Economics 05/03/2010: More questions on pensions plan

In a recent post (here) I have asked 12 questions concerning the new Government plan for pensions.

Here are more questions to follow. But before we begin, let me state the following:

• Lack of clarity on any of the questions raised by myself and other observers,
• The fact that these questions can be raised in the first instance; and
• Two independent confirmations of my questions validity from the industry sources

show that I am right in suggesting that the entire plan is badly thought through and most likely represents a new tax with no contractually verifiable benefits.

Question 13: Given that the Government will be forcing people of all ages to save 8% of their income per annum for pensions provision, the plan is not even sufficient to provide reasonable pension protection for the 22-year olds who will be enrolled into it. How will it help to defuse the demographic (aging-induced) time bomb the Government is facing?

The Government is hoping to start enrollment in 2014. It is facing pensions system meltdown around 2030-2035, which will cover by then retired generations born between before 1965. These generations by 2014 will be of age 49 or more, with 18 years or more left to go before a pension. This, in turn means that their pension provisions should be in excess of 20% of their income, assuming they are starting anew at 2014. Massively more than 8% the Government has in mind.

At the same time, the younger generations pension savers will be facing a dependency ratio of less than 2 workers per retiree by 2050. This means their total provision for pensions as well should be around 18-20% of their income annually. With 1/4 of this delivered in a promissory Government offer of 35% AE state pension, even assuming the Government will keep its promise, the unfunded contribution required is around 13.50-15% of income annually. Not 8% set by the Government.

Then there is a third sub-component of those who are in the older (pre-1970) cohorts who are currently outside private pensions schemes. They will require savings of more than 25% of their income annually to underwrite reasonable pensions provision. Again, 8% state run pension is not going to cover their shortfalls.

Question 14: If the funds were to go into the NPRF, then the life-span of the cash in the fund is about 5-10 years before the money is spend on some new emergency, e.g. another banks bust or another fiscal crisis (potentially the one induced by the collapse of the public sector pensions scheme). How will the Government protect our money from itself? It was not able to do so with the current NPRF set up and the signs are not good for any future funds security.

Question 15: Given that public sector pensions insolvency is already a known, the best for the Government to do is to reform the Rolls-Royce pensions it provides to its own employees. Why is the Government not leading by example?

Question 16: Anyone who has been outside the state scheme for 2 years will be automatically re-enrolled into the system. In the period of time between the re-enrollment and a new opt-out (which can be months), a taxpayer will be liable to pay into two pensions simultaneously (her own private plan and her state plan). Is this the case? How will the Government compensate such families who will incur overdraft charges due to such double pension provisioning courtesy of the state? How will the state actually monitor the opt-outs and whether people in the opt-out are still in a pension plan?

Question 17: What is the feasibility of the entire proposal ever being implemented, given the logistical nightmares it would entail?

• The proposal would require massive bureaucracy (and invasion of privacy) to verify - e.g. Revenue data being used by another State agency to generate demand for enrollments, re-enrollments and clear opt-outs. Is this even legal?
  
• The proposal will require the state to engage in the areas in which it has no expertise, running an investment undertaking with retail clients. What are the implications of a massive state monopoly with statutory enrollment powers to the market for pensions and financial services in Ireland? How long and how expensive will be the state battle with the EU Competition authorities to clear this scheme?
  
• How big will the paper trail be if the state were to require continued monitoring of compliance with the opt-outs? What will be the cost of this to businesses and employees? How many paper pushers will the state need to hire to keep the track of these mountains of evidence?
  

From the point of conception, to the point of translating the new authority's documents into Irish, the undertaking cannot be envisioned as an efficient and cost-competitive operator.


So why is the Government engaging in the scheme at all?

Since 'resolving the pensions problem' is clearly not on the cards (see above), one possible explanation is to get its hands on more cash through 'borrowing' against the funds raised. Another possible explanation - to raise tax (unimaginable otherwise) on business.

Remember -

• corporate tax is a sacred cow of the State;
• personal income tax is already high and will rise again in the next Budget;
• indirect taxes are crippling and the local authorities will be coming for more of their cut in the next few years.
  

So the only means for raising new cash is to levy a new charge - on businesses and incomes - that can be called something else other than tax. A promise of a service (new pension) 20-plus years down the road is a fig leaf of decorum, especially since the Government has no contractual obligation to actually honor such a promise and has set no specific target for a return on this undertaking.

This pensions proposal is a tax on employers (+2%) and a tax on people (+4%). And this tax will have the greatest negative impact on smaller businesses and entrepreneurs, since MNCs and larger companies are already offering much better pensions.

The Government might have solved the conundrum it faced courtesy of the EU Competition rules. Unable, since 2003, to charge differential tax rates on domestic and multinational businesses, it now devised a 'pensions' scheme to charge smaller companies more through a new levy. And it didn't have to raise official corporate tax rate to do so...


Of course, there is always a better solution than what our folks in the Government Buildings can deliver. That solution would be -

1. set a flat income tax rate of 12% on all income and no exemptions except for a generous up front personal tax-free limit (to exclude the real working poor from taxation);
   
2. And then tell people - including public sector workers - that they must invest at least 10% of their income in pensions of their choice, provided privately with real international competition in place (my preference would be to avoid compulsion, though);
3. Make the entire pension contribution, up to 20% of gross income, tax deductible;
   
4. Set up self-funded insurance scheme to underwrite pensions providers;
5. Done. End of story and no need for white papers from over-paid and over-staffed task forces and for bureaucrats, lawyers, mountains of paper and pensions tzars.
   

Simple, folks. Really simple. Chile did so already.

Economics 05.03.2010: Greeks are paying the price

So you've heard by now that Greece 'escaped' the wrath of the market yesterday by placing €5bn worth of 10-year bonds. But don't be fooled - Greek's escape was nothing more than a respite: Greek taxpayers are now on the hook for paying a 6.3% yield on the 10-year paper - in line with near junk status of the bonds. This marks the highest spread for Greek debt since 2001.

Despite the issue being covered at 3x, there is a possibility for prices to tumble in the secondary markets (as happened with their 5-year paper last month) and there is an added concern that demand was underpinned by speculative investors with short-term horizons, as 'hold-to-maturity' types of investors (e.g insurance companies and pension funds) are cutting back on their holdings of PIIGS bonds. If the latter is true, then we can expect a serious pressure on yields to emerge in the next few days, with subsequent noises from the EU authorities about 'speculators' profiteering.

Big - albeit artificial - test for the euro will be March 16th when the EU Commission will rule on Greek fiscal consolidation plans. Expect approval, enthused speeches, and backroom talks on how to proceed forward with the country that

• plans to cut 2% of its GDP-worth off the deficit this year, but
  
• is unlikely to deliver on this target, whilst
• needing to cut a whooping double the planned amount just to stay afloat toward the 3% deficit goal for 2014-2015.
  

Meanwhile, Jean Claude Trichet went out of his way yesterday to tell the Greeks not to invite the IMF. During his press conference, Trichet repeatedly stressed that Europe has its own safety net for defaulting states (well, not quite in these terms) so no need to call in the big boys from the IMF. One wonders, what is Mr Trichet talking about. Papers quote Trichet saying that it is absurd to envisage scenarios of Greek exit from the euro.

All of this resembles the debates in the Afghan government in 1979 - to invite the Soviets or not... And the really, really, really funny thing is - IMF is EU-led organization (of the two supernationals: the World Bank is traditionally reserved as the leadership game for the Americans, while the IMF leadership goes to the EU appointees). While the Greek taxpayers are now set to pay over ten years €184.22 per each €100 borrowed last night - a steep price for not calling in 'Your Own Bad Guys' from Washington.

Now, put the Greek pricing into a perspective. On 14 January 2010 the NTMA issued €5 billion of a new bond, the 5% Treasury Bond 2020. If Irish debt was priced at Greek yields, the total cost to Irish taxpayer from this deficit financing would have risen €21.33 from €62.89 per €100 borrowed. In other words, our expected annual deficit for 2010 alone would be some €4,050 million more expensive over 10 years.

Economics 05/03/2010: Losing capital in a recession

Live Register additional tables are signaling that the latest 'improvement' (or as I would call it - a bounce) in LR figures for February was driven by exits of the unemployed not into gainful employment, but into emigration.

In February 2010 there were 355,690 Irish nationals and 81,266 non-Irish nationals
on the LR:

• a monthly increase of 149 (0.0%) in Irish nationals and
  
• a decrease of 129 (-0.2%) in non-Irish nationals.
  

In the year to February 2010 the number of Irish nationals on the Live Register increased by 74,549 (+26.5%), while the corresponding annual increase for non-Irish nationals was 9,954 (+14.0%). This clearly shows that most non-national unemployment did come from the earliest-hit construction sector.

Among non-Irish nationals the largest number on the Live Register, were nationals from the EU15 to EU27 States (45,649) - aka the Accession States or EU10 states - while the smallest number were from the EU15 States outside of Ireland and the UK (4,139). This is, of course, reflecting levels, not proportionate terms.

Non-Irish nationals represented 18.6% of all persons on the Live Register in February 2010 against their share of the labour force being around 14.7%.

I said earlier (here) that the Live Register improvements are driven by three factors:

1. emigration;
2. exits to Fas-led 'training' and exits from the labour force (the two are equivalent in my mind, as I see no real hope for Fas to actually provide employable skills); and
3. exits to education (a better alternative to Fas, but still not a guarantee of education).

Several community leaders recently have pointed out to me that their organizations, dealing primarily with foreign residents in Ireland, are seeing a rising tide of residents who fall out of unemployment benefits and having trouble signing for welfare benefits. It seems that the better quality workers who can emigrate are now doing exactly that - inducing a loss of human capital for Ireland.

Hence, we are now in a really tough position, whereby the recession is causing:

• fire sales and exports of capital (with banks taking posessions of machinery, equipment, stocks of goods and selling these through distressed sales - including to foreign buyers); and
• exits of human capital.

Economics 05/03/2010: Can immigration help our Smart Economy?

Does targeted immigration policy (focusing on skills and capability) deliver the results for research, science and engineering? This question is important to Ireland, since

• we have ambitious objectives in driving up R&D and science activity; and
  
• we do not have a meritocratic immigration policy here (aside from by-now virtually stifled 'green card' scheme, our immigration policy is geared toward almost exclusively on internal EU27 migration)
  

A new study published this month by NBER (here) evaluates the impact of high-skilled immigrants on US technology formation using H-1B visa admissions.

Higher H-1B visa admissions are shown to increase immigrant science and engineering employment and patenting by inventors of Indian and Chinese origin in cities and firms dependent upon the program when compared against cities and firms which do not avail of the visa.

There is only a limited effect on native science and engineering employment or patenting, ruling out displacement effects, with only small crowding-in effects. Total science & engineering employment and invention increases with higher admissions primarily through direct contributions of immigrants.

“A 10% growth in the H-1B population corresponded with a 1%-4% higher growth in Indian and Chinese invention for each standard deviation increase in city dependency”. Anglo-Saxon origin inventors continue to account for approximately 70% of all domestic patents. Crowding-in is small, with a 10% growth in the H-1B population corresponding to a 0.3%-0.7% increase in total invention for each standard deviation growth in the degree of city dependency on participation in the visa programme.

Tests also confirm that these positive results “are not due to endogenous changes in national H-1B admissions following lobbying from very dependent groups."

"Total patenting shares are highly correlated with city size, and the three largest shares of US domestic patenting for 1995-2004 are San Francisco (12%), New York City (7%), and Los Angeles (6%). Ethnic patenting is generally more concentrated, with shares for San Francisco, New York City, and Los Angeles being 22%, 10%, and 9%, respectively. Indian and Chinese inventions are even further agglomerated. San Francisco shows exceptional growth from an 8% share of total US Indian and Chinese patenting in 1975-1984 to 26% in 1995-2004, while New York City share declines from 17% to 10%."

Economics 04/03/2010: Another grab of taxpayers cash?

Update 1: 04/03/2010: 10:15pm


Yesterday, the Government announced a plan to reform pensions provision system in Ireland by creating a mandatory pension scheme with a limited opt-out clause. The announcement is covered here. While lacking specific details we can only ask questions and await for some answers, here are my top-level views.

Question 1: Will additional contributions required from the taxpayers yield additional cover over the already committed state scheme that supplies 35% of the average earnings in exchange for PRSI contributions?

Question 2: What will determine the return on top-up pension? While the state is quick at setting the cost to the taxpayer (4%) and employers (2%) there is absolutely no reference to the returns to be earned from the scheme. Is the rate of return fixed? Guaranteed? Market-related? Who will underwrite this return?

Question 3: Who will manage the assets? NPRF? NTMA? Private providers? Who will actually write the policy - if any policy will be written at all.

Question 4: The plan exempts those on defined benefit pensions - aka public sector workers. Thus, in effect, the plan opens up two massive problems:

• Defined benefit pensions are the ones that are facing the largest shortfall and they are also being managed by the agent (the State) who will control our top-up pensions. How is this conflict of interest going to be resolved? Will public sector pensions hole be plugged using top-up pension funds?
• Defined benefit pensions are contractually guaranteed, while top-up pensions are not (see below), so in effect the opt-out potentially directly exposes ordinary taxpayers to underwriting the public sector pensions through both their statutory pension (already the risk we are bearing) and through the top up. If so, the top-up element of the proposal is nothing more than a tax on ordinary income earners that can be used to cover public pensions shortfalls.

Question 5: A 4% top-up requirement for 'higher earners' (undefined level of earnings) will create a further erosion of the wage premium for higher educated and higher skilled workers in this country (on top of already punitive levels of personal income taxation). How does this square off with the Government intentions to build a Smart Economy, if Smart workers require higher wage premium?

Question 6: What are the contractual rights of the taxpayers paying top up rates with respect to the pension benefits?

A private sector pension is governed by a clear contract. This contract is fully enforceable in the court of law. State pensions (with exception of those provided to public workers) are not. If you doubt this statement - check numerous legal cases where this has been deemed to be the case.

And look no further than the change in the statutory retirement age that the Government is planning to enact. In effect, forcing retirement age 2-3 years forward means that all of us who have paid PAYE are now entitled to 2-3 years less of the benefits. If this was done by your private pension provider, you would have a legal case against a unilateral change in the terms of the contract. But because it is done by the Government and we have no written legally binding contract with the Government relating to pensions provision, the State simply can cut our benefits, while still requiring us to keep our end of the deal - continuing to pay into the PAYE pot.

So the biggest issue of all is - will the new top-up requirement be legally binding for both sides of the deal or will it remain asymmetric (and therefore subject to the risk of arbitrary changes in the terms and conditions by the Government)?

Question 7: The new pension system would re-enroll people who quit every two years. This begs a question - will this 're-enrollment' be performed with crediting for years lapsed or not. If yes, then the risk of underpayment due to interruptions will be borne by the collective pool of funding. Which means that everyone paying into the system will be at a risk of bearing the cost of higher jobs exits and unemployment. If no, how will the recovery of underpayment take place? Simply requiring people who dropped out to repay the shortfall accumulated over two years of absence will not work, as it will impose huge burden on those with uncertain employment prospects.

Question 8: How will the system manage those in part-time employment, self-employment and those with hybrid income sources (multiple jobs, etc)?

Question 9: Since top-up clause requires private pension plan with employer contribution in excess of 4%, can the new plan be deemed anti-competitive? For example, if a self-employed person obtains no contribution from the employer, does the new pension mandate commit a person to a minimum contribution of 6%, thereby forcing them out of other private pension arrangements they might have, which may include single payment/lump sum contributions?

Question 10: If a person is forced to switch away from a smaller pension plan into the 'top up' Government plan, given that Government plan is not comparable in terms of risk of payout to a private plan, will this not in effect reduce the quality of pension that the employee will obtain? In other words, the Government scheme might result in a reduced quality of pensions for some savers.

Question 11: Will the new top-up arrangement cancel out PRSI contributions, or will it be on-top of the PRSI levies? If the former, who will fund the 35% promisory note of statutory state pensions? If the latter, this constitutes a massive increase in taxation burden in this economy.

Question 12: How will the Government reimburse those of us who might have higher pensions contributions by employers, but whose employers will now opt for a default position and drop their contribution to the effective minimum of 2%?

So far, the proposal is yielding more questions than answers. Which, of course, simply indicates that there is a good chance that the Government has not thought through the whole scheme and might be risking entering into another 'Policy-based evidence' scenario for which we, as a country, are so well known around the world.

On the net, however, given the nature of the top-up arrangement, unsecured contractual status of the proposal and the fact that the State decided to exempt its own employees from the obligation, the whole proposal looks like another tax by the Exchequer.

Economics 03/03/2010: Live Register and Retail Sales

Live register and retail sales are out for today - and:

LR is down in seasonally adjusted terms. A whooping 2,300 down, driving implied unemployment rate from 12.7% in January to 12.6% in February. Sounds like a good deal at last. And, of course, it is, except:

• Actual Liver Register still rose by 20 new signees;
• The rise of 810 in over 25 year olds was offset by a fall of 790 for the under 25 year olds, which makes me wonder - was the former a real increase in unemployment, while the latter a sign of younger kids abandoning the workforce to join training schemes, social welfare (with unemployment benefits for the under-25 year olds being reduced in two budgets) or going off to greener pastures elsewhere (i.e emigrating);
• Whichever way you spin the numbers, 432,400 people on the LR is a sizable number and to me still constitutes a massive crisis. 348,100 of these are over-25 year olds - prime employment age workers (down just 800 on January in seasonally adjusted terms);
• Average net weekly change to the LR in February was a much more modest +5 relative to January's +2,668 - a good sign, if one stretches the term 'good'

Now, do recall - in September 2009 we took off the LR 3,785 people who were placed in various state-sponsored training programmes, so there is still plenty of cushion for LR to show real improvement.

A chart (courtesy of the Ulster Bank economics team) to illustrate:
One clearly needs a microscope to spot the improvements in the overall picture, although the trend in moderating LR growth rate is clearly visible. Another interesting sighting is the dead-cat-bounce in October 2009. Are we in the same pattern now? I don't know, but dynamically, the chart above suggests we are at the flat part of the U-trend. How long will it take before we get through that part? How steep will be the upward part of the U?

The key risk indicator at this moment is QNHS which, I would expect, will show further contraction in employment and more aggressive exits from the labour force.


Meanwhile, retail sales are also bumping up, limp, lifeless, but twitchy. Chart below - courtesy of the Ulster Bank economics team (I will do my analytics later tonight, so stay tuned) illustrates:
The volume of retail sales (i.e. ex effects of price changes) is down 4.8% in January 2010 compared to January 2009 and down a whooping 17.3% in monthly terms. There was a monthly decrease of 17.3%. Ex-motors, volumes are down 4.7% annually and up 0.1% monthly. would the natural (and man-made) disasters of January help here? Quite possibly - electrical goods, furniture, lighting and clothing are up as people had to counter adverse weather and replace those washers and dishwashers frozen in the cold spell.

The value of sales fell 8.4% in January 2010 in annual terms and 15.6% in monthly terms as deflation at retail level continued to bite, primarily at Motor Trade levels: ex-motors, monthly change was +0.6%.

My slight concern here is that the release of retail sales data covers December 27-January 23rd, which means that while it missed a slow-to-go last week on retail sales in January, it also over-states retail sales due to capturing December 27-30 - the busiest sales period in the entire year. And, due to inclement weather, fewer people were able to travel to the North, so more shoppers stayed in the Republic, although many of these stayed at home.