28/9/18: 10th Anniversary of the Irish Banking Crisis

Yahoo Finance's Edmund Heaphy on 10th Anniversary of the Irish Bank Guarantee: https://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/destructive-goal-decade-irish-bank-guarantee-090447485.html with extensive quotes from myself.

22/6/15: IMF Review of Ireland: Part 2: Banks

IMF assessment of Irish banking sector remains pretty darn gloomy, even if the rhetoric has been changing toward more cheerleading, less warning. Here is the core statement:

"Bank health continues to improve, but impaired assets remain high and profitability low. The contraction in the three domestic banks’ interest earning assets continued, albeit at a slower pace in 2014." IN other words, deleveraging is ongoing.

"Nonetheless, operating profitability doubled to 0.8 percent of assets on foot of lower funding costs as well as nonrecurrent gains from asset sales and revaluations (Table 8). Led by the CRE and SME loan books, there was a sizable fall in the stock of nonperforming loans (NPL), by some 19 percent in 2014, although NPLs are still 23 percent of loans." Note, at 23% we are still the second worst performing banking system in the euro area, after Greece.

"This fall, together with rising property prices, allowed significant provision releases while keeping the coverage ratio stable. Profitability after provisions was achieved for the first time since the onset of the crisis. Together with lower risk weighted assets, this lifted the three banks’ aggregate core tier 1 capital ratio by over 1 percentage point, to 14½ percent."

Now, take a look at the chart above: loans volume fell EUR6.5bn y/y (-3.6%), but interest income remained intact at EUR7.9bn. While funding costs fell EUR3.7bn y/y. The result is that the banks squeezed more out of fewer loans both on the margin and in total. Give it a thought: loans should be getting cheaper, but instead banks are getting 'healthier'. At the expense of who? Why, the remaining borrowers. Net trading profits now turned losses in 2014 compared to 2013. Offset by one-off profits.

Deposits also fell in 2014 compared to 2013 as economy set into a 'robust recovery'. It looks like all the jobs creation going around ain't helping savings.

A summary / easier to read table:

Notice, in addition to the above discussion, the Texas Ratio: Non-Performing Loans ratio to Provisions + CT1 capital (higher ratio, higher risk in the system). At 108, things are better now than in 2012-2013, but on average, 2011-2012 Texas ratio was around 104, better than 2014 ratio. And that with 51.7% coverage ratio and with CT1 at 14.5%. Ugh?..

On the other hand, deleveraging helped so far: loan/deposit ratio is now at 108% a major improvement on the past.

Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) - a ratio of longer term funding to longer term liabilities and should be >100% in theory. This is now at 110.5%, first time above 100% - a good sign, reflective of much improved funding conditions for all euro area banks as well as Irish banks' gains.

Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) - monitoring the extent to which banks hold the necessary assets to cover any short-term liquidity shocks (basically, how much in highly liquid assets banks hold) is also rising and is above 100% - another positive for the banks.


Still, the above gains in lending margins - the rate of banks' extraction from the real economy - are not enough for the IMF. "Lending interest rates must enable banks to generate adequate profits to support new lending. While increasing, Irish banks’
operating profitability remains relatively low. Declines in funding costs aided by QE will assist, but there are also drags from the prevalence of tracker mortgages in loan portfolios and from prospects for a prolonged period of low ECB rates. However, with rates on new floating rate mortgages at 4.1 percent at end March, compared with an average of 2.1 percent in the euro area, political pressures to reduce mortgage rates have emerged. The mission stressed the importance of loan pricing adequate to cover credit losses—including the high costs of collateral realization in Ireland—and to build capital needed to transition to fully loaded Basel III requirements in order to avoid impediments to a revival of lending."

Here's a question IMF might want to ask: if Irish banks are already charging almost double the rates charged by other banks, while enjoying lower costs of funding and falling impairments, then why is Irish banks profitability a concern? And more pertinently, how is hiking effective rates charged in this economy going to help the banks with legacy loans, especially those that are currently marginally performing and only need a slight nudge to slip into arrears? And another question, if Irish banks charge double the rates of other banks, what is holding these other banks coming into the Irish market? Finally, how on earth charging even higher rates will support 'revival of lending'?

Ah, yes, question, questions… not many answers. But, per IMF, everything is happy in the banking sector in Ireland. Just a bit more blood-letting from the borrowers (distressed - via arrears resolutions tightening, performing - via higher interest charges) and there will be a boom. One wonders - a boom in what, exactly? Insolvencies?

5/4/2014: Markets do come back… some faster others slower…

A very neat summary table showing equity markets responses to major past shocks, starting with 1941 Pearl Harbor attack.

Most interesting is the recovery duration: median 14 days to pre-shock levels, with maximum of 285 days in the case of Lehman Bankruptcy for the US markets. Now, put this against Irish 'recovery' with Iseq (note the above figures are not adjusted to control for survivorship bias) still deeply below pre-crisis valuations, some 2,200 days and counting…

Economics 26/11/10: Contagion is spreading to Spain & Italy

Another day, another spike of contagion from Ireland's Sovereign bonds to other Eurozone countries:
Yesterday's closing bell marked another day in which markets have completely disagreed with the EU officials and Irish Government view of the reality of our and PIIGS' ability to weather out the current crisis.

Economics 22/11/10: November 12 - on the record re 'bailout'

This is an unedited version of my November 12 article in the Irish Examiner. Of course, since then the events have taken over the core premises of the article, but for archival purposes and also to posit the article into the context (at the time of print, the official position was 'we don't need a bailout'), I am posting this here.

Despite all the intensifying talk about the EU support, despite the growing number of assurances from the various officials and social partners that we can ‘grow out of our difficulties’, this week has clearly shown that Ireland is nearing the end game of the crisis. Tellingly, even the usual official policies cheerleaders, our stockbrokers, have by now one by one deserted the State-side of the arguments. As one analyst from IFSC put it earlier this week: ‘you know the game’s up when you can’t round up your own sales team to sell Irish bonds’.

The game is almost up. Were we to go into borrowing today, Irish debt will be more costly to finance than that of any other developed country, save Greece. On the assumption of a 70% recovery rate, the Irish 10 year Credit Default Swaps imply an 85% probability of Ireland defaulting sometime in the next 10 years. This, of course, is not the real probability, but an estimate. However, in comparison, even countries that availed over the last 3 years of IMF assistance, including Iceland, are enjoying much greater confidence of the markets.

We all know how we got into this predicament. Three years into the crisis, Irish Government continues to spend well beyond its means. Our current spending keeps rising. Tax revenue, despite significant tax hikes, is running below 2008 levels.

The markets know that the Irish Government has by now exhausted all means for extracting more cash out of this devastated economy. If, as expected, Minister Lenihan hikes taxes in the Budget 2011 again, he will be shifting more of our economic activity into the grey market where the taxman is a distant and powerless overlord.

Much anticipated Budget 2011 is unlikely to solve this problem. Cuts of €6 billion from the deficit this year will do very little to restore any credibility to the Government policy. As anyone with an ounce of common sense will know in the current conditions, the whole exercise will be equivalent to taking money out of one pocket – Government total spending – and putting it in the other – the banks, bondholders, social welfare and pay and pensions bill.

By avoiding soaking the bondholders from the start of this crisis, the Government has boxed itself into a proverbial corner. Instead of standing on a morally and economically high ground and soaking the bondholders early on in the crisis, as Iceland did, we have created a full-blown contagion from the banks to the sovereign. With liquidity evaporating from the shorter end of the banks funding market, this contagion is now a two-way street. Untangling this today, without going into a renegotiation of the sovereign bonds and/or guarantees, cannot constitute a credible policy position.

All of this comes before we even consider the real economy-side of the matters. With private investment on its knees, and companies, starved of trade and operational credits, operating outside the realm of normal corporate finance, can anyone really claim that we have a private sector capacity to escape a restructuring of the private or public or both debts?

Irish families are now so deep in debt and negative equity that consumption and household investment stalled, while deposits are vanishing to pay rising state and semi-state bills. Squeezed on both ends of their incomes – by falling earning and rising taxes and charges – these very households cannot be expected to provide more funding for our fiscal policy pyramid scheme.

But the final straw that broke the proverbial camel’s back is the belated realisation that the EU has no plan B for dealing with this crisis. In fact, it doesn’t even have a plan A. This was made absolutely clear by the vacuous nature of statements issued by the EU Commissioner Olli Rehn during and after his visit to Dublin this week.

The fundamental EU problem is that the much-lauded EFSF (European Financial Stabilization Facility) – the fund used to put Greece into a bond markets deep-freezer earlier this year – is not designed to address the problems we face. EFSF is designed to help cash strapped governments for a period of 3 years at ‘near market’ rates. Ireland is not cash-strapped. Nor are ‘near-market rates’ a sustainable lending option for us.

We are plain insolvent when one takes three to five years forward view. Our sovereign debt to GNP ratio is likely to exceed 140% by the end of 2015 and this is before we factor in the highly probable wave of mortgages defaults. Our household and corporate debts are more than double those of Greece. And we are staring at the abyss of rising interest rates and strong euro into the next 3-5 years.

EFSF is simply not fit for the purpose of rescuing Ireland.

At current yields, Ireland will need to grow its economy at some 6.5-7% on average annually for the next decade to counterbalance the mountain of debt we are carrying. At the ESFS rates – at ca 4.5%. Anyone expecting this to happen without radical and extremely painful structural reforms of the economy (not just budget cuts) should really go back to the basics of economics. With exception of exporting sectors our economy has slipped into a coma. Jolting it out of this state will require complete rethinking of our fiscal and economic policies.

As an optimist, I can tell you that this can be done. As a pragmatic observer of the current policy and economic environment, I have little hope that it can be done without restructuring our debts – either public or private or both – and issuing a new policies mandate for the political leadership.

Economics 31/10/10: €15bn in cuts will not be enough

This is an unedited version of my article in yesterday's Irish Examiner.

The last three days have seen dramatic volatility and extreme upward pressures on Irish, as well as Greek and Portuguese Government bonds. Briefly, early on Thursday morning, Irish 10 year bonds have set a new all-time record with yields reaching North of 7.07%. Much of these changes have been driven by the budgetary news from all three countries.

First, Greece and Portugal have shown the signs of increasing uncertainty about projected tax revenues and ability to deliver on ambitious austerity programmes.

Then, Ireland came into the line of fire.

Back in December 2009, the Government outlined a plan for piecemeal cuts in deficits over 2011-2014 that added up to a gross value of €6.5 billion (with at least €3 billion in tax measures). This was supposed to get us from having to borrow €18.8 billion in 2010 to a deficit of ca €9 billion in 2014. All courtesy of robust economic growth of more than 4% per annum penned into the Department of Finance rosy assumptions for 2011-2014.

This week, the Minister for Finance had to come down from the lofty heights of the “now you see the deficit, now your don’t” estimates by his Department. Courtesy of continuously expanding unemployment, declining tax revenues, plus ever-growing interest bills on Government debts, the headline gross savings target for 2011-2014 has been increased to €15 billion.

Dramatic as it might be, this figure is still far from being realistic – the fact that did not escape the bond vigilantes and some analysts. More than that, it represents the very conservative ethos of the Department of Finance and the Government that got us into a situation where three years into the crisis Ireland is still light years away from actually doing anything serious about correcting its fiscal position.

Let me explain.

First of all, take the actual announced plans for cuts in public spending. Over two months ago I have argued in the media that to get us onto the track toward reaching the goal of 3% to GDP deficit ratio, we need ca €7 billion in cuts in 2011, followed by €5 billion in 2012. The grand total of gross deficit reductions from now through 2014 adjusting for the effects of these cuts on our GDP and unemployment, plus steeper cost of financing Government debt, excluding new demand for funding from the banks is not the €15 billion, but €19-20 billion. In other words, once fiscal stabilizers (automatic clawbacks on Government spending) are added in, to achieve 3% target requires more than 33% deeper cuts than Minister Lenihan announced this Wednesday.

The markets know this. Just as they know that given the Government record to date there is very little chance that even €15 billion in cuts will be delivered. This mistrust in Government’s capacity to actually administer its own prescription is manifested most explicitly by the Croke Park agreement that effectively put one third of the current public expenditure out of reach of Mr Lenihan’s axe. It is further highlighted by the fact that this Government has failed to
substantially reduce public spending bills from 2008 through today. Back in 2008, net government spending stood at €55.7 billion. This year, we are likely to post a reduction of just €2.4 billion on 2008, all of which is accounted for by cuts in capital investment programmes.

Third, the markets also understand long-term implications of deficits. Even if the Irish Government manages to bring 2014 deficit close to 3% target, our Sovereign debt will grow by over €5 billion in that year. At this pace, Irish Exchequer is likely to be on the hook for a debt to GDP ratio of 125% by the end of 2014 reaching over 140% if expected additional banks liabilities materialise in 2011-2014. And all of this after we account for Mr Lenihan’s €15 billion cuts planned for 2011-2014.

Fourth, Government budgetary arithmetic falls further apart when one considers economics of the proposed deficit reduction measures. So far, the Government has planned for €3 billion increase in taxes on top of tax revenues gains due to rosy economy growth expectations between now and 2014. €15 billion target announcement raises this most likely 2-fold.

I have severe doubts that this economy has capacity left for tax revenue increases. Signs are, households are struggling with personal debts and their disposable after-tax incomes are barely sufficient to cover day-to-day spending. Credit card debts and utilities arrears are rising, savings are falling – all of which points to growing stress. Weakening sterling is pushing more retail sales out into the North just in time for Christmas shopping season. Cash economy – judging by
anecdotal evidence and corporate tax revenue in light of booming exports sectors – is expanding. The tax base is shrinking due to unemployment, underemployment and falling earnings.

Again, any rational investor will look at this as the evidence that the Government has run out of capacity to tax itself out of the fiscal corner.

But wait, this is only half of the story. The other half relates to the banking side of consumer affairs. In 2011 we can expect significant increases in mortgages costs as Irish banks once more go rummaging through the proverbial couch in search for a new injection of pennies. Bank of Ireland’s bond placing this week, with a yield of 5.4%, suggests a bleak future for lending markets. Any increases in mortgages costs will hike Government expenditure (by raising the cost of interest subsidies), hammer revenues (by reducing household consumption) and trigger new demands from banks for capital (to cover defaulting mortgages).

None of which, of course, appears to be attracting much attention from the Upper Merrion Street. At least judging by the budgetary projections released so far. At the same time, these numbers are impacting our long term growth potential and increasing the probability that Ireland, in the end, will have to restructure its public debt.

This week, similarly brutal arithmetic concerning Greek fiscal situation has prompted Professor Nouriel Roubini to make a dire prediction of the inevitable default by Greece on its Sovereign debt. Given Minister Lenihan’s recent statements and his boss’ staunch unwillingness to scrap the Croke Park agreement, it is hard to see how the forthcoming budgetary framework for 2011-2014 can get us out a similar predicament.

Economics 16/9/10: Why a rescue package for Ireland might not be a bad idea

This is an edited version of my article in today's edition of the Irish Examiner.

Two weeks into September and the crisis in our sovereign bond markets continues unabated. Ireland Government bonds are trading at above 6% mark and given the perilous state of the Irish banks, plus the path of the future public deficits, as projected by the IMF, Ireland Inc is now facing a distinct possibility of our interest bill on public debt alone reaching in excess of 6% of GDP by 2015. [Note: by now, the magic number is 6.12% as of opening of the markets today].

Sounds like a small number? Here are a couple of perspectives. At the current cost of deficit financing, our Exchequer interest bill in 2009 was 1.7% of GDP or €2.8 billion. Within 5 years the interest bill can be expected to reach over €12 billion, based on the Government own projections for growth. By this estimate, some 30% of our expected 2015 tax receipts will go to pay just the financing costs of the current policies.

It is precisely this arithmetic that prompted the Financial Times this Monday to question not only the solvency of the Irish banking sector, but the solvency of the Irish economy. The very same inescapable logic of numbers prompted me to conjecture in the early days of 2009 that our fiscal and banks consolidation policies will lead to the need for an external rescue package for Ireland.

This external rescue package is now available, fully funded and cheaper (financially-speaking) to access than the direct bond markets. It is called the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF). More than money alone, it offers this country a chance to finally embark on real reforms needed to restore our economy to some sort of a functional order.

The EFSF was set up to provide medium term financing at a discounted rate of ca 5% per annum for countries that find themselves in a difficulty of borrowing from the international markets. With effective yields on our bonds at 6.05% and rising – we qualify.

The EFSF requires that member states availing of European cash address the structural (in other terms – long term) deficit problems that got them into trouble in the first place. In Ireland’s case this is both salient and welcomed.

It is salient because, despite what we are being told by our policymakers, our problems are structural.

Banks demands for capital from the Exchequer – a big boost to Irish deficit last year and this – are neither temporary, nor dominant causes of our deficits. In the medium term, we face continued demands for cash from the banks. By my estimates, total losses by the Irish banks are likely to add up to €52-55 billion (ex-Nama) over the next three-four years. These can be broken down to €36-39 billion that will be needed in the end for the zombie Anglo, €6bn for equally dead INBS, at least €8 billion for AIB and up to €2 billion for the ‘healthiest’ of all – Bank of Ireland. These demands will come in over the next 24 months and face an upside risk should ECB begin aggressively ramp up interest rates in 2011-2012.

No economy can withstand a contraction in its GDP on this scale. Least of all, the one still running 5-7% of GDP structural deficits over the next 4 years. In 2009, banks demands for Exchequer funds managed to lift our deficit from 11.9% to 14.6%. This year, absent banks bailouts, our deficit will still reach around 11.3%. Only 3.3% of that due to the recessionary or temporary effects. In 2011, IMF estimates our structural deficit alone to be 7% and 5.9% in 2014.

Which brings us to the point that the use of the EFSF funds should also be a welcomed opportunity for Ireland.

A drawdown on EFSF funding will automatically trigger a rigorous review of our fiscal plans through 2015 by the European and, more importantly, IMF analysts. This is long overdue, as our own authorities have time and again proven that they are unable to face the reality of our runaway train of fiscal spending.

Since 2008 in virtually every pre-Budget debate, Minister Lenihan has been promising not to levy new taxes that will threaten jobs and incomes of the ordinary people of Ireland. In every one of his budgets he did exactly the opposite. Under the EFSF, the IMF will do what this Government is unwilling to do – force us to reform our tax system to broaden the tax base, increase the share of taxes contributions by the corporate sector and start shifting the proportional burden of taxation away from ordinary families.

Minister Lenihan has repeatedly promised reforms of spending. In every budget these reforms fell short of what was needed, while the capital investment was made to bear full force of the cuts. Drawing cash from the EFSF will make Mr Lenihan scrap the sweetheart Croke Park deal and start reforming current spending. Politically unacceptable, but realistically unavoidable, deep cuts to social welfare, public sector employment and wages, quangoes, and wasteful subsidies will become a feasible reality.

Starting with December 2009, the Irish Government faced numerous calls from within and outside this state (headed by the EU Commission and the IMF) to provide clarity on its plans to achieve the Stability and Growth Pact criteria of 3% deficit to GDP ratio by 2014-2015. The Government has failed to do this. Drawing funds from the EFSF will help us bring clarity as to the size and scope of fiscal adjustment we will have to take over the next 5 years.

Lastly, the EFSF conditions will include a robust change in the way we are dealing with the banks. Gone will be the unworkable Government strategy of shoving bad loans under the rug via Nama and drip-recapitalizations. These, most likely, will be replaced by haircuts on bond holders and equity purchases by the State.

Contrary to what the Government ‘analysts’ say, drawing down EFSF funds will not shut Ireland from the bond markets. Instead, swift and robust restoration of fiscal responsibility and more a more orderly exit of the exchequer from banks liabilities are likely to provide for a significant improvement in the overall markets perception of Ireland. After all, bond investors need assurances that we will not default on our debt obligations in the future. Only a strong prospect for growth and recovery can provide such an assurance. Ministerial press releases and Nama statements are no longer enough.

Economics 21/03/2010: Reckless expectations, not competition

This is a lengthy post - to reflect the importance of the issue at hand. And it is based largely on data from Professor Brian Lucey, with my added analysis.

The proposition that this post is proving is the following one:

Far from being harmed by competition from foreign lenders, Irish banking sector has suffered from its own disease of reckless lending. In fact, competition in Irish banking remains remarkably close (although below) European average and is acting as a stabilizing force in the markets relative to other factors.


I always found the argument that ‘too much competition in banking was the driver of excessive lending’ to be an economically illiterate one. Even though this view has been professed by some of my most esteemed colleagues in economics.

In theory, competition acts to lower margins in the sector, and since it takes time to build up competitive pressure, the sectors that are facing competition are characterized by stable, established players. In other words, in most cases, sectors with a lot of competition are older, mature ones. This fact is even more pronounced if entry into the sector is associated with significant capital cost requirements. Banking – in particular run of the mill, non-innovative traditional type – is the case in point everywhere in the world.

As competition drives margins down, making quick buck becomes impossible. You can’t hope to write a few high margin, high risk loans and reap huge returns. So firms in highly competitive sectors compete against each other on the basis of longer term strategies that are more stable and prudent. Deploying virtually commoditized services or products to larger numbers of population. Reputation and ever-increasing efficiencies in operations become the driving factors of every surviving firm’s success. And these promote longer term stability of the sector.

Coase’s famous proposition about transaction costs provides a basis for such a corollary.

This means that in the case of Irish banking during the last decade, if competition was indeed driving down the margins in lending (as our stockbrokers, the Government and policy analysts ardently argue today), then the following should have happened.

1. Banks should have become more prudent over time in lending and risk pricing,
2. There should have been broader diversification of the banks lending portfolia, with the bulk of new loans concentrating in the areas relating directly to depositor base – corporate and household lending, and a hefty fringe of higher-margin inter-mediation lending to financial institutions, and
3. Banks would be seeking to ‘bundle’ more services to differentiate from competitors and enhance margins.
   

In Ireland, of course, during the alleged period of ‘harmful competition’ exactly the opposite took place. Let me use Prof Brian Lucey’s data (with added analysis from myself) to show you the facts.

Firstly, Irish banks became less prudent in lending – as exemplified by falling loans approvals criteria, and by rising LTVs:

1. Lending to private sector as % of GDP was ca 50% in 1995, reaching 100% in 1998 and rising to 300% in 2009
2. Vast increases in lending to developers: in 1997 there were €10bn lent out to developers against €20bn in mortgages; in 2008 these figures were €110bn and €140bn respectively
3. Over the time when lending to private sector rose 600%, mortgages lending rose 550%, our GDP rose by 75%
   

Secondly, banks reduced their assets and liabilities diversification (charts 1-3 below) setting themselves up for a massive rise in asymmetric risk exposures.

On the funding side, out went customers deposits, in came banks deposits, foreign deposits and bonds and Irish bonds.
Capital ratios fell out of the way.

And so there has been a change in the world of Irish banking that no other competitive and mature sector of any economy has ever seen. Why? Was it because foreign banks started pushing the timid boys of BofI and AIB and Anglo and INBS out into reckless competitive lending?

You’ve gotta be mad to believe this sop. In reality, the Irish banks’ assets tell the story.

Business loans collapsed, personal loans (the stuff that allegedly, according to the likes of the Irish Times have fuelled our cars and clothing shopping binge during the Celtic Tiger years) actually declined in importance as well. Financial intermediation – the higher margin, higher risk thingy that so severely impacted the US banks – was down as well. No, competition was not driving Irish banks into the hands of higher margin lending. It was driving them into the hands of our property developers. We didn’t have a derivatives and speculative financial investment crisis here – the one that was allegedly caused by the foreign banks coming in and forcing our good boys to cut margins on run-of-the-mill ordinary lending. No, we had an old fashioned disaster of construction and property lending.

And this lending could not have been driven by foreign banks. It came from the total expansion of credit in the economy, presided over by our Central Bank and Financial Regulator, our Government and ECB.

Just how dramatic this change was? Take a look at the ratio of private sector credit to national income in the chart below.
Even a child could have seen the bust coming. The reason that our Financial Regulator and Central Bank failed to see this, despite publishing all this data in the first place, is that they were simply not looking. The former probably obsessed with the pension perks, the latter – well, may be because all the fine art in the Central Bank’s own collection was just too much of a distraction. Who knows? But judging by the above chart lack of significant correction during the crisis – we know who will pay for this in the end. Us, the taxpayers.
As chart above shows, the fundamentals for the boom – in lending and in construction – were never there, folks. And the banks missed that completely. As did our regulators and our policymakers. Brian Lucey of TCD School of Business provides evidence on what was really going on in the Irish banks (again, note that some of the analysis below is mine).
Chart above, based on the Central Bank Credit Survey, basically shows the impact three major forces: expectations of increased competition by the banks, improved banks outlook on the Irish economy three months ahead, and LTVs expectations had in Irish banks willingness to increase lending. Scores above 3 represent tightening of credit conditions (as in banks expecting to cut lending to households), while scores below 3 show forces driving looser credit to households.

If the proposition that foreign banks competition pressures drove Irish banks into looser credit supply were to be correct, one would expect the blue line above to reach far deeper into ‘below 3’ scores than the other two lines. Alas, it did not dip. In fact, competition from other banks was recognized by Irish Bankers themselves to be the least improtant factor contributing to credit supply expansion. Instead, their over-optimism about economic prospects (red line) and their willingess to give away cash at massively inlfated LTVs (the orange line – also a proxy for Bankers’ optimism regarding future direction of house prices) were the two main drivers of credit boom.

Where’s the evidence on ‘harmful competition’ that so many Central Bank leaders, the stockbrokers and Government spokespersons have decried in recent past?

The delirium of our bankers was actually so out of any proportion that, as the surveys data shows, even amidst the implosion of the housing markets since early 2008 they were still saying “hang on....we expect that changes in LTV and economic prosoects will cause us to loosen in the next 3 months". In other words, they were chasing the deflating bubble, not the imaginary foreign banks competitiors.

Let’s take another look at Brian Lucey’s data. Take the scores for Ireland in the above surveys and take their ratios to the Euro area average scores. If the ratio is in excess of 1, then the said factor has contributed to greater tightening in credit supply in Ireland than in the Euro area. If it is less than 1, then the said factor has contributed more to loosening in lending in Ireland than in the Euro area.
So, really, folks, competition in Ireland was actually more of a stabilizing force, than de-stabilizing one. LTV’s optimism and lack of realism in economic forecasts were the two main driving forces of the boom.

Lastly, ECB Herfindahl Index (ratio of Ireland to “big5” EU states) provides exactly the same conclusions:
Again, what above shows is that on virtually every occasion, Irish reading for Herfindahl Index (measuring degree of concentration in banking sector) is in excess of the average Index reading for top 5 EU countries. In other words, there was no such thing as ‘too much competition’ going on in Irish banking sector. If anything, there was somwhat too little of it, compared to Germany, France, Italy, UK and the Netherlands.

And now, for the test of all of this. The chart below regresses each survey factor on the private sector credit index. The negatively sloped line – for LTV and economic prospect factors combined - shows that when this factor scoring in the survey increased, lending became tighter. Positively sloped line – for competition – shows that when competition pressures rose (factor reading declined), lending actually got tighter. And the statistical significance of the LTV and expectations factors is more than double that of competition...
Let’s just stop talking nonesense about too much competition in Irish banking sector drove unsustainable lending. More likely – an anticiaption by our bankers that no matter what they do, they will never be allowed to fail by the state, plus an absolutely rediculous expectations about opur economy drove our banks to the brink.