln (+2.4%) yoy. Exports are also up on Q3 2007 by some €2,650mln (+7.0%)
  • Imports of goods and services are down €1,865mln (+5.9%) qoq but up €997mln (+3.3%) yoy.

GDP at constant market prices is now down €836mln qoq in Q3 2011 (-2.0%) and down €57mln (-0.1%) yoy. Compared to Q3 2007, GDP is down €3,318mln (-7.6%) in constant market prices.

Value of profits expatriated abroad net of profits inflowing from abroad has fallen €262mln (-3.1%) qoq but is up €1,347mln (+19.8%) yoy.

As the result, real GNP is now down €574mln (-1.8%) qoq and down €1,404mln (-4.2%) yoy. GNP in current market prices is down €5,398mln or 14.4% on Q3 2007.

So once again, that 'exports-led recovery' is, predictably not enough to keep economy above the waterline. And this is the case for Q3 2011, when "net exports (exports minus imports) grew by
21.8% at constant 2009 prices compared with the same quarter of last year." Record growth in exports before the slowdown hit in Q4 2011, and still recession in the overall economy.

16/12/2011: QNA for Q3 2011 - that R-thing again


Initial estimates for Q3 2011 released by CSO today show that seasonally adjusted, GDP fell 1.9% qoq  and GNP declined 2.2% qoq. Year on year, GDP is down 0.1% and GNP is down a whopping 4.2%.

In constant prices terms, real GDP fell €836mln qoq in Q3 2011 (-2.0%) and €57mln yoy (-0.1%). Relative to the peak in 2007, real GDP is now down €3,318mln or -7.6%. In constant prices terms, real GNP is now down €574mln (-1.8%) qoq and €1,404mln (-4.2%) yoy. Compared to peak 2007, GNP is down €5,398mln (-14.4%).



Output in Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing has fallen (in constant market prices and seasonally adjusted) €348mln (-30.2%) qoq, but is up 15% or €105mln in yoy terms. Relative to pre-crisis 2007 levels, sector output is up €104mln (+14.8%).

Industrial production declined €1,036mln (-8.7%) qoq and is up €419mln (+4%) yoy, while registering an increase of €227mln (+2.1%) on Q3 2007. These figures combine booming exporting sectors and collapsing building and construction sector. In building & construction, output grew €16mln (+1.9%) qoq, but is down €224mln (-20.4%) yoy and is down €1,423mln (-62%) on Q3 2007.

Distribution, transport & communications sector - a brighter spot last quarter, shrunk €129mln (-2.4%) qoq and is down €¡37mln (-2.6%) yoy. Compared to Q3 2007, the sector is down €1,064mln (-17.1%).

Other services, including rent are up €225mln (+1.3%) qoq, but down €531mln (-3.0%) yoy. The sector is down €1,889mln (-10%) on Q3 2007.

Chart below shows annualized returns by sector using data for the 11 months through November 2011 annualized using historical trends:

And the chart below shows in more detail the plight of Building & Construction sector:


Overall forecast for real GDP and GNP for 2011 based on data through November 2011 is not encouraging:
In the chart above, analysis of the latests data and historical trends suggests that 2011 GDP can come in at 0.7% growth rate, with GNP declining by -0.7% at the same time.

Net factor income from abroad - aka MNCs profits expatriations - declined in Q3 2011 to €8,136mln - or €262mln less than in Q2 2011. MNC's profits expatriation is now running €1,347mln ahead of Q3 2010 and €2,197mln ahead of Q3 2007 as record exports are fueling transfer pricing. So that 'exports-led recovery' thing... oh, it's dead in the water, folks. As predicted, record exports are not enough to sustain the entire economy. But more on this in a follow up post with detailed analysis of expenditure-based QNA.

Friday, November 4, 2011

04/11/2011: October PMIs - risk of recession rising

Continuing with the analysis of the latest PMI figures for October 2011 for Ireland, this post is looking into the relationship between employment, PMIs and exports-led recovery both over historical horizon and the latest performance. The previous two posts dealt with detailed data on Manufacturing (here) and Services (here).

Manufacturing PMI posted a rise from 47.3 to 50.1 between September 2011 and October 2011, moving above 50 reading for the first time in 5 months. However, as explained in previous post this increase does not signal expansion, as 50.1 is statistically insignificant relative to 50. At the same time, employment sub-index for Manufacturing PMI remains in contraction at 47.1 (statistically significantly below 50) for the second month in a row.

Services PMI posted a slight improvement in the rate of growth at 51.5 in October, up from 51.3 in September, but once again, given the volatility in the series, these readings are not statistically different from 50 (no growth) mark. Meanwhile, Employment sub-index of Services PMI remains below water at 46 - same reading for both October and September.

Charts below show two core trends:



The trends are:
  • Both manufacturing and Services PMIs are flatlining around 50 mark, signaling stagnation
  • Both in Manufacturing and Services, there are no signs of easing in jobs destruction

Consistent with these trends, overall Services sector has moved from the position of relative jobless recovery signalled at the beginning of 2011 to border-line recession and jobs destruction in October. Manufacturing sector has moved from the optimal growth area (jobs creation and recovery) in the beginning of 2011 to a recession in October 2011.

In addition to weaknesses in employment and overall PMIs, October figures show deterioration in exports growth, with Manufacturing New Export Orders sub-index at 49.8 and below 50 for the second month in a row (note that 49.8 is statistically not significant compared to 50) and Services New Export Business sub-index at 50.1 (down from 53.1 in September). Both sub-indices show stagnant exports performance in the sectors. Chart below shows that we are now in a recession (albeit border-line) - vis-a-vis exports-led recovery in Manufacturing and are getting close to a recession in Services.