Economics 11/05/2010: How to do fiscal austerity...

An interesting example for Ireland?

Two weeks ago, Eurostat confirmed that Bulgaria's deficit stood at 3.9% of GDP. A crisis was, therefore, unfolding in the Black Sea nation. The Bulgarian government decided to act and on the 5th of May it acted to drop public sector spending by 20% to reduce its budgetary deficit. The Government adopted an update to its 2010 budget in which spending on the part of State organisations, ministries and other public institutions is to be reduced by 20%. Flat cut across the board, with separate budgetary entities deciding on how the cuts should fall.

Clearly Bulgarians have not heard of the Croke Park 'deal' that, according to the Irish government, will help to stabilize Irish deficit (per my estimates, around 7% of GDP by the end of 2014, should all Croke Park-agreed provisions remain in place).

I will be blogging later today on the latest Exchequer results - which, recall, were received well by the banks' /stock brokerages' economists, cheering the fact that 'Exchequer revenue is now on target', without actually asking themselves the more important question: what is this target implying in terms of our solvency.

Economics 09/05/2010: Abandonning the ship of fiscal reforms

Here is an unedited version of my current article in the latest edition of Business & Finance magazine.


After two years of frantic crisis management by default and piece-meal recapitalizations, last month, the Irish state has fully committed to an outright dumping of public and banks debts onto the shoulders of the ordinary taxpayers. Since the onset of the crisis in 2008 through 2014, based on the latest Budgetary projections and banks recapitalization plans, the Government will consign ca €221 billion liabilities onto Irish workers, businesses and entrepreneurs. This figure, adding to a whooping €234,000 of new debt per average household with two working parents, is the toxic legacy of our crony corporatism.

Consider the banks. Minister Lenihan’s announcement made on Super Tuesday in March means that over the next two years, the Irish taxpayers will foot a bill of some €37 billion in direct capital injections to the banks. The interest on this bankers’ loot will add up to another €12 billion over 10 years. Nama will contribute the net loss of up to €30 billion to our woes. This comprises the costs of loans purchases, bonds financing and Nama management and operations, less the expected recovery of assets and the cash flow from the undertaking. When all is said and done, Irish people will be left with a gargantuan bill of almost €80 billion for rescuing the banks, not counting tens of billions of written-down loans and ruined businesses.

If you doubt this figure, look no further than the numbers released to accompany Tranche 1 transfer of assets from the banks to Nama. These show that having paid €8.5 billion for the first instalment of loans, Nama financial wizards managed to overpay €1.2-3.1 billion compared to the actual value of the loans. On day one of its operations, therefore, Nama has managed to put the taxpayers billions deep into the negative equity. Minister Lenihan’s choice of the cut-off date of November 30, 2009 for Nama valuations implies that Irish taxpayers stand to lose over €1.5 billion on top of all other previously forecast Nama losses. This addition is a pure waste, as there is absolutely no logistical or economic reason for setting such a date in the first place.

In the mean time, taxpayers’ representatives – from our ‘public interest’ banks’ directors to legislators – continue to insist that Nama is a profit-making opportunity for the state. In a recent encounter with myself on a national radio programme, Darragh O’Brien TD who acts as a Vice-Chair of the Public Accounts Committee has gone so far as to claim that under Nama, the state will be borrowing money from the ECB at 1% and lending it to the banks at 3%, thereby earning an instant gain of 2% on the transaction. The fact is according to Nama own documentation it will be the state who will owe the banks an annual coupon payment at the rate of euribor (currently just over 1.2% for a 12 month contract). This rate will be resettable every 6 months, so looking back at historical data, Nama cost of borrowing can easily go to 4.9% - the euribor level back in 2007 or even higher. Since the banks will be holding the bonds they, not the Exchequer, will be collecting the interest payments. The Irish taxpayers, therefore, can potentially be on the hook for an additional €2.6 billion subsidy to the banks in the form of coupon payments on the bonds.

My estimates of the overall debt burden imposed by the banks onto the taxpayers are erring on a conservative side. The latest figures from the Central bank show that the entire Irish banking sector, inclusive of non-Guaranteed institutions, holds a balance of just €226 billion in customers deposits. Assuming that some 10-15% of these deposits are subject to customer demand in any two weeks period, risk-adjusted customer deposit base of Irish banking sector is roughly €192-203 billion. This is offset but loans to customers amounting to €609 billion, plus bonds in the amount of €73 billion, and short-term ECB deposits of €78 billion. Thus, the ratio of debt and short-term obligations relative to customer deposits in the Irish banking sector currently stands at more than 323%. Liquidity risk-adjusted, this figure rises to 400%. In comparison, UK’s Northern Rock had 306% loans to customer deposits ratio at the peak of its solvency crisis in 2008.

So the entire recapitalization fiasco, coupled with the continued stream of disastrous news from the Anglo and the spectacular collapse of the INBS, should have taught us one simple lesson – people who are in charge of the banking crisis management in this country are either unaware of facts or are willingly distorting the reality.


However, for all of its publicity, the banking crisis pales in comparison with the fiscal meltdown we face. As of the time of going to press, Irish workers and small businesses – the lifeline of our economy – are being held hostage by the ‘deal brokering’ between the Trade Unions and the Government. The likeliest outcome of these talks will be a public sector ‘reforms’ package which will see a deferred reversal of Government intentions to cut wasteful spending. Freezing future pay cuts in the public sector, while pushing forward a naïve (if not deceptive) agenda of ‘improved productivity’ means that while in theory we might get more for each euro we spend, in practice, the overall spending bill will remain well out of touch with our tax receipts. The structural deficit simply cannot be corrected by plastering the expenditure gap over with new work practice rules. Only a dramatic cut in overall spend, plus a significant cut in the numbers employed in the public sector will save this country from becoming Greece-sur-Atlantique.

Looking at the Government own projections for future deficits and factoring in the cost of borrowing, Ireland Inc will have to find some €92 billion from now through 2014. Factoring in deficits cumulated between January 1 2008 and December 31 2009 adds another €37.3 billion, plus interest to the above figure. All in, 2008-2014 fiscal deficits are likely to cost Irish taxpayers some €139 billion based on Government own figures. How realistic these Government projections are is a matter for another debate, but the recent revision of our 2009 deficit from the Government-published 11.7% to 14.3% of GDP by the Eurostat shows that the above estimate of the total deficits-related costs can be even higher. Either way, the fiscal crisis we face is clearly much more significant than the banks crisis.

Having invited the Unions back to the bargaining table, the Government has ex ante turned taxpayers into a bargaining chip that it can (and will) use to appease the intransigent interest groups.

Which brings us back to that top line figure of €221 billion in liabilities that Messrs Cowen and Lenihan have decided to offload from the banks and public sector and onto the shoulders of the ordinary taxpayers. Per CSO’s latest data there are 1,887,700 people in employment in Ireland today. Everyone of these workers – no matter whether currently covered by the tax net or not – will be facing an average bill of some €117,000 for the mistakes made by our past Governments’ public expenditure policies, bankers, regulators and developers.

This is, put simply, an unsustainable mountain of public and quasi-public liabilities. Something will have to give.

Back in 2008, Ireland’s top 11,714 earners (those who earned more than €275,000 in a year), paid almost 18% of all income tax. Forget the fact that many of these individuals are now broke. Doubling their tax rates would deliver less than €10 billion in tax revenue over the next 5 years – hardly a drop in the sea of new public debt being created. Quadrupling taxes on Irish median earners – those with income around €25,000 mark – will yield no more than €5 billion in new revenue through 2014. A full one third of all income earners back in 2008 were outside the tax net. These workers, with incomes below €17,000 per annum, are about to be thrown to the wolves by our policies as the Government sets out to plug the twin budget and the banks black holes. Taxed at the standard rate, they will be in for some €0.9 billion tax burden annually. So where will the rest of €205 billion come from?

In reality, the Government simply cannot avoid hiking taxes on businesses. Budget 2010 forecasts corporation tax revenue to reach €3.16 billion. Doubling the rate of tax to 25% can be expected to yield no more than €12-14 billion through 2014. So even this amount will not correct for the public sector and banks’ debts.

Super Tuesday’s announcements by the Minister for Finance signalled the beginning of an end for the dreams for a better future for this and several subsequent generations of Irish people. Remember when Mr Lenihan asked us to be patriotic in his Budget 2009 speech?

Since July 2007, the Government has shown itself incapable of understanding the nature of the crises we face. The banks, we were told, were suffering shortage of liquidity. This means that replacing dead-weight loans on their balancesheets with bankable quasi-Government bonds will do the job of restarting lending. We now know that the real problem the banks face is that of insolvency, with their balancesheets destroyed by worthless loans offset by hefty liabilities. We were told that the collapse in the Exchequer tax revenue not the excessive permanent spending habits of our State were to be blamed for the fiscal crisis. Now we can see the truth – the Irish Exchequer and economy are facing a problem of insolvency, for not even a restoration of tax revenue to its pre-crisis long-term trend will resolve the problem of excessive deficits.


Box-out
Over the recent weeks, the heated debate about Irish banks’ liabilities has shifted its attention to the elusive bond holders. “Who are, these captains of speculation armada? The sharks of the international financial markets?” some demanded to know. Well, we can’t quite tell you who all of them are, but at least for some of the three big banks’ bond holdings we can tell. These arch-capitalists are… you, me, and the Irish Exchequer. That’s right. Per NTMA own figures, our National Pension Reserve Fund – the pot of gold at the end of the public sector employment rainbow – designed to shore up Exchequer pensions deficit has managed to get its snout deep into the Irish banks bonds feeding trough. In the 12 months between December 2007 and December 2008, NPRF has bought itself into a long position in AIB variable rate bonds - €155 million, Bank of Ireland fixed coupon bonds €205 million, Bank of Ireland variable bonds €35.5 million, hiking its overall exposure to Irish banks’ bonds from €89.2 million in 2007 to €461.7 million in 2008. Given that these long positions withstood the wholesale collapse in banks bonds prices in 2008, this was an incredibly risky bet. Then again, adding up NPRF’s balance sheet exposures to low liquidity, higher risk investment classes, such as unquoted property investments, commodities and private equity, corporate debt in Greece, plus almost €74 million worth of Greek Government bonds, etc, NPRF’s higher risk investments accounted for almost 13% of the entire investment portfolio in 2008, up from 11% in 2007 and 6.3% in 2006.

Economics 09/05/2010: What sort of EU leadership?.. Part 2

Underlying the unworkable logistics of the Euro-bond that Brussels is planning to deploy to contain the spillover of the fiscal crises in PIIGS, there is a pesky issue of the past record of the currency block management of its finances.

Here are some historic comparisons from the IMF latest GFS report worth highlighting.
Now, spot the odd ones in the above chart? That's right - the non-Euro zone countries are the ones with the lowest indebtedness of households in their economy. In other words, no matter how much the Euro area leadership talks about the US being the cause of the current crisis, data simply shows that the US - despite all its problems - has had far less of a bubble in overall debt terms than Euro area. The only reasons Germany does not figure amongst the countries with the weakest households are:

1. Germany's exports oriented economy which in effect is a 'beggar thy neighbor' economy reliant on someone else assuming credit to buy German goods; and
2. Germany's costly reunification coupled with poor demographics, which assured that over the last 20 years German consumers had virtually no improvements in their standards of living.

But in assuming all this debt, were Euro area households buying productive assets (as opposed to the Americans, who, per our Europhiles' assertions were all playing a property Ponzi game)?
Oops. Not exactly. While Americans were buying homes (fueling their own bubble), Europeans were buying... homes and public sector spending goodies. But may be, just may be, Euro area members were more prudent in buying homes than the Americans, who stand accused of causing the financial crisis of 2007-2009?
It turns out that this was simply not true. Chart above shows just how far more leveraged were the Euro area states compared to the US in terms of two main parameters of house prices sustainability.

And the same is true for overall asset valuations.
Oh, and those prudent lenders - the Germans and the rest of the Euro pack banks?
It turns out the US banks were actually much better off throughout the bubble formation period in terms of their lending and profitability than... hmmm... Germany and Belgium. Who could have known, judging by Mrs Merkel's hawkish statements as of late?

Now, take a look at the total external indebtedness of the Euro area... Recall, the US and Euroarea both have relatively similar GDP...
So suppose the EU Commission issues common bonds (and assume it places them in the market) to underpin PIIGS plus Belgium, the Netherlands and Austria - the sickest puppies of the Euro area. That would require bonds issuance to the tune of 20-30% of these countries outstanding public debt. Which means that the unified bond issuance volumes will be in the region of USD1 trillion, pushing Eurozone's combined indebtedness to over USD25 trillion. Does anyone really think this is a 'solution' to contagion or a surrender?

Economics 09/05/2010: What sort of EU leadership?.. Part 1

Prepare to be afraid, ye the financial markets – those always-on-time and forever-effective super leaders of the Eurozone have concocted a Plan. A Plan to deal once and for all with the frightening levels of their own governments’ insolvency. A Plan code-named Bondzkrieg!

The troops of illiquid and insolvent PIIGS will be backed by the armies of the liquid, but pretty much nearly as insolvent the rest of EU. The attack, commencing possibly as early as on Monday next will be a two-pronged strategy: a pincers manoeuvre.

Part 1 will, per latest reports from the EU16 summit, require an issuance of Euro Commission Bonds. These will be backed by the EU16 states’ guarantees and something that is called ‘an implicit ECB guarantee’. Sounds terrifying, folks:

1. What is exactly an ‘implicit ECB guarantee’? A sort of ‘we might print mucho Euro notes, should Brussels default’ stuff? What kind of nonsense is this? The best the ECB can do is promise to monetize the EU Common bond in the same way it monetizes Greek junk bonds. Yet, the latter has not stopped contagion, only accelerated it by undermining the ECB credibility.
2. What will back these Common bonds? The solvency of the EU nations guaranteeing them? But wait – isn’t the problem the EU is facing is precisely the very lack of solvency? How is it going to work then? A severely indebted and deficit ridden pack of nations issues new debt to cover up the old debt problems? Well, that did work for the Russian Government a miracle back in 1998. Without actually resolving the problem of excessive and long-running deficits, and without either restructuring (default) or deflating (devaluation which is a de facto default) the existent pile of debt, the new EU-wide bond issue will simply transfer Greek-style problems of the PIIGS to the rest of EU. Given that we are talking about roughly a €1 trillion worth of junk, the entire pyramid scheme concocted by the EU is going to collapse unless Germany is good for underwriting the entire EU16 with its economic might. Trouble is – Germany can’t. It has little prospect of growth and its’ current economy simply cannot carry the burden of the rest of EU16 obligations.
3. What will be the seniority of these bonds? If the new bond is subordinated to the existent state bonds (as implied by a ‘guarantee’ proviso), these bonds will have no meaning. If it will be senior to existent member states’ debt, then issuing them to pay down sovereign debt will be equal to deflating seniority of sovereign issues already outstanding. Which, in common English, is called defaulting on existent debt.
4. How can these bonds be priced? Normally a bond is priced by a combination of factors. Some are exogenous – such as global liquidity and portfolio driven demand. Some are endogenous – such as analysis of what the sovereign deficit is for the issuer, what debt burden the issuer is paying and what prospects for economic growth (and other components of future default probability) does a sovereign face. Finally, expected Forex positions for sovereign currency in which the bond is denominated are taken into account. Care to guess what any of these endogenous variables might be for the EU16? Right – they are totally meaningless. Will EU bond be written against EU own debt (which is nil) or against guarantors’ debt (sovereigns already overloaded with debt)? Will the Forex rates relate to the ECB rate which the ‘sovereign’ issuing the bonds (the EU Commission) cannot control (due to ECB independence)? Will EU ability to repay these bonds rest on Euroarea economic growth? If so, what does this mean, since the EU Commission collects revenue from EU27, of which 11 member states are not a party to issuance of the bond! Will, for example, UK government assume liability to the Eurozone-issued bonds by committing its own economy to the risk of a call on the bond should, say, Belgium decide to default?

The second prong of the EU attack on the markets is the incessant blabber about the need to set up an EU-own rating agency. Here, the promised might is clearly unmatched by any sort of internal capability:

1. The EU itself cannot certify own annual accounts, despite having only in-house own auditors. Even these are refusing to sign off on EU accounts for over a decade now. How can the same institution produce a credible rating agency that will be entrusted with providing assessment of the EU credit worthiness?
2. Can the EU-imposed metrics be seriously treated as fundamental benchmarks for solvency? Give it a thought – the EU oversees a union of member states bound by own sovereign treaty to uphold the Maastricht Criteria targets. The EU has failed to enforce these in the case of Greeks, Portuguese, Spaniards, French, Italians, Belgians and so on. In other words, the EU cannot enforce its own rules, let alone police economic and fiscal performance parameters required to issue any sort of risk assessments. In fact, this year Euroarea deficit is expected to reach 6.6% of GDP and in 2011 -6.1% - way above the 3% the block set as its own rule. Debt to GDP is heading for double digits, before we add banks supports. Letting the EU run a rating agency is equivalent to letting an alcoholic run a bar!
3. The entire idea of an EU rating agency traces back to Merkel’s and Sarkozy’s desire to shift blame for the Greek (and indeed PIIGS) debacle off the shoulders of the European governments and Brussels and onto the shoulders of ‘speculators’ and the Big-3 rating agencies. Of course, the logical inconsistency of the EU attacks on the Big-3 is painfully obvious. The Big 3 are accused for failing to properly recognize and publicize risks to the systemic solvency of financial institutions in the case of ABS/MBS and so on. Yet, the minute the rating agencies actually do their jobs – as in the case of PIIGS in recent months – they are standing accused of… well… doing the jobs only to well? Can anyone have any trust in a ‘rating agency’ set up by the very people who are simply and evidently incapable of a simple logical argument?

Mrs Merkel have stated this Friday: "Those who created the excesses on the markets will be asked to pay up -- those are in part the banks, those are the hedge funds that must be regulated ... those are the short-sellers and we agreed yesterday to implement this more quickly in Europe." Obviously, over a decade of fiscal recklessness across the PIIGS was never a problem for Mrs Merkel. And she is supposed to be the reasonable one?

All I can say, folks, forget any hope for growth in Europe with this sort of leadership.

Economics 05/05/2010: Third Force's Burn-out Bench

The news stream is getting thicker and thicker with Irish financials and sovereign / fiscal debacles stories. Reuters is reporting (hat tip to Brian) (here) that the Third Force now looks more like a Burn-out Bench and that there is little prospect for growth or profitability for BofI and AIB.

All's fine, as far as the arguments go, except, there is that silly ending to the article putting blame for the crisis on 'too much competition' in the Irish banking sector. I'd say this pure rubbish. Here is an earlier note I wrote on that subject. In simple terms, it does not matter what profit margins could have been were we to have lower competition. Irish banking crisis was caused by excessive willingness to take risks, spurred on by the Government, the Regulator, the Central Bank and ECB. May be there was too much competition amongst the incompetent cooks in that kitchen?


Oh, and Nouriel Roubini puts a clear number on the fear of European contagion: "European banks hold claims of US$193 billion on Greece and more than US$1 trillion of further claims on Portugal, Ireland and Spain. It cannot be ruled out that the ECB will eventually have to resort to more aggressive measures such as buying government bonds in the secondary market in order to stop the contagion."

So the next stage of contagion can cost Germany (and make no mistake - Germany will be paying for this in the end) upwards of 5 times what the Greek bailout will cost.

Economics 04/05/2010: Why Anglo case is irreparable

A funny way of arguing financial returns that some of our senior 'bankers' have has been highlighted in the latest comments of the Politician-turns-Banker Mr Alan Dukes reported in today's Irish Times (comments and emphasis are mine):

“The [EU] commission came back with a whole series of questions [concerning Anglo's 'business plan' - whether a zombie can have a business plan is a matter for another debate] and we are now rejigging the restructuring plan to deal with the issues the commission has raised. One of the things we are looking at is what would be the situation if we liquidated the bank immediately? Total disaster. A total non-runner. [ Am I the only person concerned with the fact that apparently the 'new plan' will be a re-jigging of the old version or that Mr Dukes has already decided that, while the bank is still looking into liquidation option, he is sure that it will be a total disaster and a non-runner?]

“...The best prospect of getting some value out of it and reducing the total cost to the taxpayer is keeping the good bank of it, because eventually it could be sold on to the benefit of the taxpayer. If you just do a wind-down, it is losses all the way. Whereas if you can make a good bank of it, which should be a quarter of the size of the whole bank, at least you have got something viable and that can be sold off to the private sector in the fullness of time.”

Our senior banker is clearly confusing gross return with net return here. Let me illustrate:

Suppose Anglo separation into two banks - bad and good -

• Yields the value of the 'Good' Anglo at €A at the time of disposal t-years from now
  
• Winding down 'Bad' Anglo costs €B by the time of disposal t-years from now
  
• In the mean time (between now and disposal) the cost of running 'Good' Anglo will be €C
• While the current value of the 'Good' Anglo, without a workout (a fire sale, if you may prefer to call it, or a shorter winding up over 5 years as I would prefer to label it) implies the value of it of €D today.
  
• Also suppose that if we wind down Anglo today (or in the near future), the cost of winding down is €E.
• Assume that present value adjustment (bringing the value of the bank and the level of costs incurred back to today from the date of disposal) is PVadj<1. pvadj="F(Interest">

Mr Dukes says that: since €A>0 then taxpayers win from the option of splitting the bank into 2 parts.

I say that:

• if (€A-€C-€B)*PVAadj>€D-€E then taxpayer loses from the rapid winding down and gains from the breaking up of the bank (Mr Dukes preferred solution)
  
• otherwise, taxpayers gain from the opposite action of completely winding down the bank as soon as possible

Mr Dukes' vision of 'positive return' is also severely skewed by his failure to consider risks (interest rate risk, asset valuation risk, liquidity risk etc) in his assessment. A rather worrying problem since mis-pricing of risks is what got Anglo into trouble in the first place.

In other words, Mr Dukes should really have read up on

1. PDV methodology of computing real returns; and
2. Net Present Value framework for carrying out comparative valuations.

These are really basic building blocks of finance... really!