23/2/18: Ireland's Migration Policies are Working Well

How to do immigration policy right? Ireland's CSO has published some new data on educational attainment in Ireland, covering 2017 results. The data is available here: http://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/eda/educationalattainmentthematicreport2017/. One table stands out on the issue of migration:

Click on the image to enlarge

Despite the report itself focusing on 3rd level attainment as a 'catch all' category, what really matters in terms of future quality of the workforce is more advanced education. And in this area, Irish migration system shines. Both, EU15 ex-Ireland & UK and non-EU migration pathways are working to enhance the stock of human capital in the country when it comes to honours tertiary degrees and post-tertiary education.

This is amazing, because the two pathways are distinct in terms of regulations covering mobility (access for immigrants). And both seem to be working well.

Of course, other factors contribute, beyond policy / regulatory facilitation, including Ireland's amazingly open society, welcoming people and social networks that support easy integration of those who want to integrate. But Ireland's policymakers and civil servants, who often act as the early contributors to this mobility also deserve credit. While problems and bottlenecks remain and need addressing, credit should be given where credit is due.

2/9/15: House prices, rents and Irish demographics

Based on latest data from CSO, Dublin has gained disproportionately in population compared to the rest of the country in 12 months through April 2015. At the top level, Dublin population rose 30,700 in 2015 compared to overall state population rise of 25,800, which implies that ex-Dublin, the country lost population at the rate of 4,900. Dublin v rest of the state population changes were even more dramatic when one considers age distribution.

• Population aged 0-19 years rose in Dublin by 15,700 in 2015. The same group numbers increased state-wide by 19,600. Which means ex-Dublin, younger population rose only 3,900 against Dublin's 15,700. This highlights family formation dynamics in Dublin as opposed to the rest of the country.
• Younger working-age population (age 20-29) fell in Dublin by 5,700 in 2015. Across the country, the decline was 25,400. Which means that ex-Dublin, younger working-age population has declined by 19,700.
• The main cohort of working-age population (30-64 years old) has risen in Dublin by 15,700 in 2015 compared to 2014. Across the country the increase was 14,100, which implies that ex-Dublin, the state lost 1,600 adults in the main working age cohort.
• Older population dynamics were also in favour of Dublin. In 12 months through April 2015, population aged 65 and older rose in Dublin by 4,900 and it was up nationwide by 25,800. Which means that ex-Dublin, older age population rose 20,900.

The above dynamics suggest demographic support for rising property prices and rents in Dublin, as was suggested by some analysts. This may or may not be so, since population dynamics work over years, not in simple y/y terms. So let's take a look at relative changes in Dublin population compared to the rest of the state:

Dublin population, as % of state-wide population of core home ownership demographic that transacts on the purchasing side of the market (30-64 year olds) has been rising overall since falling to 27.5% in 2010 and is currently standing at 28.9%, still below 29.6% high in 1996. But the rental demographic of 20-29 year olds has shown different dynamics, reaching period trough in 2013 (at 32.3%) and rising since then to 33.1% in 2015, a level consistent with 2011. Neither suggests huge uplift in demand for rentals or owner-occupied homes.

Of course, these are cohorts of 2015. Back in 2007, when house loans were last available in plentiful supply, large share of purchasers demographic today was… err… renters. And absent credit for house purchases, as this demographic moved into purchasing age, they stayed renters.  This would suggest increased pressures on rents. But the picture is more messed up by the losses of population share in 20-29 years old group, most likely due to emigration. Longer tenure for children staying in parents' homes also should have held rents back. In other words, our traditional view of demographic distribution of buyers v renters has been messed up by the sheer duration of the current crisis.

Take 2010-2015 period. Over that time, Dublin population of 20-29 year olds fell 61,000 and across the rest of the country, this cohort numbers fell 123,000. But cohort of 30-64 year olds rose in Dublin by 60,900 against a rise of 47,600 in the rest of the country. Demand based on demographics, therefore, suggests swing from renting toward purchasing. Similar picture repeats if we take 2011-2015 cumulative changes and 2012-2015 and 2013-2015. And, still, rents were rising.

What is more mysterious is that overall working age population has been relatively mildly altered in recent years. In Dublin, working age cohort (20-64 year olds) has grown by just 10,000 in 2014-2015 period and it is up only 8,000 on 2012. The cohort is still down 13,300 on 2008. Across the country, ex-Dublin, things were much worse: since 2008 the cohort fell 62,200 and compared to 2014 it is now down 21,300. In simple terms, unless children and retirees are buying homes, there shouldn't be any dramatic uplifts in demand for property in Dublin, and most certainly outside Dublin.

Which goes to say that any claims about actual demand (based on numbers of potential renters and buyers) are a bit strained. In 2008, there were 821,200 people of age 20-64 living in Dublin. Today there are 807,900. Unemployment rose over that time too. So where is that tremendous growth in demand coming from to push property prices up? Property prices in Dublin hit a period trough in 2012. Since then, there has been a net increase of just 8,000 in 20-64 year olds cohort living in Dublin. Again, where is that spiking in demand coming from?

In my view, simple demographics do not explain Irish property prices uptick from crisis lows. Speculation and latent surplus of savings in a relatively small category of Irish residents (and ex-past), plus re-distribution within cohorts between renters and buyers are the main drivers on demand side of the equation. Supply side also contributes significantly to prices uptick. And beyond that, there has to be significant behavioural component: our addiction to property - despite all the hopes of Dublin 'planners' for an Amsterdam on the Liffey - has not gone away over the years of the crisis. The first, initial shock to the economy has had an effect of scaring us put of the markets for property. Negative equity contributed more downward momentum. But once we learned to live with our fears, we simply decided o turn back to our old model of family investment: bricks and mortar. 

30/8/15: Migration & Changes in Irish Population: Working Age Population

In two previous posts, I looked at Irish migration and population changes data from the point of:
- Top level analysis of migration and natural changes in population; and
- Migration trends by nationality.

Continuing with analysis of population data from CSO released earlier this week, let's take a look at the age composition of population.

In what follows, I define two key categories within our population:

• Working age group - population aged 20 years through 64 years. This is an approximate definition, and I prefer it to including 15-20 year olds into it, primarily because it allows for more accurate reflection of numbers in full time education. There are many caveats applicable here, so take the approximation for what it is - indicative, rather than definitive.
• Non-working age population (rest of population). Again, that is not to say that younger students do not work (at least part-time) or that people beyond 65 years of age do not work. Some do. Majority do not. When many do work, they work less hours than is required to sustain independent living, so they still rely on either pensions or social transfers or family transfers or any permutations of the three to sustain themselves.

In simple terms, mindful of all caveats, etc, a ratio of working age population to non-working age population tells so a bit about how high is the dependency weight in the society due to age distribution in population. Lower ratio means fewer working age adults having to sustain themselves and non-working age people. By sustain I mean economically sustain - by working and adding value in the economy.


Chart below shows distribution of changes in working age population and non-working age population in y/y and cumulatively from 2008:

What stands out in the chart?

1. Working age population overall has been in decline since 2010. In cumulative terms, number of working age adults has fallen 2.7% on 2008 level by April 2015 - a decline of 75,500. In 2015, the rate of decline was 0.4% - more moderate than in three previous years, but still steeper than 2010-2011 average.
2. Non-working age population remains on the rise for every year covered by the CSO series and the rate of increase in 2015 (at 2%) was the highest since 2010. Overall, over 2008-2015 period, non-working age population those 13.3% or 225,900.
3. The gap between working age population and non-working age population is now at 798,400 - the worst reading in series history and 301,400 worse than in 2008.

As the result of the above trends, ratio of working age population to non-working age population continued to fall precipitously in 2015:

In 2015, the ratio of working age population to non-working age population was 1.42 - meaning that for each non-working age person, there were 1.42 working age adults. This does not correct for the working age adults who are not in the labour force as well as for the unemployed. The best performance year in this metric was 2007 when the ratio was 1.66. In other words, in 2015, there were 24 fewer working age adults per each 100 non-working age persons than in 2007.

29/8/15: Migration & Natural Changes in Irish Population: Migration by Nationality

Having looked in the previous post at top level data for population changes in Ireland reported by CSO, now let's take a look at composition of migrants flows by nationality. This is going to be charts-heavy.

Let's start with immigration flows. Chart below shows Immigration into Ireland over the recent years:

Several interesting aspects of this jump out:

1. There has been a significant increase of inflows of people from the 'Rest of the World' (ex-EU). Numbers of those coming into Ireland from outside the EU are up at 30,400 in 2015 from 25,500 in 2014. Pre-2015, average annual inflows of immigrants from outside the EU was 15,722, so last year things were pretty much ahead of the average for the third year in a row. Much of this is probably driven by big hiring numbers from multinationals which are increasingly moving their EMEA and MENA operations into Ireland. 
2. There has been a small uptick in the number of new comers from the Accession States (EU12), the numbers of which rose to 12,800 in 2015 compared to 10,000 in 2014. This is the second highest inflow rate since the start of the crisis. 2006-2014 average for these inflows (29,078) is still significantly above 2015 figure. Again, I would suspect that much of this increase is accounted for by MNCs and also by demand for particular skills. Note: I will blogging on skills matters subsequently in a separate post.
3. There has been virtually no change in inflows of people from the UK over the last 3 years, so nothing worth spotting here in terms of trends. Rest of EU-15 immigration flows also were relatively static, up to 8,900 in 2015 compared to 8,700 in 2014. Nonetheless, this has been the busiest year for EU15 migration inflows (ex-UK and Ireland) for some time - since 2009.
4. Number of Irish nationals returning rose from 11,600 in 2014 to 12,100 in 2015. Which, kind of directly flies in the face of a number of media reports about 'returning migrants'. Apparently, the migrants are not quite returning, as current rate of immigration in Ireland by Irish nationals was the second slowest on record and much closer to the lowest year (2014) than to the third lowest (2013).

Now, consider emigration figures:

Again, few things worth a closer look:

1. Irish emigration continued to decline in 2015 for the second year in a row. 2014 emigration of Irish nationals stood at 35,300 down from 40,700 in 2014 and down substantially on crisis period peak of 50,900 in 2013. The rate of emigration is now closer to 2006-2014 average of 29,444 that before, but it is still substantially above that number. Crucially, in more normal times, emigration by Irish nationals stood at around 13,700, which is well below current levels.
2. Emigration by UK nationals out of Ireland remained pretty much stable and on-trend. Historical pre-2015 average is for annual outflow of 3,467 and in 2015 the number was 3,800. Emigration by the nationals of the EU15 states (ex-UK and Ireland) was up in 2015 at 15,600 compared to 14,000 in 2014. The rate is rising now for two years and is well ahead of 9,078 average for 2006-2014 period. This is interesting, as it reflects some shift in MNCs employment: in the past, MNCs were focusing much of their hiring on old EU markets, demanding language skills from these countries. Now, it seems the momentum is shifting toward ex-EU15 markets. Notably, pre-crisis average emigration by EU15 nationals stood at 6,667 per annum, very substantially below the 2015 figure.
3. In contrast to EU15 pattern, emigration by the Accession EU12 nationals fell significantly in 2015 to 8,500 from 10,100 in 2014. This is the slowest rate of outflow for any year from 2007 on and significantly below the 2006-2014 average annual rate of outflow of 15,478.
4. Rest of the World (ex-EU) emigration picked up, rising to 17,700 in 2015 compared to 14,100 in 2014 and against the 2006-2014 average of 9,9833. The reason for this, most likely, is the turnover of MNCs-employed tech workers and specialists who tend to stay in Ireland for 2-3 years and subsequently leave. 

So last remaking bit of analysis will have to cover net immigration / emigration:

As consistent with the number discussed above:

1. Rate of net immigration from the 'Rest of the World' (ex-EU) picked up somewhat in 2015, rising to 12,700 from 11,200 in 2014. This is the highest rate of net increase in ex-EU population in Ireland for any year between 2006 and 2015.
2. Second noticeable change in 2015 was positive contribution of EU12 (Accession states) nationals, with their net immigration at 4,300 in 2015 marking the first positive net result since 2008.
3. EU15 (ex-UK and Ireland) net emigration remained significant and increased, with 6,700 more nationals of EU15 (ex-UK and Ireland) leaving Ireland than coming into Ireland in 2015, up on 5,300 in 2014. This marks the third year of rising net emigration by EU15 nationals out of Ireland and 6th consecutive year of negative net immigration by this group of residents.
4. Irish nationals net emigration from Ireland remained very substantial in 2015 at 23,200. The number is lower than 29,200 net emigrations recorded in 2014 and the lowest reading in 4 years, but it is still well above the crisis period average. In simple terms, things are getting worse slower in this metric, they are not getting better.

Combined 2008-2015 net movements of people by nationality are shown in the chart below. Since 2008 through April 2015, there are 5,200 more UK nationals residing in Ireland, while the number of EU12 migrants rose 11,100. By far, the largest net emigration on a cumulative basis relates to outflow of Irish nationals: between 2008 and 2015, 132,400 more Irish nationals left the country than came back into the country - annual average rate of net emigration of 16,600 and in 2015 annual net emigration for Irish nationals was 6,700 above that.

29/8/15: Migration & Natural Changes in Irish Population: Top Level Analysis of 2015 data

Irish migration and population data for the 12 months through April 2015 have been published by CSO recently. It is a tough read. 

Let's take a look at overall picture (2015 here references May 2014-April 2015 period as per CSO data):

• There were 67,000 births in 2015, down on 67,700 in 2014 - a decline of 700. Compared to peak births year - 2010 - births are down 10,200.
• There were also 29,600 deaths in 2015, compared to 29,800 in 2014 which is 3,200 lower than peak year (1990), but more significantly - below 2013 and 2014 readings. 
• Which means that natural increase in population was 37,400 in 2015, compared to 37,900 in 2014. This is the lowest natural rate of population increase since 2006 and it is driven exclusively by decline in birth rate which fell to 1.445% (births as percentage of total population) from 1.469% in 2014. Current birth rate is the lowest since 2001.
• Immigration into Ireland amounted to 69,300 in 2015, an uplift on 60,300 in 2014 and the highest reading since 2009. Immigration has been increasing every year starting with 2013. Note: I will be blogging on quality of immigration and emigration separately, so stay tuned. Current rate of immigration is ahead of 2008-2014 average (64,500) but behind 2000-2007 average (80,100).
• Meanwhile, emigration slipped slightly  - the good news you heard by now, most likely - from 81,900 in 2014 to 80,900 in 2015. This brings 2015 emigration closer to 2011 level (80,600) and lowest in 4 years. However, historical comparisons are still weak: in 2000-2007 average rate of emigration from Ireland was 30,700 and in 2008-2014 period it was 75,571, which means 2015 figure is higher than either pre-crisis average (obvious, really) and crisis period average. 
• Net emigration stood at 11,600 in 2015, down from 21,400 in 2014 - a decline that is accounted for by an 8,700 increase in immigration and by 1,000 decrease in emigration. Thanks to immigrants numbers rising, we are at the lowest crisis period level of net emigration. 

Over 2009-2015, cumulated net outflows of people from Ireland stand at 153,800 - or 3.3% of our population in 2015 - close to 4 last years of combined natural increases in population (births less deaths). Over the last 6 years, average annual net emigration from Ireland stood at 25,900. During the 6 years of 1987-1992 the average was 21,050. even with 2015 decline in net emigration rate, we are still sending more people abroad in the current crisis than in the late-1980s -early 1990s crisis.

Which brings us to the 'opportunity cost' of this emigration, or in simple terms - what would our population be were it not for the crisis. 

First up, our current population estimates: per CSO, in April 2015 there were 4,635,400 people living in Ireland - an increase of 25,800 on same period 2014. The rate of increase was the highest since 2009. Which is all good news. However, the rate of annual population increase in 2015 was lower than 2008-2014 average (33,386) and was way below the 2000-2007 average of 80,100.

Now, let's take three scenarios. Starting with 1997 - the year when majority of us think Ireland's catching up with EA15 states was pretty much well underway and things were not yet fully 'mad' in a Celtic Garfield sense. This is also happens to be the year when net immigration posted the first above zero trend, with 7 year average through 1997 at 4,600 being the first positive 7 year average on record (note, 7 year average is chosen because of the cut-off period and because it corresponds to the duration of the current crisis too). Now, let's define 3 scenarios:

1. Scenario 1: take an average for net migration over 1997-2000 (capturing the period all of can agree was pre-bubble in the property markets) and take projection from 1987 through 2015 at this average net immigration rate and accounting for actual realised natural rate of population change. You get 2015 population at 4,662,700 or 27,300 more people than current official estimated population.
2. Scenario 2: take an average for net migration over 1997-2003 (7 years period), capturing the period that some think was still pretty much pre-Garfield craze and, crucially, before the Accession of 2004 that brought into Ireland significant inflows of Eastern European workers. You get 2015 population of 4,784,500 or 149,100 more people than current official estimated population.
3. Scenario 3: while a bit outlandish, let's just consider the period of the entire Celtic Garfield and take the average net immigration rate at 1997-2007. Extreme, I know, but what the hell. You get 2015 population of 5,701,300 or 1,065,900 more people than current official estimated population.

Stay tuned for more analysis of net migration flows.

27/8/2014: Irish Migration Trends by Nationality: 2014

In the previous post I covered aggregate migration and population data for Ireland for 2014 (data coverage is 12 months through April 2014). The post is available here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2014/08/2782014-migration-population-change-in.html?spref=tw

Now, as promised earlier, lets take a look at the decomposition of the migration data.

First, net migration by nationality:

• Total emigration from Ireland in 12 months through April 2014 stood at 81,900, which is down from 89,000 in the same period 2013 (a decline of 7,100). This marks the first year of decrease in emigration since 2011.
• 40,700 Irish nationals emigrated from Ireland in 12 months through April 2014, down 10,200 on the same period of 2013 and marking the first slowdown in outflows since 2008. Latest rate of emigration for Irish nationals is the lowest reading since 2010.
• Over the 12 months though April 2014, 2,700 UK nationals emigrated from Ireland - which represents a decline in emigration rate for this group of residents of 1,200 y/y. However, this decline was more than off-set by the rise in emigration of 'Rest of EU-15' residents which rose 4,100 y/y to 14,000 in the 12 months through April 2014. 
• The rate of emigration from Ireland for EU12 Accession states nationals slowed down from 14,000 in 12 months through April 2013 to 10,100 in 12 months through April 2014.
• For non-EU nationals, the rate of emigration has accelerated to 14,400 in the 12 months through April 2014 from 10,300 in the same period of 2013.

Thus, for the fifth year in a row, Irish nationals represented the largest group of emigrants from Ireland by total numbers. However, if in 2011-2013 Irish nationals represented more than 50% of the total emigration numbers, in 2014 this fell to 49.7%.

Net emigration figures, however, were less encouraging for the Irish nationals.

• Total net emigration from Ireland stood at 21,400 in 12 months through April 2014, down from 33,100 in April 2013.
• Irish nationals' net emigration rate was running at 29,200 in the 12 months through April 2014, down from 35,200 in 2013, but still above the rate recorded for any other year since 2006.
• In contrast with the trend for the Irish nationals, UK nationals posted another year of rising net immigration into Ireland: 2,200 more UK nationals now reside in the country compared 1,000 more in 2013. Rest of EU-15 group posted an increase in the rate of net emigration from Ireland in 2014 (-5,300) compared to 2013 (-2,500). This made 2014 the worst year for net emigration of this group out of Ireland on record.
• Net emigration of the EU12 Accession states nationals fell to its lowest crisis-period level of 200 in 2014, down from 3,200 in 2013.
• Non-EU nationals recorded net immigration rate of 11,200 in 2014 which represents the highest rate on record (since 2006).

Chart below shows cumulated changes in migration over the period of 2008-2014:

27/8/2014: Migration & Population Change in Ireland: 2014 data

Population and migration estimates for the 12 months period through April 2014 have been finally released by the CSO with a lag of some 4 months. The figures show some marginal improvement in the underlying trends compared to the disastrous 2013, but overall the situation remains bleak.

Let's start with top level figures first and deal with compositional details in the subsequent post.

Births numbers have fallen to the levels last seen in 2007, from 70,500 in 2013 to 67,700 in 2014. Improving labour market and deteriorating personal finances are more likely behind the trend: the former means lower incentives to stay out of labour market and lower incentives to take maternity leave protection, while the latter means increased pressure to generate second income in the family, which is, of course, automatically associated with having to pay extortionate childcare costs. Whatever the drivers are, this is the births rate peaked in 2010 and has been declining since, neatly tracing out labour markets developments. 2014 marks the first year since 2007 that the rate is below 70,000.

Deaths are running at the rate proximate to 2013 and not far off from 2012. This means that the Natural Increase in population has slowed down to 37,900 in 2014 from 40,800 in 2013 and this marks the lowest natural rate of increase since 2006 and the first sub-40,000 rate of increase since 2007.

Immigration rose in 12 months through April 2014 to 60,600 from 55,900 in the 12 months through April 2013. 2014 figure is the highest since 2009. Emigration declined to 81,900 in 2014 against 89,000 in 2013. This is the lowest level of emigration since 2011 when outflow of migrants from the country was running at 80,600.

Net emigration also moderated in 12 months through April 2014, declining from 2013 level of 33,100 to 2014 figure of 21,400. This marks the lowest net emigration rate for the entire crisis period. Which is, undoubtedly, good news. Bad news, we are still in net emigration mode.

With slower rate of net emigration outflows, net change in Irish resident population was positive in 12 months through April 2014, recording an increase of 16,500 y/y, compared to 7,700 rise in 12 months through April 2013.

A chart to illustrate:

Meanwhile, cumulated 2009-2014 emigration amounted to 479,800, cumulated net emigration for the same period amounted to 142,200. These are actual figures recorded. Taking into the account the trends in Irish migration over 2000-2007 period, the 'opportunity cost' of the crisis is the *net* loss of some 521,000 residents relative to where the population could have been were the trends established in 2000-2007 to remain in place.

A chart to illustrate:

As the result of the above changes in actual migration and natural rate of increases in population, we have the following changes in the working and non-working age populations:

• Working-age (20-64 year olds) population stood at 2,728,300 as of the end of April 2014, down 14,500 on a year ago and down 64,200 on 2008.
• As percentage of the total population, working-age population is now standing at 59.2%, the lowest for any period since 2006.
• Non-working age population is up 31,300 to 1,881,600 in 2014 compared to 2013 and up 188,900 on 2008.
• Non-working age population now stands at 40.8%, up on 40.3% in 2013 and the highest for any period since 2006.

Charts to illustrate:

7/3/2014: How are cohorts of immigrants changing?.. 2002-2012 data

This week, CSO published 2012 data on PPSN numbers and employment status of immigrants. The data is telling, makes for uncomfortable reading, and you can explore all the details here: http://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/fnaes/foreignnationalsppsnallocationsemploymentandsocialwelfareactivity2012/#.UxhZ6PTV9bs

Not to run repeats of the CSO own analysis (which is excellent), here are couple of my own insights:

Chart below shows all foreign individuals age 15+ that are either in employment or in social welfare activity, irrespective of their entry year. To strip out any possible y/y volatility, I took averages roughly corresponding to the following periods:
1) Period prior to EU Accession of EU15-25 states (2002-2004)
2) Period of the pre-crisis bubble following Accession (2005-2008) and
3) Period since the onset of the crisis (2009-2012).

I then computed share of each 'nationality' in activity as percent of the total number of nationals of this group in the country at the time.

To control for effects of the overall employment trends, I then took difference for each nationality percentage in activity to the total foreign population percentage in activity.

The result is plotted in the chart.

Arrows in the chart above show overall changes in relative activity in each group/'nationality' over the three periods, relative to overall foreign population activity rates.

For example, EU15 ex Irish and UK nationals group data shows that in 2002-2004, this group was 19.1 percentage points less likely to have been employed or have social welfare activity compared to the all foreign nationals. By 2005-2008 period this number fell to 2.7 percentage points. Over 2009-2012 this group was 8.2 percentage points more likely to have registered employment or social welfare activity than the overall foreign nationals population.

What does this show?

- Across all cohorts (by date of entry), most active engagement in 2002-2012 has been associated with the nationals of EU15-EU25 states.
- Between 2002 and 2012, the largest increase in engagement took place amongst the EU-15 ex-Irish and UK nationals
- Non-2004 Accession EU states (EU25-EU27) had a massive deterioration in activity between 2002 and 2012.
- There was also deterioration in activity for 'Other', although 2009-2012 average is -1.2, which is not far away from the average.
- Americans consistently ranked the worst in terms of overall low activity in all periods.

For a second exercise, I took same year as entry performance for each entry cohort and then once again took difference to the total. Chart below shows the results.

As measured by activity rates, only one cohort showed significant improvement over time: EU15 ex-Irish and UK nationals. Marked deterioration in quality of cohorts (by year of entry) over time is recorded for EU25-EU27 group, UK and 'Other'.

There are many caveats to interpreting the data, so the above should not be deemed reflective of some real values and qualities. When I say 'quality' in the context of data, I simply reference the extent of engagement. Not actual quality of human capital or work performance etc.

My concern, however, is that we are seeing rather predictable, steady deterioration in activity rates for all groups of foreigners, excluding EU15 ex-Irish and UK nationals.

Chart below summarises.

12/9/2013: Actual v Potential Emigration from Ireland

In recent weeks, I have seen a number of figures mentioned relating to the extent of emigration from Ireland over the recent years, ranging from 300,000 to 400,000 emigrants. Here is the summary of the data:

Actual levels of Emigration from 2009 through 2013 stand at 397,900 cumulative emigrants. Actual recorded Net Emigration from Ireland over that period stands at 120,800.

Taking into the account the trends for inward and outward migration from 2000 through 2007, Net Emigration reflective of pre-crisis trend stands at around 436,700. This number, however, assumes that the trend for inward inflow of people into the country as well as the trend for outward outflow of people from the country established over 2000-2007 were to continue into 2009-2013 period as well. As such, this number (loosely) represents the potential loss of population due to rising emigration and reduced immigration. Most of this effect is driven by reduction in the inflows of people into the country relative to trend.

While the last number is only indicative and an estimate, it does show that the true demographic cost of the crisis to Ireland is in the region of 436,700 fewer residents in this economy than could have been expected under the pre-crisis trends.

5/9/2013: OECD Migration report 2013: Ireland's blues

Last week, OECD published its International Migration Outlook 2013. I wrote about this in the box-out section of my Sunday Times column which is available here in an unedited version: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/09/592013-sunday-times-september-1.html

Couple of charts to illustrate the actual findings from the OECD:

These show pretty severe adverse impact of immigration on Irish exchequer finances, driven primarily by (in descending order of importance):

1. The extent of the current crisis
2. The impact of immigration flows composition on transmitting the shocks of unemployment to exchequer balance sheet (exceptionally rapid replacement of previously jobs-linked immigration inflows prior to 2004 with post-2004 opportunistic immigration from the EU Accession states, primarily going to short-term jobs in construction and domestic services sectors)
3. The impact of the Government policies since 2000-2001 that raised significantly spending on social welfare

The problem, of course, is that the latest Government policies, acting to limit access to Irish labour market for non-EU nationals continues to reinforce the second point above. We are increasingly trading on the assumption that Accession states' nationals regardless of their skills can act as a substitute for highly skilled and perfectly selected into jobs candidates from the rest of the world. Not exactly a smart policy, folks…

In 2006 I wrote about this effect on selection bias in Irish immigration policies post-2004 for the Romanian Journal of European Studies: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1100952 Seems like my warnings came to the front in the OECD data.

30/9/2012: Ireland's Demographic Dividend Turns Negative?

Ireland has one of the highest and healthiest birth rates in the advanced economies club, a fact that remains valid even today, amidst the economic downturn. In the past, this has prompted some economists and commentators to label this trend 'the demographic dividend'. I always pointed to the fact that if this indeed is a 'dividend', then retaining it within the Irish economy (society) is as important as generating it in the first place. Alas, over the recent years, our demographic dividend has been largely squandered away by the combination of a cyclical downturn (temporary loss of jobs) and more importantly by the structural recession (longer term loss of jobs). I highlighted the top line trends in our migration in the previous posts (here and here).

Here, let's take a quick look at the 'demographic dividend'.

With many caveats, let us define two groups of population: those in active working age group (20-64 years old) and those outside this group (0-19 years old and over 65 years old). The reason for these definitions is that younger people  under 20 years of age are significantly engaged in education systems and although some of the students do work, they are not engaged in career-enhancing work and/or work part time. Similarly, some of the people in age category over 65 are still very much gainfully employed, but vast majority of people in this age category either work part time, or do not work at all. Again, all of this relates to formal employment, so we omit household work, which is important in the economy as well, but is hard to quantify.

With caveats, then:

• Between 2006 and 2009 working age group population in Ireland grew by 189,100 and in the period of 2010-2012 it shrunk by 27,000. Quite a reversal in the 'demographic dividend' if you ask me.
• The same group share of total population grew by 0.1 percentage point in 2006-2009 period and contracted by 1.0 percent in 2010-2012 period.
• Meanwhile, the opposite side of the 'dividend' performed in exactly the opposite direction: non-working age population grew in 2006-2009 period by 114,500 and then again expanded by 57,700 in the period of 2010-2012. 
• The share of total population that is captured by the non-working age population shrunk by 0.1% in 2006-2009 period and grew by 1.0% in 2010-2012.
• Let's sum this up: in 2006-2012 period, working age population expanded by 150,800, while non-working age population grew 201,600. If this is a dividend, so far it is coming up negative. Proportion of working age population as a share of total population shrunk 1.5% and proportion of non-working age population expanded by 1.5%.

Charts to illustrate:

The above, of course, leaves out the account of unemployment. But even abstracting away from this, Ireland is now at risk of suffering from rising twin dependency: fewer working-age people funding more non-working-age people. All because of emigration. Dividend...

29/9/2012: Detailed analysis of Irish migration by nationality

On foot of some comments to my earlier post on Ireland's migration flows, here are three charts to show in more details nationality breakdown of the core flows: Data refers to April-April data, so 2012 references period of April 2011 - April 2012.

Annual immigration:

• Total immigration peaked at 151,100 in 2007 and declined to the low point of 41,800 in 2010. Since then, it bounced somewhat back to 53,300 in 2011 and to 52,700 in 2012.

Annual emigration:

• Annual emigration hit bottom in 2006 at 36,000 and rose steadily to 49,200 in 2008. Thereafter, total emigration rose to 72,000 in 2009, dropped slightly to 69,200 in 2010 and shot up in 2011 (80,600) and 2012 (87,100).

Cumulated flows for 2006-2012:

• Cumulated net inflows for the period of 2006-2012 stood at 153,500 in April 2012.
• Irish nationals represent the only category of residents that registered net cumulated outflow (-23,400) in the period of 2006-2012.
• In 2006-2008, there were cumulated net inflows of 32,100 for Irish nationals and in 2009-2012 this was reversed to a cumulated net outflow of 55,500
• In 2006-2008, there were cumulated net inflows of 11,400 of UK nationals into Ireland, which was reversed to a cumulated net outflow of 2,300 in the 2009-2012 period
• In 2006-2008, there were cumulated net inflows of 14,100 for 'Rest of EU15' nationals and in 2009-2012 this was reversed to a cumulated net outflow of 5,800
• In 2006-2008, there were cumulated net inflows of 152,900 for EU12 nationals and in 2009-2012 this was reversed to a cumulated net outflow of 27,300
• In 2006-2008, there were cumulated net inflows of 30,600 for nationals from the rest of the world and in 2009-2012 there was a shallower net cumulated inflow of 3,600.

28/9/2012: 2012 Emigration hits record levels

Latest data from the CSO on Migration and Population changes estimates for the 12 months period April 2011-April 2012 shows that during the period of so-called 'economic turnaround' marked by the officially 'EU-average growth' attained in Ireland, Irish emigration has hit new post-1990 record levels.

Top line numbers are:

• In April 2011-April 2012 Ireland registered 74,000 new births - a number representing the fourth highest number of births in any year since 1987.
• Over the same period, the number of deaths stood at 29,200, implying the natural rate of increase in Irish population of 44,900 - also the fourth highest rate in history of the series, tied with the identical rate achieved in 2008.
• In April 2011 - April 2012 52,700 people migrated into Ireland well below 69,900 average for 200-2006 period.
• Over the said period 87,100 people left Ireland - a historical record level, beating 80,600 record set in April 2010 - April 2011 period and more than tripple the average rate of outward emigration (28,500) for 2000-2006 period. Overall rate of emigration is now 23% above that attained in the peak pre-crisis year of 1989.
• Net emigration reached 34,400 in April 2011 - April 2012, marking the third highest rate of net emigration in history of the series. In 2000-2006 we averaged 41,400 net immigration per annum, implying a downward swing of 75,800 per annum. Net emigration hit the post-1990 record in the 12 months through April 2012.
• As the result, Irish population expanded by only 10,500 in April 2011 - April 2012 period - the slowest rate of growth since 1990. In 2000-2006 period, Irish population grew on average at the rate of 71,200 per annum.

Charts to illustrate these trends:

Breakdown of net emigration by nationalities shows that the principal driver of emigration from Ireland is outflow of Irish nationals from the country, confirming the trend established in 2011.

Referencing the trends in migration that existed prior to the crisis, the current crisis period is associated with potential net loss of 219,300 persons in the period of 2008-2012. In gross numbers terms, 358,100 people actually emigrated from Ireland in 2008-2012.

If there is such a thing as 'demographic dividend' Ireland today is running at a massive demographic 'loss'.

11/3/2012: Records-busting emigration thingy

A person on twitter asked me about the quick off-hand comment I made stating that we are witnessing 'record emigration'. Here are some numbers from the official CSO counts.

A note of caution: official stats (link here) cover data only from 1987 through April 2011, so all data is annual estimates through April of that year or, rather, year on year comparatives for the month of April. All of the data is based on 2006 census, preliminary numbers, so subject to revisions and implying that 2007-2011 data are themselves preliminary estimates. Births and Deaths are actual recorded. Emigration data is based on QNHS responses (rather lack of responses, signifying exit from the state) and thus subject, in my view, to significant biases. On the net, I would suspect the estimate of emigration figures is biased to the downside - primarily due to surveying methods used (undercounting emigration amongst the foreign nationals).

All said, we don't have any better data than that. So let's crunch through the numbers.

Let's start with the components of population change:

Per chart below, as per my claim on twitter, emigration (gross outflow of people from Ireland) has hit a historical high in overall terms in 2011 at 76,400 against the previous high of 70,600 in 1989. Emigration has surpassed number of births (75,100) in 2011 for the first time since 1990 (emigration of 56,300 vs births at 51,900). Now, number of births, like emigration is taken to population overall, so this comparative is pretty damning.

Now, here's an interesting thing to think about. Higher number of births (record in 2011, incidentally) might be actually keeping emigration numbers down and having double that effect on net emigration. How? Ok, imagine a family with a new-born. One of the parents is receiving maternity benefits and retaining the job. If the other spouse migrates, it is more likely that the mother and the child will remain in the state, if possible, as no destination state of their choice would be covering maternity benefit for new migrants. In addition, both spouses are likely to remain in the state until the maternity runs out. So there is at least some lag possible in terms of those families interested in exiting Ireland and their maternity benefits duration. The effect is unlikely to be huge, in my view, however.

Net effects are plotted in the chart below.

Net migration (immigrants less emigrants) is not at its historic high. In fact in 2011 it slightly improved due to high number of births. Note that higher numbers of births are correlated with conditions that also drive emigration. In 2011, there were total net emigration of 34,100 from Ireland against 34,500 in 2010. These are second and first highest rates of net emigration since 1990. The only two years when net outflow of people from this country was higher were 1988 (41,900) and 1989 (43,900).

It is worth noting, however, that due to higher birth rates, overall population did not decline in any year since 1991 and that 2011 growth in overall population (13,600) was slightly ahead of that in 2010 (11,400).

Let's mention some comparatives to averages:

Again, above summarizes very poor stats for 2010-2011. Natural population increases are running at 50% higher levels than pre-crisis averages. Yet overall population change is running at about 1/5-1/6th rate of pre-crisis average. Immigration numbers are off substantially, but it is the swing in emigration numbers that is driving the entire population change.

Chart below shows net migration trends by nationality:

Prior to 2009, Irish nationals contributed between 5% and 10.3% of the total net migration numbers. In 2009 it was 0%. In 2010 and 2011 Irish national accounted for 41.7% and 67.7% of total net migration  flows. Meanwhile, the largest driver of net migration prior to the crisis - EU12 states nationals - were the source of largest absolute numbers outflows (net) in 2009, but their share of net outflows has fallen to 38.6% and 12.8% in 2010 and 2011 respectively.

Lastly, let's perform a simple exercise. Suppose that over 2008-2011 the trend established since 2000 was present and that we performed on average the same as in 2000-2006 in terms of net outflows. What would have happened then?

As chart above shows, in 2011 76,400 people emigrated from Ireland. This was 47,900 in excess of 2000-2006 average, implying net ex-average emigration of 34,100. Over the years of the crisis so far, between 2008-2011, total number of people who emigrated from Ireland was 252,100, which is 138,000 over the level of 'natural' emigration (average). Taking account of the averages, excess net emigration over and above pre-crisis trend now stands at around 203,400 people.

Economics 05/03/2010: Can immigration help our Smart Economy?

Does targeted immigration policy (focusing on skills and capability) deliver the results for research, science and engineering? This question is important to Ireland, since

• we have ambitious objectives in driving up R&D and science activity; and
  
• we do not have a meritocratic immigration policy here (aside from by-now virtually stifled 'green card' scheme, our immigration policy is geared toward almost exclusively on internal EU27 migration)
  

A new study published this month by NBER (here) evaluates the impact of high-skilled immigrants on US technology formation using H-1B visa admissions.

Higher H-1B visa admissions are shown to increase immigrant science and engineering employment and patenting by inventors of Indian and Chinese origin in cities and firms dependent upon the program when compared against cities and firms which do not avail of the visa.

There is only a limited effect on native science and engineering employment or patenting, ruling out displacement effects, with only small crowding-in effects. Total science & engineering employment and invention increases with higher admissions primarily through direct contributions of immigrants.

“A 10% growth in the H-1B population corresponded with a 1%-4% higher growth in Indian and Chinese invention for each standard deviation increase in city dependency”. Anglo-Saxon origin inventors continue to account for approximately 70% of all domestic patents. Crowding-in is small, with a 10% growth in the H-1B population corresponding to a 0.3%-0.7% increase in total invention for each standard deviation growth in the degree of city dependency on participation in the visa programme.

Tests also confirm that these positive results “are not due to endogenous changes in national H-1B admissions following lobbying from very dependent groups."

"Total patenting shares are highly correlated with city size, and the three largest shares of US domestic patenting for 1995-2004 are San Francisco (12%), New York City (7%), and Los Angeles (6%). Ethnic patenting is generally more concentrated, with shares for San Francisco, New York City, and Los Angeles being 22%, 10%, and 9%, respectively. Indian and Chinese inventions are even further agglomerated. San Francisco shows exceptional growth from an 8% share of total US Indian and Chinese patenting in 1975-1984 to 26% in 1995-2004, while New York City share declines from 17% to 10%."

Economics 07/02/2010: Human Capital, Immigrants and Social safety Nets

A very interesting piece of research that tends to support my view that higher minimum wages and more extensive welfare nets / social services nets are acting to reduce overall levels of productivity amongst the immigrants.

One paper, published this week, titled Indian Entrepreneurial Success in the US, Canada and the UK, by Robert W. Fairlie - University of California, Santa Cruz, Harry Krashinsky - University of Toronto, Julie Zissimopoulos – RAND and Krishna B. Kumar – RAND (available here) takes a look at the differences in entrepreneurship (incidence and outcomes) and education amongst one large sub-group of immigrants to the US, UK and Canada. Having a culturally homogenous and relatively large group of immigrants allows the authors to set aside the need for measuring sending country attributes, thus improving substantially the accuracy of their results.

What they found is pretty interesting.

Indian immigrants in the US and other wealthy countries are successful in entrepreneurship. But how successful these entrepreneurs are once they reach different countries and encounter different social systems, and what are the sources of their success?

The study finds that “in the US Indian entrepreneurs have average business income that is substantially higher than the national average and is higher than any other immigrant group. High levels of education among Indian immigrants in the US are responsible for nearly half of the higher level of entrepreneurial earnings while industry differences explain an additional 10 percent. In Canada, Indian entrepreneurs have average earnings slightly below the national average but they are more likely to hire employees, as are their counterparts in the US and UK. The Indian educational advantage is smaller in Canada and the UK contributing less to their entrepreneurial success.”

Hmmm… why so, you might ask?

Immigrants are most likely to enter both the US and UK as ‘family sponsored.’ Since the 1960s U.S. immigration policy has strongly favored family reunification. The UK’s immigration policies over the past four decades have shifted towards emphasizing family reunification and employment. On the other hand, Canada's point-based system which awards immigration admission points based on education, language ability (English or French), years of experience in a managerial, professional or technical occupation, age, arranged employment in Canada, and other factors leads to more skilled immigrants compared to the US.

So far so good – Canada has longer lasting and much more selective immigration policies than the US and UK.

Because of the point-based system, in Canada, roughly half of all immigrants are admitted through employment-based preferences. In contrast, slightly more than 10 percent of immigrants in the US are admitted under this classification.

Again, sounds like Canada should be really the land of entrepreneurial and higher quality immigrants.

The related category of employment creation or investors who face minimum net worth and business experience requirements, and self-employed immigrants who must have relevant experience in occupations. A larger (but still relatively small – just 7%) share of immigrants in Canada are admitted under these policies than in the US (0.1%) and UK (2.4%).

So, ex-ante data analysis, it is pretty clear that “Canada's point-based immigration system results in a higher share of employment-based immigrants compared to the US and UK. On the other hand, the UK admits a much higher share of immigrants under its refugee and asylee programs than the US or Canada. All else equal, we would expect skill levels of immigrants to be the highest in Canada and the lowest in the UK.” (emphasis is mine)

In other words: the authors “find some evidence that the educational advantage of Asian immigrants compared to the national average is lower in the UK than in the US, [consistent with differences in immigration policies]. But, we also find that the educational advantage in the US is higher than it is in Canada, which runs counter to the greater emphasis of Canada's immigration policy on rewarding points for the general skill level of immigrants.”


Why? “A more generous redistribution system, more egalitarian earnings, and other institutional and structural factors, however, may make Canada less attractive to higher skilled immigrants such as Indian immigrants.”

Boy, this is some statement – especially considering the EU policies to achieve ‘Social’ economy – economy based on greater earnings equality, greater rights-based outcomes equalization and maintaining a very generous welfare and redistribution systems. And this is serious, folks. Canada, US and UK are much younger – demographically – societies than EU-core states. This means that in general, the EU has a much more acute need to import younger entrepreneurial talent and skills in order to pay even comparable welfare rates to those in Canada, US and UK. Let alone to afford a more generous system of benefits. The prospects of this happening are not that good, folks.


Let us get back to the study, though:

“We find that Indian entrepreneurs are much more successful than the national average in the US. Indian businesses also perform well in Canada and the UK, but the evidence is not as strong. In the US, Indian entrepreneurs earn 60 percent more than white entrepreneurs and have the highest average business income of any immigrant group.”

No, wait – income inequality is actually favoring ethnic minorities in the US? Without an EU-styled rights legislation that polices allocations of income to specific ethnic groups? Who would have thought that to be possible!

“Estimates from business-level data sources also indicate that Indian firms have higher profits, hire more employees, and have lower failure rates than the average for all U.S. firms.”

Ouch - higher profits = hire more workers + have lower failure rates? And all without help of SIPTU/ICTU/etc to protect the interests of workers and to curb profiteering? Who could have thought?


But what drives such astounding results?

“To explain to relative success of Indian entrepreneurs we focus on the role of human capital. ...We test the hypothesis that a highly-educated Indian entrepreneurial-force is responsible for their superior performance in business. Indian immigrants in all three countries have education levels that are higher than the national average, and in the US the education levels of Indian immigrants are particularly high relative to the entire population. In the US, 68 percent of Indian entrepreneurs have a college education which is twice the rate for whites or the national average. Some of the variation in the education of Indian immigrants across the US, Canada and UK is likely due to immigration policy. Another possibility is that the higher returns to education in the US result in a more selective immigrant pool in the US compared to Canada and the UK.”

Bu wait – ‘higher returns to education’ = greater income inequality between educated and non-educated. Again, who could have thought that this might be a good thing, especially for a ‘knowledge economy’?

“When we examine business income, we find large, positive effects of education in the US and Canada. We also find large positive effects of education on employment in Canada, but smaller positive effects in the UK. The findings for education imply that the relatively high levels of education among Indian entrepreneurs have a large effect on business performance at least in the US and Canada. Decomposition estimates provide exact estimates of the contribution of higher levels of education among Indian entrepreneurs to their higher business incomes and employment levels.

• In the US, higher levels of education among Indian entrepreneurs result in a business income advantage of 21 log points, which represents 43.9 percent of the gap.
• High levels of education also contribute substantially to why Indian entrepreneurs earn more in Canada (12.5 log points), but the difference is not as large as in the US.
• “The combination of the larger education advantage held by Indian entrepreneurs and the larger return to education is responsible for the increased importance of education as an explanatory factor in the US compared to Canada.
• “In contrast to these results, the smaller educational advantage and lower returns to education in the UK result in less explanatory power in the UK.”
  

But sectoral and cultural decompositions also matter: “Lower concentrations of Indian entrepreneurs in agriculture and construction, lower female share*, higher marriage rates, and favorable regional distributions also generally contribute to why Indian businesses perform better than white businesses or the national average.”

Again, give it a thought, folks. The above says that Indian entrepreneurs are so spectacularly successful in all three countries because they avoid investing in ‘losing’ sectors and regions. So where does it put state-led efforts to pump money into such ‘losing’ sectors as, for example, agriculture? And where does this leave Ireland’s ‘National Spatial Development Plans’ that reallocate cash to ‘losing’ regions/areas? In the category of ‘luxury goods’ – an affordable (in certain times) cost of keeping at bay social discontent amongst those who are falling behind?

And it also says that higher marriage rates are positively associated with higher returns to entrepreneurship. Who could have thought?


Some food for thought for our immigration policy bureaucrats and our national development authorities, then…



*[Aside - the issue of lower female share of entrepreneurship is, in my view, a simple statistical legacy. Women entrepreneurs tend to run businesses that are on average younger than those for men, hence, some increased risk in statistical measures. Over time, I would expect as female entrepreneurship gains fully similar footing in types of business, sources of financing etc as male entrepreneurship, this difference will disappear completely.]

Economics 26/12/2009: Commoners Amongst Our Foreigners

Merry Christmas to all and a Happy New Year.

To start off the post-Christmas season on an interesting note, here is a different look at the CSO's data on PPS allocations.
Cumulative PPS allocations over 2002-2008 show clearly the magnitude (absolute and relative) of migration from Poland to Ireland. It is worth highlighting the fact that the number of people moving to Ireland from the countries with strong historical links to this country is smaller than that from Poland, and close to that from the 3 Baltic States. Of course, the relative potential pool of migrants from the historically important destinations for Irish emigrants in the past is of magnitude of 100 times greater than that of the Baltic 3 entire populations.
Total immigration figures are impressive, peaking in 2006 and falling in 2008 to the average of 2004-2005 levels.
Looking at the same in terms of countries, the above graph shows again how dramatic was immigration from Poland relative to other countries. In 2005, tiny Lithuania sent more people into Ireland than any other country save for UK and Poland. However, as credit bubble blossomed back in the Baltics, Lithuanian and Latvian migration started to decline after 2005, as was the case with Slovakia post 2006.
A messy chart above shows several interesting trends in migration from other countries. Nigeria - a clear decline post Michael McDowell-led reforms of the free-for-all asylum processes. Brazil - massive increase between 2004 and 2008. Whatever the reasons might be? Philippines - no dramatic slowdown in inflows, save for 2002-2004 period. In other words, given that the Philippines is the leading country supplying nursing staff to HSE, there is really no evidence here that Filipino nurses stopped coming to Ireland (remember the claims made by the trade unions). There are many other interesting things going on in the chart, so feel free to interpret/speculate.
Some more trends in PPS allocations in 2002-2008 above. As percentage of the total, Poland's weight was still increasing in 2008, relative to all other major destinations sending immigrants to Ireland.
Cumulative allocations as shares of total allocations above. And next, same by broader region:
Here is a funny thing - 3 Baltic states accounted for more allocations in 2004-2006 than the UK, the rest of the EU15, the US and even the rest of the world. Amazing, given these three countries are about 1/100th of the EU27 population. And, given that incomes were raising in these countries at very high rates, why would these three countries attract such a massive migration to Ireland? Perhaps the reason is coincident with the anecdotal evidence that vast majority of migrants from these 3 states were Russian speaking. Of course, if this is true, it would represent a small embarrassment to these countries' leaderships, because it would illustrate dramatically how prosecution of Russian-speaking minorities in these countries was pushing people to emigrate. But, again, this is speculative at this point in time, as we never bothered to ask these people their ethnicity, as opposed to their citizenship.

Now, next, look at the dynamics of allocations of PPS numbers to foreign nationals:
Note the dramatic dynamics for the EU10 - virtually none in 2003, jump in 2004 and on to peaking in 2006. what does it tell us about these workers? Prior to 2004, they had to compete with the rest of non-EU employees for jobs. And they were not very good at it, apparently. Post 2004, they no longer had to face real competition. And they became, overnight, very good at getting jobs. Suspicious? Me too. Just shows how arbitrary the world is out there - your skills, your aptitude, your knowledge - all these matter as a secondary differential at the very best. Your passport is what determines who you are, can be and will be to a greater extent.
Total allocations to foreign nationals above.

Now, on to two very interesting graphs:
The above chart shows that overall, the groups with no employment activity were dominated not by the EU10 citizens, but by the UK, EU15, and US migrants. Why, you might ask? Well, citizens of these countries came to Ireland for many reasons, some of which were simply not available to those from EU10 - retirement would be one, second homes would be another one. In other words, it is not that the citizens of these countries had lower propensity to work in Ireland, they simply were more heterogeneous (age wise and occupation/income wise).
Chart above dispels several myths:

• EU10 citizens propensity to drop out of labour market activities was no more dramatic than that of other major groups of migrants. However, this must be interpreted with care, as the EU10 migrants do not include second home owners or retirees (which makes their drop-out rates higher than average for EU15, UK and US migrants) and they have no restrictions on spouses employment here (which makes their rates of dropping out more significant than those for the rest of the world migrants);
• US migrants have the lowest rate of decline in labour market activities;
• EU10 numbers for 2008 also conceal the fact that many of those migrants probably moved into gray economy (cash payments) and into sub-contracting, both not recorded by PAYE system. This increases the rate of non-participation for these immigrants.
  

So despite a massively different levels of migration from the EU10 over 2004-2008, there is little evidence so far to suggest that these migrants were dramatically different from other groups of migrants. In some areas they were somewhat distinct, but one cannot conclude that these differences were dramatic...