Monday, November 21, 2011

21/11/2011: Sunday Times 20/11/2011 - Exporting our way out of recession

Here's the unedited version of my article for Sunday Times (November 20, 2011).



The latest trade statistics, released this week were, as usual, greeted with enthusiasm by the growing media tired of the adverse newsflows. From the headline figures, preliminary data shows that seasonally adjusted exports of goods rose 2% to €7.9 billion in September, and the trade surplus jumped 11% to €4.1 billion. This makes September trade surplus second highest on record.

Trade in goods in general has been going through a boom, rising from the annual trade surplus of €25.7 billion at the bottom of the peak of the Celtic Tiger era in 2007 to €43.4 billion last year. Data through the first nine months of this year suggests that our annual trade surplus will post another record in 2011, finishing the year at some €43.8 billion.

For years we have been told by two successive governments that Ireland’s recovery will be exports-led. The latest data appears to be supportive of this. Except, appearances can be deceiving.

Consider closer the monthly goods trade data. September increase in trade surplus was, in fact, driven as much by rising exports (up €193 million month-on-month), as by shrinking imports (down €208 million).

Given deep cuts in consumption goods imports in 2008-2010, any recent reductions in imports are primarily reflective of the changes in demand for intermediate inputs into production of our exports. In other words, trade surpluses based on imports reductions are not sustainable in the medium term. This is evident from the longer-term statistics. In H1 2011, Irish trade surplus in goods was up only 3.4% year on year. In H2 2011, based on latest data, trade surplus might actually fall some 2% year on year. Back in November 2010 4 year programme, the Government projected that in 2011 exports will increase 5% and imports will rise just 2.75%, which would have implied an annual goods trade balance of €47 billion this year. It looks now that this projection might be undershot by over €3 billion. Not exactly an optimistic picture.

This performance is worrisome for another reason. The above data, cited most often as the core driver of our economic ‘recovery’ relates solely to trade in goods. Yet, the overall balance of trade for the country includes net exports of services. We have to rely on the Quarterly National Accounts data to gauge overall trade balance in both goods and services.

Full trade data we have covers only the first half of 2011 – the period before the latest slowdown in Euro area, UK and US economies became pronounced. Despite this, the data shows some emerging strains on the side of Ireland’s full trade surplus. Year on year, exports of goods and service through H1 2011 were up 5.8%, but imports increased 6.1%, which means that the trade surplus expanded by just under 4.7%.



Exports-led recovery may be starting to falter. In 2009, trade balance for goods and services grew at a massive 52.5% year on year. Last year it expanded by 19.7%. This year, so far, annualized rate of growth is just under 4.7% and that was under more benign global growth conditions that prevailed through June 2011. Budgetary projections were for a 14.7% expansion on total trade surplus for 2011 – 3 times the current rate.

If ‘exports-led recovery’ was really able to carry us out of the economic doldrums, much of the external trade growth now appears to be behind us in 2009-2010. It didn’t happen. Why? Exports growth is good, creates jobs and huge value added in our economy. But exports are not enough, because Ireland is not an exports-intensive economy. It is a multinationals-intensive economy.

Let’s take a look at the National Accounts. In Q2 2011, Net Factor Income outflows from Ireland – largely multinational profits – accounted for 21.4% of our GDP, 20.3% of all our exports and equal to 100% of the entire trade balance in goods and services. In other words, in national accounts terms, trade basically pays for itself, plus small employment pool of workers. And that’s about it.

This is not surprising. In 2010, one category of trade: Organic Chemicals, Medicinal and Pharmaceutical Products accounted for 86.1% of our entire trade surplus. Between 2000 and 2009, the same sector average contribution to trade surplus was 84.1%. Total food and live animals – the indigenous companies-dominated exporting sector – combined trade surplus in 2010 was just €2.4 billion or some 16 times smaller than the trade surplus from the Organic Chemicals, Medicinal and Pharmaceutical Products category.

This reliance on MNCs-dominated sectors presents significant risks to our trade flows going forward.

Firstly, Ireland-based MNCs face the risk of the much-feared ‘patent cliff’ threatening the pharma sector. Various estimates put the effect of the blockbuster drug going off-patent at a staggering up to 80% reduction in revenues within the first 3 months after patent expiration. In the next 3 years, according to some estimates, this fate awaits approximately 30-35% of our MNCs sales. This can see our trade balance dropping by almost €6 billion in the first year of impact.

Secondly, lack of diversification in sectoral patterns of trade – further reinforced by the fact that computer equipment exports are now down 11% year on year in the first 8 months of 2011 – is paralleled by the decline of regional diversification of our exports. In 8 moths through August 2011, 18.7% of our exports went to the countries outside the EU and US. A year ago, the same number was 19.1%. Ireland’s trade with the largest emerging and middle income economies, such as the BRIC countries, remains virtually static and minor year on year at just €2.2 billion or less than 3.7% of our exports. Our trade balance with the BRIC countries stood at unimpressive €80.2 million in January-August 2010 and has fallen to €70.3 million in the same period of 2011. You get the picture: Ireland is missing out on booming trade markets.

Thirdly, recent proposals in Washington – combining a potential reduction in the US corporate tax rate with a tax holiday for repatriation of US MNCs’ profits back into the US can have profound effects here. Just a 25% acceleration in repatriation of profits by the US multinationals can result in GDP/GNP gap rising to 22.5% by 2016 against current 17%. This, in effect, will mean that Irish economy will be sending abroad more funds in repatriated profits than the entire trade surplus brings into the country.


The risks we face on our exporting sectors’ side point to the reasons why exports-led recoveries are rare in general.

Historical evidence, across the euro area states, taken over the period of 1990-2010 clearly shows that, in general, countries do not reverse external imbalances overnight. Only two out of 17 euro area countries, Austria and Germany, have managed to switch from persistent current account deficits in the 1990s to current account surpluses in 2000-2010. Evidence also shows that between 1990 and 2009, no country in the Euro area was able to achieve average current account surpluses in excess of 5% annually and only one country – the Netherlands – was able to deliver average surpluses of over 4% of GDP. Given Ireland’s Government debt overhang, we would have to run over 4% average surplus for a good part of the next two decades if exports-led growth were to be the engine for our economic recovery.

Ireland’s exporters are doing a stellar job trying to break out of the globally-driven patterns of trade and generate growth well in excess of that delivered by other countries around the world. The real problem is the unreasonable expectations for the exports-led recovery that are bestowed upon them by the Government. If Ireland is to develop an indigenously anchored robust export-driven economy, we need serious policy reforms to facilitate domestic investment and entrepreneurship, know-how and skills acquisition and ease access to trade for our services and goods exporters. So far, the Government has been talking the talk on some of these reforms. It is yet to put its words into action.


Box-out:

The continued turmoil in the Euro area sovereign bond markets presents an interesting sort of a dilemma for investors around the world. By all possible debt metrics, Japan is more insolvent than Italy or all of the PIIGS combined. In addition, barring the latest quarter uplift, Japan had not seen appreciable economic growth in ages. And yet, Japanese Government bonds yields are falling and the country is perceived to be a sort of safe-haven for investors fleeing the beleaguered Euro area. Why? The short answer to this question is – investment risks. There are tree basic investment risks when it comes to bonds. The first risk is that of future interest rates increases. If interest rates were to rise, currently trading bonds will see their price drop, devaluing the investment. Japan is less likely to rise interest rates any time in the near future than the ECB, as it faces significant costs of rebuilding its economy and its high debt levels require lower interest rates financing. The second risk is of high inflation. Once again, Japan wins here, as the country had sustained periods of near-zero to deflationary price changes in its recent past. In addition, the country is no more susceptible to importing inflation from the global commodities markets than Europe. Lastly, there is the set of re-investment, credit and default risks, which in the nutshell boil down to the risk that the issuing sovereign will not be able to roll over current bonds for new ones at maturity. Of course, in the case of Japan this can happen only if investors refuse to accept new bonds in a swap for old bonds. But in the case of European states, this can happen also if the euro were to break up between now and maturity period (in which case the swap will not be like-for-like) or if the collective entity – the EU – were to compel sovereign bond holders to accept haircuts at some future date. With both these possibilities being open in the case of, say, Italy, Japan – as sick as its economy might be – presents a potentially lower risk bet for many investors today.

Saturday, November 19, 2011

21/11/2011: Residential Property Prices: October

Sorry to break the bad news, folks, but the latest Residential Property Price Index (RPPI) for October is showing accelerating property prices declines on foot of already substantial rates of contraction registered during 2011 as a whole. the bust is getting bustier.

All properties index fell to 71.2 in october from 72.8 in September, posting a monthly decline of 2.20%. This is the sharpest rate of monthly contraction in prices since March 2009 and the third fastest rate of decline in the history of the series! 3moMA for RPPI is now at 72.63. Year on year prices are now down 15.14% - the highest yoy decline since February 2010. Relative to peak prices are down 45.44%. 12 mo MA is at -1.36% for mom rate of decline and year-to-date rate of prices declines average -1.49%.

When it comes to Nama, relative to its cut-off date of November 30, 2009, property prices are now down 24.17%. When fully set up, Nama called bottoming out of the markets for Q1 2010. Since then, prices are down 20.62%, so those highly paid geniuses employed by Nama to 'value' properties and 'assess' markets are really shining stars. Recall that Nama paid an uplift of LTEV on assets purchased of an average 10%, plus carries a burden-sharing discount / cushion. Factoring these two into the equation, Nama-assessed properties are now held at a loss of 27.79% on their Nama valuations, even with burden sharing cushion 'savings' factored in. Taken across Nama book value, these (for now paper) losses can be assessed at ca €8.3bn.


Let's drill deeper. House prices sub-index is now at 74.3 against 76.0 in September, a decline mom of -2.24% the largest monthly drop since June 2011. 3moMA now stands at 75.77 and year on year change in the sub-index is 14.89% - the steepest annual decline rate since February 2010. relative to peak house prices sub-index is now -43.71% off. 

Apartments prices sub-index fell from 53.2 in September to 52.2 in October, a mom drop of 1.88% shallower than September mom decline of 3.10%. 3moMA is now at 53.43 and year on year sub-index is down 19.81% - the steepest annual decline since April 2010. Relative to peak, apartments prices are now off 57.87%.


Recalling that Nama holds loads of assets written against apartments, Nama cut-off-date valuations, LTEVs and burden sharing cushion included, Nama valuations for apartments-related properties are now off 35.10%.


Chart above shows the price dynamics for Dublin properties. Dublin sub-index stands at 63.1 against September reading of 65.1, a mom decline of 3.07% - steepest since the catastrophic drop of 3.76% in August this year. 3mo MA is now at 64.9 and year on year prices in Dublin are down 17.52% - largest yearly decline since March 2010. Relative to peak, Dublin residential prices are down 53.09%.

Given the above, we can update projections for the core index and sub-indices for 2011 as a whole. These are shown below.


Depressing is the word that comes to mind. The picture is made even less palatable when we recall incessant blabber from our Government reps and stuff-brokers, as well as property 'experts' that inundated the earlier parts of the year with 'property prices will bottom out in H2 2011' noise.

Friday, November 18, 2011

18/11/2011: Mortgages Arrears for Q3 2011

Data for Irish Mortgages defaults for Q3 2011 was released today by the Central Bank and is already causing some commotions. That is because by the broader metric I deployed recently, including in last week's Sunday Times article (see here), we are now beyond 100K number when it comes to mortgages at risk.

let me un through the figures. Note that the CB has changed methodology for reporting back in Q3 2010, expanding reporting. So I estimated some of the sub-series back to Q3 2009 when the narrower reporting was first introduced. Thus, caution should be applied to taking Q3 2009-Q2 2010 data. Also, note that 2011 figure - corresponding to Q4 2011 - is a forecast based on mortgages arrears dynamics by each subcategory of mortgages.


  • In Q3 2011 there were 773,420 mortgages outstanding in Ireland a decline of 3,901 on Q2 2011 (-0.5% qoq) and 15,325 yoy (-1.94%). This represents a drop of 2.7% or 21,189 mortgages on Q3 2009.
  • The outstanding value of mortgages has declined €676,166 or 0.59% qoq to €114.41bn down from €115.09bn in Q2 2011 and €117.40bn in Q3 2010. Note that in Q2 2011 Irish household deposits were €87.00bn which implies that Mortgages to Deposits ratio in Ireland is at 131.5% well ahead of the LTDs mandated for the irish banks for all loans at 125.5%.
Of the above mortgages:
  • In Q3 2011 there were 62,970 mortgages in arrears 91 days and over with the balance of €12.37bn. This represents an increase of 7,207 mortgages qoq (+12.92%) and 22,498 mortgages yoy (+55.59%). Compared to Q3 2009, the number of mortgages in this category is estimated to have risen by 36,699 mortgages or 139.7%. In terms of value of the mortgages in arrears, the value rose 14.13% qoq and 58.7% yoy. I mentioned in the previous articles on the subject that we can expect faster increases in mortgages in arrears values, rather than numbers as arrears primarily hit most those households that tended to borrow more in the years around the peak of the property markets.
  • Repossessions also rose from 809 in Q2 2011 to 884 in Q3 2011 (+75 or 9.27% qoq). Repossessions are now up 69.7% yoy (+363) and are estimated to have risen 501% on Q3 2009 (+737).
  • Restructured loans that are no in arrears are down from 39,395 in Q2 2011 (value of these loans was €6.66bn) to 36,376 (€5.93bn) - a decline of 3,019 mortgages qoq or 7.7%. Year on year these mortgages are up 9.7% or 3,212.
Based on the above we can define mortgages at risk and defaulted to include all mortgages that are currently in arrears, all mortgages that are restructured, but are not in arrears and mortgages that went through the repossessions. 
  • In Q3 2011 total mortgages at risk or defaulted stood at 100,230 with the total value of €18.3bn, up 4,263 mortgages (+4.4%) qoq and 26,073 mortgages (+35.2%) on Q3 2010. Since Q3 2009 these mortgages rose in number some estimated 125.9%. In value, mortgages at risk or defaulted have risen €803mln qoq (+4.6%) and €10.5bn yoy (+134.7%).



As chart above summarizes, percentage of mortgages at risk relative to overall number of mortgages has risen in Q3 2011 to 12.96% from 12.35% in Q2 2011. The value of mortgages at risk has increased from 15.2% of all mortgages value to 15.99%.

It is worth noting that Q3 dynamics represent a marked slowdown on the rates of increases in mortgages at risk in previous quarters. This decrease is accounted for as follows:

  • Total number of mortgages outstanding paydown slowed from -0.65% in Q2 2011 relative to Q1 2011 to -0.50% in Q3 2011 relative to Q2 2011. This means that the base decline was slower, pushing down the percentage change in the relative share of mortgages at risk.
  • Number of mortgages in arrears rose +12.9% in Q2 2011 relative to Q1 2011 and this rate was +12.4% in Q3 2011 relative to Q2 2011 - hardly a marked slowdown here.
  • Number of mortgages restructured but not in arrears rose +7.5% in Q2 2011 relative to Q1 2011 and declined -7.7% in Q3 2011 relative to Q2 2011 - this is the core driver of mortgages at risk growth slowdown. Unfortunately we do not know if this decline was driven by these mortgages exiting the restructuring arrangement by going into arrears, or returning back to performing mortgages (for how long can these be expected to remain there is another question), or going into new renegotiations for further restructuring.

Thursday, November 17, 2011

17/11/2011: INTO is correct on JobBridge Scheme

INTO has issued a direction to its members not to co-operate with the Government's JobBridge scheme. The details are reported here.

While I extremely rarely find myself in agreement with INTO, this time around I think their position is compelling. If JobBridge scheme were to be used in the case of teaching staff, then this means that there are:

  1. Teaching positions unfilled (otherwise how can a JobBridge position materialise), 
  2. Teachers with incomplete qualifications who can benefit from on-the-job training, and
  3. There are no teachers who are fully qualified and are unemployed.
It appears that this is not the case. Per INTO, there are unemployed qualified teachers (violating 3 above) and there are, supposedly, no vacancies to employ these qualified teachers (condition 1 violated). In this environment.

If there are positions that are unfilled in the presence of unemployed teachers, these unemployed teachers should be hired with normal pay to do their jobs. 

If there are no positions unfilled, and the schools want to create new positions, there should be no discrimination between those coming into the new jobs that are identical to existent jobs in terms of responsibilities.

The JobBridge scheme should not be used to employ people doing normal work at lower pay. It should only be used to provide skills training in very limited set of circumstances where apprenticeships are suitable. In fact, we need a real apprenticeship schemes, not a JobBridge scheme.

Wednesday, November 16, 2011

16/11/2011: Irish Mortgages Crisis

Unedited version of my latest Sunday Times article (November 13, 2011).


Per latest data available to us – at the end of June 2011, there were 777,321 outstanding mortgages in Ireland. Of these, 55,763 mortgages were in arrears more than 90 days, up 53% on same period a year ago. In addition, 39,395 mortgages were ‘restructured’ but are currently ‘performing’ – in other words, paying at least some interest. Adding together all mortgages in arrears, repossessions, plus those that were restructured but are not in arrears yet, 95,967 mortgages (12.3% of the total) amounting to €17.5 billion (or 15.2% of the total outstanding mortgages amount) are currently at risk of default, defaulting or have defaulted.

Given the trend in these developments to-date, we can expect that by the end of 2011 there will be some 114,000 mortgages in distress in Ireland. By the end of 2012 this number can rise to over 161,000 or some 21% of the total mortgages pool in the country.

This is a staggeringly high number. When considered in the light of demographic distribution and vintages, 21% of all mortgages that are likely to be in arrears around the end of 2012-the beginning of 2013 will account for up to 30% of the total value of mortgages outstanding.

Mortgages at risk of default

Source: Central Bank of Ireland and author own calculations

This is a simple corollary from the fact that mortgages crisis is now impacting most severely families in their 30s and 40s, with more recent and, thus, larger mortgages signed around the peak of the property bubble. These households are facing three pressures in today’s environment.

Firstly, they are experiencing above-average unemployment and income pressures. Per Quarterly National Household Survey, in Q2 2011, unemployment rate for persons aged 25-34 was 16.5% and unemployment rate for those in age group of 35-44 was 12.4, both well ahead of the 8.95% average unemployment rate for older households. By virtue of being more concentrated in the middle class earning categories, they are also facing higher tax burdens than their lower-earning younger and more asset-rich older counterparts.

Secondly, they are facing higher costs of living, further depressing their capacity to repay these mortgages. More likely to live on the outer margins of commuter belts, our middle-income earners are facing more expensive cost of commute, courtesy of higher energy prices, high taxes associated with car ownership and the lack of viable public transport alternatives. In September this year, prices of petrol were 15.4% above their levels a year ago. Inflation in diesel prices is running at 14.8%. Cost of road transport increased 5% in a year through September, and bus fares are up 10.8% These households are also facing higher costs associated with raising children. Since the time these families bought their houses (e.g. 2005-2007), primary and secondary education costs went up 21-22%, and third level education costs rose 32%. On average, larger families require greater health spending, the cost of which rose 3.4% year on year in September and now stands at 16% above 2005-2007 levels. The three categories of costs described above comprise ca 19% of the total household budget for an average Irish household and above that for a mid-aged household with children.

Thirdly, as their disposable incomes shrink and mortgage costs rise (mortgages-related interest costs are up 17.2 year on year and 11% on 2006), the very same households that are hardest hit by the crisis are also missing vital years for generating savings for their old age pensions provisions and most active years for entrepreneurship and investment.

In short, courtesy of the crisis and the Government policy responses to it to-date, Ireland already has a ‘lost generation’ – the most economically, socially and culturally productive one. And this generation is now at the forefront of the largest homemade crisis we are facing – the crisis of mortgages defaults and personal bankruptcies.

Against this backdrop, the forthcoming Personal Bankruptcies Bill should form a cornerstone of the Government’s policy.

This week, the media reported some of the specifics of the forthcoming legislation, which include two crucial details: the 3-years release period for personal bankruptcy and the non-recourse nature of the arrangement. Under the former, the current period of bankruptcy will be cut from 12 years to 3 years, while under the latter, the new bankruptcy law will limit the extent of the household liability to the current value of the property underlying the mortgage. It is uncertain, at this stage, what claims, if any, can be levied against personal and family savings and other assets.

The provisions, as reported in the media, appear to be well-balanced for a normal bankruptcy reform, but remain excessively harsh for the legislation designed to tackle an acute crisis. Here’s what is needed.

A conditional bankruptcy release period for mortgages taken in the period of 2003-2008 should be set at 12 months subject to satisfactory completion of court-set conditions. Full release should apply after 3 years. There should be no restriction on companies directorships for those in the process, so as not to reduce entrepreneurship and small business ownership.

The lien against the personal income and assets should be designed as follows. No more than 25-35% of the after-tax disposable income can be diverted to the repayment of the mortgage, to allow for private sector rent payments. No more than 30% of the household assets below €25,000 can be used to repay the residual mortgage post-foreclosure. The amount can rise to 50% for assets valued between €25,001 to €50,000 and to the maximum of 70% for assets valued over €50,000. This will minimize losses to the banks, disincentivise strategic defaults and reduce moral hazard, while still allowing families to retain safety cushion of savings to offset the risks of sudden income losses or illness.

Banks objections to relaxing bankruptcy laws, raised this week, is that the new law will trigger a significant demand for capital as losses due to non-recourse clauses will be borne by the lenders. This is simply not true.

Firstly, with some claim on family assets in place, bankruptcy process will still be used only in the cases of extreme financial distress. A combination of a limited liability applying to some family assets and a 3-year repayment period will create both a disincentive to abuse the system and a cushion of burden sharing, reducing the end losses to the banks.  Savings on interest payments supports and legal costs will further reduce taxpayers potential exposure.

Secondly, the stress tests carried out earlier this year were supposed to provide ample supports for the banks against mortgages defaults. Blackrock estimates of the worst-case scenario losses on Irish mortgages over the life-time of the loans amount to €16.3 billion split between €10.2 billion owner-occupier and €6.1 billion for buy-to-let borrowers. Central Bank of Ireland assumed 3-year losses amount to the total of €9 billion. Reformed bankruptcy law is unlikely to raise the Blackrock estimates for life-time losses, but is likely to push forward the defaults that would have occurred outside the Central Bank-assumed time frame of 2011-2013. In other words, unless the stress tests performed were not rigorous enough, or the Central Bank assumptions on 2011-2013 defaults were not realistic, capital supplied to the banks post PCARs already incorporates expected losses.

Either way, there is neither an economic nor moral justification for using bankruptcy laws as a tool for locking borrowers in servitude to the lender. During the boom, the Irish state and banks have acted recklessly toward the very same borrowers. The duty of care to protect consumers and investors was abandoned by the previous Financial Regulator, the banks, public authorities in charge of regulating property markets and, ultimately, the Governments that presided over the system, which put full burden of risks associated with property purchases on the buyers. Remedying this requires giving distressed borrowers some powers to compel burden sharing vis-à-vis the banks.


Box-out:

This week, the entire world was consumed with the saga of Silvio Berlusconi’s resignation. Played out across the media – from print to facebook – the story of the ‘departing villain’ was almost comical, were it not tragic in the end. Tragic not so much in the inevitable rise in Italian bond yields, but in the sense of denial of reality that the media and political circus that surrounded Mr Berlusconi’s departure from power. Italy is a Leviathanian version of the zombie economies of Greece and Portugal. Between 1990 and 2010, Italian real GDP grew at an average rate of less than 1% per annum, less than half the rate of Spain, Greece and Portugal. Italian growth in exports of goods and services, over the same period was roughly one half of the rate of growth in Spain and 1.5 times lower than that for Greece and Portugal. Italy’s unemployment rate averaged just below that for other 3 countries. Italian fiscal deficits, at an average of 5.2% per annum, were greater than those of Portugal (3.3%) and Spain (3.1%), but lower than those in Greece (7.8%). Ditto for structural deficits. These are hardly attributable to Mr Berlusconi alone and are unlikely to be altered dramatically by his successors. While it is easy to point the finger at the internationally disliked leader, the truth remains the same – with or without Berlusconi, Italy is a nation with a dysfunctional economy.

Tuesday, November 15, 2011

15/11/2011: Q3 2011 Growth in Euro area

Latest data on euro area economies:

  • France posted a quarter-on-quarter +0.4% in GDP in Q3 2011 after -0.1% contraction in Q2. Household spending +0.3% in Q3 from -0.8% decline in Q2. Domestic demand +0.3% from -0.3% fall in Q2. Production in goods and services +0.4% in Q3 compared to -0.1% drop in Q1.
  • Germany GDP +2.6% y/y in Q3, 0.5% qoq and Q2 is revised up to +0.3% from +0.1% in preliminary release.
  • Spain posted 0.0% growth qoq and 0.8% yoy growth in Q3 2011 against 0.2% qoq and 0.8% yoy growth in Q2 2011.
  • Italy is yet to report data
  • Overall, Euro area 17 posted 0.2% growth qoq in Q3 2011, same as in Q2 2011, with yearly growth of 1.4% in Q3 2011 down from 1.6% in Q2 2011. The slowdown is now evident in the yearly growth terms with Q4 2010 coming at 1.9%, rising to 2.4% in Q1 2011 and falling to 1.6% in Q2 2011 followed by the latest preliminary growth estimate of 1.4% for Q3 2011
  • EU 27 also posted a slowdown in Q3 2011: Q4 2010 annualized growth was 2.1%, rising to 2.4% in Q1 2011, and falling back to 1.7% in Q2 2011 and 1.4% in Q3 2011. Quarterly growth rates in EU27 were 0.2% in Q3 2011 against 0.2% in Q2 2011, down from 0.7% in Q1 2011.

The above compares against:
  • Q3 2011 growth of 0.6% qoq against Q2 2011 growth of 0.3% in the US. Yoy growth in the US was 1.6% unchanged from Q2 2011.
  • Q3 2011 growth of +1.5% qoq against contraction of -0.3% in Q2 2011 in Japan. Yoy growth in Japan in Q3 2011 was -0.2% against -1.0% growth in Q2 2011.
Updated:


NY Fed manufacturing index reached back into positive territory, albeit barely, in November following five consecutive months of negative readings. Index rose to 0.6 in November from negative 8.5 in October. However, underlying conditions remained generally poor: new orders index fell to negative 2.1 in November from 0.2 in October and inventories fell to negative 12.2 in November from negative 9.0 in October. The employment index fell to negative 3.7 in November from 3.4 in October while the average workweek rose for the first time in six months. The prices paid index fell to its lowest level in nearly two years and this pressured margins.


U.S. retail sales were up 0.5% in October, driven by higher purchases online and higher spending on electronics and appliance. Sales of autos rose just 0.4% after a big surge in September while gasoline sales fell. Ex-auto sector, retail sales increased 0.6%. Retail sales for September were up 1.1%, were unchanged. Yoy through October retail sales are up 7.2%.