Wednesday, August 1, 2012

1/8/2012: Live Register - Hidden Unemployment Rising

There's a boisterous chatter in the Irish media (unwilling to have any reality voices on the air anymore due to reasons unknown) about the latest headline numbers coming out of the Live Register for Ireland (July 2012 data released today).

Some of it is part-true. Some of it is part-spin. None of it is fully true. So in the next couple of posts I will be uncovering what the figures really do tell us. Stay tuned.

Let's start from the headline numbers:


  • Standardized (Live Register-implied) unemployment rate remains intact at 14.8% in July, same as in June. The SUR is now between 14.7% and 14.8% every month since January 2012 and 14.8% is the highest point reached since the beginning of the crisis (hit first in February 2012). So headline story is: Irish Unemployment Remains at Record High for the Crisis.
  • Last time we had 14.7-14.8% unemployment as measured by the Live Register was back in March-April 1994. Oh, that's right, 1994! Good news, folks, I guess is that it is still off 17.0 absolute record achieved back in December 1986-January 1987, though with a major caveat (see below).
  • Want more 'good news'? Ok: crisis period average SUR is 13.5% and STDEV is 1.33, which means that the current rate of unemployment is more than 1/2 STDEV above the crisis period average.
Chart to illustrate the good news:


Bet you your local friendly radio presenter and their guests didn't mention the above, in fear of undermining your confidence in the economic turnaround.

But, hey, let's keep looking into the data:
  • Overall numbers on Live Register (seasonally-adjusted) are currently at 437,300 (July) down 9,900 on July 2011 (-2.214%). This is good. M/m decline in July 2012 is 2,300 which contrasts with m/m rise in June of 2,500. Which is sort-of good: m/m decline is a good thing, m/m decline that doesn't fully offset previous m/m rise is not so good.
  • Y/y June 2012 LR posted a decline of 6,200 (-1.39%) and this is now bettered by July decline of 9,900 (-2.21%). Which is good.
  • 3mo average LR through July is 0.13% higher than 3mo average through April 2012. Not so good. Year on year, 3mo average LR is 1.77% lower in July. Which is good.



So the above is a mixed bag story. Yet, the story is hardly complete. You see, there are some 76,533 workers out there who are 'engaged' in State-sponsored Live Register Activation Programmes. The CSO has the following to say about them: "Persons on activation programmes are not counted as part of the monthly Live Register." Ugh? That's right - they get paid LR supplements. They don't work for actual pay. They are not unemployed and are not in receipt of state unemployment benefits. Let's add them to the LR, shall we?

Taking into account the numbers engaged in the LR Activation Programmes:
  • There were 513,833 individuals in Ireland on LR as of June-July 2012 (note, Activation Programmes participation is reported with one month lag, just to make life hell for anyone trying to compile real figures).
  • The above number represents an increase m/m on June's 501,516 (some 12,300 up). Year on year, the number of those in receipt of LR benefits is now up (not down) 1,680 (+0.33%) and that is worse than June y/y figure (up 1,429, or +0.29%).
  • Recall that official Standardized Unemployment Rate is 14.8% on 437,300 LR recipients. This implies that counting those in Activation Programmes the real 'unemployment' rate is around 17% (17.4% more precisely, but there's a grey area of estimation errors around there).
  • So the main headline, really, should be - total (official + hidden) unemployment in Ireland is up m/m and up y/y. Not down. Up!



Now, do me a favour (cause I can't find time to do this myself) - check with your local friendly radio / TV station and press - see if any of the 'incisive' analysts/guests/hosts/editors/journalists give you that sort of a breakdown on the numbers? 

Now don't take me wrong - some of these programmes are good, and it is generally positive that people are drawn to them. But until they gain full paying jobs post-completion, they remain unemployed. The Government has no right to write them off as 'not unemployed' by excluding them from the LR.

Monday, July 30, 2012

30/7/2012: Euro Area forecast by Standard and Poor

S&P's note on euro area crisis is a rather entertaining read, if you are into the sort of 'entertaining' a la mode of Quentin Tarantino... The note is The Curse Of The Three Ds: Triple Deleveraging Drags Europe Deeper Into Recession, authored by EMEA Chief Economist: Jean-Michel Six.


Snapshot of views (emphasis mine):

  • A combination of public, household, and bank deleveraging are stifling growth in most European economies. [Now, I've been saying all along that we cannot ignore household debts, yes so far, European and National policymakers are utterly hell-bent on saddling indebted households with the bills for indebted states and banks. Just look at Ireland, where the banking sector is now outright moving into enslaving households by dictating to them how much they should spend on food & clothing so they can maximize extraction of mortgages repayments. And the Irish Government only eager to lend their support to the banks.]
  • This is also limiting the effectiveness of the European Central Bank's efforts to support the financial sector and eurozone economies. [Not really, folks. You might missed it, but European 'leaders' are heavily taxing economy already to subsidize insolvent banks and sovereigns. Alas, the room for more taxes is limited in Europe not by household debt - about which the respective National Governments give no damn - but by the fact that Europe already has some of the highest income taxes in the world.]
  • Subsequently, the S&P is cutting their base-case growth forecasts for the eurozone and U.K. economies for 2012 and 2013. See two tables below




  • S&P also see a 40% chance that downside risks could push European economies into a genuine double-dip recession in 2013 (second table above).
So risk-weighted expected growth is now forecast, for the Euro area to be -0.76 in 2012 and -0.08 in 2013. If we take potential growth at 1.5%, this would imply an opportunity cost of over 3% in 2012-2013 to the Euro area economy.

And the core downside risks are:
  • A hard landing in some emerging markets, delaying the recovery in world trade;
  • The prospect of one of the main eurozone countries losing access to capital markets for a prolonged period; and
  • A more pronounced retrenchment in consumer demand, especially in the core countries.
Key changes to previous forecasts:
  • "We have cut our forecast for GDP growth in France to just 0.3% this year and 0.7% in 2013, from 0.5% and 1%, respectively, in our previous forecasts. 
  • "We've also revised downward our GDP projections for Italy to negative 2.1% for 2012 and negative 0.4% in 2013. 
  • "In the case of Spain, we now forecast GDP will decline by 1.7% this year and that it will be negative 0.6% next year—a cut from our previous forecast declines of 1.5% and 0.5%. 
  • "For the U.K., we have revised our 2012 estimate to 0.3% this year. Yet, the provisional GDP estimate released on July 25 by the U.K. statistical office for the second quarter of negative 0.7% makes our full-year forecast more uncertain. If confirmed, this result would most likely lead to zero or slightly negative growth this year."

30/7/2012: Grazie, Sig Draghi?

So Mr Draghi made some serious sounding pronouncements last week. The markets rallied. Over the weekend, more serious sounding soundbites came out of Mr Juncker. The markets... oh... still rallying? And thanks to both, Italy had a 'Successories'-worthy auction today am:

  • Italy 5 year CDS fell 20bps to 478 (lowest since early July) prior to the auction
  • 5 year bond sold at yild 5.29 (against 5.84 in previous) with bid/cover of 1.34 (down on 1.54 achieved in previous auction) and maximum allotment of 2.224bn out of 2.250bn aimed
  • 10 year 2022 5.5% bond sold at 5.96% yield (previous auction 6.19%) and bid/cover ratio of 1.286 (against previous 1.28) with allotment of 2.484bn out of 2.5bn planned.

Grazie Sig Draghi?

Now, wait a sec. Yes, there's an improvement. But on less than €4.7bn of issuance... and Italy needs are:

(Source: Pictet)

And hold on for a second longer:

  • Italy's net debt financing cost was at 4.721% of GDP in 2011 with debt/GDP ratio of 120.11% which implies effective financing rate of 3.931%
  • Of course, a single auction does not lift this up in a linear fashion, but... if Italy had troubles with 3.9%, should we not be concerned with 5.29%?
  • Let's put it differently: Italy's GDP grew in 2010-2011 by 1.804% and 0.431% respectively. Over the same period of time, Italy's government debt net financing costs went from 4.236% of GDP to 4.721% of GDP. This year they are set to rise to over 5.36% of GDP as economy is likely to contract ca 1.9-2.0%.
So maybe (I know, cheeky) cheering the current yields is a bit premature? Eh?

Sunday, July 29, 2012

29/7/2012: Financial Markets Repression

In my recent conversation with Carmen Reinhart, we discussed at length various forms of financial repression to be unleashed onto the public with the coming systemic deleveraging in the US, EU and elsewhere. One of the most prominent topics in our discussion were potential capital controls. And we both agreed that most likely, it will be Eurozone that will be first in the races to impose such. Of course, there are signs of softer version of capital controls within the banking system already present. So much so that Mario Draghi had to identify national regulations as barriers to single market in banking under current conditions.

Never mind. The US Fed is not about to fall behind the curve. And in the latest suggestion for policymakers, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Staff Report No. 564, July 2012, linked here) puts forward an idea that "for money market fund (MMF) reform [to] mitigate systemic risks arising from these funds by protecting shareholders, such as retail  investors, who do not redeem quickly from distressed funds... a small fraction of each MMF investor’s recent balances, called the “minimum 

balance at risk” (MBR), be demarcated to absorb losses if the fund is liquidated."

Wait, does this mean that fund investors can face some small share loss imposed onto them because they might be quicker than other investors in exiting or more foresightful enough to spot the fund running into trouble ahead of other investors? Yep, that's right.

"The MBR would be a small fraction (for example, 5 percent)  of each shareholder’s recent balances that could be redeemed only with a delay.  The delay would ensure that redeeming investors remain partially invested in the fund long enough (we suggest 30 days) to share in any imminent portfolio losses or costs of their redemptions.  However, as long as an investor’s balance exceeds her MBR, the rule would have no effect on her transactions, and no portion of any redemption would be delayed if her remaining shares exceed her minimum balance."

And the rationale: "to reduce the vulnerability of MMFs to runs and protect investors who do not redeem quickly in crises."


That, folks, is a hell of a capital control proposal.

29/7/2012: One ugly chart

One ugly euro chart:


Nothing new, of course, just an illustration.

29/7/2012: Irish Competitiveness



Unedited version of my Sunday Times article from July 22.



These days, with nearly 15 percent unemployment, and almost 530,000 currently in receipt of some unemployment supports, the minds of Irish policymakers and analysts are rightly preoccupied with jobs creation. Every euro of new investment is paraded through the media as the evidence of regained confidence in the economy. This week, even the insolvent Irish Government got into the game of ‘creating jobs’ with an ‘investment stimulus’.

Alas, economics of jobs creation is an entirely different discipline from the political PR accompanying it. In the real world, some private and public jobs are created on the basis of sustainable long-term demand for skills. Others are generated on the foot of tax advantages and subsidies, including stimulus. In the short run, the latter types of jobs can still yield a positive boost to economic activity. But in the longer run, they are not sustainable and drain resources that can be better allocated to other areas. The ultimate difference between the two types is found in productivity growth associated, or the competitiveness gain or loss generated in the economy.

The prospects of Irish economic recovery have been rhetorically coupled with the improvements in our cost competitiveness since early 2008. And for a good reason. Rapid deterioration in competitiveness in years before the crisis is what got us into the situation where structural collapse of the economy was inevitable.

During the Celtic Garfield era of 2001-2007, Irish Harmonized Competitiveness Indicators (HCIs) have deteriorated by some 26%. Our productivity growth, stripping out effects of MNCs transfer pricing and tax arbitrage, has been running well below the rate of the advanced economies average. In years of the property bubble, Ireland was the least competitive economy in the entire euro area.

Structurally, our lack of competitiveness was underpinned by the labour costs inflation in relation to producer and consumer prices. Consumer costs-related competitiveness indicator for Ireland deteriorated by 38 percent between the end of 2001 and mid-2008, more than one-and-a-half times the rate of deterioration in producer costs-linked measure. Another, even more pervasive and long-term force at play was creation of hundreds of thousands of jobs in the sectors, like building and construction, domestic retail and finance that lagged in value-added well behind the exporting sectors.

This was not a model of sustainable jobs creation. Instead of incentivising investment in real skills and aptitude to work and entrepreneurship, we taught our younger generation to expect a €40-45,000 starting gig in a ‘professional’ occupation or laying bricks at a construction site. Not surprisingly, uptake of degrees in harder sciences and more mathematically intensive fields of business studies slumped, while degrees in ‘softer’ social and cultural studies were booming. The workforce we were producing had a rapidly expanding mismatch between pay expectations, career prospects, and reality of an internationally competitive economy.

Placated by the opportunity to locate in the corporate tax haven, our MNCs were drumming up the myth of the superior workforce with great skills and education. The Government and its quasi-official mouthpieces of economic analysis in academia, banks, and financial and professional services were only happy to repeat the same line.

The crisis laid bare the truths about our fabled competitiveness outside the corporate tax arbitrage opportunities.

Since then, the focus of the Government labour market reforms, in rhetoric, if not in real terms, has been on regaining cost competitiveness. Sadly, this process so far replicates, rather than corrects the very same errors of judgement we pursued before the crisis erupted.

In terms of headline metrics, things are looking up. Our harmonised competitiveness indicator (HCI) has improved by 5% between January 2009 and April 2012 – the latest data available. However, these gains are accounted for by two drivers. Firstly, jobs destruction in the construction and retail sectors has led to rapid elimination of less productive – from economic value-added point of view – activities. Secondly, domestic business activity collapse added price deflation to the equation, distorting gains from any real productivity improvements. Thus, our HCI deflated by producer prices has fallen 7.7% over the above period of time, while consumer prices-deflated HCI dropped 12.5%.

Thus, much still remains to be done on the competitiveness front, especially since deflationary pressures in the economy are no longer rampant. The momentum of gains in competitiveness experienced in 2008-2010 has slowed dramatically and is likely to continue declining.

On the one hand, jobs destruction has moderated markedly, while across the economy overall earnings are rising. Wages inflation in several sectors where skills shortages are present, such as ICT and internationally traded services, now complements declining competitiveness of individual tax policies.

Year on year, Q1 2012 saw average weekly earnings rising in Ireland by 0.7%. Weekly earnings in the private sector went up 1.5% annually, while there was an increase of 2.0% in the public sector over the year. Between Q1 2008 and Q1 2012, average weekly earnings fell 3.5% in the private sector and rose 0.8% in the public sector.

The skills crunch is evident both via the earnings inflation within the larger size enterprises and by occupational categories. earnings of Managers, professional and associated professionals rose 5.7% y/y in Q1 2012 and are now 1.1% ahead of where they were in Q1 2009. Earnings for clerical, sales and service employees are up 2.4% y/y and down almost 2% on 2009.

The real problem with our labour costs competitiveness is that with rising tax burdens it is becoming increasingly difficult to import skills and our system of training and education simply cannot deliver on the growing demand for specialist knowledge. The former problem has been repeatedly highlighted by the indigenous exporters. The latter has been a major talking point for the larger MNCs. The latest example of this is PayPal, whose global operations vice-president Louise Phelan warned this week that Ireland needs to focus on language skills, especially in German, Dutch and Nordic languages “to protect our status as a European gateway”.

Sadly, the Government is listening to the latter more than to the indigenous entrepreneurs.

Reforming education system is a long-term process and should not be tailored to the current demand for narrow skills. Instead, it should aim to provide broad and diversified education base, including leading (not obscure) modern languages, proper teaching of core subjects, such as history, philosophy, arts and sciences.

Such reforms will not have a direct impact on the likes of PayPal’s ability to hire people with very narrow skill sets. Which means that Ireland will have to systemically reduce the costs of importing human capital.

To derive real competitive advantage anchored in sustainable jobs creation and productivity growth, we need to focus on creating the right mix of tax incentives, educational supports and immigration regulations to lower the cost of employing highly skilled workers and increase returns to individual investments in education and training. Let us then leave the job of selecting which areas of study should be pursued to those who intend to succeed in the market place.






Box-out
The CMA Global Sovereign Credit Risk Report for the second quarter 2012 shows Ireland improving its ranking position from the 7th highest risk sovereign debt issuer in the world in Q1 2012 to the 8th – a gain that is, on the surface, should signal that the country Credit Default Spreads (CDS) were improving compared to its peers. While Ireland’s CDS have indeed improved during the quarter falling below 600 basis points (bps) in the last two days of June for the first time since the first week of May, in effect Ireland ended Q2 2012 pretty much where it started it in terms of CDS levels. What really propelled Irish rankings gain was the return of Greece to the CDS markets few weeks after the country ‘selective default’. In fact, Ireland’s rate of improvement (by 1 notch) is identical to that of Cyprus and marks below average performance for the group of the highest risk sovereigns. Perhaps even more revealing is the comparative between Ireland and Iceland. The latter is ranked 20th in the risk league table, improving in Q2 2012 by two ranks. At the end of June, Icelandic 5 year CDS were trading at 290 bps, with implied cumulative probability of country default over the 5 years horizon of 22.9%. Ireland’s CDS were trading at 554 bps with implied cumulative probability of default of 38.6%.