Friday, June 3, 2011

03/06/2011: Services and Manufacturing PMIs signal a slowdown

A quick post on some additional analysis of the PMIs released this week. Combining Services and Manufacturing PMIs.

As noted in the previous post, Manufacturing PMIs have posted weakening performance, declining to 51.8 in May from 56 in April and falling below 12mo and 3mo averages. Detailed analysis of Services PMIs is to follow in the next post, but the headline figure showed a marginal improvement to 50.5 from 50.2 in May, also below 12mo and 3mo averages.
Thus, as the chart above shows, both Manufacturing and Services PMIs reflect extremely slow rates of expansion. This is reflected in employment data:
Employment sub-index has now fallen to 48.1 from 51.1 in April for Services, which means that employment is now set to contract in the sector. At 48.1, employment sub-index in Services stands below 12mo, 3mo average, 3mo to May 2010 average and relative to 2010. Employment in manufacturing is also now in the contraction territory with a reading of 49.9 in May, down from 54.0 in April. 3mo average and 12mo average both were above 50.

Using PMI data, I computed my own index of profitability or index of profit margins based on the sub-indices for prices of inputs and outputs. Chart below illustrates:
What is clear from the above chart is that deflation of final output prices is being contrasted by slightly moderating inflation in the input prices, which in turn means that both sectors of the economy are continuing to operate in the environment of shrinking profit margins. This cannot be good. Also note that in the last 2 months, the rate of decline in profit margins is the third fastest for Services and fourth fastest for manufacturing since September 2002.

In longer-term outlook, we are clearly regressing relative to January 2011 in both Services and Manufacturing:
We are also operating in the environment of very weak recovery and continued growth in unemployment.

Lastly, lets look at some relationships between unemployment and exports orders. Remember the idea of exports-led recoveries?
Well, couple of things can be noted from the chart above. Firstly, as expected, there is a stronger relationship between stronger exports orders growth and jobs creation in the Services sector than in Manufacturing. This explains why we had months of booming PMIs on Manufacturing side and no serious new jobs creation. Second thing to note: historically (the data is since 1998 for Manufacturing and 2002 for Services), there is a 40.3% chance on Manufacturing side that an expansion in Exports orders is going to be associated with contraction in employment (a Jobless Recovery scenario). For Services sector this probability is 43%.

Thursday, June 2, 2011

03/05/11: Exchequer receipts for May

Exchequer returns for May are in and the results are pretty much in line with everyone's expectations. On the surface things are improving, but in reality, our fiscal problems are not going away.

Here's the analysis of receipts (analysis of expenditure will follow in a separate post):
  • Income tax receipts came in at €5.061bn inclusive of the USC, which is 9.2% above 2009 levels and 19.93% above 2010 level. How much of this is due to USC and how much was substituted away from other sources of revenue, such as health levies etc.

  • VAT receipts offer a more direct comparative - VAT receipts stood at €4.867bn in May 2011 slightly down on €4.873bn a year ago.
  • Corporate tax receipts - another gauge of economic activity, this time dominated by MNCs - are down: May 2011 level was €599mln, as opposed to €748mln a year ago. Thus Corporate tax receipts are down 19.92% on 2010 and 47.41% on 2009. For comparative purpose, May 2008 receipts were €1.357bn - more than double 2011 levels, while 2007 receipts were €1.484bn.

  • Excise tax receipts came in at €1.791bn in May, slightly up on May 2010 when they reached €1.704bn, the variation of 5.1% yoy, the receipts are also up on May 2009 - by 2.11%.
  • Stamps continue unabated decline - down to €235mln in May 2011 or 3.69% yoy and 20.07% on 2009. To put things into perspective, May 2007 stamps were €1.438bn.

  • Capital taxes are really taking a serious dive. CGT is down 25.23% year on year and 56.09% on 2009, reaching just €83mln in May 2011. CAT is down 66.09% yoy and 63.21% on 2009 at €39mln in May 2011. Combined CGT and CAT stood at €1.168bn in May 2007, €744mln in May 2008, €295mln in May 2009, €226mln in May 2010 and €122mln in May 2011. Ouch - that global capex boom of 2010 has clearly passed Ireland untouched and this can only mean one thing - we are into the 4th year of collapsed investment now.
  • Lastly, customs duties stood at €98mln in May, 18.1% up yoy

  • Total tax receipts, therefore, came in at €12.795bn in 5 months through May 2011. This is 5.6% above the level of tax receipts for the same period of 2010 and 5.43% below 2009.

  • The Exchequer deficit for the five months through May 2011 now stands at €10.231bn inclusive of €3.060bn promisory notes capital injections to INBS and Anglo in March. May 2010 deficit was €7.867bn (ex-banks) and 2009 deficit for the period was €10.588bn.
So on the net, tax receipts suggest to me that economic activity has stalled. All comparable tax heads across years relating to economic growth - corporate tax, VAT, capital taxes - are performing either in line with 2010 or below. The only significant increases in tax heads are where new taxes were implemented and some of these are in effect transfers from non-tax receipts side, implying that increase in tax receipts via USC, for example, includes transfer of health levy which has an effect of increasing expenditure side.

02/06/11: Manufacturing PMIs

A quick run through yesterday's PMIs for Irish manufacturing sector, released by NCB. A more detailed analysis will follow when Services PMIs are released.

As you have heard by now, May manufacturing PMIs have shown some surprising (to some) weaknesses. Here are the headline numbers:
  • PMIs headline reading is now 51.8 down from 56 a month ago. Year ago, the same reading stood at 54.1. 12-mo average is 52.8 and latest 3mo average is 54.5. Hence, the slowdown in growth is quite pronounced indeed.
  • Output index reading stands at 52.6 in May, down from 58.7 in April. 12-mo average is at 54.4 and over the last 3 mo average reading was 56.4. Again, strong slowdown in growth.
  • New orders index declined from 57.3 in April to 52.9 in May and now stands below 12mo average of 53.6 and well below 3mo average of 56.0. Compared with the same period in 2010, the index has fallen 2.5 points, but it still significantly above the disastrous 37.7 reading for May 2009.
  • New Export Orders index has declined marginally to 58.7 in May, from April's 59. Export Orders index is still above 56.3 12-mo average, but below 3mo average of 59. The index ia also lower than the reading attained in May 2010 - 59.5.
  • Employment sub-index posted a strong decline from 54.0 in April to 49.9 in May, crossing back into negative growth territory for the first time since November 2010.
Charts to illustrate:


Quick note on interpretations of PMIs for Ireland. Overall, historically, Irish PMIs are highly volatile series. For example, for core PMIs:
  • Full sample (1998-present) standard deviation is 4.667
  • Since 2000, standard deviation is 4.619, and
  • Since 2008 (crisis period) standard deviation is a massive 6.17
A similar picture applies to employment series (and indeed all other sub-components of the PMIs):
  • Full sample (1998-present) standard deviation for Employment sub-index is 4.787
  • Since 2000, standard deviation is 4.558, and
  • Since 2008 (crisis period) standard deviation is a stronger 5.778
In terms of the rates of change mom:
  • PMIs for Manufacturing dropped 4.2 points mom in May
  • 1STDEV for full sample is 1.5 points
  • 1STDEV for the sub-sample since 2000 is 1.574 points and
  • 1STDEV for the sub-sample since 2008 is 2.289
So May change does seem to be signifcant. On the other hand, Manufacturing PMIs crossed the 50 points line into growth territory back in March 2010 and remained there with exception for September 2010. Yet, the economy didn't really show much of a turnaround. May be, just may be, that hope of an exports-led recovery is not as powerful as the Government thinks it is?

Either way, of course, I'd rather see PMIs at above 60 reading, than heading for a downward territory.

02/06/2011: Latest shenanigans at the banks

Two junior bondholders in Allied Irish Banks - Aurelius Capital Management and Abadi Co – are taking the Irish government to court today over the AIB plans to impose burden-sharing on some bondholders in failed banks. Aurelius is a distressed debt investment vehicle which also holds debt of Dubai World so it should be well familiar with the case of haircuts.

These are not investors who bought Irish banks bonds at their full value, but those who pick up distressed debt at a significant discount. However, it is their right to maximize their returns on such investments.

Let us recall that AIB is the sickest of the 4 banks reviewed under the original PCARs back on March 31 this year. Under the stress tests, AIB is expected to lose €3.07bn on Residential Mortgages (all figures refer to stress scenario, 3-year time frame), €972mln on Corporate loans, €2.67bn on SMEs loans, €4.49bn on Commercial Real Estate loans and €1.4bn on Non-mortgage Consumer loans and Other loans. The grand total expected 2011-2013 losses under stressed scenario is €12.6bn or almost ½ of the total expected stress scenario losses across IRL-4 banks of €27.72bn.

Of the €24bn capital buffer for IRL-4 required by the Central Bank PCAR exercise, full €13.3bn is accounted for by AIB.

Which implies that AIB – accounting for just €93.7bn of the €273.94bn of loans held by the IRL-4 at the time of PCARs (just over 34.2% of the total loans of IRL-4) is responsible for over 55.4% of overall capital demands. It is, by a mile, the worst performing bank of IRL-4... Really, folks, 'Be with AIB' as their old commercials would say.

So in the case of AIB, Finance Minister Michael Noonan – the majority shareholder in AIB – is now attempting to impose losses of between 75 and 90 percent on €2.6bn of the bank’s subordinated debt. This means that the bond-holders are expected to contribute just 15-16% of the total cost of the latest bank recapitalization programme. This, of course, is a drop in a sea of pain already levied against Irish taxpayers.

The problem in Ireland is that the so-called subordinated liabilities orders (SLO), which the government is using to force a deal on bondholders is untested in law. Bondholders can claim priority over shareholders in the event of insolvency. But the banks are now existing solely on government life-support. Although they are complete zombies, they are not technically insolvent. This in turn means their equity retains some – if only tiny – value. The Irish Government in the case of AIB driving bondholders’ haircuts can be seen as the means for improving that value to the shareholder at the expense of bondholders, since equity will benefit from lower debt and changes in the capital structure.

In the case of AIB this means two possible things:
  • If the court finds in favour of Aurelius and Abadi, the deal is off the table or will be more expensive to execute (lower haircuts), which will in turn imply greater demand on taxpayers to step in. Of course, this also means the Gov in effect destroying a large portion of its own shares value.
  • If the court rules in favour of the Gov, the deal is on and we have a precedent for aggressive burden sharing. This, however, will only benefit the majority state-owned banks, i.e. Anglo, INBS, EBS and AIB, and only with respect to savings on subordinated debt.
The problem is in the timing of this burden sharing – the previous Gov insistence on paying on bonds in full means that we, the taxpayers, are now on the hook for losses on our shares in the banks via dilution. You don’t have to go far to see what happens here. Just look at Bank of Ireland (below).

Normal process of banks workout should have been:
  • Step 1 – Impose losses on shareholders, while preserving depositors by ring-fencing them via specific legislation to remove equivalent status between senior bondholders and depositors. Such legislation can be enacted on the grounds that depositors are not lenders to the activities of the banks, but are clients of the banks for the purpose of safe-keeping of their money. It is also justified from the point of view of finance, as depositors are being paid much lower rates of return on their money, implying lower risk premium
  • Step 2 – Impose losses on bondholders via a combination of robust haircuts and debt-for-equity swaps, but only after depositors are protected
  • Step 3 – For any amounts of capital still outstanding per writedowns requirements, the Government can then take equity positions in the banks.
This sequence of actions would have prevented depositors runs and repeated taxpayer equity dilutions. It would also have given the Government a mandate to take over and reform failed banks.

By doing everything backwards, we are now in a veritable mess. This mess was not caused by the current Government – it is the toxic legacy of the previous Government which made gross errors in managing the whole banking crisis. This mess is extremely hard to unwind and my sympathies go here to Minister Noonan who is at the very least trying to do something right after years of spoofing and wasting taxpayers money by his predecessor.

Note: The Government is aiming to cut around €5bn from the total bill for bailing out Irish-6 banks. Imposing losses of up to 90 percent on junior bonds in AIB, Bank of Ireland, Irish Life & Permanent and EBS Building Society is on the cards:
  • IL&P said it would offer 20cents on the euro for €840m of debt
  • EBS wants to pay 10c to 20c on the euro for around €260m of subordinated bonds
  • Bank of Ireland is pushing up to 90% discount on €2.6 billion worth of subordinated debt. Bank of Ireland said it would offer holders of Tier 1 securities just 10 percent of the face value of their original investment, and holders of Tier 2 securities 20 percent.
It is revealing, perhaps, of the state of our nation’s policy making that over a year ago myself, Brian Lucey, Peter Mathews, David McWilliams and a small number of other commentators suggested 80-90% haircuts for subordinated bondholders. We were, of course, promptly attacked as ‘reckless’, ‘irresponsible’ and ‘naïve’. Yet, doing this back then would have netted taxpayers savings of more than double the amount hoped for today.

And this is before the savings that could have been generated from avoiding painful dilution of equity holdings acquired by the Government in Irish banks. How painful? Look no further than the unfolding Bank of Ireland saga.

Bank of Ireland's lower Tier 2 paper is trading at 37-40 cents on the euro post-announcement of the after the announcement that T2 will be offered an 80 percent discount alongside with a ‘more attractive’ debt-for-equity swap. Tier 1 paper holders are offered 10 cents on the euro cash ex-accrued interest. Shares swap will factor in accrued interest to sweeten the deal. The debt-equity swap is so powerful of a promise that BofI shares have all but collapsed over the last few days losing over 62% of their already minuscule value. Of course, with Government holding 39% of equity pre-swap, the taxpayers have suffered the same loss as the ordinary shareholders, all courtesy of perverse timing of equity injections by the previous Government.

And there’s more. Even if successful in applying haircuts and swaps to junior bondholders, Bank of Ireland will still need to raise additional €1.6bn from either new investors or existent shareholders (including the Government). Which means even more dilution is to come.

Wednesday, June 1, 2011

02/06/11: Central Bank Monthly Stats - IRL 6

This is the second post of two covering Central Bank stats for April 2011. The first post (here) focused on Domestic Group of banks. This post deals with Covered Institutions (the IRL-6 banks that are on a life support from the Government).

First up - central bank and ECB lending to banks was broken down into:
  • Other assets held by the CBofI - aka lending by CBofI itself to Irish banks - declined from €66.7bn in March to €54.15bn, this mans that mom lending by CBofI fell €12.64bn (-18.93%) and year on year it is now up €40.5bn (+296.8%)
  • Borrowing from the Eurosystem (ECB) declined from €79.22bn to €74.23bn - a drop of €4.985bn mom or 6.29%. Relative to April 2010, borrowing increased €38.31bn which almost exactly off-sets increases in CBofI lending, suggesting a transfer of risk from ECB to CBofI
  • Total loans to Irish 6 from Euro system and CBofI amounted to €128.4bn in April 2011 down €17.63bn mom (-12.1%). Relative to April 2010, loans increased €78.81bn or 159%.

On deposits side:
  • Total deposits in IRL 6 have increased from €224.17bn in March to €235.2bn in April an increase of 4.93% mom. Relative to April 2010, deposits are still down €14.07bn or 5.65%
  • However, the main driver for these increases were deposits from the Irish Government. Government deposits rose €12.743bn in April (+148.4%) mom and are up €18.566bn (+671.5%) year on year - the very same €18 billion mentioned in the first post.
  • Private sector deposits also increased, 1.81% or €1.93bn mom, but remain €20.92bn on April 2010 (-16.2%)
  • Monetary institutions deposits dropped €3.63bn mom (-3.32%) and €11.72bn (-9.98%) yoy
On lending side:
  • Loans to Irish residents fell €6.97bn (-2.2%) mom to €314.14bn. Loans stood at €27.97bn below April 2010 (a decline of 8.18% yoy)
  • Loans to General Government were marginally up €47mln to €28.3bn, which means that IRL 6 are the dominant players in lending to Irish Government (as asserted in the previous post)
  • Loans to other Monetary Institutions werte down €4.05bn mom (-375%) and
  • Loans to Private Sector fell additional €2.97bn (-1.61%) mom and €33.633bn (-15.62%) yoy to €181.71bn.

Lastly, loans to deposits ratios:
  • LTDs for all IRL 6 institutions improved by 10 percentage points to 133.56% in April 2011, which represents a decline of 4 percentage points yoy
  • LTDs for Private Sector lending fell 6 percentage points in April to 167.9%, an increase of 1 percentage point on April 2010.
In other words, deleveraging over the last 12 months has been led by Government and other financial isntitutions activities, not by private sector pay-down of debt to deposits ratios.

02/06/2011: Central Bank Monthly Stats - Domestic Group

Ok, folks, with some brief delay due to computational complexities - here are charts on Irish banking sector health. These are aggregates from the CBofI monthly stats for April 2011.

This release is broken into 2 post. The first post deals with Domestic Group of banks (see note Credit Institutions Resident in the Republic of Ireland). The second post will deal with Ireland-6 Zombies... err... banks that is known as Guaranteed or Covered Institutions.

Headlines first:
  • Total Private Sector Deposits are now at €164.9bn or €1.93bn up on April 2011 (+1.18%) and still €19.65bn down year on year (-10.64%)
  • All of this increase is due to Overnight deposits which are up €2.09bn (+2.53%) mom and down just €1.52bn yoy
  • Deposits with maturity <2 years declined to €54.94bn in April, down €57mln (0.1%) mom and €13.64bn (-19.9%) yoy
  • Deposits with maturity >2 years rose €56mln (+0.52%) mom to €10.78bn, which still implies a decline of €1.71bn (-13.71%) yoy
  • Deposits redeemable at notice <3 months were down €162mln (-1.1%) mom to €14.5bn and down €2.77bn (-16.05%) yoy
Chart to illustrate:
Now, take a look at total deposits by source:

Please note the above marking an increase in Government deposits as an important driver of deposits dynamics. Here are the details:
  • Domestic Group institutions saw their total liabilities fall to €712.72bn in April - a decline of €10.22bn mom (-1.41%) or a drop of €65.18bn (-8.38%) yoy (see chart below)
  • Deposits rose across the Domestic Group by €10.46bn mom (+3.7%) although they remain down €12.53bn (-9.63%) yoy
  • Clearly, as chart above shows, the increase in deposits was due primarily to Government deposits with Irish banks (well flagged before by many other researchers, this is really a transfer game whereby the Government mandated transfer of some €18bn of its reserves to Irish banks, increasing the risk to these funds, but creating an artificial improvement in the banks balance sheets). Government deposits rose €12.781bn (+143.6%) mom in April and are now up - yes, you;ve guessed it - €18.52bn (+586.2%) yoy
  • Another positive driver, albeit much smaller than Government, were Private Sector deposits, which rose €2.0bn (more accurately €1,999mln) or 1.32% mom, while still falling €21.85bn (-12.46%) short of April 2010 levels.
  • Monetary Institutions deposits with Domestic Group banks were down €4.325bn (-3.54%) mom in April and down €12.534bn (-9.63%) yoy.
Now, consider loans to deposit ratios:

Thanks to Government deposits, the series are declining for overall Domestic Group:
  • Overall LTDs fell 7 percentage points mom from 136.76% in March to 129.67% in April, yoy decline is 9 percentage points
  • LTDs for Private Sector declined 4% mom to 155.15% in April, this was consistent with a 12 percentage points decline year on year.

Lastly, let's consider loans to Irish residents within the system:
  • Overall loans to Irish residents fell from €386.3bn in March to €379.84bn in April a decline of 1.68% mom and 11.47% yoy
  • Loans to Monetary Institutions declined by €3.31bn (-2.84%) mom and are down €11.23bn (-9.03%) yoy
  • Loans to Government went up €45mln mom to €28.49bn (+0.16% mom and 150.75% yoy). Over the last 12 months Irish banks have revolved some €17.13bn worth of lending (bonds purchases) back to the State in what can only be described as a circular transfer of money from taxpayers underwriting banks to banks lending back to taxpayers to underwrite the banks
  • Private Sector loans meanwhile declined €3.21bn (-1.33%) mom to €238.2bn. This means that over the last 12 months credit supply to private sector dropped a massive 18.8% or €55.09bn. Roughly 1/3 of the annual GDP has been sucked out of the real economy by the banking crisis within just 12 months.
Chart to illustrate: