28/3/2012: Sunday Times 25/3/2012 - Irish emigration curse

Below is the unedited version of my article for Sunday Times from 25/03/2012.

Last week, as Ireland and the world celebrated the St Patrick’s Day, close to fifteen hundred Irish residents, including close to a thousand of Irish nationals, have left this country. In all the celebratory public relations kitsch, no Irish official has bothered to remember those who are currently being driven out of their native and adopted homeland by the realities of our dire economic situation.

According to the latest CSO report – covering the period from 1987 through 2011, emigration from Ireland has hit a record high. In a year to April 2011 some 76,400 Irish residents have chosen to leave the country, against the previous high of 70,600 recorded in 1989. For the first time since 1990, emigration has surpassed the number of births.

Given the CSO methodology, it is highly probable that the above figures tell only a part of the story. Our official emigration statistics are based on the Quarterly National Household Survey, unlikely to cover with reasonable accuracy highly mobile and less likely to engage in official surveys younger households, especially those that moved to Ireland from East Central Europe.

For example, emigration numbers for Irish nationals rose 200% between 2008 and 2011, with steady increases recorded every year since the onset of the crisis. Over the same period of time, growth in emigration outflows of EU15 (ex-UK) nationals from Ireland peaked in 2008-2009 and halved since then. Prior to 2010, Irish nationals contributed between 0% and 10% of the total net migration numbers. By 2010 and 2011 this rose to 42% and 68% respectively. Meanwhile, the largest driver of net migration inflows prior to the crisis - EU12 states nationals - were the source of the largest emigration outflows in 2009, but their share of net outflows has fallen to 39% and 13% in 2010 and 2011 respectively. There were no corresponding shifts in Irish and non-Irish nationals’ shares on the Live Register. In other words, unemployment data for non-Nationals does not appear to collaborate the official emigration statistics, most likely reflecting some significant under-reporting of actual emigration rates for EU12 and other non-EU nationals.

There are more worrisome facts that point to a dramatic change in the migration flows in recent years. Back in 2004-2007 there were a number of boisterous reports issued by banks and stockbrokerages that claimed that Irish population and migration dynamics were driving significant and long-term sustainable growth into the Irish economy. The so-called demographic dividend, we were told, was the vote of confidence in the future of this economy, the driver of demand for property and investment, savings and consumption.

In 2006, one illustrious stockbrokerage research outfit produced the following conclusions: “The population [of Ireland] is forecast to reach 5 million in 2015… The labour force is projected to grow at an annual average 2.2% over the whole period 2005 to 2015. Combined with sustained 3% annual growth in productivity, this suggests the underlying potential real rate of growth in Irish GDP in the five years to 2010 could be close to 5.75%. Between 2011 and 2015, the potential GDP growth rate could cool down to around 5%.”

Since the onset of the crisis, however, the ‘dividend’ has turned into a loss, as I predicted back in 2006 in response to the aforementioned report publication. People tend to follow opportunities, not stick around in a hope of old-age pay-outs on having kids. In 2009, only 33% of new holders of PPS numbers were employed. Back in 2004 that number was 68%. Amazingly, only one third of those who moved to Ireland in 2004-2007 were still in employment in 2009. Almost half of those who came here in 2008 had no employment activity in the last 2 years on record (2008 and 2009) and for those who came here in 2009 the figure was two thirds.

In more simple terms, prior to the crisis, majority (up to 68%) of those who came here did so to work. Now (at least in 2009 – the last year we have official record for) only one third did the same. It is not only the gross emigration of the Nationals and Non-Nationals that is working against Ireland today. Instead, the changes in employability of Non-Nationals who continue to move into Ireland are compounding the overall cost of emigration.

In order to assess these costs, let us first consider the evidence on net emigration in excess of immigration. In every year – pre-crisis and since 2008, there were both simultaneous inflows and outflows of people to and from Ireland. In 2006, the number of people immigrating into Ireland was above the number of people emigrating from Ireland by 71,800. Last year, there was net emigration of 34,100. Between 2009 and 2011, some 76,400 more people left Ireland than moved here.

Assuming that 2004-2007 period was the period of ‘demographic dividend’, total net outflows of people from the country in the period since 2008 through 2011 compared to the pre-crisis migration trend is 203,400 people. In other words, were the ‘demographic dividend’ continued at the rates of 2004-2007 unabated through the years of the current crisis, working population addition to Ireland from net migration would have been around 2/3rds of 203,400 net migrants or roughly 136,000 people. Based on the latest average earnings of €689.54 per week, recorded in Q4 2011, and an extremely conservative value added multiplier of 2.5 times earnings, the total cost of the ‘demographic losses’ arising from emigration can be close to 8% of our GDP. And that is before we factor in substantial costs of keeping a small army of immigrants on the Live Register. Some dividend this is.

This is only the tip of an iceberg, when it comes to capturing the economic costs of emigration as the estimates above ignore some other, for now unquantifiable losses, that are still working through the system.

In recent years, Ireland experienced a small, but noticeable baby boom. In 2007-2007, the average annual number of births in Ireland stood at just below 60,000. During 2009-2011 period that number rose by almost 25%. 2011 marked the record year of births in Ireland since 1987 – at 75,100. In the environment of high unemployment, elevated birth rates can act to actually temporarily moderate overall emigration, since maternity benefits are not generally transferable from Ireland to other countries, especially the countries outside the EU. Even when these benefits do transfer with families, new host country benefits replacement may be much lower than the benefits in Ireland. Which, of course, means that a number of emigrants from Ireland can be temporarily under-reported until that time when the maternity benefits run their course and spouses reunite abroad.

Even absent the above lags and reporting errors, net migration is now running close to its historic high. In 2011, there were total net emigration of 34,100 from Ireland against 34,500 in 2010. These represent the second and the first highest rates of net emigration since 1990.

At this stage, it is pretty much irrelevant – from the policy debate point of view – whether or not emigrants are leaving this country because they are forced to do so by the jobs losses or are compelled to make such a choice because of their perceptions of the potential for having a future in Ireland. And it is wholly academic as to whether or not these people have any intentions of returning at some point in their lives. What matters is that Ireland is once again a large-scale exporter of skills, talents and productive capacity of hundreds of thousands of people. The dividend is now exhausted, replaced by a massive economic, not to mention personal, social, and political costs that come along with the Government policies that see massive scale emigration as a ‘safety valve’ and/or ‘personal choice’.

Charts:

Box-out:

On 14^th of March, Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland, Professor Honohan has told Limerick Law Society that Irish banks should be less inhibited about repossessing properties held against investment or buy-to-let mortgages. This conjecture cuts across a number of points, ranging from the capital implications of accelerated foreclosures to economic risks. However, one little known set of facts casts an even darker shadow over the banks capacity to what professor Honohan suggests they should. All of the core banking institutions in the country currently run large scale undertakings relating to covered bonds and securitizations they issued prior to 2008 crisis. Since 2008, the combination of falling credit ratings for the banks and accumulation of arrears in the mortgages accounts has meant that the banks were forced to increase the collateral held in the asset pools that back the bonds. In the case of just one Irish bank this over-collateralization increased by 60% in the last 4 years. This is done in order to increase security of the Covered Bond pool for the benefit of the Bondholders and is achieved by transferring additional mortgages into the pool. In just one year to December 2011, the said bank transferred over 26,000 new mortgages into one such pool. As the result of this, the bank can face restrictions and/or additional costs were it to foreclose on the mortgages within the pool. Things are even worse than that. In many cases, banks now hold mortgages that had their principal value pledged as a collateral in one vehicle while interest payments they generate has been collateralized through a separate vehicle. The mortgage itself can potentially even be double-collateralized into the security pool as described above. The big questions for the Central Bank in this context are: 1) Can the banks legally foreclose on such loans? and 2) Do the banks have sufficient capital and new collateral to cover the shortfalls arising from foreclosing mortgages without undermining Covered Bonds security?

17/3/2012: Long-term impact of unemployment - US study, Irish implications

An interesting study by Steven Davis and Til Wachter titled "Recessions and the cost of job loss"published by Becker Friedman Institute for Research in Economics Working Paper No. 2011-009 aims to quantify some of the effects of jobs displacement in the recession on cumulative losses in earnings. The study uses microdata from Social Security records for US workers from 1974 to 2008. 


Some findings:

• In present value terms, men lose an average of 1.4 years of re-displacement earnings if displaced in mass layoff events that occur when the US unemployment rate is below 6 percent. 
• Men lose double that - 2.8 years - of pre-displacement earnings if they lose their job when the unemployment rate exceeds 8 percent. 
• To add to authors conclusions: if you think of it in terms of the life-time losses, this is equivalent to roughly 14% loss in life-time earnings. Now, if you put this into a retirement perspective - this amounts to roughly 1/3 of an average funded retirement stream of earnings.
• Some more granularity on the study results: "For men with 3 or more years of prior tenure who lose jobs in mass-layoff events at larger firms, job displacement reduces the present value of future earnings by 12 percent in an average year. The present value losses are high in all years, but they rise steeply with the unemployment rate in the year of displacement. Present value losses for displacements that occur in recessions are nearly twice as large as for displacements in [economic] expansions. The entire future path of earnings losses is much higher for displacements that occur in recessions. In short, the present value earnings losses associated with job displacement are very large, and they are highly sensitive to labor market conditions at the time of displacement."
• The study also finds "large cyclical movements in the incidence of job loss and job displacement and present evidence on how worker anxieties about job loss, wage cuts and job opportunities respond to contemporaneous economic conditions". 
• More specifically on the above point: "Drawing on data from the General Social Survey and Gallup polling, we examine the relationship of anxieties about job loss, wage cuts, ease of job finding and other labor market prospects to actual labor market conditions. The available evidence indicates that cyclical fluctuations in worker perceptions and anxieties track actual labor market conditions rather closely, and that they respond quickly to deteriorations in the economic outlook. Gallup data, in particular, show a tremendous increase in worker anxieties about labor market prospects after the peak of the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. They also show a recent return to the same high levels of anxiety. These data suggest that fears about job loss and other negative labor market outcomes are themselves a significant and costly aspect of economic downturns for a broad segment of the population. These findings also imply that workers are well aware of and concerned about the costly nature of job loss, especially in recessions."

While re-parameterizing the US labour market experience as revealed in the study into that in Ireland is not possible, the above results very clearly point to the extremely significant implications of the current unemployment in Ireland on expected future life-time earnings of a large proportion of our population. In Ireland, we have not even began assessing the impact that current unemployment crisis will have on:

• future economic growth (via earnings-savings-investment and earnings-consumption links which imply that previous unemployment-related reduction in life-time earnings will have significant, potentially double-digit-sized adverse drag on savings, investment and consumption levels, let alone growth rates, into the future) 
• fiscal revenues in the future (via earnings-tax revenues links which imply reduced tax revenues levels from consumption, investment and income taxes into the future) 
• retirement funding and demand for public health and pensions (via earnings-savings-investment links which imply reduced funding for retirement and private health)
• education funding for children (via reduced earnings of parent impact on children education) and
• the links between current debt levels, property markets, future investment and economic activity.

Neither do the above results cover the Irish-specific case of household wealth destruction and debt overhang accompanying the stratospheric rise of unemployment.

5/3/2012: Services & Manufacturing Employment - PMI data for February

In previous posts I have covered new data on Manufacturing PMI and Services PMI. In this post, I will look closer at Employment sub-indices by these two broad sectors.

As before, all original data is courtesy of NCB, with analysis provided by myself. Some of the indices reported are derived by me on the basis of proprietary models and are labeled/identified as such.

Chart above shows core PMIs for Services and Manufacturing, highlighting the following changes:

• Manufacturing PMI moved from 48.3 in January to 49.7 in February, remaining below 50 line, signaling weaker contraction mom. 12mo MA is now at 50.3 and Q1 2012 average running is 49.0 against Q4 2011 average of 49.1.
• Services PMI has improved from contractionary 48.3 in January to expansionary 53.3 in February, with 12mo MA at 51.0 below february reading. Q1 2012 running average is 50.8 and it is almost identical to 50.9 average for Q4 2011.
• Volatility of Manufacturing PMI had risen from the STDEV of 4.48 in 2000-present sample to 5.62 for 2008-present sub-sample (crisis period), while volatility of Services PMI had fallen from 7.75 in 2000-present to 6.60 in 2008-present.

The chart below summarizes Employment sub-indices for Services and Manufacturing PMIs:

• Employment index in Manufacturing has deteriorated from 49.5 (contractionary) in January to 49.3 in February, with 12mo MA now at 49.9, Q1 2012 running average of 49.4 and Q4 2011 average of 48.6.
• Employment index in Manufacturing has become more volatile during the crisis, with STDEV rising from 4.41 for the sample of 2000-present to 5.51 for the crisis-period sample.
• Employment index in Services has improved from contractionary 44.5 in January to still contractionary 47.9 in February, with 12mo MA at 47.7 and Q1 2012 running average of 46.2 against Q4 2011 average of 47.3.
• Employment in Services is less volatile since the crisis on-set, with STDEV of index running at 6.71 for the sample of 2000-present against crisis period STDEV of 5.64.
• Overall, Employment index in Services is virtually as volatile during the crisis period as the Employment index in Manufacturing. However, before the crisis onset, and historically overall, employment was much less volatile in Manufacturing than in Services. This suggests, given strong growth of our exports in Manufacturing compared to Services, that most of our current exports boom is explained not by real economic activity, but by transfer pricing - a conjecture supported by my analysis of the trade data here. Note, that this is also consistent with lower overall employment and lack of jobs creation despite the relatively strong singlas coming from the PMIs in both sectors.

Charts below clearly show that our 'exports-led' recovery is not creating jobs and is instead associated with overall net jobs destruction continuing to rage across the economy.

So what is going on? we can only speculate, but in my view, 


Reasons why our Services PMI growth is not translating into jobs creation are: 
(1) much of growth is due to transfer pricing via IFSC & likes, 
(2) Maj of services exports are not labour intensive (hours worked) but skills intensive (high-end skills generating high value added), 
(3) Domestic services continue to shrink (retail etc), 
(4) Profit margins are very severely strained - so profitability has ben shrinking since end of 2007 every month, implying cuts in employment to raise productivity, 
(5) Many of jobs in services exports are NOT employing domestic workers as lack of skills drives these jobs into international markets. And these are the growth areas, while domestic employment sectors are shrinking. 


Incidentally, this is not new. 


Since the beginning of data series, in Manufacturing, we had 33 months characterized by rising unemployment and rising exports (exports-led jobless recovery) against 43 months of jobs-creating exports-led growth. So there is a 43.4% chance that any recovery in Irish manufacturing will be jobless. This chance is much higher during the current crisis, with 20 monthly episodes of jobless recovery against just 8 jobs-creating recovery episodes.


Similarly, in Services, since the beginning of the data history, we had 31 episodes of jobless recoveries against 32 episodes of jobs-creating exports growth. So probability of 49.2% is associated with seeing jobless recovery if a recovery is exports-driven. Since the beginning of this crisis, there were 26 jobless exports-growth episodes against only 1 month when jobs growth coincided with exports growth.


The above, of course, show exactly how fallacious it is to anticipate exports growth to translate into jobs recovery.

30/1/2012: Irish Long-term Unemployment Saga

Unemployment figures, by age - distinguish youth and adult unemployment - have been preoccupying many analysts in recent weeks. Loads of media attention has been paid - internationally, if not in Ireland - to the plight of youth unemployment. In the next several posts, I will take a closer look at the data for EU27, including Ireland. All of the data comes courtesy of the Eurostat and covers the latest available period Q3 2011.

First, let's take a look at long term unemployment (defined as unemployment spell of 12 months or more) and very long-term unemployment (defined as 24 months or more).

Table below summarizes the data:

As you can see, we are not exactly a good performer. Prior to the crisis, Irish long-term unemployment averaged just 1.4% of the active age population - 23rd lowest in the group of EU27 plus Norway. In Q3 2011 our long-term unemployment stood at 8.8% - the third highest in the sample of 28 states. Over the period covered we have experienced an increase in long-term unemployment of 7.4 percentage points - the steepest rise in the EU27+Norway.

Matters are even worse when it comes to very long-term unemployment, where our rate has moved from  0.7% average for Q3 readings pre-crisis to 5.4% in Q3 2011 - an increase of 4.7 percentage points. Only Slovakia (6.0%) is worse performer than Ireland in terms of overall very long-term unemployment rate and we are the absolute worst in the EU27 + Norway group in terms of increase in very long-term unemployment.

Here is a chart to illustrate some of the above:

\Broken down by gender:

Long-term unemployment rates for men and women:

Ireland used to rank 22 in the EU 27+Norway in the size of its long-term unemployment pool amongst the males prior to the crisis. By Q3 2011 we had the highest rate of male long-term unemployment. We fared much better in terms of long-term female unemployment, moving from the lowest unemployment in the sample of countries prior to the crisis to 9th highest position. However, in both male and female long-term unemployment, Ireland experienced the largest and second largest, respectively, increases during the crisis.

Things are even worse for Irish very long-term unemployed figures. Prior to the crisis, very long term unemployment amongst Irish males averaged 1.0% (22nd highest in the EU27+Norway). In Q3 2011 that number rose to 7.5% (the highest in the EU27+Norway). This increase was the largest in the sample of countries over the period.

Very long-term unemployment amongst the females in Ireland averaged just 0.4% in pre-crisis period - third lowest in the EU27+Norway sample. In Q3 2011 this rose to 2.4% - 10th highest reading in the sample. Ireland's rate of increase in female very long-term unemployment was the fastest in the EU27 + Norway group of countries.

In the next post we will take a look at the unemployment figures by age.

20/12/2011: IMF IV Review of Ireland Programme: part 3

In the previous two posts I covered the IMF analysis of mortgages arrears and budgetary dynamics. Here, let's focus on IMF forward-looking analysis for 2012.

"Given the strong growth in the first half, real GDP growth has been revised up to 1.1 percent
in 2011 from 0.4 percent in the most recent WEO projection. However, nominal GDP would
be essentially flat in 2011 given a projected 1 percent decline in the GDP deflator owing to a
deterioration in the terms of trade." [You can read this as follows: we repay debt out of nominal GDP. Which is flat. Thus our capacity to repay our debts in 2011 remains identical to that in 2010. Another year, and not any closer to the elusive - and utterly unattainable, of course - goal of paying down our total debts.]

"Further deceleration in external trade prevents any growth pick-up in the baseline in 2012. Growth projected for key trading partners—the euro area, the U.S. and the U.K. account for 80 percent of exports—has been revised down from 2 percent at the Third Review to 1½ percent currently (export-weighted). The non-cyclicality of pharmaceutical exports and recent improvements in competitiveness help mitigate the impact of lower demand, nonetheless, projected Irish export growth in 2012 has been revised down from 5¼ percent to 3¾ percent. Domestic demand will continue to contract, leaving GDP growth at 1 percent in 2012, down from 1.9 percent at the previous review. Low growth allows only a small reduction in unemployment in 2012. Inflation would remain low at about 1 percent in 2012, as higher indirect tax rates broadly offset the impact of weaker international price pressures." [So, in a summary: if pharma exports remain as they are - no patent cliff effects etc - we will grow at 1% in 2012, unemployment will decline slightly solely due to exits from the labor force and emigration, and high taxes will hammer domestic demand, thus driving down inflation. Did I hear 'stagnation' said anywhere?]

"Overall, growth is expected to average 2¾ percent over 2013–15, but the unemployment rate may remain in double-digits through 2016, risking the development of sizeable structural unemployment." [In other words, the growth rate IMF builds in assumes 2012 growth of 1.0%, 2013 growth of 2.3%, 2014 of 2.7% and 2015 of 3%. Department of Finance projects growth of 1.3-1.6% for 2012 (+0.3-0.6% on IMF), 2.4% in 2013 (+0.1% on IMF), and 3% in 2014 and 2015. Cumulative departure over 2012-2015 between IMF forecasts and DofF/Budget 2012 forecasts is, therefore, at 0.75-1.08 percent. If anything, were the IMF to be correct in their assumptions, Ireland will need some additional cuts of 0.02-0.03% of 2015 GDP - €172-204mln. If, however, the IMF itself is over-optimistic and Irish GDP growth were to come in at 2.5% average for the 2013-2015 period instead of 2.75%, the shortfall on targets will be as high as €293mln. And that's just the growth estimates effects.]

Importantly, the IMF revised its previous forecasts for 2015 deficit of 2.9% in line with the Government plans. However, debt/GDP ratio remains projected to peak at 118.1% in 2013 and this reflects adjustments for the €3.72bn 'Cardiff error'.

"Debt-to-GDP is projected to peak at 118 percent in 2013, in line with the previous review. The debt path is lowered by a correction to the end-2010 general government debt level and the reduced interest rate on EU loans, but this is offset by lower projections for nominal GDP. Potential privatization receipts could lower debt prospects, while outlays to restructure the credit union sector could raise debt prospects, but such outlays are expected to be manageable. External developments affecting growth and the prospective interest rates on market financing are the key sources of risk to debt sustainability."[The assumption is that projected cost of credit unions losses covers will be €500-1,000mln only.]

But don't worry - Government revenues are going to be very transparent. Per IMF analysis, in effect, the entire revenue adjustment forward will be carried through income taxes:

Perhaps a telling thing about the report is that the entire 'growth policies' section of the review is given less space than the reforms of the credit unions. What is given, however, is bizarrely thin on ideas and impact.

Most of the 'measures' referenced reflect focus on Employment Regulation Orders (EROs) or Registered Employment Agreements (REA) review - a measure that is likely to produce some labour cost reductions in the construction sector and perhaps some other labor intensive, lower-wage sectors. However, it is simply naive to believe that labor costs hold back jobs creation in retail, hospitality and construction. Instead, market structure, lack of consumer demand, Nama - for construction, banks credit availability and, above all, devastated personal incomes of those still working (via taxes hits and earnings declines) are the main drivers for lack of jobs creation in these sector. Review of wage setting mechanisms might be a high enough priority, but it is not the highest by any possible means.

Apart from that, IMF Megaminds have nothing else to say about jobs creation.

In the next post, I will focus on the IMF review of risks with respect to fiscal consolidation and growth.

12/12/2011: QNHS Q3 2011 - Take 2

Another quick note on the QNHS latest data:

• Total labour force is now down 147,600 on peak levels
• Total employment is down 346,800 on peak levels
• The demographic dividend is bust.

Table of sectoral changes to summarize latest data (note, public sector data is from the main QNHS, so it is less accurate than data reported in previous post):

Notable differences arise in terms of part-time and ful-time employment changes. relative to pre-crisis levels, full-time employment is down 21.5% while part-time employment is up 9.6%. Thus, overall quality of employment is deteriorating rapidly. But while yoy full-time employment is being displaced by part-time employment -3.69% to +1.76%, qoq both part-time and full-time employment is shrinking.

Relative to pre-crisis levels, employment is down in all sectors except Transportation & Storage (+3.28%),  ICT (+9.35%),  Education (+3.02%), and Human Health and Social Work Activities (+9.46%).

Overall number in employment is down 15.82% on pre-crisis levels. Meanwhile, of sectors that posted declines in employment over the same period:

• Largest declines were recorded in the collapsed Construction (-59.53%), in the allegedly-booming Agriculture, forestry and fishing (-28.9%) and Industry (-23.25%). 
• In addition, Administrative and support services (-20.25%) and Accommodation and food service activities (-18.01%) posted deeper than average cuts.
• Shallow cuts were recorded in Financial, insurance and real estate activities (-6.12%) and Public administration and defence; compulsory social security (-5.45%)

12/12/2011: QNHS Q3 2011

Headline unemployment number out of QNHS for Q3 2011 is at 14.4% up on 14.2% in Q2. This is bad, but not as bad as two other core labour market performance parameters.

On a seasonally adjusted basis, Irish employment fell by 20,500 (-1.1%) in Q3 2011. This follows on from a seasonally adjusted fall in employment of 4,100 (-0.2%) in Q2 2011 - an acceleration of 5-fold!

Unemployment increased by 15,700 (+5.3%) in the year to Q3 2011 and the total number of persons unemployed now stands at 314,700.

Meanwhile, the long-term unemployment rate increased from 6.5% to 8.4% over the year to Q3 2011. Long-term unemployment accounted for 56.3% of total unemployment in Q3 2011 compared with 47.0% a year earlier and 25.5% in the third quarter of 2009.

The total number of persons in the labour force in the third quarter of 2011 was 2,120,300, representing a decrease of 30,200 (-1.4%) over the year. This compares with a labour force decrease of 51,800 (-2.4%) in the year to Q3 2010.

Charts to illustrate the above:

Adding to this emigration, the above chart paints the picture of mass-exodus from the labour force, most likely due to twin effects: layoffs and tax increases.

Now, updating figures for public v private sector employment:

 CSO provides more accurate, by their own admission, figures for public sector employment in the Table A3 of the QNHS release. Here is the summary, excluding temporary Census 2011 staff:

• Civil service employment in Q3 2011 stood at 39,900, up on Q1 2011 39,500 reading and unchanged on Q3 2010. In Q3 2008 the same number stood at 43,000 so net reductions on pre-crisis level are 3,100 or 7.2%.
• Total public sector excluding Semi-State bodies stood at 339,900 in Q3 2011, down 8,400 on Q3 2010 and 5.6% lower than in Q3 2008.
• Total public sector employment including Semi-State bodies is now at 392,900, down from 399,000 in Q1 2011 and down 8,200 on Q3 2010. Compared to Q3 2008, public sector total employment is down 24,000 or 5.8%.
• Total private sector employment is at 1,123,600, down from 1,147,800 (-2.1%) year on year and down 194,800 on pre-crisis levels or -14.8%.

So to summarize - public sector employment is down 5.8% relative to pre-crisis levels, while private sector employment is down 14.8%.

30/11/2011: Live Register for November: Monthly Rates of Change

In a follow-up on the previous post, here are monthly changes in Live Register for the duration of the crisis. It is worth noting that Live Register volatility has markedly improved during the last 23 months. Standard deviation in monthly changes in LR for the entire pre-crisis history is 6,935, for the period of the crisis (January 2008-present) it stands at 7,511 (statistically significantly above the pre-crisis levels), but since January 2010 it stands at 2,587 (estimate is small-sample adjusted). Historical STDEV is 7,723, indistinct from the crisis period volatility.

So that chart:

20/11/2011: Live Register - November

Live Register continued a parade of weaker Irish economy performance indicators for Q4 2011. Here are the headlines and updates.

November LR-implied unemployment rate edged up by another 10bps to 14.5% getting closer to 12mo high of 14.6% back in December 2010.

In absolute seasonally-adjusted terms, there are now 448,600 people on LR, up 1,700 month on month from October 2011. Year on year, LR rose 3,700 or +0.83%, back in October, year on year LR stood at 300 down on October 2010 (-0.07%). 3mo MA through November 2011 is 0.13% below 3mo MA through November 2010. In 3 months through November 2011, LR posted zero cumulative change, which contrasts with a decline of 2,200 over 3 months through November 2010 and 4,500 increase in LR for 3 months through August 2011. In 6 months through November 2011 LR rose 4,500, while in January-November LR rose 2,500.

Overall, seasonally adjusted LR number currently stands at the second highest level in history (same level was also attained in August this year and the highest level of 449,400 was attained in September 2010.

Numbers of casual and part-time workers rose once again from 85,029 in October to 86,612 in November or 1,583 mom (+1.86%). Year on year the number of part-time workers rose 6,404 (+7.98%). 3mo MA through November 2011 is up 8.79% year on year.

percentage of non-Irish nationals on LR rose from 17.43% in october to 17.58% in November as decline of 1,347 Irish nationals on LR mom was offset by an increase of 482 non-Irish nationals over the same period. Year on year, numbers of non-nationals on LR is up 737 or 0.99% while number of Irish nationals is up 3,828 or +1.09%. However, last 3mo saw an increase of 0.051% in non-Irish nationals on LR and an increase of 0.033% for Irish nationals.

Per CSO: "The number of long term claimants on the Live Register in November 2011 was 179,890. The number of male long term claimants increased by 19,939 (+18.1%) in the year to November 2011, while the comparable increase for females was 9,624 (+24.1%) giving an overall annual increase of 29,563 (+19.7%) in the number of long term claimants. This rate of increase in long term claimants has been slowing through the year with an annual increase of 57,597 (55.9%) having been recorded in January 2011." I am quite puzzled by CSO's apparent selective interpretation of this data, which appears to present the "positive" side of statistics. The slowdown in the rate of increases in long term claimants appears to be in line with overall slowdown in the rate of increase in the series for unemployment. January 2011 transition rates referenced Q3 2009-Q4 2009 net signees - of which there were, you guessed it, 25,400. But November 2011 transition rates are referencing net signees for Q2 2010-Q3 2010 - of which there were 10,200. So some better analysis would have done here for CSO.

05/11/2011: Jobs destruction in Ireland 2008-2010

So we had the Celtic Tiger, now we are having a Celtic Bust. Our extreme (for a young, small open economy with high levels of tertiary education - in numbers, if not quality - etc). But how do we stack up against other advanced economies in this area?

Here's some data from the OECD covering the period of the crisis (2008-2010, no annual data for 2011 yet) on jobs destruction in Ireland, compared to same in other advanced economies.

For a small economy, even in absolute terms, the number of jobs lost in Ireland in 2008-2010 period was 261,000 or 8th largest loss in the sample of 24 advanced economies. Net of new jobs created (+11,000), Irish economy lost 251,000 (note rounding differences) jobs in the period covered. The net loss we sustained in terms of jobs destruction in absolute terms was the 5th largest in the advanced economies sample.

Chart below puts the above numbers in relative context. As a percentage of total employment, Irish net jobs destruction was 12.2% - second highest after Estonia.

In terms of sectors most severely impacted by losses, Construction leads with 87.8% share of all jobs changes during the crisis. Surprisingly - being the source of so much destruction via Irish domestic banking collapse - Financial Services jobs category posted the shallowest jobs declines at 15.1%. This is most likely due to the lack of layoffs in the state-controlled banking sector, plus the resilience of the IFSC. The only sector that saw increases in jobs numbers is the sector of Community, social and personal services.

03/11/2011: Another shallow rise in unemployment

The Live Register figures are out for October with standardized (LR-implied) rate of unemployment inching up to 14.4%. Here are the details.

Live Register-implied Standardized Unemployment Rate (SUR) rose from 14.3% in September to 14.4% in October, matching the levels in July and August. 14.4% is the highest level SUR reached in 10 months through October 2011 and the third highest since the crisis began (note that 14.4% SUR was recorded in 4 months since the crisis began). October 2011 SUR is now identical to that recored in October 2010Chart below illustrates.

Overall, seasonally-adjusted LR rose to 447,100 in October 2011, up 2,700 on September 2011. year on year, LR fell 300 (-0.07%). In September 2011, LR declined 4,300 mom and fell 5,400 yoy (-1.2% yoy). 3mo average through October 2011 is down 0.31% yoy. As shown below, we have a virtually flat trend.

Seasonally-adjusted LR numbers for those 25 years of age and older rose 2,100, from 364,000 in September to 366,100 in October. Year on year the number of 25 years and older workers on LR is up 2,600 (+0.72%) and 3mo average through October is 1.4% above the same period yoy. The numbers of under 25-yo workers on LR increased 500 (+0.62%) from 80,400 in September to 80,900 in October 2011. However, year on year, the number of young workers on LR fell 5,700 (-6.6%) - a shallower fall than in September 2011, but a significant decline. Overall, this suggests that younger workers exits into education, emigration and general falling out of the benefits net can be a significant source for moderating trends in LR figures overall in recent months.

Casual and part-time workers counts on LR rose 1,012 (+1.2%) from 84,017 in September to 85,029 in October 2011. 3mo average through October is now 9.1% above the same period in 2010 and year on year October reading is 7,105 (+9.1%) ahead of October 2010 level. Chart below illustrates.

Numbers of non-nationals on LR fell 384 in October to 75,037 - a decline of 0.51% and are up year on year by 402 (+0.54%). Numbers of Irish nationals on LR declined 6,625 mom (-1.83%) and are up 477 yoy (+0.13%). For both series there were small (less than 0.22%) declines in 3mo average through october, yoy. Please remember - these are not seasonally adjusted.

Per CSO release, "in October 58.2% (250,659) of all claimants on the Live Register were short term claimants. The comparable figure for October 2010 was 65.6% (281,945)." The annual fall of 31,286 (-11.1%) was recorded in the number of short term claimants. "The number of long term claimants on the Live Register in October 2011 was 179,773", up  32,165 (+21.8%) yoy. "This rate of increase in long term claimants has been slowing through the year with an annual increase of 57,597 (55.9%) having been recorded in January 2011."

The rate of increase, however, can be slowing due to several factors not mentioned by the CSO, such as draw down in LR numbers due to training programmes participation, emigration and dropping out of unemployed second earners from the labour force and LR benefits.

05/11/2011: Live Register surprises on improvement side

According to the latest Live Register data, standardised unemployment rate in September 2011 was 14.3%, down slightly from a rate of 14.4% in August and in line with the latest seasonally adjusted unemployment rate from QNHS (14.2%) for Q2 2011. The average unemployment rate during 2010 was 13.6% while the average rate for 9mos of 2011 to-date is 14.2%.

On a seasonally adjusted basis there was a decrease of 5,400 (-1.2%) on the Live Register in the month to September 2011 bringing the seasonally adjusted total to 442,200. Per CSO: "This decrease follows four consecutive months of relatively low increases in the seasonally adjusted series. Over the last twelve months the seasonally adjusted Live Register has remained in the relatively narrow range of

441,600 to 447,900". Importantly:

• We now have the largest decrease in seasonally adjusted LR since September 2007.
• Year on year LR declined 5,700 or 1.28% against previous month year-on-year increase of 1,200 (+0.27%)
• Q3 2011 average LR is now up 0.39% on Q2 2011 and 0.15% down on Q3 2010.

The above suggest significant decreases in LR, although the source of these decrease is unclear, as exits from benefits and/or emigration would reflect positively on LR figures, while having an adverse impact on overall economy.

Charts above illustrate the two trends - one of moderating decrease in LR and the other chart showing just how significant the drop of 5,700 is compared to historical monthly changes.

On a seasonally adjusted basis there were monthly decreases of 3,000 males and 2,400 females on the Live Register in September 2011 which implies that female unemployment (of lesser vintage than average male unemployment) is somewhat sticker for now. The same is confirmed by the annual data, with the number of female claimants increasing by 2,834 (+1.9%) to 155,453 over the year, while the number of male claimants decreasing by 7,810 (-2.7%) to 281,988.

The number of long term claimants on the Live Register continued to increase over the year with 41.9% of claimants in September 2011 on the Live Register for one year or more, up on 33.4% in September 2010.

Trends for national v foreign workers on LR and for casual and part-time LR signees are illustrated below:

So on the net - the new data is encouragingly strong on monthly decline side, but requires further confirmations in October-December to raise confidence that we are witnessing a sustained trend. It also requires cross-referencing to changes in the labour force that can only be performed using QNHS results for Q3.

05/10/2011: Employment conditions in Services & Manufacturing

September PMI for Manufacturing and Services have signaled continued weaknesses in much of the activity, including:

• Core PMIs: Manufacturing PMI sliding deeper into red at 47.3 in September against 49.7 in August, while Services PMI posting weak growth at 51.3 in September up from 51.1 in August.
• Overall New Business Activity falling for Services from already contractionary 47.9 in August to 47.5 in September. In Manufacturing, New Orders activity fell from 57.7 in August to a miserable 45.8 in September.
• Much of the above performance is posting repeats month on month since May-June 2011 and there is little hope for this to change any time soon.

However, it is in the employment sub-indices where the entire nature of our exports-led 'recovery' becomes apparent.

• Employment sub-index in Manufacturing in September stood at 46.5 down from 51.1 in August, with year-to-date average of 50.7 and Q3 2011 average of 48.9.
• Employment sub-index in Services in September was 46.0 down from 48.2 in August, marking the fifth consecutive month of contracting employment.

The chart below shows clearly that we are in a jobless 'recovery' scenario for Services (with 'recovery' part of the equation being extremely weak) and in recession scenario for Manufacturing:

And the next chart shows that the 'exports-led recovery' tale is not alleviating the misery of unemployment reality, as predicted.