20/7/2012: European Corporatism comes full circle

A very important analysis from Edmund Phelps in today's FT (link here) of the roots and core causes of the euro area crisis.

Some major points of interest:

"The difficulties of many European countries derive from their corporatism: state projects serving cronies and vast social protection programmes, both run by elites. These surged in the 1970s and 1980s. The prospect of a lifetime of such benefits – sweet contracts, soft loans, early pensions and the rest – created something new: social wealth."


On the money. And


"As increases in benefits outpaced increases in taxes, households saved some of the gains in disposable income. So households saw their private wealth rising alongside the social wealth."


Also on the money. Even more so because 1) taxes were already high so there was no room to increase them by much, and 2) lowering of taxes was used strategically to strengthen corporatist re-distribution of income & wealth from the more productive to the less productive activities (a combination of corporate and social welfare state).


"In both Italy and France, the ratio of household net private wealth to household disposable income soared, rising by one-fifth from 2000 to 2007. (The increase was one-sixth in Germany, negative in the US.)" 


Now, note: what does the European (and Irish) Left wanted and still wants? Higher income taxes. Which, of course, will mean wealth/income ratio would have been / will be even higher! This is exactly what I said during my recent appearance on TV3 Vincent Browne's show. 


The role of banks and debt in all of this charade? To cover the widening gap in wealth/income ratio and public deficits, "So it was a relief that the Basel I agreement, which went into effect in 1990, lowered to zero banks’ capital requirement on sovereign debt – no matter how risky." In other words, European sovereigns financed their corrupt corporatist regimes via leveraging private deposits to fund government bonds purchases by the banks - privatizing public waste first. 


So two lessons or questions from above are:

1. Does transfer of private banks debts to public purses in Europe constitute the return of previously privatized public debts? And if it does, the effect is that the state has twice colluded with the banks to defraud the people of Europe - first as savers and consumers, second as taxpayers.
2. Does the ongoing process of increasing government bonds holdings in domestic banks and investment and pensions funds actively promoted by the European and national authorities (see for example ECB LTROs and Irish NTMA latest plans) not constitute exactly the replay of the road to the crisis? 

19/7/2012: Q2 report from the World Gold Council

Q2 analysis of the trends and drivers for gold prices from the World Gold Council is worth a read (here) for a number of reasons. Here are two, from my point of view:

Point 1: Per Gold Council: "Gold prices declined in most currencies during the second quarter with the exception of the euro, Swiss franc and Indian rupee, in part due to a strong US dollar. Despite a 3.8% decline in Q2 to US$1,598.50/oz on the London PM fix, gold was up 4.4% during the first half of the year. Volatility remained elevated amidst a busy event-risk period. However, gold generally outperformed risk assets."

Chart and table alongside:

Table explaining events in the chart above:

Table summarizing Q/Q performance of gold prices in various currencies.

"Gold’s correlation to equities and other risk assets fell towards long-run average levels in Q2 helping portfolio diversification. Gold’s increased correlation to equities in Q1 was an indirect effect related to a weaker global economy coupled with a stronger US dollar."

Tow charts to compare on the above:

So things are reverting to historical levels - just what I drew as a conclusion from the gold coins markets data.

Point 2: More importantly, the theme is that of the 'depletion of traditional safe havens': 

"Over the past year, two national bond markets have provided shelter from turbulence in global risk assets: US Treasuries and German Bunds. Additionally, the US dollar, the Japanese yen and the Swiss franc have benefited from de-risking flows... However, being an asset of last resort is not without consequences. In particular, the investors seeking more “safe” assets must also recognise that the ever-increasing supply of both currency and debt deplete the value of these assets. Furthermore, as declining yields approach zero, they create very skewed pay-off structures with much more downside risk."

In other words, these risk-free returns for safe havens start to look like return-free risks once price upside is virtually exhausted either by persistent policy interventions or by natural exhaustion of the asymptotic valuations (in the case of US Treasuries - zero yield bound on prices).

Good luck fitting zero yields into pricing equation for Treasuries, folks...

19/7/2012: Minister Noonan's 'valuations' & NTMA's latest scheme

An interesting - and potentially revealing - contribution from Minister Noonan on the prospective ESM involvement in purchasing Irish banks assets held by the Government - see full link here (H/T to Owen Callan of Danske Markets).

Here are some interesting bits (from my pov - note, emphasis in quotes is mine):

"...if Europe's new rescue fund takes over the government's stakes in its banks, it would need to do so at prices significantly above their current low valuations."

So what should be the prices benchmark to be paid by ESM for Irish banks?

We know what Minister Noonan thinks what they should not be:
"We wouldn't think we were being assisted or treated fairly if we were only offered the terms we could get from a willing hedge fund who wanted to purchase the stake the Irish government has in the banks," Noonan told a news conference"

Ok, a willing hedge fund is mentioned as a benchmark floor. What willing hedge fund? 1) Have there been approaches that set out some valuation? 2) Have these approaches involved sufficient depth of discussion to show the actual price the fund was willing to pay, other than the low-ball first bid? 3) Have these approaches been systematic or random?

Now, suppose there has been a series of approaches and the hedge funds' willing price is €X million. Suppose Minister Noonan insists on ESM paying a minimum price of €Y million that is above €X million, which means there is a positive premium to be paid by ESM.

What principle should guide this premium valuation? "The valuation will be an issue for negotiation but before we could agree, they would need to be significantly in advance of those figures," Noonan added, referring to figures showing that investments by the country's National Pension Reserve Fund (NPRF) in its top two banks were now worth 8.1 billion euros."

Is Minister Noonan seriously suggesting ESM should pay Irish Government more than €8.1 billion? Since NPRF valuations of the banks stakes are make-believe stuff with absolutely no proven testability in the actual markets, will ESM be buying into a loss then? Ex ante?!



Another interesting comment in the article cited above is the following one:

"The NTMA also confirmed plans to diversify its sources of funding later this year with its first sovereign issuance of annuity bonds to Irish-based pension funds and inflation-linked bonds also aimed at domestic investors.

Corrigan said it was not inconceivable that it could raise 3 to 5 billion euros over the next 18 months from the two new instruments.

"International investors don't owe us a living, they don't have to buy our paper, and if the local investors don't have the confidence to invest in the market and aren't seen to have that confidence, it's going to be very difficult to get international investors back," he said."

Which, of course is all reasonably fine but for two matters:

1. Domestic pension funds will be acting against normal practice and investing in low-rated (high risk) government securities within the very same economy in which they face future liabilities (reducing risk diversification). In other words, Irish insurance funds will have to be compelled to undertake such investment in violation of acceptable international standards. Have the Government now also taken over the pensions industry to add to their banking sector portfolio?
2. If foreign investors 'won't owe Irish Government a living' why should domestic investors owe Irish Government anything? By treating two investors differently rhetorically, does Mr Corrigan explicitly differentiate treatment of domestic investors from foreign investors? It appears to be exactly so because the products he references are not going to be offered to foreign investors. Which begs the third question:
3. Will NTMA create sub-category of seniority for Irish pension funds and 'domestic investors' to effectively load even more risk onto them compared to foreign investors? After all, he seems to suggest domestic investor owe him something that foreign investors don't?

17/7/2012: Euro area debt crisis timeline

One hell of an infographic via The Financialist here summarizing the time line for the euro area debt crisis.

17/7/2012: Fiscal Monitor Update - another chart

Here’s an interesting chart from the Fiscal Monitor update released by the IMF yesterday that is worth some attention on its own (see more analysis here).

Basically, this shows that in 2008-2010 period, Irish bonds valuations were not as much divorced from the immediate fiscal sustainability fundamentals as our politicos claimed. If anything, they were virtually in line with the fundamentals, pricing almost no longer-term structural underperformance of the economy.

This is not to say that we lack in the room for structural reforms, or that we were well on the way to delivering such reforms. Markets perception of Ireland even during the deeply crisis-ridden days of 2008-2010 seemed to have been much better than that of Portugal, Italy and Spain. Whether that was justifiable or not – is an entirely different question. But what is clear is that compared to other peripherals, our Government had no one else but itself to blame for our bonds spreads.

16/7/2012: Some charts to illustrate Italian 'disease'

An interesting set of charts on Italian public finances.

First, consider Primary Deficits:

Charts above clearly show that Italy has been running significant primary surpluses since at least 2000 and especially in 2007-2011 period. It is also expected to run strong surpluses in 2012-2017, according to IMF projections.

In fact, net of debt maintenance costs, Italy has outperformed Germany in the area of public deficits in every year other than 2008 and 2009:

Yet, Italy's gross government debt is running over 90% of GDP since 1989 and over 100% of GDP since 1992.

The problem for Italy is clearly on the side of interest payments on its debt:

Although these have moderated during the euro era, the cost is now once again rising.

Italy is but one example of debt overhang that presents long-term problems for the economy. Looking at the set of all advanced economies which experienced more than 5 years periods of debt to GDP ratio in excess of 90%, the chart below shows the relationship between growth rates in real GDP and debt:

Although the explanatory power of the relationship above is weak (ca 10% of variation), the negative relationship between debt to GDP ratio and real growth in GDP is traceable. In terms of averages:

Many caveats go along with the above numbers, but overall, two things are fairly clear: once reached, debt to GDP levels of 85-90% become hard to overcome for many economies, and once debt overhang becomes a problem, growth rates tend to falter.