Friday, June 7, 2013

7/6/2013: Goodish news on capital investment in Ireland in Industry

Given the volatility in capital sales and acquisitions in Ireland, based on quarterly data, it might be premature to say much about the trends for capital investment in 2013 so far, but nonetheless, at least we are having some good news to go along with the sunshine outside.

Per CSO: "Capital acquisitions in industry in the first quarter of 2013 were €661.3m, compared with €580.8m in the first quarter of 2012. Among the main contributors to capital acquisitions were the following sectors:

  • Basic pharmaceutical products and preparations with €102.5m.
  • Computer, electronic and optical products with €92.9m.
  • Capital sales in the first quarter of 2013 were €89.9m, compared with €218.3m in the first quarter of 2012. 

The main contributors to capital sales were the following sectors:

  • Other manufacturing with €33.8m.
  • Basic pharmaceutical products and preparations with €27.1m."

You can see the data here http://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/cai/capitalassetsinindustryquarter12013/#.UbBltyuglF8 but, as usual, this blog should add some value to the reader. Hence, below is the chart showing Q1 figures for 2011-2013 in terms of net capital acquisitions (new investment) in the industry:


And the good news is (conditioning on the above comment on volatility): 
  • Net capital acquisitions rose in Q1 2013 compared to Q1 2011 and Q1 2012
  • The rise in net capital acquisitions was marked and significant in 2012-2013 period
  • Rise in new investment has been much broader based across various sectors in Q1 2013 than in Q1 2012, although the MNCs-dominated sectors of Computer, electronic & optical equipment and Pharma have been the two largest contributors to the increases in capital investment in 2012 and 2013.

7/6/2013: Government 'scorecard' on unemployment: May 2013

In the previous post (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/06/762013-live-register-may-2013-headline.html) I looked at the very broad trends in the Live Register data for May 2013. This time, let's do something slightly cheeky. Recall that the Government is keen on referencing jobs creation and unemployment reduction numbers as the sign of the success of the state policies. Recall also, that I have previously showed, repeatedly, that at the very least when it comes to broader unemployment data, these claims might be a serious over-stretching of reality (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/05/3052013-official-broader-unemployment.html and http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/05/3152013-part-time-v-full-time.html ).

Before we proceed, let us recognise the following facts and plausible conjectures:

  1. Irish Government has inherited a massive task when it comes to dealing with unemployment and jobs creation on foot of the mistakes made by the previous Government and, more importantly, on foot of an unprecedented economic crisis we face;
  2. Irish Government has very limited resources it can deploy to deal with unemployment crisis;
  3. Irish Government has been making, in my opinion, honest efforts to attempt dealing with the crisis.
With the above points recognised, let's build a table measuring the current Government progress on jobs creation based on Live Register stats. With a dose of over-exaggeration (please, do not take this as a direct indictment of the Government efforts etc, just as a response to Government-own propensity to push out unemployment numbers as evidence of own success), here is 

Irish Government Performance Score Card

As marked by blue color, Official Live Register tends to confirm Government's claims: since taking the office, this coalition saw, to-date, a 3.8% reduction in the Official Live Register. However, the same period saw an increAse of 4.3% in casual and part-time workers who require some unemployment supports to sustain themselves and their families, as well as a massive 32% increase in state training programme participants. The latter is good, in so far as people are getting at least some training and apprenticeships access, but it is also bad news for the Government, as it means that in reality, actual numbers of those receiving Live Register unemployment assistance and supports rose 0.8% on Q1 2011, not fallen. Meanwhile, as we know, over Q1 2011-Q1 2013, official labour force numbers fell 0.55%.

7/6/2013: Live Register May 2013: Headline Trends


Live Register numbers for May 2013 were out yesterday and I am only now getting to them (busy few days speaking and dealing with students etc), so here is the first of two posts on the subject. As usual, first up: headline numbers.

-- Total number of persons on Live Register in May stood at 426,100, which is 700 down on April 2013. Y/y LR is down 2.52% and this is an improvement on 2.29% decline recorded in April 2013. To-date Q2 2013 figures are down 0.53% on Q1 2013 and down 2.58% on Q2 2012. Again, as with monthly readings, this y/y decline in Q2 2013 to-date is deeper than the decline in Q1 2013 which posted -2.29%.
-- Total number of Live Register supports recipients to-date (official number, as distinct of the actual one - see data on state training participants below) is 266,607 ahead of pre-crisis 2000-2007 average.




In the charts above, I am referencing Live Register inclusive of the State Training Programmes participants. The reason for this separate data reporting is that while they continue to receive unemployment (Live Register) benefits, they are not included in the official Live Register counts. Please note: state training programmes participation is reported with 1 month lag compared to Live Register, so the latest number we have is for April 2013, which means that combined metric for May simply incorporates May 2013 data for Live Register, plus April 2013 data for State Training Programmes participation.

  • In April 2013, there were 86,042 Live Register supports recipients who were officially engaged in State-run Training Programmes (STP). This was up 4.72% on April 2012.
  • In April 2013, m/m change in Live Register was -200, while m/m change in STP was +673. In other words, in April, entire m/m 'decrease' in the official Live Register was 3 times smaller than an increase in STP.
  • In April 2013, y/y change in official Live Register was -10,000, with 3,881 of these accounted for by increases in STP. 
  • Put differently, in April 2013, m/m there was no decrease in unemployment benefits recipients' numbers at all, and in fact there was a m.m increase in these of some 473. Also in April 2013, y/y officially-reported massive decrease of 10,000 in official Live Register was really a smaller scale (albeit still welcome) decrease of 6,119.
  • In May 2013, estimated Live Register + STP measure of unemployment benefits claimants stood at 512,142, which represents 23.96% of the labour force. Put differently, almost 1/4 of Ireland's labour force is currently in receipt of some form of unemployment assistance, which is well ahead of the official Live Register-implied estimated unemployment rate of 13.7% which would correspond to roughly 292,838 individuals.




  • The numbers of those on the Live Register under the age of 25 was stuck in May at the same level of 68,900 as in March and April 2013. This represents a decline on 69,700 recorded in February and roughly corresponds to the levels last seen in December 2008-February 2009. However, it is most likely that these numbers are superficially depressed by the STP participation. Sadly, we do not have data on STPs reported regularly by the CSO to determine the exact extent of unemployment supports in the younger population.
  • In May 2013, 16.17% of all Live Register supports recipients were under 25.
  • Y/y, number of younger LR recipients was down 7.27% and so far in Q2 2013 the number is down on average 7.48% on Q2 2012.


Per CSO: "The number of long term claimants on the Live Register in May 2013 was 191,997." Overall, the number of long term claimants increased by 3,268 (+1.7%) y/y, while the proportion of the short-term claimants dropped to 54.5% (229,740) from 56.4% (244,178). This suggests that, as would be normally expected, short-term unemployed are finding it easier to find jobs than their longer term counterparts, and that, potentially, this effect is being reinforced by accelerating exits of the long-term unemployed due to benefits expiration.

Thursday, June 6, 2013

6/6/2013: Detroit is about to go bankrupt... differently from the Irish banks

So who is to say sovereign (or rather quasi-sovereign) defaults are a rarity in fiscal + currency unions? Here's a story about forthcoming, well-flagged in advanced Chapter 9 bankruptcy for Detroit: http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/93438-detroit-facing-chapter-9-bankruptcy/

And, guess what - the story is telling in more than just one context. The terms and conditions of the restructuring will be ugly, but manageable... And the sequencing of events is revealing:
  • Step 1: Detroit had $15.7 billion debt load it cannot repay - diagnosis was set as insolvency. 
  • Step 2: The city was taken over by the state of Michigan and emergency manager was appointed.
  • Step 3: The state of Michigan needed a calm evaluation of the problem confirming the diagnosis of insolvency and it was deemed to be structural (economy suffering from unsustainable levels of unemployment, declining population, loss of revenues, etc, but also cost overruns).
  • Step 4: Rating agencies dropped ratings on Detroit debt and debt limits kicked in before then.
  • Step 5: Chapter 9 bankruptcy, forced deal with the unions and Financial Advisory Board was set up with very clear termination objectives.
The sequencing of events above is distinct from what has happened in the case of Ireland's banking crisis resolution, where the above steps were re-ordered as follows:
  1. Steps 4 and 5 (resolution steps) took place ahead of any assessment and diagnosis postulation and confirmation (banks guarantee issuance)
  2. Step 3 took place next in the form of PCARs assessments
  3. Step 2 (takeover) took place only after the PCARs
  4. Diagnosis was never fully correctly established - all banks, save for Anglo and INBS are still considered officially solvent
  5. Step 5 never took place with exception of Anglo and INBS
In other words, we never created a security cordon around the banks that would have resulted in banks takeover prior to guarantees and recapitalisations and this has meant that the banks were always able to use the threat of disclosure of insolvency as the means for bargaining out improved position vis a vis the taxpayers. 

Best proof of this: at no point in time did the state of Michigan tell the markets or the nation or its own taxpayers that Detroit will never be allowed to go bust. In contrast, during 2008-2010 period, Irish Government repeatedly asserted that the banks will be provided all and any funding necessary to stay in business. 



6/6/2013: Can Ballyfermot area unemployment be running at ca 60%?

A survey conducted by Sin Fein in the specific area of Dublin landed in my mailbox today.

"Survey shows 60.28% unemployment in Cherry Orchard: Ballyfermot Sinn Féin conducted an unemployment survey in the greater Cherry Orchard area. The purpose of which was to identify at first hand the true level of unemployment experienced by residents.

Speaking today after the survey was published; Sinn Féin’s Ballyfermot representative Daithí Doolan has called for, ‘immediate action to provide jobs for Ballyfermot.’ Doolan said, ‘Our aim was to identify at first hand the true level of unemployment experienced by the residents in Cherry Orchard. The findings of our survey are shocking and should act as a wake-up call to local government TDs.  We knocked on every door in Cherry Orchard. The stories we heard were heart breaking, families struggling with unemployment and emigration. The findings show that a massive 60.28% of those surveyed are unemployed. Even more concerning is the fact that over 85% are long term unemployed."

The question is: the shocking 60.28% unemployment rate figure - can it be true? Sadly, in my opinion, it can be true. Sinn Fein survey basically asked people the broadest question of defining whether they are working or not (self-reported unemployment, unrestricted by CSO methodological constraints). Thus, we can interpret it to be equivalent to CSO PLS4 category of unemployment (see http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/05/3052013-official-broader-unemployment.html), plus those in state training programmes.

I define this metric as PLS4+STP, which in Q1 2013 nationwide was running at ca 29%. However, this metric excludes those who are unemployed and are in non-state training. Given the geography of the area surveyed, there is little reason to believe that the number of those in education and training but not in employment in the area is outside the nationwide average. Adding them into the PLS$+STP group should push overall 'unemployment' as self-reported potentially to 32-33%. The area of Ballyfermot has always had higher rates of unemployment than other areas of the country. For example, in 2006 unemployment in Ballyfermot was reportedly running at around 11.2% while nationwide unemployment was running at 5.2%. In 2008 the same was true, compared to Dublin overall: http://irelandafternama.files.wordpress.com/2009/12/unemployment-dublin-ea-scale-2008.jpg and things got worse into 2009: http://irelandafternama.files.wordpress.com/2009/12/live-register-recipients-increase-aug-08-to-feb-09.jpg.

There is plenty more evidence to support the assertion that overall broader unemployment in the Ballyfermot area can be running at around twice the rate of the national unemployment and this would push broader unemployment in the area surveyed by Sinn Fein out toward 60%.



6/6/2013: Irish School of Growthology: Sunday Times 02/06/2013


This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times column from June 2, 2013


This month, welcoming the start of the silly news season, interest group after interest group has been appealing to the Irish Government to "act decisively" on dealing with the crises sweeping across their sectors. From retail services to construction industry, from early age education to public sector unions, from pensions to faming, and so on every lobbyist is loudly demanding that the Government divert its resources to the plight of his clients.

The Irish School of 'Growthology', spurred on by the 'end of austerity' noises emanating from Brussels, as well as by the promised departure of the Troika, is out in public once again. One quango after another is promoting its sector as a core driver for future jobs creation, economic activity and a wellspring of exchequer returns subject to the Government taking the correct action on growth today.

The reality is that no one involved in this policy circus - not the economists launching reports, nor the quangos backing them, and least of all the Government - has a faintest idea as to how the Government really can do anything about growth. Everyone at the launches knows this and no one admits it. So after two or three iterations of the Growthology events, the entire Irish establishment begins to believe that if only the Government threw its support behind the latest fad, the crisis will be over. Hungry for PR opportunities, Ministers spin exports growth numbers like greyhounds bets, and green-nano-bio-gen-cloud-tech working groups and centres of excellence for knowledge-food-wind-agri island spin jobs promises in tens of thousands.

The ministers love Growthology, As George Bernard Show put it ages ago "a government which robs Peter to pay Paul, can always count on the support of Paul".


Since the Irish state cannot print its own money, the Cabinet can only tax one side of economy to 'invest' in the other. Which is just fine with the Growthologists, as long as the Government robs someone else to pay them.
There are three basic variants of these 'multiplier schemes' being offered to the Government for post-Troika days.

The business lobby and the unions have been busy pushing the Government to do something to 'unlock' the spending power held in people’s savings. The preferred mechanism for forcing households to part with their safety nets varies from deploying inflationary pressures to expropriating funds via levies. Unions are calling for higher taxes on someone else (usually, the so-called 'rich'). The fact that such policies can leave households exposed to adverse income shocks in the case of a job loss or unexpected illness or a rise in necessary spending, such as children education fees, is not something that our Social Partners are concerned with.

Another option, usually favoured by the official economic policy quangos, is finding rich foreigners to invest in Ireland. Which, of course, sounds much more palatable than expropriating from our own. However, inward real FDI (as opposed to retained earnings accumulating in the IFSC) into Ireland has peaked. Worse, as the data from our external trade over 2010-2012 indicates, the FDI we are bringing in is linked to services exports. The latter have much lower propensity to support new employment, and when they do hire workers, they tend to import them. The activities of these new MNCs do increase our GDP, but this growth is illusory when it comes to the real economy.

About the only new value added generated by the MNCs activities in Ireland today relates to clustering and partnering models that some - but not all - R&D intensive MNCs are engaged in.  These are in their infancy still and require serious changes in the way we do business in this country to nurture to strengths. Examples of what needs to be done here include changing the way we tax equity investments, reinvested profits and how we deal with currently protected sectors of our economy. Again, promising, but not a Big Bang idea for jump-starting the economy without taking serious pain of structural reforms first.

The last pathway for Growthological 'stimulus' is to convince the Irish Government to borrow more funds to invest in some capital programmes. This is the preferred imaginary source for ‘funding growth’ for the Unions and the Labour Party backbenchers. However, even the current Government finds this theory infeasible. The reason is that we cannot sustain an increase in borrowings over 2013-2016 horizon without triggering a cascading effect of higher interest costs on existent debt.

In a way, in contrast to the Irish Growthology movement, this week's announcement by the Minister for Finance, Michael Noonan that he is working on a multi-annual plan covering the period of 2014-2020 to commit his and future Governments to continued fiscal discipline and structural reforms was a courageous and correct thing to do. By pre-empting the spread of Growthology across the Cabinet, Minister Noonan tried to focus our attention on the longer-term game, as well as on the present reality.

Irish Government will need to take some EUR5.1 billion more out of the private sector economy in 2014 and 2015 under the current Troika programme. Thereafter, just to keep on track toward reducing Government debt/GDP ratio to below 100% by 2020, total tax take by the Government will have to increase from EUR39.8 billion in 2012 to EUR54.1 billion in 2018, with expenditure, excluding banks measures, rising from rising fromEUR65 billion to EUR69 billion over the same period. Even that requires rather rosy assumptions, including the projections for government debt financing costs being flat over the next 7 years and economic growth averaging almost 3.7% per annum on GNP side through 2018.


Absent the pipe dreams of Growthology, the only real chances for Ireland to regain sustainable growth momentum is through organic and persistent long-term reforms. Instead of ‘Government must act decisively on growth’ mantra, we need a ‘Government must help change the way we work’ model.

Start with the elephant in the room: private sector debts. Write down using debt-for-equity swaps and direct write-offs all principal residences mortgages to the maximum of 110% of the current value of the house. By my estimates, this will require banks capital of less than EUR20 billion. To reduce capital call on the banks, change the rules for capital provisioning against legacy equity assumed by the banks and push out to 2020 the requirement for Irish banks to comply with the EU baseline capital targets. Restructure and convert all remaining mortgages into fixed rate loans. If needed, assuming the EU does not come to our help in doing this, exit the euro by monetising the economy with own currency, and make euro, dollar and sterling fully accepted as legal tenders.

Thereafter, levy a significant tax on land and use raised revenue to eliminate property tax and create a flat rate tax on all income under, say, EUR200,000 per annum per family of two at a benign rate of around 15%. Equalise corporate, income and capital gains tax rates. Remove all targeted tax breaks and incentives schemes, leaving only one standard general tax allowance per each adult with half-rate applying per each child.

Reform local authorities by consolidating them into 5 regional governments with half of all land value tax revenues accruing to them. Put in place a 4-year balanced budget rule for central and local governments. Break up all semi-state companies excluding infrastructure utilities (e.g. EirGrid) and privatize or mutualize them. Put a statutory cap on market share of any company or governing body (for professional services organizations) in any sector of domestic economy not to exceed 33% to reduce regulatory capture and incentivise exporting activities. Remove all restrictions on access to professions.

In the public sector, gradually identify and develop opportunities for linking pay and promotion to productivity. Shift – where possible – public sector operations to revenue generating models with staff sharing the upside of any exports and new business creation revenues. End life-time contracts and link hiring, tenure and promotions to on-the-job performance. Identify flagship public services, such as higher education and health as spearheads for developing exports potential and, again, incentivise staff to compete globally. Benchmark all non-revenue positions to EU27 average earnings and all political and politically-appointed salaries to a scale linked directly to GNP per capita. End fully all defined benefit pensions schemes and create mandatory pensions and unemployment insurance funds based on a mixture of public and private provision models.

Open up Irish immigration regime to new entrepreneurs and key skills employees with strong incentives to naturalise successful newcomers and anchor them here. Use early immigration incentives such as social contributions tax credits in exchange for zero access to social welfare net over the first 10 years of residency (including post-naturalization).

Lastly, we need to gradually, but dramatically reform our social welfare and health care systems. We need to retain a meaningful, high quality safety net, but we also need to eliminate any possible disincentives to work and undertake business activities currently present in the system.

Aside from the changes mentioned above, we also need political reforms, changes in the way we shape and enact policies, enhancement of direct democracy tools and building robust systems of transparent governance and administration.

The main point, however, is that we need to end our addiction to the Growthlogist interest groups politics.



Box-out:


The latest data on earnings and labour costs in Irish economy was published this week. The data shows that average weekly earnings in the economy in Q1 2013 stood at EUR €696.59, basically unchanged on last year. In contrast, average hourly earnings rose from EUR 22.15 in the first quarter 2012 to EUR22.31 in 2013. In other words, Irish labour cost competitiveness remained at the same levels as in 2012 solely because over the period of 12 months through March 2013, average hours of paid work have fallen by 1%. Given that over the last 4 years weekly paid hours in the private sector have fallen by 2.2%, the latest data suggests that the average quality of employment in private sector has declined at an accelerated rate in 2012, compared to the 2009-2011 period.