18/3/20: Dow Jones Industrials: COVID Impact

Top 50 movements down and up in Dow Jones Industrial Average from 1985 through today:

	% change on close, down		% change on close, up
19/10/1987	-22.61%	13/10/2008	11.08%
16/03/2020	-12.93%	28/10/2008	10.88%
12/03/2020	-9.99%	21/10/1987	10.15%
26/10/1987	-8.04%	13/03/2020	9.36%
15/10/2008	-7.87%	23/03/2009	6.84%
09/03/2020	-7.79%	13/11/2008	6.67%
01/12/2008	-7.70%	21/11/2008	6.54%
09/10/2008	-7.33%	24/07/2002	6.35%
27/10/1997	-7.18%	20/10/1987	5.88%
17/09/2001	-7.13%	10/03/2009	5.80%
29/09/2008	-6.98%	29/07/2002	5.41%
13/10/1989	-6.91%	17/03/2020	5.20%
08/01/1988	-6.85%	02/03/2020	5.09%
31/08/1998	-6.37%	26/12/2018	4.98%
18/03/2020	-6.30%	08/09/1998	4.98%
11/03/2020	-5.86%	29/10/1987	4.96%
22/10/2008	-5.69%	24/11/2008	4.93%
14/04/2000	-5.66%	16/03/2000	4.93%
20/11/2008	-5.56%	10/03/2020	4.89%
08/08/2011	-5.55%	15/10/2002	4.80%
07/10/2008	-5.11%	28/10/1997	4.71%
19/11/2008	-5.07%	30/09/2008	4.68%
05/11/2008	-5.05%	16/10/2008	4.68%
06/11/2008	-4.85%	20/10/2008	4.67%
14/04/1988	-4.82%	01/10/2002	4.57%
12/11/2008	-4.73%	17/01/1991	4.57%
19/07/2002	-4.64%	04/03/2020	4.53%
10/08/2011	-4.62%	24/09/2001	4.47%
10/02/2009	-4.62%	30/11/2011	4.24%
11/09/1986	-4.61%	05/04/2001	4.23%
05/02/2018	-4.60%	11/10/2002	4.20%
16/10/1987	-4.60%	16/12/2008	4.20%
27/02/2020	-4.42%	15/10/1998	4.15%
15/09/2008	-4.42%	09/08/2011	3.98%
20/09/2001	-4.37%	26/08/2015	3.95%
04/08/2011	-4.31%	11/08/2011	3.95%
02/03/2009	-4.24%	04/01/1988	3.94%
27/08/1998	-4.19%	18/04/2001	3.91%
08/02/2018	-4.15%	10/05/2010	3.90%
03/09/2002	-4.10%	18/09/2008	3.86%
12/03/2001	-4.10%	01/09/1998	3.82%
05/03/2009	-4.09%	31/05/1988	3.82%
17/09/2008	-4.06%	17/03/2003	3.59%
30/11/1987	-4.03%	05/07/2002	3.58%
20/01/2009	-4.01%	13/03/2003	3.57%
15/11/1991	-3.93%	11/03/2008	3.55%
03/12/1987	-3.92%	14/12/1987	3.53%
14/11/2008	-3.82%	18/03/2008	3.51%
22/10/1987	-3.82%	21/01/2009	3.51%
14/10/1987	-3.81%	08/12/2008	3.46%

18/3/20: What's Scarier? Corporate Finance or COVID?

Larger corporates in the U.S. are seeking public supports in the face of COVID19 pandemic, from airlines to banks, and the demand for public resources is likely to rise over time as the disease takes its toll on the economy.

Yet, one of the key problems faced by companies today is down to the long running strategies of creating financial supports for share prices that companies pursued over the good part of the last decade, including shares buybacks and payouts of dividends. These strategies have been demanded by the activist investors across numerous campaigns and by shareholders, and have been incentivized by the pay structures for the companies executives.

Artificial supports for share price valuations are financially dangerous in the long run, even though they generate higher shareholder value in the short run. The danger comes from:

1. Shares buybacks using companies cash to effectively inflate share prices, reduce free float of shares and lower the number of shareholders in the company, thereby reducing future space for issuance of new shares;
2. Shares buybacks have often been accompanied by companies borrowing at ultra-low interest rates to purchase own firm equity, reducing equity capital and increasing debt exposures;
3. Shares buybacks generate future expectations of more buybacks, even during the times of financial weaknesses;
4. Shares buybacks also reduce future firms' capacity to borrow by either increasing debt to equity ratio, increasing overall debt loads carried by the firm or both;
5. Payouts of dividends also use cash reserves the company can hold to offset any future risks to its financial wellbeing and to invest in organic growth and R&D;
6. Payouts of dividends create future expectations of higher dividends from investors, reducing firm's capacity to deploy its cash elsewhere;
7. Payouts of dividends increase cum dividend prise to earnings ratios, reducing the overall capacity of the firm to raise capital cheaply in the future.

These are just some of the factors that overall imply that shares buybacks and payouts of extraordinary (or financial unsustainable) dividends can be a dangerous approach to managing corporate finances. 

So here is the evidence on just how deeply destabilizing the scale of shares buybacks and dividends payouts has been within the S&P 500 sector:

In Q3 2019, shares buybacks and dividends yielded USD1,246.73 billion on a four-quarters trailing basis, fourth highest quarter on record. Overall market yield contributions from buybacks (3.12%) was higher than that from dividends (1.81%), with combined yield of 5.05%. In simple terms, any company operating today will have to allocate 5.05 percent of its return to simply match shares buybacks and dividend payouts yields. This is a very high fence to jump.

Put differently, what the above data shows is that just one, single quarter - Q3 2019 - has managed to absorb more resources in shares repurchases and dividend payouts than what the corporate America is currently asking in financial supports from Washington. 

What's scarier? Corporate finance or corona virus?.. 

18/3/20: Yield Curve and Recessions

Some things work even in pandemics:

18/3/20: Banks, The Fed and Money Markets Woes

My article for the International Banker on pre-Covid monetary policy bottlenecks in the US markets is out and available here: https://internationalbanker.com/finance/banks-the-fed-and-money-markets-woes/

18/3/20: Past Recessions and COVID19 Crisis

As governments around the world are revising the expected duration of the extraordinary restrictive measures aimed at containing COVID19 pandemic, it is worth looking back at the history of past recessions by duration:

The chart above clearly shows that U.S. recessions (generally historically shallower and less prolonged than those in Europe) have been lengthy in duration, with only two recessions lasting < 8 months and only six lasting less than 10 months. The 1918-1919 recession was preceded by the Spanish Flu epidemic, but the recovery from the recession was also supported by the end of the WW1. Some more on the Spanish Flu pandemic effects on the economy can be found here: https://www.stlouisfed.org/~/media/files/pdfs/community-development/research-reports/pandemic_flu_report.pdf.

The 1918-1919 recession was not an isolated incident, as it was followed closely by the twin recession of 1920-1921. The joint episodes lasted 25 months. Similarly, the 1980 and 1981 twin recessions should also be treated as a joint episode of 22 months duration. Adjusting for these, average recession has been lasting 15 months, not 13 months, with only four recession of duration < 10 months.

Should, as now expected, the Covid2019 pandemic cause a global recession, it is unlikely to be short-lived, implying that any fiscal and monetary supports required to ameliorate the crisis core effects will have to be in place for much longer than the 2-3 months currently implied by the crisis contagion and social distancing restriction.

15/3/20: Acute beds and hospital beds capacity

With Covid-19 cases worldwide reaching almost 143,000 worldwide, it is worth examining some of the data on healthcare systems' capacity to absorb the influx of patients in weeks to come.

Here is an interesting set of data from OECD comparing the numbers of hospital beds per 1,000 population across the range of countries (I highlight some interesting comparatives):

These are not ICU beds with specialized equipment, of course, but it is hard to imagine that the relationship between ICU beds and general counts of beds is non-linear. Some people on Twitter claimed that the U.S. has higher number of acute care beds, than, say Italy or S. Korea. Which is simply, factually, false. Here's OECD data:

U.S. has 2.44 acute care beds per 1,000 population, Italy has 2.62, while S. Korea has 7.14. For those who are interested, Ireland has 2.77 and the OECD average is 3.59, with the median of 3.23.

The reality is simple: no country is fully ready for the onset of the Covid pandemic at the scale of what has happened in more impacted countries, like Italy, Korea or China. But of all countries we have data for, the U.S. system of healthcare is probably the least capable of handling any large scale public health events, not only due to mediocre capacity, but due primarily to the lack of access to healthcare.

Consider the following facts:

• Over 40% of Americans cannot afford to cover a financial emergency of > $1,000 per annum;
• Average health insurance deductible in the U.S. was in excess of $4,578 in 2018 (see chart below: source https://www.ehealthinsurance.com/resources/individual-and-family/how-much-does-individual-health-insurance-cost); for workers covered by their employers, average deductible was $1,573 in 2018 (https://www.kff.org/health-costs/report/2018-employer-health-benefits-survey/);
• By the above two facts, average family in the U.S. simply cannot afford the deductibles they are contracted for;
• The U.S. 27.5 million people were uninsured in 2018, meaning they cannot afford any care;
• 10-12.5 million of undocumented immigrants residing in the U.S. have no insurance and cannot afford any care. 

Roughly-speaking, between 159 and 162 million people living in the U.S. either have no access to insurance or cannot afford their deductibles. Does anyone expect these people to be pro-active in accessing testing and treatment for Covid early on?

9/3/20: Beware the Endlessly Inflating Global Debt Bubble

My latest article for Manning Financial on the global debt overload is available here: https://issuu.com/publicationire/docs/mf_spring_2020?fr=sZjI3NzI2MTg4NA. Alternatively, see posted below (click on each image to magnify):

9/3/20: BRIC PMIs 1Q 2020: The Test of Covid2019

BRIC PMIs for February 2020 are out and showing massive strains of #COVID2019 on Chinese economy and the twin supply and demand shocks impact on the Global economy:

Starting with Manufacturing:

India is the only BRIC economy that provided strong support to the upside for Global Manufacturing PMI, with India 1Q 2020 Manufacturing PMI reading so far at 54.9, the strongest since 2Q 2012. Brazil Manufacturing PMI was at 51.7 - marking a moderately strong expansion - roughly in line with 51.8 ad 51.9 for 4Q 2019 and 3Q 2019, respectively. In contrast, Russian Manufacturing PMI continued to show contracting sector activity at 48.1, marking the third consecutive quarter of sub-50 readings. Last time Russian Manufacturing reported cautiously positive PMIs was in 1Q 2019.

The real story, however, was Chinese Manufacturing PMI. Thanks to Corona Virus, PMI fell to 45.7 over January-February 2020, with February reading of 40.3 being a complete disaster. The quarterly average is now at it lowest reading since 1Q 2009 when it was at 44.0 and is likely to tank further in March.

Thus, BRIC Manufacturing PMI sat at an abysmal 48.6 reading in 1Q 2020 based on January-February data, the lowest reading since 4Q 2015 and notch below 48.8 reading for Global Manufacturing PMI.

Services PMIs showed the same dynamics as Manufacturing. Again, India led to the upside at 54.9, and Brazil followed at 51.6. Russia remained in solid growth territory, however, in the sector with 1Q 2020 PMI reading at 53.1. China tanked: Chinese services PMI fell to 39.2 in 1Q 2020, dragging the BRIC Services PMI to 45.6 in 1Q 2020, down from 52.3 in 4Q 2019. This is lowest BRIC Services PMI reading on record (note: I use GDP weights to compute BRIC PMIs). Global Services PMI was at 49.9.

Composite PMIs traced the patterns described above for Services and Manufacturing. India Composite PMI was at 57.0 the strongest since 1Q 2011. Brazil Composite PMI was at 51.6, basically unchanged on 4Q 2019 reading of 51.5. Russia Composite Index was at 51.8, down from 4Q 2019 reading of 52.7. China Composite PMI fell to 39.7, its lowest reading on record. Global Composite PMI was at 49.15.

Once again, these readings to-date are impact benchmarks for Corona Virus pandemic shock to the global economy, since the data does not cover the massive spread of contagion from China to other economies which happened in March. The next update, due in early April, should be brutal, as COVID19 bites across the broader global economy.

9/3/20: Irish February PMIs: Baseline for the Covid2019 Impact

With the start of March and with corona virus impacting the global economy, I have decided to restart coverage of Irish PMIs - something I did not do for some years now. So here are some of the 1Q 2020 results based on January-February data.

First off, Sector and Composite PMIs on a quarterly average basis. As reminder, Composite PMIs are computed by me based on Markit and CSO data as GDP share-weighted averages for each sub-component, namely Manufacturing, Services and Construction:

Services clearly lead the recovery from 4Q 2020 weakness, with both Manufacturing and Construction nominally in the expansion territory, but statistically too close to zero growth to be congratulatory.

Composite PMIs ex-Construction are statistically within long term average and consistent with subdued growth rates. Composite ex-Construction (based on just Manufacturing and Services) is at 52.86 against the upper bound for the 95% confidence interval around the historical mean of 52.74. Including Construction, the Composite PMI rises to 56.14.

Monthly PMIs against period averages:

None of this data reflects any major concerns with COVID2019, since no cases have been identified in Ireland in the period covered by data. The impact should be felt in March 2020 figures due at the start of April. So we can look at the above charts as the base for the upcoming COVID2019 impact.

8/3/20: Global Economy's Titanic: Meet Your Iceberg

Here's that iceberg that is drifting toward our economy's Titanic... and no, it ain't a virus, but it is our choice:

Via: @Schuldensuehner

Years of easy credit, easy money. The pile of debt from Baa to lower ratings is the real threat here, for its sustainability is heavily contingent on two highly correlated factors: cost of debt (interest rates) and availability of liquidity. The two factors are closely correlated, but are also somewhat distinct. And both are linked to the state of the global economy.

There are additional problems hidden within A and even Aa rated debt, since these ratings are vulnerable to downgrades, and current Aa rating shifting to Baa or Ba will entail a discrete jump in the cost of debt refinancing and carry.

8/3/20: COVID-19: Global Growth Trends

So far, one thing is clear: we are in an exponential growth (not linear) when it comes to #Covid-19, everywhere, except for Japan...

Here is the full data set through March 7th:

Two observations worth making: ex-China data is exponential. The doubling rate remains at around 4 days since February 24th, prior to that, it was at 6-7 days. Which indicates acceleration in the exponential trend. With China data included, the trend is a bit more complex: we have exponential sub-trends of different steepness, with the first period through February 8th, followed by the step-function (on average still exponential) through February 17th, a linear sub-trend over 18th-24th of February and a new exponential trend since February 25th.

Post-February 25th trend is dominated by global infections, as opposed to China-based infections.

Currently, 17 countries have in excess of 100 confirmed cases:

2/3/20: BRIC Manufacturing PMI: February 2020

A quick post: Manufacturing PMIs are out for the BRIC economies and, unsurprisingly, things are tanking in China and remain seriously under pressure in Russia:

This is the first snapshot of the effects of Coronavirus #COVID19 #CoronaOutbreak on Chinese top-level economic activity figures. The data plotted above is quarter-based averages of the monthly indicator published by Markit. The BRIC quarterly index is computed by me using relative economy size weights for each BRIC economy. In the preceding 3 quarters, BRICs led global manufacturing activity. In 1Q 2020 so far, the BRIC economies as a group have been a drag on global growth.