Showing posts with label Irish current account. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Irish current account. Show all posts

Friday, June 13, 2014

13/6/2014: January-April Trade in Goods: Ireland


Some quick stats on trade in goods data out today:

First up: aggregates:


Core points:

  1. Aggregate exports are down once again in 2014: off 1.8% for the period January-April
  2. Much of this is down to pharma and organic chemicals, but declines overall were registered in 4 out of 9 categories, while four categories posted increases in exports.
  3. Trade surplus declined again, this time by 11.1%. Trade surplus dropped y/y in 6 out of 9 categories.
  4. Trade surplus dropped by a total of EUR1.357 billion, while exports declined by EUR527 million.
  5. The summary of sectoral contributions is provided below




    Geographic breakdown of changes in exports and trade surplus is provided in the table below:


    The above shows geographically wide-ranging declines in exports and trade surplus.

    Sunday, May 4, 2014

    4/5/2014: Ireland's Fabled External Balance Performance: 1990-2013


    Ireland's external balance performance has always been a major point for departure in analysis of our economic growth, sustainability of our debt and overall consideration of our economic infrastructure quality. As a Small Open economy, Ireland is trade-intensive. As an MNCs-led economy, Ireland is even more trade-dependent, in so far as we need larger external surplus to deliver same jobs creation as other European economies with smaller MNCs-induced GDP/GNP gap.

    Since the start of the crisis, Irish current account performance was invariably brought forward as evidence of significant improvements in the underlying economy's competitiveness. And our gains were pretty strong - judging by this metric:
    • In the 1990s, Ireland averaged current account surpluses of 1.85% of GDP annually
    • In the 20002, we run current account deficits averaging -2.29% GDP per annnum
    • Since 2010 through 2013 we have been running current account surpluses averaging 3.35% per annum
    • The swing - from the deficit to surplus is 5.43% of GDP for Ireland - seemingly strong stuff.


    The question is, of course, are the above numbers really strong, as in exceptionally strong or very strong as judged by comparison with other similar economies?

    Let's consider EEA24 - 24 advanced economies of EEA community (excluding those economies of EEA that are not making it into 'advanced economies' club).
    • In 1990-1999 Ireland's performance was strong in terms of the current account, but it was not exceptions - we ranked 5th in the EEA24 in the size of average current account surplus, behind Belgium (4.67% of GDP), Luxembourg (10.52% of GDP), the Netherlands (4.16% of GDP), and Switzerland (6.93% of GDP).
    • In 2000-2009 we ranked 14th (no need to list the countries we were behind in this metric during this period - we were doing badly).
    • In 2010-2013 we ranked 7th - behind Denmark (6.09%), Germany (7.05%), Luxembourg (6.91%), the Netherlands (9.17%), Sweden (6.08%) and Switzerland (10.74%).

    Here's a chart illustrating this performance - for legibility, I only left in the chart Small Open Economies.



    But what about the overall period of the crisis, you might ask? 

    Instead of decades-averages, let's take a look at the average current account balances over 2008-2013 period. Here we rank 8th in the EEA24 with our current account surplus averaging 5.4% of GDP.


    The key point here is that Ireland's current account performance has been strong, but it has not been exceptional. Certainly not exceptional given the need of this economy for deleveraging (and associated requirement for higher current account surpluses). 

    The good news is that at 5.4% of GDP, our current account surpluses since 2008 are above those in the deleveraging period of 1992-1997 when these averaged 3.13% of GDP.

    The bad news is that we are still to undo the aggressive current account leveraging accumulated during the 2000s. In the decade of 2000s, Ireland's cumulated current account deficit amounted to USD52.42 billion. During the 1990s our cumulated surplus was USD12.49billion and in 2010-2013 our cumulated surplus was USD28.88 billion. In other words, from 1990 through 2013 we are still in a deficit of USD11.04 billion and if we take 2000 as the starting point, our cumulated deficit is USD23.54 billion.

    For comparison, Switzerland's cumulated 2000-2013 surplus is USD644.86 billion, Sweden's USD377.99 billion, Denmark's 149.18 billion. 

    In fact, non-euro EEA24 members are in a vastly stronger current account position than their euro area counterparts, but that is probably a matter best covered separately, although it does probably explain why euro area needs ESM and other means for borrowing externally.

    Lastly, however, let's come back to that 'swing' in our current account from deficits in the 2000s to surplus in 2010-2013. Remember, the swing was a sizeable 5.64% of GDP. But it only ranks us as 5th economy in the EEA24 in terms of the magnitude of improvement in our competitiveness. Not exactly an 'exceptional case' either.

    Tuesday, April 22, 2014

    22/4/2014: On Irish Taxes, Quangos, Trade and other recent links


    Some interesting links from recent media reports:


    1. Apparently, completely unpredictably, unexpectedly, shockingly abruptly etc etc etc... but Ireland-based MNCs are allegedly concerned with the OECD (aka G7-G20 prompted, EU-supported) efforts to reforms international tax systems to close off the more egregious loopholes in corporate taxation: http://www.independent.ie/business/world/major-companies-concerned-over-oecds-plans-for-global-tax-reform-30202748.html Now, with the IBEC, DofF, and everyone else in irish Officialdom repeatedly declaring that our tax regime is above the water and thus not in the firing line, one must wonder just why are these companies concerned with the OECD moves?
    2. On a related note, I just posted a new paper I wrote for the Cayman Financial Review on the above topic - see link here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2427359
    3. Unrelated to taxation issues, but related to fiscal policies of the Irish state, a note from the Irish Times on Government's heroic struggle with one electoral objective they set before 2011 GE: the objective of rationalising the massive spread of quangoes in Irish public policy ecosystem: http://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/coalition-s-quango-cull-falls-well-short-of-promises-1.1768500. Core facts pointed out in the article are: The Government promised to abolish 100-145 quangoes right before it came to power in Q1 2011. Three years later, 45 have been either abolished or planned for abolition, of which only 20 are likely to be completely shut by the next GE in Q1 2016 net of new created. To-date, only 28 bodies have been abolished, 17 more are set to be culled in the remaining tenure. And 33 new agencies have been created or planned for creation. Net impact: of 732 quangoes in existence in mid-2012, we are likely to have 720 quangoes in existence in mid-2016. 
    4. Now, recall that we are being repeatedly told that life outside the Euro for Ireland means kissing good bye our wonderful exporting capabilities. Here is a chart showing current account balance for Ireland and Germany (two star performers in the euro area in terms of trade) as contrasted by Denmark (a non-euro country that should be suffering from the trade deprivation due to its absence from the euro club). It turns out Denmark consistently outperforms Ireland in terms of current account surplus... So next time one of the Government parties' candidates start talking about Ireland's alleged benefits from the euro membership, do suggest they should take a trip to Denmark...
    5. An absolutely brilliant short summary of Economics as a field of inquiry in 297 words by Professor Thomas Sargent http://www.vox.com/2014/4/19/5631654/this-graduation-speech-teaches-you-everything-you-need-to-know-about It is superb.
    6. On artsy side of things, a stunning and powerfully original statement from China for Milan Expo 2015: http://www.dezeen.com/2014/04/01/china-pavilion-expo-milano-2015/ 
    7. A set of excellent, insightful essays and articles on Ukrainian crisis or more significantly - on Russia's position vis-a-vis the West: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/18/us-ukraine-putin-diplomacy-special-repor-idUSBREA3H0OQ20140418 and http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141018/mitchell-a-orenstein/get-ready-for-a-russo-german-europe and http://euobserver.com/foreign/123879

    Tuesday, July 16, 2013

    16/7/2013: Irish ICT Services & Data Protection Harmonisation in Europe


    An FT article today covers the issue of data protection regulation in Ireland and the divergence between Irish regime and the emerging European trend toward greater protection: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/50fb3088-ed65-11e2-ad6e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2ZBPI5mJ2

    Removing all the usual bluster about 'one-stop-shop' and 'no light touch regulation here' that we hear from our authorities on a daily basis these days, the issue is of core importance to Ireland. Here's why:


    ICT services are by now the sole most important contributor to the external balance of the country of all sectors, accounting for 14.93% of the entire credit side of the current account in Ireland and for 39.5% of Ireland's total services contribution to the credit side of the external balance.

    And for a scary quote: ""We have great data protection laws in Germany but if Facebook is based in Ireland, then Irish law applies,” said Ms Merkel. “We wish that companies make clear to us in Europe to whom they give their data. This will have to be part of a [European] data protection directive.""

    So, per usual, another comparative advantage to Ireland is being threatened? You bet!

    H/T on the FT story:  Philippe Legrain @plegrain

    Monday, July 15, 2013

    15/7/2013: Current Account Q1 2013: Extreme Imbalances in the Irish Economy

    CSO recently released Balance of Payments stats for Q1 2013 - you can read the main headlines and see underlying data here.

    Current account data is of more interest from my point of view. And it shows some changes both at a trend and at shorter-term levels, as well as the extremes of skewness in Irish economic activity in favour of the MNCs-dominated Financial and ICT services.

    Let's run through the credit side (exports from Ireland) of the CA first.

    Aggregate levels of exports (goods and services):

    • Aggregate level (goods and services) exports run at EUR55.657bn in Q1 2013, down on EUR60.295bn in Q4 2012 and down on EUR58.034bn in Q1 2012. This marked the level of exports comparable to Q1 2011 (EUR55.570bn) before we adjust for inflation.
    • Aggregate exports were dow 7.69% q/q in Q1 2013, having posted an increase of 1.22% q/q in Q4 2012. The rate of decline was 4.1% y/y compared to 2.19% rise in y/y figure for Q4 2012. 
    • Current level of quarterly exports is down 12.03% on peak.
    • Cumulated exports of goods and services for last 6 months were down 3.87% on previous 6 months and down 0.93% y/y. Last 12 months cumulated exports (12 months through March 2013) were still up 2.21% y/y. 

    Chart above clearly shows the downward shift in the shorter-term trend from the peak of Q2 2012. The chart also shows that prior to the Q2 2012, from Q3 2009, rate of increase in overall exports was slower than in the period of Q1 2005-Q4 2007. This suggests that the 'exports-led recovery' of 2010-2011 was not rapid enough to compare with the previous periods of strong exports growth, such as Q1 1998-Q4 2000, and Q1 2005-Q4 2007. Instead, the rate of growth in exports was closer to that attained in Q1 2003 - Q4 2004 - the period coincident with growth post-collapse of the dot.com bubble.

    Breakdown between goods and services exports:
    • Credit on goods side (exports) shrunk 3.82% q/q in Q4 2012 and this was followed by the decline of 4.83% in Q1 2013. Y/y exports of goods were down 9.21% in Q1 2013, after posting a y/y increase of 0.52% in Q4 2012. Credit on goods side of the Current Account was down 18.16% on peak in Q1 2013. 
    • Longer term series for credit on goods side were down 7.12% in current 6 months cumulative basis compared to previous 6 months period and y/y last 6 months cumulated credit on goods side was down 4.47%. Over the last 12 months (through March 2013) cumulated credit on merchandise side was down 1.74%.
    • On services side of credit in current account, q/q rise of 4.65% in Q4 2012 was followed by a decline of 8.66% q/q in Q1 2013. Y/y changes are more solid: +8.90% in Q4 2012, slower at +2.68% in Q1 2013. Current levels are 8.66% below peak.
    • Longer term trend for Services shows current 6 months cumulated services credits down 0.74% on previous 6 months - bad news. Good news, current 6 months cumulated credit up 5.84% y/y. 12 months cumulated credit through March 2013 is still solidly up 8.75% y/y.

    On trends side: chart above shows worrying shorter-term changes downward in merchandise credit, from a gently up-sloping trend established in and contraction in Q4 2009, and a sharp short-term decline on robustly upward trend in services.

    Breakdown in the core MNCs-driven services credits is in the following chart:

    Balance side:
    • Merchandise balance has deteriorated at an accelerated rate in Q1 2013. Net balance in Q1 2013 stood at EUR7.458 billion surplus, down from EUR8.616 billion in Q4 2012 and EUR8.401 billion in Q1 2012. Overall, this is the lowest Q1 balance on merchandise side since the disastrous Q1 2008.
    • On Services, side, balance rose to EUR754 million in Q1 2013 from EUR238 million in Q4 2012 and is up on EUR178 million recorded in Q1 2012. Q1 2013 balance marked the third highest balance in the series, but the balance is rather sluggish compared to previous two top performing quarters (Q2 and Q3 2012).

    • Overall balance is at EUR1.197 billion in Q1 2013, down on EUR2.895 billion in Q4 2012 and up on deficit of EUR704 million in Q1 2012. Good news is: Q1 2013 marked the 7th strongest quarterly balance on current account side of all quarters since Q1 1998, and the strongest first quarter of any year since Q1 1998.
     Chart below shows breakdown in balance contributions by key MNCs-driven services sector:


    The chart above underpins the extremely skewed distribution of source of the current account balance. Taking three sources of the balance attributable to MNCs-driven trade in services: Financial Services, Computer Services, net of Royalties and licenses payments, the three sources of balance accounted for 21.5% of all credits recorded on the credit side of the Current Account, but 190% of the total balance. In other words, even when we factor out net outflows of funds to cover licenses and royalties, the resulting balance on two sub-sectors of ICT and financial services stood at EUR2.271 billion which is almost double the total current account surplus of EUR1.197billion recorded across the entire economy.


    Sunday, April 21, 2013

    21/4/2014: Exports-led recovery? Not that promising so far...

    Regular readers of this blog know that since the beginning of the crisis, I have been sceptical about the Government-pushed proposition that exports led recovery can be sufficient to lift Ireland out of the current crises-induced stagnation.

    Over the recent years I have put forward a number of arguments as to why this proposition is faulty, including:

    1. A weakening link between our GDP, GNP and national income,
    2. A worrisome demographic trend that is structurally leading to lower labour markets participation, alongside the renewed emigration,
    3. Structural weaknesses in the economy left ravaged by some 15 years if not more of bubbles-driven growth,
    4. Taxation and state policy structures that favor old modes of economic development and which are incompatible with high value-added entrepreneurship, employment creation and growth, 
    5. Substitution away from more real economy-linked goods exports in favor of the superficially inflated exports of services in the ICT and international financial services sectors, etc
    But the dynamics of our exports are also not encouraging. 

    Here's a summary of some trends in Irish exports since 1930s, all expressed in relation to nominal value of merchandise trade (omitting effects of inflation). Based on 5-year cumulative trade volumes (summing up annual trade volumes over 5 year periods):
    • Irish exports grew 147.8% in 1980-1984 and 86.7% in 1985-1989 - during the 1980s recession. This did not lift Irish economy out of the crisis, then.
    • Irish exports grew 56.3% in 1990-1994 period and 56.4% in 1995-1999 period. Thus, slower  rate of growth in exports during the 1990s than in the 1980s accompanied growth in the 1990s. This hardly presents a strong case for an 'exports-led recovery'.
    • Irish exports expanded cumulatively 148.0% in 2000-2004, before shrinking by 0.4% in 2005-2009 period and is expected to grow at 4.6% cumulatively in 2010-2014 (using 2010-2012 data available to project trend to 2014). 
    The last point above presents a problem for the Government thesis on exports-led recovery: the rates of growth in merchandise exports currently expected to prevail over 2010-2014 period are nowhere near either the 1980s crisis-period rates of growth or 1990s Celtic Tiger period rates of growth.

    Ok, but what about trade surplus? Recall, trade surplus feeds directly into current account which, some believe almost religious, is the only thing that matters in determining the economy's ability to recover from debt-linked crises. Again, here are the facts:
    • During the 1980-1984 Ireland run trade deficit that on a cumulative basis amounted to EUR5,969mln. This gave way to a cumulated surplus of EUR8,938mln in 1985-1989 period. So attaining a relatively strong trade surplus did not lift Irish economy from the crisis of the 1980s.
    • In Celtic Tiger era, during 1990-1994 period, cumulated surpluses rose at a robust rate of 155.7% on previous 5 year period, and this increase was followed by a further improvement of 113.9% in 1995-1999 period. 
    • During Celtic Garfield stage, in 2000-2004 period Irish trade surplus increased by a cumulative 245.4%. However, in 2005-2009 period trade surplus shrunk 10.9% cumulatively on previous 5 years. Based on data through 2012, projected cumulated growth in trade surplus (recall, this is merchandise trade only) grew by 43.6%.
    Again, trade surplus growth is strong, currently, but it is nowhere near being as strong as in the 1990s. Worse, current rate of growth in trade surplus is well below the rate of growth attained in the 1980s.

    Charts to illustrate:


    Oh, and do note in the above chart the inverse relationship between the ratio of merchandise exports to imports (that kept rising during the Celtic Tiger and Garfield periods as per trend) and the downward trend in exports growth. 

    Sunday, September 9, 2012

    9/9/2012: Ireland's stellar exports performance?


    Three charts that put to the test one of our greatest claims to fame - the claim that Ireland is one of the world leaders in exports performance.



    Charts above clearly show that Ireland's performance in exports growth was rather spectacular in the 1990s, strong in 2000-2004 period and below average in 2005-2009 period. However, in 2010-2012 period - the very period when, according to our Government we are experiencing dramatic growth in exports - Ireland's exports performance is, in fact, well below the average for our peers.

    As the result of this, despite an absolutely massive collapse in imports, Irish current account performance (external balance that is supposedly - per Government and official analysts, and the likes of Brugel think-tank heads - going to rescue us from the massive debt overhang we have) is underwhelming:


    Saturday, August 18, 2012

    18/8/2012: What the IDA forecasts don't tell us?

    I waited for several days before posting about the latest mystery of Irish statistics. 

    This presentation from IDA contains the following chart:




    Now, IDA is correct in highlighting the Current Account as a key to our recovery 'policies'. For a number of reasons:

    1. In virtually all debt overhang recessions in the past, return to positive surpluses on current account were required as a necessary, albeit not always sufficient, condition to restore economy to a stable path
    2. In Ireland, we have witnessed some significant improvements in the Current Account so far during the Great Recession
    Alas, the above chart is a mystery to me. Let me explain.

    Firstly, it cites CSO as the source of the chart. I have contacted CSO about their 'forecasts' for 2012-2017 period for the Current Account and their reply was: 
    "Having consulted with my colleagues they assure me that they do not produce forecasts, let alone five year forecasts. Furthermore, my colleague suggested that the figures might be derived from a paper published by the Dept. of Finance (page 9): http://budget.gov.ie/budgets/2012/Documents/Economic%20and%20Fiscal%20Outlook.pdf It should be stressed, however, that these figures are the department's and not the CSO's."

    Now, here are two forecasts for Ireland's Current Account known to me, sourced from the updated IMF database (July 2012 update to WEO database) and the above link from the Department of Finance:



    Clearly, no source, bar IMF projects anything beyond 2015. Also, clearly, even the IMF projections appear (one can't really properly read IDA chart) to be as 'upbeat' as IDA's chart in 2013-2017 projections range. 

    But wait, recall that IMF is providing a forecast, based on their central tendency scenario. They also provide useful assumptions and data that went into their scenarios assessments which allow us to compute historical confidence intervals for their own forecast. And, ahem, it turns out the IMF 'central' tendency forecast - illustrated above - firmly falls outside the reasonable 90% single tail confidence interval (adjusting for sample size, but caveating this). In other words, it is improbable, were historical Irish performance on current account balance to be out guide. The same applies to the stress-testing metric on current accounts used by the IMF - the primary current account balances (current account ex-interest payments).

    So the IMF forecasts above assume massive change in Irish current account performance relative to history, the change that - may be IDA can expand on this - is supposed to come in the environment of adverse global trading conditions, pharma cliff hitting Irish exports, and re-orientation of trade flows worldwide away from North-South shipments of higher value added goods and services toward South-South flows.

    But wait, things are actually worse than that. DofF forecasts deviate from the average for the above sources ex-DofF by a cumulative 1.7% of GDP and from those by the IMF by a cumulative of 2.5% of GDP for the period 2011-2015, which means that DofF forecasts are even less probabilistically likely to materialise than those for the IMF.

    Even were the IMF to materialise, Ireland's current account surplus in 2012-2017 will be 2.78% of GDP on average - an impressive swing from a recent historical performance, yet contrasted by the economy with ca 120% debt/GDP metric on Government side alone! Anyone out there really thinking this is going to be a silver bullet for our economy?

    So things are a bit less rosy than the IDA seems willing to admit to the prospective Foreign Direct Investors and the media. 

    Monday, November 21, 2011

    21/11/2011: Sunday Times 20/11/2011 - Exporting our way out of recession

    Here's the unedited version of my article for Sunday Times (November 20, 2011).



    The latest trade statistics, released this week were, as usual, greeted with enthusiasm by the growing media tired of the adverse newsflows. From the headline figures, preliminary data shows that seasonally adjusted exports of goods rose 2% to €7.9 billion in September, and the trade surplus jumped 11% to €4.1 billion. This makes September trade surplus second highest on record.

    Trade in goods in general has been going through a boom, rising from the annual trade surplus of €25.7 billion at the bottom of the peak of the Celtic Tiger era in 2007 to €43.4 billion last year. Data through the first nine months of this year suggests that our annual trade surplus will post another record in 2011, finishing the year at some €43.8 billion.

    For years we have been told by two successive governments that Ireland’s recovery will be exports-led. The latest data appears to be supportive of this. Except, appearances can be deceiving.

    Consider closer the monthly goods trade data. September increase in trade surplus was, in fact, driven as much by rising exports (up €193 million month-on-month), as by shrinking imports (down €208 million).

    Given deep cuts in consumption goods imports in 2008-2010, any recent reductions in imports are primarily reflective of the changes in demand for intermediate inputs into production of our exports. In other words, trade surpluses based on imports reductions are not sustainable in the medium term. This is evident from the longer-term statistics. In H1 2011, Irish trade surplus in goods was up only 3.4% year on year. In H2 2011, based on latest data, trade surplus might actually fall some 2% year on year. Back in November 2010 4 year programme, the Government projected that in 2011 exports will increase 5% and imports will rise just 2.75%, which would have implied an annual goods trade balance of €47 billion this year. It looks now that this projection might be undershot by over €3 billion. Not exactly an optimistic picture.

    This performance is worrisome for another reason. The above data, cited most often as the core driver of our economic ‘recovery’ relates solely to trade in goods. Yet, the overall balance of trade for the country includes net exports of services. We have to rely on the Quarterly National Accounts data to gauge overall trade balance in both goods and services.

    Full trade data we have covers only the first half of 2011 – the period before the latest slowdown in Euro area, UK and US economies became pronounced. Despite this, the data shows some emerging strains on the side of Ireland’s full trade surplus. Year on year, exports of goods and service through H1 2011 were up 5.8%, but imports increased 6.1%, which means that the trade surplus expanded by just under 4.7%.



    Exports-led recovery may be starting to falter. In 2009, trade balance for goods and services grew at a massive 52.5% year on year. Last year it expanded by 19.7%. This year, so far, annualized rate of growth is just under 4.7% and that was under more benign global growth conditions that prevailed through June 2011. Budgetary projections were for a 14.7% expansion on total trade surplus for 2011 – 3 times the current rate.

    If ‘exports-led recovery’ was really able to carry us out of the economic doldrums, much of the external trade growth now appears to be behind us in 2009-2010. It didn’t happen. Why? Exports growth is good, creates jobs and huge value added in our economy. But exports are not enough, because Ireland is not an exports-intensive economy. It is a multinationals-intensive economy.

    Let’s take a look at the National Accounts. In Q2 2011, Net Factor Income outflows from Ireland – largely multinational profits – accounted for 21.4% of our GDP, 20.3% of all our exports and equal to 100% of the entire trade balance in goods and services. In other words, in national accounts terms, trade basically pays for itself, plus small employment pool of workers. And that’s about it.

    This is not surprising. In 2010, one category of trade: Organic Chemicals, Medicinal and Pharmaceutical Products accounted for 86.1% of our entire trade surplus. Between 2000 and 2009, the same sector average contribution to trade surplus was 84.1%. Total food and live animals – the indigenous companies-dominated exporting sector – combined trade surplus in 2010 was just €2.4 billion or some 16 times smaller than the trade surplus from the Organic Chemicals, Medicinal and Pharmaceutical Products category.

    This reliance on MNCs-dominated sectors presents significant risks to our trade flows going forward.

    Firstly, Ireland-based MNCs face the risk of the much-feared ‘patent cliff’ threatening the pharma sector. Various estimates put the effect of the blockbuster drug going off-patent at a staggering up to 80% reduction in revenues within the first 3 months after patent expiration. In the next 3 years, according to some estimates, this fate awaits approximately 30-35% of our MNCs sales. This can see our trade balance dropping by almost €6 billion in the first year of impact.

    Secondly, lack of diversification in sectoral patterns of trade – further reinforced by the fact that computer equipment exports are now down 11% year on year in the first 8 months of 2011 – is paralleled by the decline of regional diversification of our exports. In 8 moths through August 2011, 18.7% of our exports went to the countries outside the EU and US. A year ago, the same number was 19.1%. Ireland’s trade with the largest emerging and middle income economies, such as the BRIC countries, remains virtually static and minor year on year at just €2.2 billion or less than 3.7% of our exports. Our trade balance with the BRIC countries stood at unimpressive €80.2 million in January-August 2010 and has fallen to €70.3 million in the same period of 2011. You get the picture: Ireland is missing out on booming trade markets.

    Thirdly, recent proposals in Washington – combining a potential reduction in the US corporate tax rate with a tax holiday for repatriation of US MNCs’ profits back into the US can have profound effects here. Just a 25% acceleration in repatriation of profits by the US multinationals can result in GDP/GNP gap rising to 22.5% by 2016 against current 17%. This, in effect, will mean that Irish economy will be sending abroad more funds in repatriated profits than the entire trade surplus brings into the country.


    The risks we face on our exporting sectors’ side point to the reasons why exports-led recoveries are rare in general.

    Historical evidence, across the euro area states, taken over the period of 1990-2010 clearly shows that, in general, countries do not reverse external imbalances overnight. Only two out of 17 euro area countries, Austria and Germany, have managed to switch from persistent current account deficits in the 1990s to current account surpluses in 2000-2010. Evidence also shows that between 1990 and 2009, no country in the Euro area was able to achieve average current account surpluses in excess of 5% annually and only one country – the Netherlands – was able to deliver average surpluses of over 4% of GDP. Given Ireland’s Government debt overhang, we would have to run over 4% average surplus for a good part of the next two decades if exports-led growth were to be the engine for our economic recovery.

    Ireland’s exporters are doing a stellar job trying to break out of the globally-driven patterns of trade and generate growth well in excess of that delivered by other countries around the world. The real problem is the unreasonable expectations for the exports-led recovery that are bestowed upon them by the Government. If Ireland is to develop an indigenously anchored robust export-driven economy, we need serious policy reforms to facilitate domestic investment and entrepreneurship, know-how and skills acquisition and ease access to trade for our services and goods exporters. So far, the Government has been talking the talk on some of these reforms. It is yet to put its words into action.


    Box-out:

    The continued turmoil in the Euro area sovereign bond markets presents an interesting sort of a dilemma for investors around the world. By all possible debt metrics, Japan is more insolvent than Italy or all of the PIIGS combined. In addition, barring the latest quarter uplift, Japan had not seen appreciable economic growth in ages. And yet, Japanese Government bonds yields are falling and the country is perceived to be a sort of safe-haven for investors fleeing the beleaguered Euro area. Why? The short answer to this question is – investment risks. There are tree basic investment risks when it comes to bonds. The first risk is that of future interest rates increases. If interest rates were to rise, currently trading bonds will see their price drop, devaluing the investment. Japan is less likely to rise interest rates any time in the near future than the ECB, as it faces significant costs of rebuilding its economy and its high debt levels require lower interest rates financing. The second risk is of high inflation. Once again, Japan wins here, as the country had sustained periods of near-zero to deflationary price changes in its recent past. In addition, the country is no more susceptible to importing inflation from the global commodities markets than Europe. Lastly, there is the set of re-investment, credit and default risks, which in the nutshell boil down to the risk that the issuing sovereign will not be able to roll over current bonds for new ones at maturity. Of course, in the case of Japan this can happen only if investors refuse to accept new bonds in a swap for old bonds. But in the case of European states, this can happen also if the euro were to break up between now and maturity period (in which case the swap will not be like-for-like) or if the collective entity – the EU – were to compel sovereign bond holders to accept haircuts at some future date. With both these possibilities being open in the case of, say, Italy, Japan – as sick as its economy might be – presents a potentially lower risk bet for many investors today.

    Tuesday, June 21, 2011

    21/06/2011: Trade Data for April

    Per latest CSO data released today: Ireland's seasonally adjusted
    • Imports rose from €3,721m in March to €4,914.3m in April (+32%)
    • Exports decreased from €7,717.6m to €7,530.4m (-2%)
    • Please note, these figures cover only goods trade

    Ireland's trade surplus was €2,616.1m in April 2011, down on €3,758.1m in April 2010 and down on €3,996.6m in March 2011.

    January-March 2011 imports rose strongly in:
    • Food & Live Animals - from €1,066.1m to €1,248.0m yoy
    • Crude Materials, Inedible, except fuels - from €152.7m to €189.9m yoy
    • Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials - from €1,347.9m to €1,748.1m yoy
    • Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes - from €37.7m to €57.5m yoy
    • Chemical and related products - from €2,131.3m to €2,524.0m yoy
    • Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material - from €802.7m to €922.0m yoy
    • Machinery and transport equipment - from €3,203.7m to €3,707.0m yoy
    • Miscellaneous manufactured articles - from €1,408.2m to €1,494.0m yoy
    Changes in imports in mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials, as well as in chemical and related products is broadly in line with MNCs demand for inputs to deliver increases in exports. Machinery and transport equipment imports increases were characteristic of some replacement of lost (depreciated) capital base in the industry.

    Exports increased by 9% to €23,346m in Q1 2011 compared to Q1 2010 with:
    • Exports of Medical and pharmaceutical products increased by 18% or €1,065m
    • Exports of Organic chemicals rose by 15% or €716m.
    Exports of Electrical machinery decreased by 6% or €48m.

    Lastly, terms of trade deteriorated for Irish exporters from 78.0 (price of exports ratio to price of imports) in February 2011 to 77.1 in March 2011. March reading was the lowest since January 2003 and compares unfavorably to 86.3 reading in March 2010 and 86.6 reading in March 2009.
    This, of course, means reduced profit margins for Irish exporters and pressure on tax returns from external trade activities, as well as potential pressure (it will take more than a couple of months of low readings) on employment in the traded sectors. Broadly-speaking (ignoring a slight rise from 80.8 in November 2010 to 80.9 in December 2010), terms of trade have been deteriorating now for 10 months.
    So as chart above shows, high exports volumes are coming in at the cost of reduced profit margins. Of course, much of this can most likely be attributed to transfer pricing by MNCs, suggesting that we might see increased emphasis on booking profits via Irish operations. This, n turn, can provide artificial support for GNP in the same way as it did in Q4 2010.

    Sunday, August 22, 2010

    Economics 22/8/10: Fundamentals of investing in IRL Inc - IV

    This is the last post in the series of four that presents fundamentals comparatives between Ireland, Switzerland and Luxembourg. The first post (here) covered analysis of current account dynamics, the second post (here) dealt with General Government balance, third post (here) highlighted differences in GDP and income. This post deal with residual fundamentals such as inflation, unemployment and population.

    In terms of inflation we are not doing too well. Since 2000 Ireland remains expensive. More expensive than Switzerland, despite our massive bout of deflation. This, of course, does not account for the fact that Swiss residents get much better quality public sector services than we do, for less money spent. But that's a matter of a different comparison that I touched upon earlier (here, here and here).

    So Chart 12 shows our inflation performance.

    Chart 12:

    You wouldn't be picking Ireland for your investment if you were concerned with real returns or with effects of inflation on economy's ability to carry debt.

    If population growth is really a longer term dividend, we should expect Ireland Inc to overtake Switzerland by now in terms of
    prosperity (Chart 13). After all, our 1980s and 1970s'-born cohorts are currently at the peak of their productivity. But recall per capita GDP... so far, there isn't really any evidence that growth in population leads to higher growth in GDP once scale effects are taken out of equation.

    Chart 13:

    Would you have invested in Ireland's debt if you were thinking about Ireland's ability to repay on the basis of lower costs of unemployment and greater proportion of labour force at work? Take a look at Chart 14.

    Chart 14:


    Well, not really. Swiss and Lux make for a much more compelling
    case here and not just in the current crisis environment.

    So
    here's our real problem that is not a function of cyclical dynamics, but a structural one. Our employed are carrying much greater burden of providing for the rest of our population than Switzerland (Chart 15).

    Chart 15:

    Factor in that Irish public sector is larger, in relative-to-population terms than Swiss... and you have an even greater discrepancy in terms of the true earning capacity of the Irish economy.
    Which brings us to the issue of productivity and back to the topic of exporters carrying the burden of the entire economy out of the recession. Apart from the construction boom, economy-wide income per person working is lower in Ireland than in either Switzerland or Lux since the 1980s. Even at the peak of the largest real estate bubble known to any other European country in modern history, our 2008 GDP per person employed was still not that much greater than that of Switzerland (Chart 16).

    Chart 16:

    May be, just may be it was because our wealthy developers all wanted a fine Swiss watch, while no Swiss investors wanted our bungalows in Drogheda or apartments in Tallaght? which is the same as to say - the Swiss are productive to the point of the rest of the world wanting their goods and services. We are productive only to the extent of the rest of the world wanting goods and services produced by MNCs and few indigenous exporters based here. But their productivity is high in gross terms and low in net terms (recall current account analysis in the first post). Unless we can dramatically increase the number of exporters while simultaneously upping the net value added in their operations to Swiss levels, there's no chance external trade can carry this economy out of the recession.

    Economics 22/8/10: Fundamentals of investing in IRL Inc - III

    This is the third post in the series of four that presents fundamentals comparatives between Ireland, Switzerland and Luxembourg. The first post (here) covered analysis of current account dynamics, the second post (here) dealt with General Government balance. This post will highlight differences in GDP.

    Once again, think of an investor making a choice between sovereign debt of three countries. Fundamentals about current account (external surpluses generated by economy - subject of the first post), government balances (second post), economic income and growth (present post), as well as unemployment, population and income per working person (following concluding post) all help underpin the economy ability to repay its sovereign debts.

    So far, we have shown that:
    1. By external balances metric, Ireland is a much poorer performer than either Switzerland or Lux;
    2. By sovereign balances metric, Ireland is a much poorer performer than either Switzerland or Lux
    Now, consider GDP metrics. We all heard that we are one of the richest economies in the entire world. Is this really so?

    Let me put a caveat here - analysis of GDP figures for Lux is a bit tricky, since Luxembourg official stats exclude all those people who work in Luxembourg but reside outside its borders. So the best benchmark here is Switzerland. So
    take a look at the 'Celtic Tiger' vis-a-vis Switzerland. 2002-2007 growth rates are virtually identical in both. But since 2007 - we have been a basket case, while Swiss have been ticking along nicely, like a fabled clock.

    Chart 8:

    And this is highlighted in each country share of the world GDP as well: w
    e have 61% of Swiss population and 886% of Lux's population (Chart 9). Yet we have - in absolute terms - 54% of Swiss global share of GDP and 438% of Lux's. PPP-adjusted, our GDP is just 28.8% of Swiss and 400% of Lux's. In current prices-measured GDP, Ireland's GDP is 42.2% of Swiss and 400% of Lux's. So that population growth dividend isn't really working for us so far.

    Chart 9:

    Per capita GDP in current prices (Chart 10):

    Chart 10:

    • 2008 peaks in all three countries: Luxembourg=USD118,570.05, Ireland= USD60,510.00, Switzerland= USD68,433.12
    • Peaks recovered by: Luxembourg= USD119,048.05 by the end of 2015, Ireland= USD60,729.66 by the end of 2019, Switzerland= USD69,838.79 by the end of 2010.
    So it will take Ireland 9 more years to regain its income per capita 2007 levels, which were below those of Switzerland to begin with. Note: 2016-2020 forecast was performed assuming no recession between 2010 and 2019.

    Of course, we were a stellar performer in terms of GDP growth prior to 2006. That's one fundamental where we did shine. But stripping out construction sector contribution in 2001-2007, we are not that spectacular (Chart 11)...

    Chart 11:
    The fourth and last post will conclude by making comparisons across other variables, such as inflation, population growth and labour markets.

    Economics 22/8/10: Fundamentals of investing in IRL Inc - II

    This is the second post in the series of four that presents fundamentals comparatives between Ireland, Switzerland and Luxembourg. Post I (here) covered analysis of current account dynamics. The present post will deal with General Government balance.

    N
    ow, let's check IRL's sovereign solvency position. Chart 5 illustrates:

    Chart 5:

    Again, if you are an investor hoping to get repaid on your bonds, you wouldn’t really go for Ireland as a place to park your money. Except during 1996-2001 and 2003-2007. But then, get out as fast as you can in 2007. All in, Ireland Inc hasn't paid its bills since 2007.

    Let's see if the Government has been running operations consistent with long term attractiveness to sovereign investors. To do so, suppose we invested in the bonds written against General Government balances. Since timing matters, let us take two scenarios: investing €1.00 in 1980 and investing €1.00 in 1995, holding to 2010 or 2011.

    So c
    umulative returns on countries sovereign balances from 1980 are (Chart 6):
    • 2010: Ireland=28.5%, Switzerland=32.2%, Lux=43.3%. Ireland gap to best performer = -14.8%
    • 2011: Ireland=25.4%, Switzerland=31.9%, Lux=41.1%. Ireland gap to best performer = -15.7%
    • 2010-2011 gap deterioration for Ireland = -0.9%

    Chart 6:

    Chart 7 shows Slide 7 cumulative returns from 1995 are:
    • 2010: Ireland=-12.2%, Switzerland=-1.1%, Lux=-3.85%. Ireland gap to best performer=-11.1%
    • 2011: Ireland=-11.1%, Switzerland=-0.9%, Lux=-5.1%. Ireland gap to best performer=-10.2%
    • 2010-2011 gap improvement for Ireland = +0.9%
    Chart 7:

    So a portfolio of 50:50 split between 1980 investment and 1995 investment written against Irish Governments' fiscal positions since 1980 would have lost to investor 12.95% by 2010 and 2011, compared to a similar allocation into other two countries.

    Economics 22/8/10: Fundamentals of investing in IRL Inc - I

    Few months ago, while speaking as a guest on RTE's Frontline, I confronted two of our 'surrender to Brussels' politicians with a suggestion that a country can do just fine outside the 'Yes, Commissioner' world of European convergence consensus. In return, one politician - from the opposition side of the Dail - rushed to conclude that when advocating greater sovereignty on economic policies I was talking about the UK. My reply was that I had in mind more the path of the country like Switzerland.

    In the light of the ongoing sovereign crisis, and with all the talk about bond markets unwillingness to underwrite our economy, I decided to return to the same issue. Here are major comparatives in investment (bonds-related) fundamentals in Ireland vis-a-vis Switzerland and Luxembourg.

    I do this in a series of 4 posts. The first one deals with current account dynamics, the second one will deal with Government finances, the third one will show comparatives for GDP, and the fourth one will conclude by making comparisons across other variables, such as inflation, population growth and labour markets.

    All data is based on IMF's World Economic Outlook, updates for April and July 2010, which covers period from 1980-2015. Some additional forecasts (beyond 2015) were performed by myself, alongside some additional variables computations.

    I chose the two countries for several reasons:
    1. Both are core European countries;
    2. One of these is outside the EU, another is inside the same tent as Ireland;
    3. With a caveat concerning some of aggregate accounting issues with Luxembourg's data, all three have roughly similar economies characterized by: (a) no significant natural resources of their own, (b) small size of population and land mass, (c) heavy reliance on exports, (d) open nature of economies, (e) 'more Boston than Berlin' aspirations in tax policies, (f) being a bit of a thorn in the softer side of Brussels, and so on
    So here are few charts and comments. In most cases, I take on the position of a rational investor in sovereign bonds, willing to hold these to maturity. In other words, what matters to me in most of these charts is the answer to the following question: "Given country A fundamentals compared to countries B and C, what is the likelihood that country A can generate sufficient net income to cover its debt obligations?"

    Chart 1:
    If our expected current account surplus of 2010 were to be used to pay down our debt, how long would it take? The answer to it is 'forever'. Our net surplus from trade and investments from the entire world was negative €4.03bn throughout the 2000s. In the 1990s, our average current account surplus was just €1.108bn, in 2010 our expected surplus in the only year when current account was positive in the 200s - the year 2010 - will be only €849mln. At the same time, our debt currently stands at €86.83bn and rising with interest bill on this well in excess of €4.56bn annually at latest 10 year bond auction yields. In other words, exporting our way out of the recession will not even cover our entire interest bill.

    Here's an interesting observation. Irish Government thinks that exports will carry Ireland out of the recession. However, there is an argument to be made that value added in our exports is not really that impressive once the inputs costs are taken out.

    Chart 2:
    If you were an investor thinking about Ireland's fundamentals, you wouldn't have much hope of getting a positive return on your investment, if net exports were your underlying security, except in the period 1992-2000.

    This, one can argue, might be true of our manufacturing exports, where we import often expensive inputs and where transfer
    pricing (on inter-company sales) further contributes to lower net value added. But what about our services trade? Well, the current account data shows that during the last decade, when services trade really started to take off in Ireland, our net external balance was negative. So something is not adding up and I will take a look at this in the forthcoming posts.

    But for now, we do have impressive exporters, yet our current account performance has been exceptionally weak, compared to
    Switzerland and Luxembourg - two countries that are equally as reliant on imported inputs as Ireland.

    It is worth noting also that in the case of Switzerland, their exports composition includes significant pharma and high tech
    manufacturing exports as well. It just appears that they manage to do trade better...

    I
    n fact, a bet made on Ireland Inc based on its external economic performance back in 1980 would have been a disastrous one as Chart 3 below illustrates. An investor betting on our external balance would have 48.1 cents on every euro invested. Based on IMF forecasts, by 2015 this loss can be expected to widen to 48.9 cents. At the same time, identical bet on Luxembourg would have netted a gross return of over €5.11 by now, and a projected gain of €9.20 by 2015: a spread in return relative to Ireland of €5.59 by 2010 and €9.69 by 2015.

    Chart 3:
    The differences are even more dramatic when we look at comparison to Switzerland: a bet of €1.00 on Swiss external balance made in 1980 would have netted investor €8.145 by 2010 and is expected to yield €13.434 by 2015, implying the spread between investment in Ireland and Switzerland of €8.626 in 2010 and €13.923 in 2015.

    O
    bviously, the earlier analysis is sensitive to the time frame for investment chosen (Chart 4).

    Chart 4:
    Suppose a bet €1.00 was made on Ireland Inc based on its external economic performance back in 1995. An investor betting on our external balance would have grossed 0.393 cents on every euro invested by today and can be expected to gross a loss of 1 cent by 2015. An identical bet on Luxembourg would have netted a gross return of 11.23 cents by now, and a projected gain of 13.305 cents by 2015. The differences are slightly less dramatic when we look at comparison to Switzerland: a bet of €1.00 on Swiss external balance made in 1995 would have netted investor 9.54 cents by 2010 and is expected to yield 11.88 cents by 2015. Oh, and there wouldn't be any risk of getting these returns expropriated by the Government tax policy changes.

    (Second post to follow)