Tuesday, February 16, 2010

Economics 16/02/2010: Daft.ie and rental markets

So Daft.ie numbers for rents for January are out and there is a bit of a hoopla going on in the blogosphere and the media about how things are improving. Well, they might be. 1% rise on December sounds like good news. The first rise in 24 months sounds like fantastic news. Falling net surplus of properties for rent on the market sounds like it is time to rush out to H&MacD office near you and buy-buy-buy those apartments in Dublin 78 for 250K before they are all rented out to… Who, I would wonder?

In my humble opinion, the hype is being overdone. Here is why:

  1. There is seasonality issue – explained below – which suggests that January rise might be just a dead cat bounce;
  2. There is demand issue – also elaborated upon below – which suggests that there is no fundamentals-based explanation for January rise; and
  3. There is a momentum issue – again, more below – which implies that after 24 months of straight downward trajectory, a small correction is long over due and that this will not necessarily establish an upward trend.

So let us take a look at the 3 possible factors listed above.


Seasonality. A chart might help, or two.

The first chart shows Daft rental index, marking in red circles all the cases where January posted an improvement on December (table below brings this out in numbers in terms of m-o-m changes in the index). Only one occasion – end of 2005 – was the case where this local peaking took place one month before the normal January peak. So this January is no exception here.

Some have argued that this January is different because it is the first reversal of the established trend. True, if we take the trend to mean 2007 peak to today. But if you look at the chart above, you notice that January shows exactly the same performance relative to preceding months and following months on the upward trend and on the downward trend. So I do not buy this argument that because we were falling before, a bounce today means a change in trend.


Now take a look at daft own chart (I have no data for transactions from them, so can’t really do any analysis).
Notice the V-shaped segments? Aha, they too take place on end of 2007 to the beginning of 2008, end of 2008 to the beginning of 2009, and end of 2009 to, you’ve guessed it the ‘Great Improvement Month’ of January 2010. But here is more worrying thing: take a look at within-year trend lines for 2007, 2008 and 2009:
  • Numbers of properties inflowing and exiting (rented, withdrawn, sold, demolished and soon also Namacised) trend up in 2007 and 2008 almost at the same trend line and intercept.
  • Number of properties inflowing and exiting trend still up in 2009, but with higher intercept than before and flattening slope.
  • Number of properties listed overall is down, true, but this simply means we have soaked up some of the overbuild into rentals. How much of it? 2007-2010 differential is about 15,000 units. Surely this is about 1/6th of the supply out there in terms of new-built, plus another 20,000 units vacated by the leaving immigrants and emigrants. Good luck if anyone thinks that we are bottoming out in terms of supply. We are just pausing.

So what does this tell us about 2010? Little, but… if this continues, numbers of transactions will flatten more, with greater overall average volume (higher intercept and positive slope) in 2010 than in 2009. Does this mean we are out of the woods and that supply is finally catching up (downward) with demand? I don’t know this. Why? Because I do not know anything about the drivers of supply and I know something about the drivers of demand.


On supply side, 2009 saw no new built properties hitting the market.


And it saw some reductions in supply as banks took possessions of some properties that might have been on the market for renting, but never rented. Absent actual contracts for rent, banks have no incentive to go into the expensive rental market themselves. They would rather rent wholesale to the local authorities and may be sign up with rental agents. Rental agents will list in bulk, so one listing on daft might mean a large number of actual apartments behind it. Statistics show improved (reduced) supply, but reality shows increased supply.


Other contractions took place in estates that are now completely frozen. In anticipation of continued work, half-finished estates might have seen developers listing some properties there for rent. Now that estates are abandoned – in court proceedings or simply frozen by cash-strapped developers – the listings ‘exited’ (green line went up in the chart above). Happy times? I doubt it.


But what is even more concerning in my view is the demand side. We know that there is no growth in demand out there – demographics is slow moving, so expectations based on kids finishing college and renting their first apartment are static. Foreigners are not flooding into Ireland and net emigration is now a reality. So what is happening on demand side to keep things from going bust? People move, given falling rents, to better accommodations. This leads to hollowing out of the cheaper apartments and rise in demand for more expensive (still deflating, though) better quality properties.


Daft really should do some analysis here to see if this is true. But it looks plausible. If this is happening, then we can expect to see: number of exits improving, while number of listings growing slower (lags in re-listing cheaper properties, etc). This is why the green line above is trending up faster than the blue line.


But the implication of this being true – if it is true, that is – is that within a month or so, once contracts are shifted to new and better quality properties, the cheaper, smaller apartments market will implode. And it will also drag down the more expensive market with a lag of, say 3-6 months.


In short, I simply do not buy the idea that the rental markets are signaling improvement. It will take 3-4 months of continued up-trending for me to buy the story.

Monday, February 15, 2010

Economics 15/02/2010: Bank of Ireland ethical dilemma

So here we are folks, the state has run into a bit of a trouble.

Remember those dividends that our (taxpayer-bought) preference shares in the BofI and AIB were supposed to generate? Ok, there is a problem here.

On February 22, BofI is supposed to pay out some €240 million to us (the taxpayers, in case if you wondering) in dividends on these shares. Alas, if you recall, the EU has imposed severe restrictions on the banks dividends. This means that we are now in a no-man's land when it comes to getting paid on that €3.5 billion we put into BofI. The Government has an option to circumvent the EU rules and ask for shares to be paid in instead of cash, but this surely will open claims from the bondholders who are not being paid their coupons. And, of course, if shares are issued in the way of payment, there will be dilution. At current price, €240 million worht of BofI shares will be, ahem, 24% of the expected €1,000 million rights issue or 19.1% of the market capi of the bank. Some serious dilution, unless the EU grants an exemption to the State.

But an exemption for the Government is an ethically dubious move for several reasons:
  • In all other bank support schemes, the EU did not lift restrictions on dividends/interest/coupon payments for sovereigns. Should it do so for Ireland, what's next?
  • Payments to other bondholders who have identical rights to the state (on paper) will not be made, opening up the entire process to legal challenges.
And we (the taxpayers) were told by the Government and its stockbrokers that we've made a sound investment in the BofI preference shares... Ouch...

Economics 15/02/2010: Ireland and the Euro

Sunday Times, February 14, 2010.

Like a namesake of Federico Fellini’s 1983 classic, E la nave va (And the ship sails on), the Greek debt saga continues its course toward the increasingly inevitable default. Another week, another impenetrable web of announcements, and no real solutions. At this stage, the EU’s ability to resolve the crisis is no longer a matter of markets trust and the reputational costs for the euro are becoming more than evident.

So much so that conservative and forward-looking ECB is starting to think of contingency planning. A source close to Frankfurt has told me earlier in the week that some ECB economists are contemplating the likely run on the euro leading to a 20-25% devaluation of the currency to bring it virtually to parity with the dollar. If that happens, an interest rates hike of 50 basis points or more will be a strong possibility sometime before the end of Q3 2010. A derailment of the nascent economic recovery in the core euro zone countries will be virtually assured.
The plan, currently under discussion at the EU level, involves a guarantee on Greek debt, plus a package of subsidised loans both underwritten by other euro zone countries (re: Germany). The problem is that this is unlikely to be enough.

Greek problems are not cyclical and will not go away once the markets calm down. Country structural deficit, in line with Ireland’s is around 60-70 percent of the overall exchequer annual shortfall. And unlike Ireland, Greece is facing an acute problem refinancing its gargantuan public debt. Worse than that, the latest revelations concerning the complex derivative contracts used by the Greek authorities to hide a significant share of its deficit over the recent years clearly show that the country will have to be much more aggressive in scaling back its annual deficits in order to be able to issue new bonds. The EU latest plan does not facilitate any of these measures. Neither does it have a credible enforcement mechanism. Should Greece decide at any point in the future to renege on its obligations under the rescue package, the entire crisis will be replayed tenfold. And the threat of this gives the Greeks a trump card against the EU Commission under collective guarantees.

Thus, currently, there are only three economically feasible structural solutions to the ongoing crisis in the euro area.

The best option would be a massive injection of liquidity across the common currency area. Minting a fresh batch of euros worth around €1-1.5 trillion and disbursing the currency to the national Governments on a per-capita basis would allow the PIIGS some breathing room in dealing with their deficit and debt problems. At the same time, countries like Germany, with more fiscally sound public spending habits, would be able to use this money to stimulate domestic demand and savings through tax credits and investment.

The drawback of such a plan is that it can reignite inflationary pressures within the euro area. This risk, in my view, is misplaced. Given structural weakness in consumer demand and continued cyclical weakness in new business investment, it is unlikely that much of the freshly-minted cash will go anywhere other than savings. Incidentally, with most the money flowing back into the banking sector, the ECB can then use this increase in deposits to close down some of the asset-backed lending positions that euro area banks have built up with Frankfurt.

Two other solutions involve introduction of a parallel ‘weak’ euro for PIIGS, or an outright bailout of Greece, Portugal, and possibly Spain and Ireland, through a partial pay-down of these countries debts. Both would have dire consequences for the euro itself.

The logistics of running two parallel currencies within a block of countries under a single-handed management of the ECB will produce more than confusion in the markets. The monetary policy required for the ‘weak’ euro state would entail interest rates at roughly triple those in the ‘strong’ euro countries, with the resultant potential for an explosion of carry trades unfolding within a single monetary union.

In addition, there is no mechanism by which either Greece or any other country can be compelled to switch to a ‘weak’ euro. In Ireland’s case, being forced into a ‘weak’ euro will be a disaster for the longer term prospects of maintaining strong presence of the US and UK multinationals here who rely on out full membership in the common currency club to drive their transfer pricing.

An outright paydown of the PIIGS debts – no matter how tough the EU Commission gets in terms of talking up ‘conditional lending’ and ‘direct supervision’ provisos of such an action – will result in an unenforceable lending from Germany to the PIIGS.


From Ireland’s point of view, however, the inevitable outcome of all possible alternatives for dealing with Greece will be devaluation of the euro close to parity with the US dollar. And here may lie the best news Irish exporting firms have heard since the beginning of this recession.

Given the dynamics of our exports-producing sectors, Ireland desperately needs a shot in the arm to stay alive as economy through 2010.

Per CSO, our MNCs-dominated modern manufacturing – the source of most of our goods exports – has managed to post a spectacular 14.5% seasonally-adjusted drop in production in Q4 2009. Pharmaceuticals output declined a 7.5% in the last quarter, while computer, electronic and optical equipment sector – another pillar of our exporting activities was down 14.9% in December 2009. It all points to growing weakness in exports-driven high value added segment of our manufacturing. In short, Ireland can use a serious devaluation of the euro on the exporting side.

But a silver lining never comes without some cumulus clouds in tow.

A devaluation – while a boom for exporters – will act to reduce consumer spending and, through higher cost of imports, will further reduce income available for domestic savings and investment. Given the already abysmally low levels of personal consumption, it is highly likely that this will trigger more household defaults on debt and mortgages.

Furthermore, a devaluation can trigger rising inflation across the euro area which, once imported into Ireland, will undermine the gains in competitiveness achieved during the current crisis. For comparison, consider the case of Ireland v Greece. In his recent note, NIB’s Chief Economist, Ronnie O’Toole highlighted the fact that between mid 2008 and the end of 2009, Irish consumer prices have fallen some 4.6%. In contrast, Greece saw its prices rise some 2.3% over the same period. Of course, falling price levels imply that it is much easier for companies and governments to cut nominal wages. A new bout of inflation induced by the EU solutions to the Greek crisis can wipe out this advantage.

Alas, no one so far has noticed that in both, Ireland and Greece, a cut in nominal wages in line with inflation will do two things. One – it will leave real wages – the stuff that private sector producers really care about – intact. And it will be a magnitude of 3-4 times too little for repairing the Exchequer balance sheet. With both countries facing a 2010 deficit of 10-11% of GDP, a 5% cut in public sector wages is equivalent to applying Bandaid to a shark bite.

And a rise in euro area inflation will have an adverse impact on Irish exporters. Despite devaluation, many of our MNCs and indigenous exporting companies buy large quantities of raw and intermediate inputs from abroad. The rise in the cost of imports bill will partially cancel out the gains in final prices achieved due to devaluation. This is especially significant for the companies trading in modern higher value-added sectors, where geographically diversified multinationals use Ireland as a later stage production base with intermediate inputs coming from other EU countries and the US.

Lastly, a devaluation of the euro close to the dollar parity is likely to trigger monetary tightening by the ECB, with interest rates rising by 50 basis points in the next six months. Coupled with reduced provision of new liquidity by Frankfurt, the resulting credit crunch on the Irish banks will trigger a massive jump in the burden of mortgages here. Needless to say, even with booming exports, Ireland Inc will be in deep trouble as trade credits, corporate funding and personal loans will be pushed deep into red by rising costs of borrowing.

At this stage, we really are caught between a rock and a hard place.

Saturday, February 13, 2010

Economics 13/02/2010: On benefits of marriage to investment

Feeling marital around the Valentine's Day? Well, how about investing in some stocks?

A paper just published in The Review of Financial Studies (2010, 23(1) pages 385-432)
titled: “The Effect of Marital Status and Children on Savings and Portfolio Choice" by David A. Love (not kidding there) looked at the impact of marital status on optimal decisions about saving, life insurance, and asset allocation. It turns out, quite predictably I must add, that changes in marital-status and the number of children can have “important effects on optimal household decisions”:
  • Widowhood induces sharp reductions in the portfolio shares in stock, and the impact is largest for women and individuals with children.
  • Divorce causes men and women to reallocate their portfolios in different directions; men choose much riskier allocations, while women opt for safer ones.
  • Children play a fundamental role in the optimal portfolio decisions. Men with children, for example, increase their shares in response to divorce by less than half as much as men without children.
Obviously, this might have something to do with the fall-off in disposable income and wealth, induced by a divorce when long-term child payments are involved. “…Imagine that a couple with two children living at home gets a divorce. Depending on the legal assignment of custody, the mandated level of child support, anticipated earnings, and the division of household wealth, the ratio of wealth to the present value of future income for each spouse will almost surely differ from the level previously observed in marriage. …this ratio is key to understanding optimal asset allocation because it summarizes, at least in part, the exposure of future consumption possibilities to fluctuations in financial markets.”

In addition to wealth-to-income ratio, divorce and portfolio choice are linked through changes in financial background risk as “the former spouses move from living on a combined income to each relying on a potentially more volatile single stream. …Uninsurable background risk, arising, for example, from labor income, business income, and housing, can have a quantitatively large impact on optimal portfolio decisions.”


A final way that the divorce might influence optimal portfolio choice is through its effect on savings “as the former spouses update their desired consumption of housing, food, transportation, and childcare.” Divorcees from a single car household buy a new car. They also increase childcare expenditure in most cases, unless large divorce settlements induce one parent exit from the labour force. Food consumption expenditure and volume rise, as all other consumption of both durables and non-durables.


Contrast the economic implications of divorce for the two-child couple with those of a childless couple. Members of the childless couple will still experience a change in wealth and income in the event of a divorce, “but there will be no additional shock to resources due to child support, college expenses, or differences in scale economies related to the assignment of custody. Given this differential impact on resources, it is reasonable to expect that the childless couple will respond differently to divorce in terms of saving and portfolio choice. In addition, children may also alter households' responses to widowhood. For example, depending on the strength of the bequest motive, surviving spouses with children will tend to have larger amounts of wealth relative to income compared to those without children, leaving them more exposed to market risk.”


All of these conjectures are supported by evidence, but there are some surprises in findings as well:
“We find that households with children tend to accumulate substantially less wealth during the working years but that their slower rates of drawdown in retirement leave them with more savings toward the tail end of life.” Does marriage really mean life-long prudence?

“This trajectory of wealth accumulation is mirrored, in part, by the evolution of portfolio shares. Earlier in the life cycle, households with children hold riskier portfolio shares (by about 10 percentage points) than households without children, but the relationship reverses in retirement.” So no, risk aversion is lower for married couples probably because their dual incomes act as hedges against single income volatility.

Instead – it is bequest motive that drives them to become more conservative in older age. “…a riskier allocation for these younger households is optimal because their consumption streams are less dependent on the performance of financial markets. In retirement, however, children provide an incentive to maintain wealth for bequests, and the resulting increase in the wealth-to-income ratio makes households increasingly sensitive to stock market volatility.”


Hmmm, this brings us to taxes, then. A rise in inheritance tax during the wealth accumulation period of household life cycle implies a reduced incentive to save for bequest. This, should then result in lower risk aversion for older age households. And that, in turn, will lead to greater volatility of investment and also to higher cost of borrowing by the sovereigns. How so? Because if older households become less risk averse, their share of government bonds in total investment portfolio will drop. This means lower demand for bonds and higher yields on new issuance. Cost of sovereign borrowing goes up and the benefits of higher taxes to Government revenues are cancelled out, at least in part.


Imagine that – some say there is no such thing as Laffer Curve… not even at 100% marginal tax rate?

Economics 13/02/2010: Inflation targets and What's in a name?

One interesting observation – Oliver Blanchard in yesterday interview with Wall Street Journal suggests (here) that “If I were to choose inflation target today, I’d strongly argue for 4%. But we have started with 2%, so going from 2% to 4% would raise issues of credibility. We should have a discussion about it.”

I have argued for some time now that a combination of
  • continued tightness in the credit markets,
  • long-term stickiness of European unemployment and
  • massive national deficits and debt issuance since 2008 imply the need for inflationary reductions in debt levels accumulated by the euro area states, especially those members of the APIIGS club
will mean continued need for unprecedented liquidity injections by the ECB through 2010. The three forces mean that the ECB will have no option but to shift away from its current ‘below 2%’ target for inflation and move on to 4% target.

Good to see serious heavy hitter in policy economics, like Oliver Blanchard, also thinking the same.



Now, to more ‘fun’ economics.

Remember Shakespeare’s “What’s in a name? / That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet.” (Romeo and Juliet).

In the world where information moves much faster and where uncertainty is much higher – in other words, in the world we inhabit today – this view is no longer true, for what is in the name does tell us much about what is in the name bearer.

A recent paper by Aura, Saku and Hess, Gregory D., What’s in a Name?, Economic Inquiry, Vol. 48, Issue 1, pp. 214-227, January 2010 (link here) shows exactly this.

“Expectant parents lie awake at night, consult books, and some even hire a consultant to choose their new child’s name. Is it similar to the process that manufacturers undertake when branding a new product? Viagara pretty much speaks for itself, but to what extent does Gregory, Saku or even Jamaal convey information and/or meaning.”

The study attempts to answer two main questions:
  1. does a person’s name convey information about their background?
  2. does a person’s name have an impact on the person’s long run economic outcomes, such as income, education, fertility, social standing, happiness or prestige?”
“In our dataset, this would mean comparing the outcomes of otherwise similar individuals with a name like Mark (exclusively a white name in our data) with Marcus (exclusively a black name in our data) or comparing Alice (white name) with Tanisha (black name)…

…More specifically, we investigate the extent to which a respondent’s first name features affect his or her years of formal education, self reported financial relative position as well as social class, to have a child before 25, and occupational prestige. …we can examine the gender differences between lifetime outcomes and first name features.”

There are broadly speaking three main findings:
  1. there is a strong empirical relationship between an individual’s first name and their background;
  2. there is a weaker (but still significant) empirical relationship between an individual’s lifetime outcomes and their first names. Taken together, these first two findings imply that names do convey information about an individual’s labor market productivity. A rose is not quite a rose by any other name.
  3. both non-black non-whites with ‘blacker’ names as well as blacks with more popular (i.e. predominantly ‘whiter’) names have significantly worse financial outcomes. “This last piece of evidence can be interpreted in light of a subtle form of discrimination: namely, while black names come with discrimination and identity costs and benefits for black individuals, non-black non-whites with ‘blacker’ names face the costs of such names though not the benefits. A similar identity/discrimination channel would also hold for blacks with more popular (i.e. whiter) names, …though it does not provide conclusive proof of discrimination.”

First, names indicate a great deal of information on
  • gender (and this conclusion is not based on linguistic gender of the name, but on standard phonetic characteristics);
  • the year when one was born,
  • a respondent’s higher parental education background "can be partially inferred from higher popularity, fewer syllables, more standard spellings, fewer ‘oh’ endings, not starting with a vowel, ending with a consonant and having a lower Blackness Index (the extent to which a given name is race-specific). This latter result …is actually quite large: moving from a purely non-black name to a fully black name is associated with a Father having 2 fewer years of formal education and a Mother having 1 year less.”
  • more popular names are associated with better lifetime outcomes: that is, more education, occupational prestige and income, and a reduced likelihood of having a child before
  • names with higher values for Blackness Index are “associated with poorer lifetime outcomes: that is, less education, occupational prestige, happiness, social class and income, and an increased likelihood of having a child before 25".
  • ‘ah’ and ‘oh’ ending sounds in a name are also related to poorer lifetime outcomes, though popularity is related to better lifetime outcomes.
So first names just by themselves convey information about a respondent’s lifetime outcomes. But does "your first name features affect one’s lifetime outcomes after learning information that may be readily available in a job resume".

It turns out that when this is controlled for,
  1. Name popularity remains a significant explanatory variable in education outcomes, but not in financial outcomes;
  2. Blackness Index is statistically significant again in the class determination, and whether or not a person has higher happiness quotient in the future, as well as in educational attainment: “Higher values for BIND lead to a lower assessment of social class, happiness and an increased chance of having children before 25. However, as with POPULARITY, BIND is now no longer statistically significant in the income responses. Again, the role of education and labor market experience is clearly soaking up the role that POPULARITY and BIND played in the income response” in earlier analysis.
“It would thus seem that first names retain a strong role overall in determining lifetime outcomes even after controlling for a respondent’s labor market experience.”

“There is the further possibility that these quasi economic outcomes may also be correlated with labor productivity: simply unhappy workers and those that feel that they are lower class (or even upper class) may have differential labor productivities. Based on the findings… controlling for a myriad of exogenous family background characteristics, a first name’s popularity and/or ‘blackness’ appear to have an impact on intermediate economic outcomes that are likely correlated with labor productivity but not on actual economic outcomes. It would thus appear that …the ‘blackness’ of a name is correlated with factors that can affect labor productivity which could in turn be reflected in discrimination at the resume level [but not at face-to-face level]. As we demonstrate, however, this potential channel of discrimination does not have an impact on pure economic outcomes in our sample.”

In general, this explains why past immigrants to the US – from Europe and elsewhere – tended to automatically adopt most popular local names for their children to ‘assimilate’ into the American mainstream.

It also shows that, for example in the case of Ireland, one would expect past emigrants to be selected on the basis of those with more common names experiencing more favorable in outcomes. Furthermore, currently, within the country, Irish first names might provide for better outcomes - as they serve as more acceptable norms here, while at the same time placing children at relative disadvantage to their peers if they should emigrate out of Ireland.

Lastly, when looking at the trends in names, since the onset of recession, more mainstream names have moved up the popularity chain in Ireland with more Gaelic-derived names becoming less popular. This too might be explained by the findings - when times are tough, implicitly, parents tend to focus more on real economic and social outcomes than on the feeling of being in tune with Eamon O Cuiv's 'national culture'.


Overall, instead of the Shakespeare’s idea that it is the inherent subject characteristic that matters, not the name, is no longer true. Instead, modern relationship between the name and the person is probably better described by a different quote – from Johnny Cash’s (1969), A Boy Named Sue: “So I give ya that name and I said goodbye / I knew you’d have to get tough or die / And it’s that name that helped to make you strong”.

Friday, February 12, 2010

Economics 12/02/2010: Crisis pressures in broader debt markets

And so the Greek saga continues, with yesterday’s announcement that the EU has a worked-out rescue package for the country now turning out to be yet another wishful thinking piece of poorly prepared PR. No package details, and the markets are not impressed.

But forget Greece for a moment. The good news is that just as in Autumn 2008, the last couple of months have been the case of “bad news = good news”. The markets have finally started to turn their attention to the completely reckless ways in which majority of Governments around the world have been managing their finances, both before the crisis and during it.


The new line of fire is now directed at Turkey and Japan.


Japan, pushing for well over 200% of GDP ratio of debt is in a league of its own. And the current Government is hell-bent on raising the debt limits higher with aggressive spending targets and Napoleonic plans for shifting even more public expenditure into largely unproductive investment (for a country with already extensive public capital stock, the diminishing marginal returns on new public investment have set in some time ago). Debt ratio to working age population is now well above USD100,000 and is rising at accelerating pace. Savings rate has fallen to below 4% while the fiscal deficits are now much higher than they were back in the days when the savings rate was around 18%. Current account balance has declined from the peak of 5% in 2007 to under 1.5% today and is set to fall further. With these dynamics in mind, Japan is going to account for roughly 11% of the total global expected issuance of new bonds in 2010.

Turkey is a serious basket case, although it might not appear to be such from the simple debt levels comparisons. Like Ireland, Turkey has low debt to GDP ratio (45% as opposed to Greece with 113%, Portugal with 77%, Spain with 54%), It is in line with Ireland current 46.2% debt levels (although in Ireland’s case, a GNP base would work much better, bringing out true public debt to a much more formidable 57% of GNP). But it is not the level of debt that is worrisome. The awesome rate of debt increase, along with hidden debts that the public sector underwrites are the real concerns here.


An interesting chart from Turkey Data Monitor:
shows just how bad Turkish debt dynamics are. In the environment where it is currently yielding over 8% with an average maturity being around 2 years, the problem for Turkey is the following:
  • Can a country with history of past debt problems and rising deficits really roll-over some USD125 billion worth of debt? and
  • Can such a country do this in the environment where worldwide, national governments are expected to issue some USD4.5 trillion worth of bonds in 2010 - three times the normal volume of global debt issuance?
Now, think of it this way – Turkey debt is held by domestic banks (roughly 60%) and the remainder – by foreigners. This, normally, presents the point of stability. Alas, if the banks are not operating in the liquidity saturated markets for funding (and they are clearly not doing so) the Turkish Government cannot default on the debt without risking destabilizing its banking system. And if it does destabilize the banks, the Government ‘solution’ to default will imply demand for massive banks rescue package, adding further to the debt mountain. In other words, unlike with other countries that have heavier exposures to international lenders, Turkey simply must refinance the roll-over debt.

So dynamics matter. And they matter for Ireland. Which got me thinking – just how bad is our debt position going to get and what costs will this impose on the economy. Here are few charts:
Start with gross debt as percentage of GDP and GNP. Above chart shows figures for the official debt estimates from Stability Plan Update, December 2009, issued by the Department of Finance. Additional lines show the ratio of debt to GNP and also extension of debt figures to include Nama's €59 billion allocation, plus expected €12 billion in post-Nama capital injections into the banks. Finally, the last line shows the above, accounting for a lower growth rate in GNP scenario than the one forecast by the DofF for 2012-2014 period. The important issue here is that our debt to GNP (the real measure of our economy) is going to breach 100% even under DofF own rosy assumptions.

Next, consider the growth rate in our debt:
Pretty dramatic, especially when you compare the rate of growth in 2009-2012 against the tiny rates of decline predicted for 2013-2014. The rates of decline in fact will be about half the rate of interest we will be paying on this debt.

So expect no respite in terms of the cost of debt financing in sight:
The above are pretty big annual numbers - up to €14 billion going to feed the debt monster annually! Crazy stuff for an economy worth around €130 billion in terms of its GNP. Alternatively, €14 billion is roughly 30% of the total Government expenditure that this country can afford if we were to stay on structurally balanced fiscal path!

And thus, cost of debt financing as percentage of our economy is going to be excruciating - up to 9.5% of the annual economic output at the peak (under the most pessimistic scenario). Which means the total cost of the current fiscal crisis is also going to be astronomical:
By the end of 2014, thus, we are looking to have wasted between €50 billion and €80 billion in total on sustaining that which is simply unsustainable - our gargantuan public sector overspending.


Incidentally, this pretty much explains why I do not believe that marginal reforms of the public sector, such as 'productivity improvements', 'reduced spending on external consultants' and 'staff re-allocations' will be enough to address the issue. In real world we inhabit, we need a massive cut in terms of overall spending on public sector and this can only be achieved by slashing numbers employed in the public sector and cutting pensions and wage expenditure on the remaining staff.


PS 1: given chronic lack of skills, aptitude and capabilities present in many areas of the public sector, an idea of using internal expertise to reduce reliance on external consultants advice and expertise, while hoping for improved efficiency is simply absurd.


PS2: A year ago, myself and Brian Lucey wrote an article for the Irish Times about the massive debt overhang in the Irish economy. Using IMF statistics we established that Irish economy stands out as the second most indebted economy in the world in terms of ratio of debts to GDP, the most indebted economy in the world when it comes to applying our real measure of economic activity - GNP, and one of the most indebted economies in absolute terms.

In response to the article, we were told by the Irish officials that 'total debts do not matter, only public debt does'.

In the real world, total debts of economy do matter because they show structural composition of economy itself, revealing the extent to which economic growth is being financed by reckless borrowing.

This month, Hayman Advisors weighted in on our side:
The above debts cover public debt, plus 5 top banks per country, with Iceland figure showing pre-crisis conditions. Forbes magazine reproduced this chart in their cover story for February 8 edition with a tag line saying "It's the Total Debt, Stupid".

I agree.

Wednesday, February 10, 2010

Economics 10/02/2010: Can Labour Party lead?

Does a coalition involving any party in partnership with Labour makes sense?

Unfortunately, despite Labour Party having in its ranks some very talented and economically literate senior politicians (Joan Burton and Ruairi Quinn come to mind), there is a legacy of the LP being largely captured by the Trade Unionist movement. In times of economic expansion, this risks the party pre-committing itself to the policy platforms that:
  • expand public sector beyond economically efficient levels;
  • make the above expansions permanent in nature (i.e. irreversible); and
  • commit the state to correcting any potential funding shortfalls out of tax revenue increases.
In this context, it is irrelevant whether or not the Labour Party can or cannot commit to a credible path of public sector productivity reforms. It is simply a party that will find it impossible to impose fiscal discipline on its own constituency.

For example, consider the current situation with public sector wages and non-wage earnings clearly being out of line with private sector and with the reality of economic crisis on the ground. Two past policy dimensions, each one sufficient enough to rule out Labour's ability to impose fiscal discipline on the state, that come to mind:
  1. Labour consistently supported increases in the lower tier wages, thus advocating a compression of wage distribution from the left tail. In current environment, Labour could cut upper tier public sector wages, further compressing the distribution, this time from the right tail. But it cannot commit to shifting the entire distribution left. And this means that any savings achieved will be poultry and will not go far enough to address the existent wages gap between public and private workers to the left of the median wage.
  2. Labour also persistently advocated minimum wage increases. A cut in a minimum wage, therefore, is not an option for Labour. But absent cuts in minimum wages, what policy can promote jobs creation at the bottom of the skills distribution? A cut in the cost of employing workers - aka a cut in employer PRSI - is also out of question for Labour. Training and state subsidised employment simply cannot deliver sustained jobs for this category of unemployed.
The legacy of traditionalist approach to class politics is tainting Labour party platforms today. Their current proposals for dealing with unemployment virtually invariably require the State to find new funding to expand existent programmes, such as investment in education and training, a jobs fund in the Budget and a new National Development Plan. Funny thing is, Labour party seems that propping up the same programmes that failed to deliver jobs in the times of the boom (aka all mentioned above) will somehow, once expanded, deliver jobs in a recession.

There is also a strange belief, on behalf of Labour party that extending a place in a university to everyone who applies (see here), regardless of their merit or ability, is a jobs-supporting policy as well. In following this, Labour commits two cardinal errors:
  • It implicitly beliefs that getting a college degree improves ones ability to gain employment; and
  • It explicitly assumes that providing tertiary education for all is necessarily net-additive economic and social activity.
In other words, Labour party fails to recognise that education can yield diminishing social and economic returns and it fails to recognise that the rate at which social and economic returns diminish is unrelated to the quality of graduates.

So there you have it - despite having some very good people in its ranks, Labour party is simply not a credible contender for economic crisis management.

Economics 10/02/2010: Minumum wage and unemployment benefits

Two weeks ago in my Sunday Times article (see here) I wrote about the long-term effects of the minimum wages. Instead of dealing with the losses of economic competitiveness from Irish high minim wage, I elected to focus in the article on the distorted incentives and reduced training for potential and actual minimum wage recipients. Interestingly, these adverse effects are nearly identical for minimum wages and unemployment benefits.

Last week’s research paper from Zafar Nazarov of RAND, academic think tank in the US and Europe, titled The effect of the unemployment insurance wage replacement rate on reemployment wages, showed that higher unemployment benefits lead to lower wages commanded by those who manage to re-enter employment. In addition, higher wage replacement rate under unemployment benefits ‘depresses depresses the prospect of finding full-time work while increasing the prospect of finding part-time work”. To summarize, therefore, higher unemployment benefits paid hurt those unemployed who find a job in the future and lead to lower quality of jobs available to the previously unemployed.

Qui bono
, then from higher unemployment payments? Those on permanent welfare, of course. Since they do not face a prospect of gaining a job in the future, they face none of the costs of higher unemployment benefits. But as their own pay is linked to unemployment benefits through social fairness arguments, there is all the upside of higher rates. Oh, the bizarre world of state-controlled wages, unemployment insurance and welfare benefits. Makes banks’ s shenanigans sound pretty banal.

Monday, February 8, 2010

Economics 08/02/2010: Nama v IMF revelations

Fair play to the Irish Times' Simon Carswell (here) for unearthing through FOI request that IMF note which back in April last year told the Irish Government that Nama will not restore lending in the economy.

This, of course, is the old news to many of us. You can search this blog for 'restore credit' and other key words and see posts going back to April 2009 with exactly the same analysis. Outside of this blog, I warned on the matter in my columns in Business & Finance and in the Sunday Times, in articles in Irish Mail, Irish Independent, Irish Times, in numerous appearances on BBC, Bloomberg, RTE, TV3, Newstalk, TodayFM and so on. Even in the likes of Wall Street Journal and numerous international print outfits. Several other analysts - namely Professors Brian Lucey and Karl Whelan, banking specialist Peter Mathews, economist Ronan Lyons and others - all have done so as well.

But what is new is the fact that this IMF opinion was known to the Government and its advisers who, having buried it from public view, have gone out on a prolonged PR campaign, in effect liberally treating the truth about Nama. Ditto for NTMA and Nama officials. That public representatives and officials engaged in such an act is a betrayal of public trust. It is, simply put, a deception of public opinion.

Quote from Irish Times: "Speaking at the publication of the Nama legislation last September, Mr Lenihan said Nama would “strengthen and improve” the funding positions of the banks “so that they can lend to viable businesses and households”. Taoiseach Brian Cowen had said the Government’s objective in restructuring the banks was to generate “more access to credit for Irish business at this critical time”"

But there is more to Simon's article (my emphasis):

"In an internal e-mail dated June 6th, 2009, ...senior department [of Finance] official Kevin Cardiff warned against making public any official estimate for the losses faced by the banks, saying that the department had not made this information public. “We naturally shared with the IMF team our informal views on the range of possibilities, but would be uneasy about seeing these formalised,” said Mr Cardiff, who has since been appointed secretary general of the department."

This is uncomfortably close to an admission that the DofF willingly withheld crucial information about Nama from the official communications in order to avoid this information being disclosed publicly through future FOI requests. Again, I am not a conspiracy theorist, but what else does one need in terms of proof that the Government and its officials knowingly engaged in acts of public deception when they were making claims about
  • Nama's expected impact on credit supply;
  • Nama's expected costs and losses.
Tellingly, IMF estimated that Irish banks will face losses of up to €35 billion and that the DofF was informed by them of this figure. If you look at my posts on Nama Trust, expected Nama losses and the cost of nationalizing the banks - my estimates from early 2009 on consistently show that the at risk assets of Irish banks covered by Nama are around €32-37 billion - bang on in line with IMF's estimate. Again, I wasn't the only person providing these estimates.

The Government, Nama, NTMA, DofF and the Central Bank - all have elected to completely ignore all independent analysis that has been performed by myself, Brian Lucey, Karl Whelan, Peter Mathews and others. And yet, not a week goes by since September 2009 in which the Government is forced to admit that we were right in our estimates and forecasts.

While the Government continues to spend hundreds of thousands of our euros on PR spin doctors and 'advisers'. At the same time, the entire staff and executive structure of Nama have been loaded with either 'quiet men' of 'I have no interest in defending taxpayers' type or outright 'yes men' for the Government.

Let me reproduce here few quotes that a reader posted in his reply to one of my earlier blog posts:

"The government did an "A1" job in their spin on NAMA, they persuaded the shareholders into voting for NAMA so that the banks would avoid nationalisation. Blindfold nationalisation is inevitable. Memorable brainwashing quotes:
  • "NAMA is the only game in town"
  • "there is no easy way out"
  • "We need NAMA to get credit flowing into the economy"
  • "Ireland is getting "NAMA Money" from the EU"
  • "There will be no more 100% nationalisations"
And so on...

Disgraceful, really!

Do send me other quotes from public officials that you feel might have been outright deceiving in nature and I will post them on the blog!

Economics 08/02/2010: PIIGS or PIGS?

For those of you who missed my article in yesterday's Sunday Times, here is an unedited version of it, as usual:

This week marked a new low for the euro zone. Despite all the posturing by Brussels officials about Greek deficits and the incessant talking up of the euro by the ECB and the Commission, the events clearly show that the common currency is lacking credible tools to bring order to public finances of its member states. Thanks to the clientilist politicians and the electorate, keen on piling up debt to pay for perks and inefficient public services, the Greeks really blew it. Then again, given their performance over the last fifteen years – inclusive of massive persistent deficits and outright manipulation of official data to conceal them – about the only surprising thing in the ongoing Greek tragedy is that their bonds are still trading at all.

Much more interesting events, related to the Greek debacle, are unfolding in Ireland. Boosted by the factually erroneous, yet ideologically pleasing statements by international observers, Ireland’s image in the euro area has improved significantly since the publication of the Budget 2010.

Which, of course, is out of line with economic reality on the ground. Far from exiting the PIIGS club of sickest euro economies, comprised of Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain, we are now looking like a country to which the wrath of international bond markets might turn next, once Greece is dealt with.

Let me explain.

This week, writing in the Financial Times, a respected economist, Nouriel Roubini has clearly shown just how escapist is the current thinking about the state of public finances in Ireland.

"The best course [for Greece] would be to follow Ireland, Hungary and Latvia with a credible fiscal plan heavy on spending cuts that government can control, rather than tax hikes... This approach is working in Ireland – spreads exploded as public debt ballooned to save its banks, but came back in as public spending was cut by 20 percent."

Professor Roubini’s comment was echoed later in the day by ECB’s President Jean-Claude Trichet who lent unprecedented amount of good will to the ‘right policy choices’ made by Ireland.

Even our Department of Finance has not, officially, claimed such a thing.

First off - Irish fiscal adjustments from the beginning of the crisis to-date are split approximately 50:50 between higher tax burden and ‘savings’. This debunks Professor Roubini’s general analysis of our policies.

But more importantly, it shows that our Government policies have focused on providing fiscal and financial supports to a select few at the expense of the entire economy. Some €70 billion plus of real future taxpayers’ money has been already committed and €10-15 billion more is still waiting to be deployed post-Nama to rescuing Irish banks’ bondholders. Slightly less comfort was given to the developers who will get a three year holiday on loans repayments courtesy of the taxpayers.

In a real world, economic recovery can only start with ordinary households and businesses. In Ireland, public policy assumes that raising taxes and charges at the times of shrinking incomes and revenues to sustain banks bondholders and narrow interest groups within this society passes for ‘doing the right thing’.

International observers might overlook this fact. For them the costs of encountering a deep and prolonged Irish recession are nil. But for us, the spectre of the 1980s is painfully evident.

In contrast to Greece, Ireland has been hit by an unprecedented, in magnitude and duration, economic recession. Our house prices bust and financial assets collapse was deeper than that of Greece. We also are facing a much more severe banking crisis and a significantly more dramatic rates of deterioration in public deficits. Ditto for our unemployment levels and credit contraction rates.

Our sole claim to better health is a substantially lower existent public debt burden. Alas, this too is optical. In real per capita terms, total levels of debt in Ireland (combining public and private debts) are several times greater than those in Greece.

Even when it comes to budgetary adjustments – as far as Governments plans go – the Greeks are ahead of us. Starting from marginally higher deficit in 2009, the Greeks are planning to bring their deficit to within 3% of GDP limit by 2012. We are planning to do the same by 2014. Of course, both plans are unrealistic, but whilst the EU Commission will attempt to force the Greeks to comply with their target, no one will be closely monitoring our Government’s progress.

In summary, we are nowhere near exiting the PIIGS club.

But let’s take a look at the ‘Love the Irish Policies’ media circus going on in international press. Contrary to Professor Roubini statement, Irish Government has been unable to achieve meaningful cuts in public spending to-date. Instead, we delivered a reallocation of some funding from one side of public expenditure to another. ‘Cuts’ in majority of departments have been simply re-diverted to social welfare and Fas.

By Government-own admission, there will be no net reduction in public expenditure in Ireland since 2009. Department of Finance’s "Ireland – Stability Programme Update, December 2009" provides some stats. In 2009, Gross Current Government Expenditure in Ireland stood at €61,108 million. In 2010 it is budgeted to reach €61,872 million. The latter figure does not include the cost of recapitalizing the banks post-Nama. In 2011-2014 the Government is projecting the Gross Current Expenditure to rise steadily from €63,518 million to €65,768 million.

To Professor Roubini this might look like savings, but to me it looks like the Government continuing to leverage our economic future in exchange for avoiding taking necessary medicine now.

The only reasons why our deficits are expected to contract from 2011 through 2014 is because the Government has been slashing public investment, raising tax burden and is banking on a robust recovery after 2010.

Overall, DofF plans for a 2.8% cut in the General Government Balance in 2010, and that will leave us (per their rosy forecasts on growth and tax revenue) at 11.6% deficit relative to GDP, down a whooping 0.1 percentage point on 11.7% deficit achieved in 2009. Adding expected costs of banks recapitalization, our Government deficit can easily reach beyond 14-15 percent of GDP this year. Greece is now aiming for 8-9% deficit this year under a watchful eye of the Commission. Do tell me Budget 2010 qualifies us for being treated as a stronger economy than Greece.

Stripping out its interest rate bill, Greece is planning for lower per-capita state borrowing in 2010 than Ireland. But Irish Exchequer is planning to raise its borrowing this year by 3%. If international observers are correct, why would the Government that managed to cut its spending by 20% increase its borrowing? That would only make sense if the revenue is expected to fall by more than 20%. Yet Budget 2010 assumes tax revenue decline of only 4.7% in 2010 and an increase in non-tax revenues.

So what has Irish Government done to deserve such a sweet-heart treatment from the EU and Professor Roubini?


One word comes to mind – smart marketing. Budget 2010 simply took €4,051 million from one Government pocket and loaded it into another. Then, the Government promptly reversed itself out of some of the higher profile cuts, such as those imposed on higher earners in the public sector. Even at the highest point of estimates, the savings – before they get cancelled out by rising spending and falling revenue – amount to the total of 6.42% of the Gross Total Expenditure in 2009.

After 2 years of the deepest economic crisis in the euro area, we are now facing one of the heaviest upper marginal tax burdens in the developed world, and a deficit that is simply out of control. Hardly the road map to a recovery.

Sunday, February 7, 2010

Economics 07/02/2010: Human Capital, Immigrants and Social safety Nets

A very interesting piece of research that tends to support my view that higher minimum wages and more extensive welfare nets / social services nets are acting to reduce overall levels of productivity amongst the immigrants.

One paper, published this week, titled Indian Entrepreneurial Success in the US, Canada and the UK, by Robert W. Fairlie - University of California, Santa Cruz, Harry Krashinsky - University of Toronto, Julie Zissimopoulos – RAND and Krishna B. Kumar – RAND (available here) takes a look at the differences in entrepreneurship (incidence and outcomes) and education amongst one large sub-group of immigrants to the US, UK and Canada. Having a culturally homogenous and relatively large group of immigrants allows the authors to set aside the need for measuring sending country attributes, thus improving substantially the accuracy of their results.

What they found is pretty interesting.

Indian immigrants in the US and other wealthy countries are successful in entrepreneurship. But how successful these entrepreneurs are once they reach different countries and encounter different social systems, and what are the sources of their success?

The study finds that “in the US Indian entrepreneurs have average business income that is substantially higher than the national average and is higher than any other immigrant group. High levels of education among Indian immigrants in the US are responsible for nearly half of the higher level of entrepreneurial earnings while industry differences explain an additional 10 percent. In Canada, Indian entrepreneurs have average earnings slightly below the national average but they are more likely to hire employees, as are their counterparts in the US and UK. The Indian educational advantage is smaller in Canada and the UK contributing less to their entrepreneurial success.”

Hmmm… why so, you might ask?

Immigrants are most likely to enter both the US and UK as ‘family sponsored.’ Since the 1960s U.S. immigration policy has strongly favored family reunification. The UK’s immigration policies over the past four decades have shifted towards emphasizing family reunification and employment. On the other hand, Canada's point-based system which awards immigration admission points based on education, language ability (English or French), years of experience in a managerial, professional or technical occupation, age, arranged employment in Canada, and other factors leads to more skilled immigrants compared to the US.

So far so good – Canada has longer lasting and much more selective immigration policies than the US and UK.

Because of the point-based system, in Canada, roughly half of all immigrants are admitted through employment-based preferences. In contrast, slightly more than 10 percent of immigrants in the US are admitted under this classification.

Again, sounds like Canada should be really the land of entrepreneurial and higher quality immigrants.

The related category of employment creation or investors who face minimum net worth and business experience requirements, and self-employed immigrants who must have relevant experience in occupations. A larger (but still relatively small – just 7%) share of immigrants in Canada are admitted under these policies than in the US (0.1%) and UK (2.4%).

So, ex-ante data analysis, it is pretty clear that “Canada's point-based immigration system results in a higher share of employment-based immigrants compared to the US and UK. On the other hand, the UK admits a much higher share of immigrants under its refugee and asylee programs than the US or Canada. All else equal, we would expect skill levels of immigrants to be the highest in Canada and the lowest in the UK.” (emphasis is mine)

In other words: the authors “find some evidence that the educational advantage of Asian immigrants compared to the national average is lower in the UK than in the US, [consistent with differences in immigration policies]. But, we also find that the educational advantage in the US is higher than it is in Canada, which runs counter to the greater emphasis of Canada's immigration policy on rewarding points for the general skill level of immigrants.”


Why? “A more generous redistribution system, more egalitarian earnings, and other institutional and structural factors, however, may make Canada less attractive to higher skilled immigrants such as Indian immigrants.”

Boy, this is some statement – especially considering the EU policies to achieve ‘Social’ economy – economy based on greater earnings equality, greater rights-based outcomes equalization and maintaining a very generous welfare and redistribution systems. And this is serious, folks. Canada, US and UK are much younger – demographically – societies than EU-core states. This means that in general, the EU has a much more acute need to import younger entrepreneurial talent and skills in order to pay even comparable welfare rates to those in Canada, US and UK. Let alone to afford a more generous system of benefits. The prospects of this happening are not that good, folks.


Let us get back to the study, though:

“We find that Indian entrepreneurs are much more successful than the national average in the US. Indian businesses also perform well in Canada and the UK, but the evidence is not as strong. In the US, Indian entrepreneurs earn 60 percent more than white entrepreneurs and have the highest average business income of any immigrant group.”

No, wait – income inequality is actually favoring ethnic minorities in the US? Without an EU-styled rights legislation that polices allocations of income to specific ethnic groups? Who would have thought that to be possible!

“Estimates from business-level data sources also indicate that Indian firms have higher profits, hire more employees, and have lower failure rates than the average for all U.S. firms.”

Ouch - higher profits = hire more workers + have lower failure rates? And all without help of SIPTU/ICTU/etc to protect the interests of workers and to curb profiteering? Who could have thought?


But what drives such astounding results?

“To explain to relative success of Indian entrepreneurs we focus on the role of human capital. ...We test the hypothesis that a highly-educated Indian entrepreneurial-force is responsible for their superior performance in business. Indian immigrants in all three countries have education levels that are higher than the national average, and in the US the education levels of Indian immigrants are particularly high relative to the entire population. In the US, 68 percent of Indian entrepreneurs have a college education which is twice the rate for whites or the national average. Some of the variation in the education of Indian immigrants across the US, Canada and UK is likely due to immigration policy. Another possibility is that the higher returns to education in the US result in a more selective immigrant pool in the US compared to Canada and the UK.”

Bu wait – ‘higher returns to education’ = greater income inequality between educated and non-educated. Again, who could have thought that this might be a good thing, especially for a ‘knowledge economy’?

“When we examine business income, we find large, positive effects of education in the US and Canada. We also find large positive effects of education on employment in Canada, but smaller positive effects in the UK. The findings for education imply that the relatively high levels of education among Indian entrepreneurs have a large effect on business performance at least in the US and Canada. Decomposition estimates provide exact estimates of the contribution of higher levels of education among Indian entrepreneurs to their higher business incomes and employment levels.

  • In the US, higher levels of education among Indian entrepreneurs result in a business income advantage of 21 log points, which represents 43.9 percent of the gap.
  • High levels of education also contribute substantially to why Indian entrepreneurs earn more in Canada (12.5 log points), but the difference is not as large as in the US.
  • “The combination of the larger education advantage held by Indian entrepreneurs and the larger return to education is responsible for the increased importance of education as an explanatory factor in the US compared to Canada.
  • “In contrast to these results, the smaller educational advantage and lower returns to education in the UK result in less explanatory power in the UK.”
But sectoral and cultural decompositions also matter: “Lower concentrations of Indian entrepreneurs in agriculture and construction, lower female share*, higher marriage rates, and favorable regional distributions also generally contribute to why Indian businesses perform better than white businesses or the national average.”

Again, give it a thought, folks. The above says that Indian entrepreneurs are so spectacularly successful in all three countries because they avoid investing in ‘losing’ sectors and regions. So where does it put state-led efforts to pump money into such ‘losing’ sectors as, for example, agriculture? And where does this leave Ireland’s ‘National Spatial Development Plans’ that reallocate cash to ‘losing’ regions/areas? In the category of ‘luxury goods’ – an affordable (in certain times) cost of keeping at bay social discontent amongst those who are falling behind?

And it also says that higher marriage rates are positively associated with higher returns to entrepreneurship. Who could have thought?


Some food for thought for our immigration policy bureaucrats and our national development authorities, then…



*[Aside - the issue of lower female share of entrepreneurship is, in my view, a simple statistical legacy. Women entrepreneurs tend to run businesses that are on average younger than those for men, hence, some increased risk in statistical measures. Over time, I would expect as female entrepreneurship gains fully similar footing in types of business, sources of financing etc as male entrepreneurship, this difference will disappear completely.]

Saturday, February 6, 2010

Economics 06/02/2010: Nama stalling at the EU doorsteps

For those of you who missed my Thursday musings on Nama in the Irish Daily Mail, here is an unedited version of that article:

Two friends from the distant land of global finance have caught up with me the other day. ‘What’s going on with your Nama?’ they demanded to know.

Their concerns were about the latest hiatus created around our Bank Rescue scheme.

Yesterday’s news that NTMA is to take over management of the Exchequer affairs relating to bank shares bought with taxpayers’ cash is the case in point. Apparently, NTMA – the parent institution to Nama – will hold talks on capital needs with the banks as well as engage in their realignment or restructuring. It will also advise on banking matters, and crisis prevention, management and resolution. Just exactly can this task be achieved without creating a severe conflict of interest between NTMA and Nama, or without stepping on the heels of the Central Bank and Financial Regulator is anybody’s guess. But the bigger problem here is whether such a role for NTMA will constitute an undue interference in the financial markets for banks shares.


This activist approach to managing Nama news is not new, however. Following the quiet publication of the last piece of legislative jigsaw, Nama (Designation of Eligible Bank Assets) Regulations 2009, on the day before Christmas Eve, our Government has gone into an overdrive, trying to spin Nama as a panacea for all economic ills of the country.


Nama was painted as a socially responsible undertaking that will be reporting to the Government ministers on the issues of ‘social dividend’. It will provide housing for the poor and will take off the market vast surpluses of unwanted properties. Nama will also deliver a healthy dividend by charging local authorities for this ‘service’. But the local authorities will still somehow come on top by saving money.


Perhaps mindful of having produced too much gibberish of the above variety, our public representatives have started talking up the discounts that Nama will apply on loans it buys from the banks. Just 6 months or so ago Nama enthusiasts were saying that a 12-20 percent average discount will reflect the ‘true long term economic value’ of the loans? Now we are into 30-35 percent haircuts and rising.


The iron logic of finance tells us that the greater the discount Nama imposes the greater proportion of the original loan will have to be written down by the banks as a loss. This will require fresh capital, of which the taxpayers are the only source for no investor will be willing to buy new shares in Irish banks voluntarily.


By my estimates from some 9 months ago, the Irish banks will require Euro 10-13 billion of fresh capital the minute Nama goes through their books. After months of ignoring this prediction, the Government now admits as much.


But wait, as the discounts estimates increase, so are the concerns in Brussels and Frankfurt about Irish Government’s plan. First, the ECB is now seriously worried about the quality of Irish banks collateral deposited in its vaults. Second, the EU Commission is more concerned that approving Nama will produce poor optics internationally, as Nama will be openly buying trash with taxpayers cash and Europe’s approval.


As if these two issues were not enough, we now have two official versions of financial theory – the Frank Fahey’s Proposition and an Alan Ahearne’s Theorem.


The former claims that ECB is giving us a free lunch – a deeply discomforting statement from ECB’s point of view as it undermines the bank’s credibility.


The latter states that the banks, repaired by Nama, will “stimulate demand” for consumer loans. So our economic policy is being shaped by people who think that the banks can drive up demand for credit in the economy stuck in negative equity, with consumers facing higher taxes and falling incomes. And, of course, there is an added concern about the ordinary homeowners and their bad debts. As the Government is preparing to create another massively risky scheme for ‘helping’ defaulting mortgage holders, the Commission is starting to think – was Nama a limited undertaking, or will Irish banking crisis spill over into a general economic crisis as well.


Then there is an ongoing saga with loans. Back in the days before Nama Bill was passed, we were told that the Government has an excellent idea as to what security they can get on Nama-bound loans. It turns out they hadn’t a clue. As Namacrats are discovering, the loans held by the Irish banks often have a secondary claim to the underlying assets. And, they are finding that the poorer the loan the lower, usually, is the underlying security.


Suppose the bank has a loan for Euro 10 million secured against the property worth Euro 5 million. Suppose Nama buys the loan for the face value of the underlying property, implying a haircut of 50%. But if loan seniority is secondary in seniority, given the recent cases of our top builders going through the insolvency courts, the post-default value of the asset is somewhere between half a million and nil. Subtract the legal costs of fighting the borrower and better-secured lenders in the courts. The state will be lucky to get a euro from the deal.


This arithmetic is not escaping the ECB. Since December, we are painfully aware of Frankfurt’s intentions to close the discount window through which Irish banks have already pumped some Euro 98 billion worth of junk-rated assets in exchange for cash. By all Euro area standards, Ireland – a minnow accounting for roughly 1.8 percent of the entire common currency economy – has swallowed about 19% of all cash released by the ECB since the beginning of the crisis. More than any other country in absolute terms. Add to that the prospect of Euro 59 billion worth of Nama bonds, plus another Euro 10-12 billion for banks recapitalization, Irish banking system bailout can cost ECB up to Euro 170 billion in loans secured against, you’ve guessed it – unfinished estates in the middle of nowhere.


So understandably, the ECB folks are worried. By May they will start reversing junk securities they loaned against out of their vaults and back into the banks. Should they succeed, Irish taxpayers will be stuck for more cash to plug the new hole in banks balancesheets.


Which in turn will drive the quality of our collateral even lower. Mortgage rates will climb by 100-150 basis points for those of us who are still paying them down. Cost of credit for businesses will rise well into double-digit figures. Credit cards, car loans, consumer loans – all will become as rare in Ireland as polar bears in Sahara. Taxes and charges will increase – by 15-20 percent on average over 2011-2013. Instead of banks stimulating demand for credit, as Alan Ahearne suggests, Ireland Inc will be back on the slippery slope toward deeper recession.


Ultimately, it is the prospect of Ireland sliding back to rival Greece as the drag on the Euro that has been bothering my friends, as well as the ECB and the EU Commission. Sadly, their concerns are our last line of defense against Nama.