Two junior bondholders in Allied Irish Banks - Aurelius Capital Management and Abadi Co – are taking the Irish government to court today over the AIB plans to impose burden-sharing on some bondholders in failed banks. Aurelius is a distressed debt investment vehicle which also holds debt of Dubai World so it should be well familiar with the case of haircuts.
These are not investors who bought Irish banks bonds at their full value, but those who pick up distressed debt at a significant discount. However, it is their right to maximize their returns on such investments.
Let us recall that AIB is the sickest of the 4 banks reviewed under the original PCARs back on March 31 this year. Under the stress tests, AIB is expected to lose €3.07bn on Residential Mortgages (all figures refer to stress scenario, 3-year time frame), €972mln on Corporate loans, €2.67bn on SMEs loans, €4.49bn on Commercial Real Estate loans and €1.4bn on Non-mortgage Consumer loans and Other loans. The grand total expected 2011-2013 losses under stressed scenario is €12.6bn or almost ½ of the total expected stress scenario losses across IRL-4 banks of €27.72bn.
Of the €24bn capital buffer for IRL-4 required by the Central Bank PCAR exercise, full €13.3bn is accounted for by AIB.
Which implies that AIB – accounting for just €93.7bn of the €273.94bn of loans held by the IRL-4 at the time of PCARs (just over 34.2% of the total loans of IRL-4) is responsible for over 55.4% of overall capital demands. It is, by a mile, the worst performing bank of IRL-4... Really, folks, 'Be with AIB' as their old commercials would say.
So in the case of AIB, Finance Minister Michael Noonan – the majority shareholder in AIB – is now attempting to impose losses of between 75 and 90 percent on €2.6bn of the bank’s subordinated debt. This means that the bond-holders are expected to contribute just 15-16% of the total cost of the latest bank recapitalization programme. This, of course, is a drop in a sea of pain already levied against Irish taxpayers.
The problem in Ireland is that the so-called subordinated liabilities orders (SLO), which the government is using to force a deal on bondholders is untested in law. Bondholders can claim priority over shareholders in the event of insolvency. But the banks are now existing solely on government life-support. Although they are complete zombies, they are not technically insolvent. This in turn means their equity retains some – if only tiny – value. The Irish Government in the case of AIB driving bondholders’ haircuts can be seen as the means for improving that value to the shareholder at the expense of bondholders, since equity will benefit from lower debt and changes in the capital structure.
In the case of AIB this means two possible things:
- If the court finds in favour of Aurelius and Abadi, the deal is off the table or will be more expensive to execute (lower haircuts), which will in turn imply greater demand on taxpayers to step in. Of course, this also means the Gov in effect destroying a large portion of its own shares value.
- If the court rules in favour of the Gov, the deal is on and we have a precedent for aggressive burden sharing. This, however, will only benefit the majority state-owned banks, i.e. Anglo, INBS, EBS and AIB, and only with respect to savings on subordinated debt.
The problem is in the timing of this burden sharing – the previous Gov insistence on paying on bonds in full means that we, the taxpayers, are now on the hook for losses on our shares in the banks via dilution. You don’t have to go far to see what happens here. Just look at Bank of Ireland (below).
Normal process of banks workout should have been:
- Step 1 – Impose losses on shareholders, while preserving depositors by ring-fencing them via specific legislation to remove equivalent status between senior bondholders and depositors. Such legislation can be enacted on the grounds that depositors are not lenders to the activities of the banks, but are clients of the banks for the purpose of safe-keeping of their money. It is also justified from the point of view of finance, as depositors are being paid much lower rates of return on their money, implying lower risk premium
- Step 2 – Impose losses on bondholders via a combination of robust haircuts and debt-for-equity swaps, but only after depositors are protected
- Step 3 – For any amounts of capital still outstanding per writedowns requirements, the Government can then take equity positions in the banks.
This sequence of actions would have prevented depositors runs and repeated taxpayer equity dilutions. It would also have given the Government a mandate to take over and reform failed banks.
By doing everything backwards, we are now in a veritable mess. This mess was not caused by the current Government – it is the toxic legacy of the previous Government which made gross errors in managing the whole banking crisis. This mess is extremely hard to unwind and my sympathies go here to Minister Noonan who is at the very least trying to do something right after years of spoofing and wasting taxpayers money by his predecessor.
Note: The Government is aiming to cut around €5bn from the total bill for bailing out Irish-6 banks. Imposing losses of up to 90 percent on junior bonds in AIB, Bank of Ireland, Irish Life & Permanent and EBS Building Society is on the cards:
- IL&P said it would offer 20cents on the euro for €840m of debt
- EBS wants to pay 10c to 20c on the euro for around €260m of subordinated bonds
- Bank of Ireland is pushing up to 90% discount on €2.6 billion worth of subordinated debt. Bank of Ireland said it would offer holders of Tier 1 securities just 10 percent of the face value of their original investment, and holders of Tier 2 securities 20 percent.
It is revealing, perhaps, of the state of our nation’s policy making that over a year ago myself, Brian Lucey, Peter Mathews, David McWilliams and a small number of other commentators suggested 80-90% haircuts for subordinated bondholders. We were, of course, promptly attacked as ‘reckless’, ‘irresponsible’ and ‘naïve’. Yet, doing this back then would have netted taxpayers savings of more than double the amount hoped for today.
And this is before the savings that could have been generated from avoiding painful dilution of equity holdings acquired by the Government in Irish banks. How painful? Look no further than the unfolding Bank of Ireland saga.
Bank of Ireland's lower Tier 2 paper is trading at 37-40 cents on the euro post-announcement of the
after the announcement that T2 will be offered an 80 percent discount alongside with a ‘more attractive’ debt-for-equity swap. Tier 1 paper holders are offered 10 cents on the euro cash ex-accrued interest. Shares swap will factor in accrued interest to sweeten the deal. The debt-equity swap is so powerful of a promise that BofI shares have all but collapsed over the last few days losing over 62% of their already minuscule value. Of course, with Government holding 39% of equity pre-swap, the taxpayers have suffered the same loss as the ordinary shareholders, all courtesy of perverse timing of equity injections by the previous Government.
And there’s more. Even if successful in applying haircuts and swaps to junior bondholders, Bank of Ireland will still need to raise additional €1.6bn from either new investors or existent shareholders (including the Government). Which means even more dilution is to come.
As far as evidence goes, US-based 
Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation - a seasoned research think tank into entrepreneurship - recently (June 2009) published an intriguing study titled 
