Economics 12/8/10: Irish July CPI: Deflation is over, for the State sectors

“Consumer Prices in July, as measured by the CPI, remained unchanged in the month,” says CSO. Hurrah, the end of deflation then? “This compares to a decrease of 0.8% recorded in July of last year. As a result, prices on average, as measured by the CPI, were 0.1% lower in July compared with July 2009.”
Sounds like the good news. But… “The EU Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) decreased by 0.1% in the month, compared to a decrease of 0.8% recorded in July of last year. As a result, prices on average, as measured by the HICP, were 1.2% lower in July compared with July 2009.”

Err, of course, HICP excludes the cost of housing. And the cost of housing has been going up in Ireland courtesy of the banks. So let me see:

• Deflation is bad, because it signals lower returns for businesses, induces consumers to save excessively and stops investment;
• Inflation is ok, then, as long as it reverses the three ‘bads’ caused by deflation.
  

So our ‘good news’ of the ending of deflation isn’t good at all, then. Why? Because, per CSO: most notable changes in the year were decreases in (see charts below)

• Clothing & Footwear (-8.5%) - competitive sector;
  
• Food & Non-Alcoholic Beverages (-3.8%) - relatively competitive sector; and
  
• Furnishings, Household Equipment & Routine Household Maintenance (-3.4%) - buyers' market.
  

There were increases in

• Education (+9.2%) - state controlled,
  
• Housing, Water, Electricity, Gas & Other Fuels (+5.5%) - state- and banks-controlled, and
  
• Transport (+2.7%) - state-controlled in terms of costs and charges.

Which of course means that prices have risen primarily in state- and banks- controlled sectors. These sectors inflation does not induce businesses to invest (as they are forced to pay higher costs and do not see increased revenue in their core activities), it does not induce people to consume (as they continue to save even more in anticipation of banks coming for their money through mortgages increases) and it does not result in increased returns to productive business activity (as higher costs shrink margins). The CPI excluding mortgage interest showed no change in the month and was down by 1.0% in the year.

Let’s plot that relationship between state-controlled prices and private sector prices, weighted by their respective weights in overall CPI basket:

No further comment needed, I presume.

Economics 11/8/10: Bank of Ireland H1 results

Bof I results for the H1 2010 did represent a significantly different picture from those reported by AIB, with one notable exception – both AIB and BofI are yet to catch up with reality curve on expected future impairments.

BofI profit before provisions was €553mln against €811mln in H1 2009. This, however, doesn’t mean much, as a score of one-off measures were included in H1 2010 figure:

• Losses on sales of loans to NAMA’s were factored in at €466mln
• Debt exchange added a positive of €699mln
• Pension deal brought in a positive contribution of €676mln.
• Net positive of the one-off measures was, therefore around €909mln implying that BofI really was running a loss €356mln before provisions and after one-offs are factored in.
  

Underlying loss before tax, net of charges, was €1.246bn or almost double the €668mln loss last year. The impairment charges amounted to €1.8bn in H1 2010, inclusive of €893mln non NAMA provisions. The impairment charge therefore almost doubled on €926mln in H1 2009.

Big ‘news’ today was that BofI continues to guide for €4.7bn in impairments charges for March 2009-2011. Given that the bank has taken €3.9bn of these provisions to date, it will have to deliver an €1.2bn gain on H1 2010 (roughly 1% of its loan book value) before March 2011 to stick with the impairments estimate. How much can BofI squeeze out of its customers remains uncertain, but to get to its target figures, the bank needs either a helping hand of Nama (on valuations for Tranche 3) or a dramatic reduction in cost of funding (unlikely) or a 30%+ increase in what it charges on loans (without any subsequent deterioration in their quality).

These are unlikely for the following reasons.

Impaired loans are up by a significant €2.1bn reaching 7.1% of the total loan book (these were 5.5% at the end-December 2009). Risk weighted assets stood at €93bn down on €98bn in December. And asset quality is still declining: impaired loans were €15.8bn of which €8.86bn were on non-NAMA book. This compares to €13.35bn in December of which €6.79bn related to non-NAMA book. Provisions were €6.64bn in June of which €3.725bn non-NAMA, implying 42% cover, down from 43% in December when provisions amounted to €5.8bn in total, with €3.0bn non-NAMA.

BofI maintains that bad debts peaked in H2 2009, showing a charge of 1.4% on gross loans in H1, compared with a charge of 2.9% in Q4 of last year.

This looks optimistic. BofI business side continues to suffer from income declines and costs overruns. Total income was down 8% yoy at €1.76bn. Cost cutting this year will have to come at a premium as BofI prepares to shed some 750 more jobs. Total staff numbers are down by 805 or 5% yoy so far in 2010.

BofI H1 2010 net interest margin was 130 bps down 40bps relative to H1 last year. Causes: higher deposit and funding costs, lower capital earnings and Government guarantee. Assets repricing helped by adding 19bps to the margin. Cost to income ratio increased to 61% relative to 54% a year ago, despite costs falling by 3% to €916mln. This means income is seriously under pressure. Impaired loans on residential lending book have increased by 58.5%.

One improved side – capital ratios came in at Core Equity Tier 1 of 8.2% up on 5.3% in December and ahead of 7% regulatory target, but still low relative to European and US peers. Tier 1 ratio was 9.9% virtually unchanged on 9.8% in December.


BofI might be right in some of its rosy projections. You see, Nama has been rolling over for the bank so far. BofI originally guided Nama discount of €4.8bn on €12.2bn it planned to transfer to Nama, or 39% haircut. Nama obliged so far by shaving off 36% on the €1.9bn of loans transferred in Tranche 1 in April and then 35% on Tranche 2 transfer of €1.5bn in July. This was done despite the fact that impaired loans proportion continues to rise in the sub-portfolio of BofI loans destined for Nama.

And this rise is a serious one. At the end of June, 69% of the loans remaining in the Nama-bound portfolio were impaired, up on 54% in the overall Nama portfolio set aside in December 2009. So Tranche 1 transfer picked out better loans or the loans have deteriorated dramatically since Tranche 1 transfer or both. Either way, lower discount on Tranche 2 loans suggests a blatant subsidy from Nama.


Funding side remains under threat, though BofI put a brave face in stating that it raised €4.6bn in term funding so far (mostly in the beginning of the year before the proverbial sovereign debt sh***t hit the fan). The bank still has to raise €9.5bn more before the end of the year 2010. The balancesheet numbers as well as market conditions suggest that this might be tight.

Total loans held grew by €3bn in H1 2010 to €125bn driven by sterling appreciation. Meanwhile, deposits were down €1bn to €84bn, so bank’s loan-to-deposit ratio, ex-NAMA, rose to 143% from 141% in December 2009. Deposits decline was driven by ratings downgrade for S&P in January 2010 which shaved €3bn worth of value from the ratings-sensitive deposits.

This doesn't make BofI any more attractive to the lenders.

But the bank has done coupple of things right. BofI is gradually improving its funding outlook by extending funding maturity – up to 41% of wholesale funding being in excess of 12 months in H1 compared to 32% back in December 2009. And BofI has been reducing its reliance on wholesale funding – down €3bn in H1 to €58bn total. BofI still holds €41bn worth of contingent liquidity collateral, theoretically eligible for ECB borrowings.

The bank also has €8bn exposure to ECB – same as at the end of 2009. You can either read this as the brokers do, meaning that BofI still has massive reserve it can tap if it needs to go to ECB. Alternatively you can say that in the last 6 months, the bank did nothing to work itself off the reliance on ECB funding.

Finally, virtually all analysis (with exception of one brokerage – if I recall correctly it was NCB) overlooked the data released on the deposits breakdown. Per note, “deposits with a balance greater than €100,000 amounted to €50bn at end-June. …As it stands, the ELG guarantee will no longer cover corporate deposits greater than €100,000 with a maturity of less than three months — presumably a significant proportion of these balances — after September, with the ELG set to go completely at year-end. It seems certain to us that the ELG will have to be extended to shore up confidence and facilitate the as yet unfinished wholesale terming effort.”

Economics 11/8/10: Anglo saga continues

For about 24 hours I have resisted commenting on the Anglo latest twist in the capital hole - the EU approval yesterday of additional funding for the dead bank. But given the lack of straight forward and insightful analysis in the media, I thought I should throw int couple of direct comments on the affair.

First, consider the EU statement (available here):
"Anglo Irish Bank needs a third emergency recapitalisation to meet its obligations. ...there is no doubt that Anglo Irish Bank has to restructure profoundly in a way that effectively tackles the weaknesses of the past business model and ensures a sustainable future without continued State support."

Sadly, no Irish commentator noticed the irony that the EU is calling for a profound restructuring of the Anglo after 3 episodes of approvals of extraordinary funding for the bank by the taxpayers. Surely, if the Commission were to do its job and properly police national decisions relating to financial institutions stability, after the second call for capital from Anglo, Mr Almunia should have said something along the following lines: "Don't come back for any additional funds approval until you first provide a clear map as to how you are planning to shut down this insolvent institution."

Second, consider the timing of the approval. For some days before the approval, Irish 'analysts' and policy officials have been massaging public opinion. Various leaks and speculative statements that the bank will need more cash were floated around. Some of the Irish brokerages suggested that Anglo will need €2-4bn more in funding. Of course, while this circus was ongoing, the Government has been quietly labouring away at the submission to the EU Commission. The approval was issued on Tuesday, suggesting that the request for emergency funding extension was filed at the very latest - on Friday. This request was not subject to any parliamentary debate or other procedures that should have been deployed to ensure democratic participation in disbursing of the public money was adhered to.

Third consider Irish media and 'analysts' response to the Anglo call for cash. Of all stockbrokers, only NCB managed to comment on the Anglo call, despite the fact that Anglo's capital demands are indicative of the sector-wide problems. NCB guys actually did a good job in their morning note, saying that:

• "We had added €23bn to our General Government Debt to GDP ratio as a result of Anglo to leave it at 98.1% at year end 2011. This additional €1.4bn now needs to be added and will add approximately 0.7% to our debt to GDP figure at year end 2011." Yeps, with Anglo latest request for funding, Ireland Inc sovereign debt is set to be 99% by the end of 2011.
  
• The NCB guys are also aware, unlike, it appears Davy and Goodies, that Anglo can end up costing us (taxpayers) of sovereign bonds side as well: "The NTMA announced that its next auction on Tuesday August 17th it will tap the 4.0% 15 January 2014 bond and the 5.0% 18 October 2020 bond. The NTMA will be hoping that the Anglo issue is cleared up sooner rather than later and that clarity is given on the final requirement by the State. The uncertainty surrounding the exact amount of the transfer into Anglo is weighing on the Irish sovereign. The Irish 10 year is currently at 5.16% which is 274bps over the equivalent German bond and wider than the benchmark Portuguese 10 year which is yielding 5.079%."

Of course, most of the media have missed the two points of Anglo contagion to the broader markets:

1. Sovereign risk rising due to Anglo uncertainty, and
2. Corporate risk is also rising due to spillover from sovereign uncertainty to corporate assets valuations.

Finally, the whole circus around Anglo's 'news' missed the core point - Anglo started into the present mess with €71bn of 'assets' (aka loans). The total amount earmarked to date for the bank amounts to €24.354bn.

If Nama were to be believed in its LTEV estimates, Anglo's book is roughly 55% under water. This means that its post-Nama book is somewhere closer to being:

• 1/7 of the total book (€10bn) under water to Nama or better than Nama levels - say impairment of 30% due;
• 35% (or €25bn destined for the 'Bad' bank) is under water more than Nama haircuts - say 60-70% impairment due.

Translated to the full pre-crisis book, this implies the average recovery rate on Anglo loans of ca 43-47% across the whole book.

Let me explain the above numbers: €10bn recoverable at 70% and 25bn recoverable at 30-40% implies 14.5bn recovery on 35bn of assets left post-Nama, adding to it Nama haircuts implies recovery rate of 43-47%, ex-costs). This, in turn, implies across the book impairments of €37.6-40.5bn. Take the lower number - total through restructuring cost of Anglo can be expected to reach ca €37bn in the end or higher. Take 10% off for risk-weighting and restructurings of funding etc to boost regulatory capital.

End of the Anglo affair cost comes to roughly speaking €33bn. That's the amount we can expect to pay in the end. The latest €24.4bn count is, therefore, only less than 3/4 of the saga. So here's my forecast - by end 2011 Anglo will ask for ca €10bn more in our cash and by the end of 2012 - for up to €13bn more than the amounts already advanced. The only way these figures can be made smaller is if Nama grossly overpays Anglo for Tranche 2 and 3 loans.

Anyone noticed that? Not really. Just as no one noticed that Anglo is going to, in the end, cost every working person in this country something of the order of €19,600 - a hefty bill for rescuing Anglo's bondholders for every household of two trying to pay a (negative equity) mortgage and get kids through school.

Instead, our media keeps on asking Minister Lenihan rhetorical questions along the lines 'How much more?' and lamenting 'unexpected Anglo demands for more cash'. Per all publicly available information on this site, Peter Mathews' site and Irish Economy site, all I can say: "Expect more of the 'unexpected', folks".

Economics 9/8/10: Ireland's Construction PMIs

This morning brought with it another bunch of wonderfully optimistic statements from the Irish 'experts' on business cycles.

Let's take in the facts:

• Ulster Banks’ Irish Construction PMI data released today showed moderating decline in Irish construction activity in July. PMI increased modestly from 44.9 in June to 45.0 in July which still means a contraction in activity.
  
• However, at 45.0 the 'improvement' in terms of slower rate of decline is within margin of error, at least one based on time series residuals (Ulster Bank won't tell us what the real underlying margin of error in PMI surveys for the sector is).
  
• So on the surface, contraction in activity is now "the slowest in three years". Which of course is only a natural statistical property - after 3 years of destruction raging across the sector, you'd get an asymptotic curve to 'stabilization', aka the bottom. This has absolutely nothing to do with any pending improvements.
  
• Residential sub-sector was the weakest, showing accelerating drop-off to 40.8 in July, from 45.4 in June. So housing continues to fall off the cliff.
  
• Commercial and civil engineering sub-sectors posted an 'improvement' in July - with the rate of collapse slowing from 45.8 to 46.0 (another statistically insignificant change) and to 43.6 form 38.4 respectively (clearly a statistically significant number). Again - the 'good news' here is a slowdown in the rate of the fall off, no real improvement.
  

The real spin stuff was, actually, in the interpretations concerning future expectations: "Future sentiment remained strongly positive in July, and improved slightly since the previous month, as over 40% of respondents expect activity to be higher in twelve months’ time."

You see, should the question have been 'Do ou expect any improvement in activity 10 years from now?' the 'improved' sentiment would have probably been even stronger.

Virtually identical analysis was presented by the Ulster Bank itself (here). Ulster Bank chief economist Simon Barry told the Irish Times that "index showed that conditions in the Irish construction sector remained “very tough”, with firms continuing to cut back sharply on their employment levels... [But] 'Looking forward, the July survey picked up a further improvement in confidence among Irish construction firms,' Mr Barry said. The rise in new business would provide “added encouragement”, he noted... 'As heartening as this development is, the increase is very modest indeed and it is probably more an indication of possible stabilisation in the sector at very weak levels rather than a strong recovery anytime soon.'"

This type of interpretation omits a very simple economic reality: after 38 months of contraction, the firms still remaining standing in for the survey are those that survived so far into the downturn. These same firms might have higher expectation of surviving into the near future as well. In other words, the entire PMI survey component suffers from survivorship bias. This bias may (or may not) be significant for several reasons:

1. Surviving firms might be biased on the optimism side because they expect to pick up a greater share of future public spending on construction due to declined competition. In other words, survivors might be looking forward to having an increased market share of a shrinking economic pie. Surely that wouldn't be indicative of 'stabilization'.
2. Surviving firms might also be collectively biased in their responses to the survey, if they have individual incentives to do so. For example, a number of Irish construction firms are currently under continued pressure from their banks. If each one of those firms were to make a signal to their lenders that 'things are going to improve soon, just wait a little longer', the resulting bias can be significant enough to induce higher optimism readings on the survey side. This is a significant enough effect in other sectors using surveys of expected future conditions to invalidate entire indices. One classical example involves surveys of expectations for future direction in Forex markets.
3. Surviving firms might also be selected on the basis of their actual exposure to the Irish market. For example - two leading surviving firms in the Irish construction sector are Kingspan and CRH. CRH derives only 4% of its revenue from Ireland and Kingspan's share of revenue accruing to Ireland is 7%. If firms are indeed selected into survivors group by their lower exposure to the Irish market, the question is then whether the expectations data they report is purely based on their perception of future trading conditions in Ireland or whether it is 'contaminated' by their reading of other markets.
   

What (1) and (3) above really suggest is that before we engage in interpreting the future expectations we need to rigorously check for a number of classical biases that might be present in the data. Only economists unaware of the hazards of interpreting survey based gauges of expectations would make the basic mistake of taking the number at their face value and interpreting them directly.

Alternatively, for a more crude correction, the survey results should not be interpreted independent of the quantitative data from contemporaneous PMI reading. In other words, one can make a conclusion that 'It is likely that in the near term there will be improvements in trading conditions in the sector' only if there are some contemporaneous signals of improvements and only if these signals are statistically strong enough.

This, of course is hardly the case, given that PMIs contemporaneous reading increased by just 0.1 from 44.9 to 45.0 - an increase that appears to be well within the margin of error.

Economics 8/8/10: Some Tullamore fun

Per report by RTE today (here), our Minister for Agriculture Brendan Smith said that Ireland's agri-food sector "is making a colossal contribution to economic recovery". The Minister was speaking at the Tullamore Show in Co Offaly.

I am impressed. Of course, agri-food sector is a relatively undefined (by CSO core national accounts statistics - it doesn't even exist) sector, so Minister's claims cannot be fully tested. You see, they belong to that great category of assertions that are non-falsifiable.

But we can take a look at Minister's direct sector of charge - Agriculture. Here are few charts based on latest data from the Quarterly National Accounts and National Income and Expenditure Annual Results for 2009.

Let us start with the Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing sector contribution to GDP:
Not exactly spectacular contributions to the national income - AFF sector delivered just 2.38% of national GDP in Q1 2010 - and that was above average performance. All in, the sector output was worth just €995mln. Not a pittance, but when one considers the massive levels of CAP-delivered financial subsidies the sector receives, I wonder what is so 'colossal' in this?

When measured in terms of constant factor costs, AFF sector has hardly performed any better. Its share of our GDP stands at a miserly 2.37% in Q1 2010, which is down on 2.39% achieved in Q1 2009. Back in Q1 2005 the same share was at a height of a 'colossal' 2.77%.

Annual value of the sector output, in constant market prices, never once exceeded €4,000mln since 2005 and has actually declined over the years from the peak of €3,953mln in 2005 to €3,555mln in 2009.

But may be Minister Smith's sector is 'colossal' in terms of its contribution to growth in our economy?
Again, data suggests that, sadly, this is not true either. In 2004-2009 the overall net value added in AFF sector has fallen by 4%. Other sectors experience growth in net value added of 2.5% over the same period. AFF has managed to collect massive load of subsidies over these years. Subsidies to all other sectors have been negligible and actually declined precipitously.

May be the AFF sector provided a relatively stronger shoulder for our floundering economy in 2008-2009? Not really -

• Between 2007 and 2008, Net Value Added in the AFF sector shrunk by 10.4% while NVA in all of the economy declined by 3.9%;
• Between 2008 and 2009, NVA in AFF sector has fallen by 24.4% against a drop of 8.6% in the economy-wide NVA;
• So far in the crisis - between 2008 and 2009, Net Value Added in Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing sector has declined by 32.3% while economy-wide NVA declined by less than 12.2%.

But wait, if AFF sector is not so 'colossal' in terms of growth in income or its contribution to income, may be it is a giant in terms of capital formation (aka wealth storage)?
Look at the national accounts data. The AFF sector is barely registering on the radar as a capital investment sector. True, it does appear to be more stable in the wake of the massive wave of capital values destruction since 2007 that impacted other sectors (e.g. construction, development, finance etc). But...
As you can see from above, sector share of overall capital pie remains miserably low, with exception of the two years when our land markets went nuts - 2007 and 2008 (incorporating lags).

Overall, per latest CSO data (so grossly outdated, we only have figures for 2009 so far):

• Net value added at basic prices in the entire sector was €1,197.5mln in 2007, €840.2mln in 2008 and a dramatic €204.2mln in 2009. In other words, once subsidies and consumption of capital are taken out, Irish Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing managed to post of collapse in the Net Value added of -76% between 2008 and 2009.
  

Sorry, Minister, I don't seem to find much of evidence of anything colossal going on in our AFF sector at all, apart, that is, from the subsidies it receives from the EU (€1,850mln in 2009 net of taxes paid by the sector or well in excess of the sector operating surplus of €1,612mln) and the precipitous rate of collapse in

• Goods output (down 18.1% yoy in 2009) and
  
• Operating surplus (down 30% yoy in 2009).

Of course, as I have mentioned above, the CSO nomenclature does not allow us to test the proposition of 'colossal' potential for our agri-food sector. But as far as Minister Smith's direct charge goes, we are now decades away from the days when Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing last time provided a significant, let alone 'colossal', contribution to economy or economic growth or increases in the country stock of wealth.

Which is really sad, given our natural conditions for excellent agricultural production.

Economics 6/8/10: Anglo's plans & systemic risks

Updated

Here are some interesting questions (note - just questions for now, on the foot of comments made by Prof Brian Lucey earlier today) regarding the 'Good' v 'Bad' Anglo plans.

Take it from the top: we started with a bank with €71bn on the books valued at valuations of the peak markets. This is now allegedly going to:

• €25bn of the face value of loans pre-writedowns - to the 'Bad' bank, implying that these loans are so poor in quality, even Nama, with an average 50%+ (LTEV-inclusive) haircut is not touching it. This implies that even in the long run, these loans are not going to generate more than, say, 30% recovery rate (a generous 30% that is, but let's take it as such. Note: that is across the entire loan book of the 'Bad' bank);
• €10bn of the face value of loans pre-writedowns - to the 'Good' bank, implying that these loans are better than Nama average, so the LTEV on these loans is above 50%. Assume that the LTEV on them is 60% (which makes them better than Ulster Bank's Irish book, per today's results for Ulster - again a generous allowance, but let's entertain it);
• the remainder is going to Nama.

Now, another little factoid: Central Bank of Ireland has lent Anglo €11.5bn under a MLRA repo agreement secured against the non-Nama loans.

Per Anglo last published results: "Sale and repurchase agreements with central banks include €12.2bn (30 September 2008: €7.6bn) borrowed under open market operations from central banks and €11.5bn (30 September 2008: €nil) borrowed under a Master Loan Repurchase Agreement (’MLRA’) with the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland."

Let's do some simple math.

Value (recall - I am factoring referencing to Long Term Economic Value, not the current mark-to-market value, which is even lower):

• €10bn in 'Good' Anglo can be (optimistically) expected to yield €6bn valuation using LTEV;
• €25bn in 'Bad' Anglo can be (again, optimistically) expected to yield €7.5bn valuation using LTEV.
• Allow for 1.5% margin of costs on both sides, to €525mln pa, or over 5 years - i.e. much shorter than Nama horizon - €2.6bn (note: current bank cost structure, which one can expect to be preserved as both banks go about conducting impaired assets recovery - a higher cost activity)
  
• Total non-Nama book value is, inclusive of LTEV net of expected management costs, therefore could be already around €10.9bn.

Against this value of €10.9-13.5bn, CB of Ireland holds €11.5bn worth of loans to the Anglo.

Now to the question: Does this mean that CB might be facing a potentially significant loss on the repos?

This possibility raises two issues:

1. If the repos are spread across 'Good' and 'Bad' bank, then the 'Good' bank is hardly a feasible undertaking, as repos alone already exceed the value of the 'Good' bank even absent impairment charges, while 'Bad' bank has clearly no ability to repay any fraction of these;
2. If the repos are inherited by the 'Bad' bank, then, either CB has to declare a loss (and I am not sure how it can do this), or the taxpayer is on the hook for the repos by having to pay them down through the 'Bad' Anglo.
   

Now, alternatively, let's ask the following question: to recover CBs repos from non-Nama assets, we need to have a combined 'Good' & 'Bad' banks recovery rate of 33% (not covering the costs of operating both banks, funding, bond holders etc). And this, once again, refers to the valuations done on the face value of the loans before any recent impairments - before the bubble burst. To recover all other CBs' funds, plus our own - we need a recovery rate of ca 68% (again ex all costs etc). That's really highly unlikely, folks.


Quite a dilemma, then, especially since ECB (see here) didn't approved the repos in the first place... and since Anglo also owes the other Eurozone Central Banks some €12.2bn more.

What could Mr Trichet say about Anglo's priorities in repaying the loans? Would he be (a) so kind as allow CB of Ireland to recoup its repos, which ECB thought were dodgy enough to refuse to take them itself? or (b) insist that other CBs be repaid first before our own repos are covered? If (a) - I'd say Mrs Merkel would have a few kind words to say to Mr Trichet, given her electorate's feelings about having to bailout Greece. If (b) - the above potential negative valuation of the repos will have to be multiples larger...

Just asking some questions for now... Wonder if there are any answers out there...

Economics 5/8/10: Russia and wheat prices

Following the worst drought in 130 years, the unprecedented heat wave and subsequent wild fires, Russia stopped exports of wheat, corn, rye, barley and flower from August 15 through December 31, 2010. Russia is the third largest exporter of wheat in the world. It expects 2010 harvest to come at 65-75mln tonnes, a 25% shortfall on 2009. Prior to the latest disasters, which started in April this year and is expected to continue at least through August, Russia expected to post second record breaking export years in wheat in 2010.

Despite the shortfall, Russian Government does not expect significant shortages of wheat for domestic markets. Government holds estimated 9.5 million tonnes of wheat in reserves and has ordered fixed price deliveries of wheat to regions impacted by the fires and drought.

The implications of the Russian exports ban are multiple:

1. There is a direct impact on wheat prices, with short term futures rallying today 8%, while longer term deliveries contracts being on an exponential uplift curve (see chart below for December deliveries contracts);
2. There is indirect impact on other commodities and food products, such as milk, etc, as wheat and its by-products are used across almost entire production and breeding chain.

Wheat prices on the CBOT were up 42% in July, the biggest monthly gain since at least 1959. Monday prices were up 5%, and are now the highest for 22 months.

Economics 5/8/10: Service PMIs

Time to update my earlier post on PMIs - this time with new data on services PMIs. The original post is here. Once again, the data is from NCB Stockbrokers PMI release and you can read their very good objective analysis on their site.
New business activity in the chat above is the one to worry about going forward. Giving a snapshot of more recent periods:
Here, both, the flattening out of the expansion rate in total business activity and the decline in the growth of new business activity are pretty clearly evident. Nonetheless, both series are above 50, signaling continued expansion.
Underlying macro parameters are a mixed bag. Business expectations are still improving and are pretty robust, though the rate of improvement is slipping. More dramatic is the slippage in the rate of new export business orders expansion. In the mean time, contraction continues across services employment and profitability, though the rate of contraction is slowing and is almost reaching zero.

Unlike in the case of manufacturing PMIs, services-related prices are trending in the right direction:deflation is setting in once again in input prices and deflation is ongoing, but at a slowing rate, in terms of output prices.

Putting services and manufacturing sectors side by side, first consider the employment picture:
Both employment pools are contracting. Manufacturing employment has crossed into negative growth territory, while employment in services sectors is falling at a slower rate than before.

Lastly, putting side by side actual PMIs:
Expansion in manufacturing has been under pressure in Ireland over the last three months. Meanwhile, services sector has been on expansionary path since the beginning of the year.

Of course, PMIs are not a perfect signal for near term future of the overall economic activity. Nonetheless, the series have been signaling weak expansion for almost 7 months now. This is the good news. The bad news is that there is low degree of confidence in the gains made so far, especially in manufacturing. In all likelihood September-November will be the key months when it comes to either stabilizing economy in a growth mode, or triggering a double dip. In my view, the risk of the latter before the end of Q1 20111 is around 40-45% and rising.

Economics 5/8/10: Live Register - up & up, again

Live register is out today with some poor news: the seasonally adjusted LR rose from 444,000 in June to 452,500 in July (+8,500 mom).This year to July 2010 LR rose by the cumulative total of 34,403 (+8%).

The latest increase in LR is marked by women signees leading males signees by 4,600 to 3,900. This suggests that (a) services sectors are more likely to show accelerating contraction in employment, and (b) the trend for jobs destruction in higher value added activities is still running strong.

This is confirmed by LR new data on occupation breakdown of lost jobs. Per CSO: "All occupational groups showed monthly Live Register increases in July. The largest percentage increase was in the Professional group (+12.3%), while the smallest percentage increase was in the Craft and related group (+0.1%). In the six months to July 2010 all occupational groups showed Live Register increases with the largest percentage increase in Professional (+22.8%), while the next largest increases were in Clerical and secretarial (+15.6%) and Sales (+13.0%). The smallest percentage increase was in the Craft and related group (+0.1%)."

So for the headline impact of the news - take an average weekly earnings (Q4 2009) at €716.09 (€37,237pa), take the average professional grade weekly earnings at €793.35 (€41,254pa), apply tax rates consistent with these earnings at €3,963-5,610 net tax liability, plus €1,225-1,386 PRSI, plus €1,489-1,650 Health Levy and €745-825 Income levy. Net loss to the Exchequer of tax revenue alone is €7,422-9,471. Employer-side taxes lost are ca €1,250-1,400. Now, add to this the cost of unemployment benefits, loss of Vat on private health insurance, provision of public benefits, such as health etc - you have total cost to the Exchequer of €28,040-30,240 per each new signee.

So July figures are signaling a hit on the Exchequer balance of ca €257mln over the year - just like that, one month worth of newly unemployed.


The average net weekly increase in the seasonally adjusted LR was 1,700 in July or virtually identical to June figure of 1,725.
Monthly rate of change accelerated in July to 8,500 up from 4,900 in June and marking the fastest rate of monthly increase in a year to date, and the highest rate of increase since July 2009:
The standardised unemployment rate in July is now at 13.7% up from 13.4% in June. This compares with 12.9% in the first quarter of 2010, the latest seasonally adjusted unemployment rate from QNHS.
Some final comparatives:

• Weekly net increases average from January 2008 through July 2010 were 2,102 - above the July average weekly net rate of increase of 1,700. However, over the last 12 months, average net weekly increases were 386 - well below the figure for July;
• Monthly average rate of increase in LR was: January 2008-July 2010 = 9,100, 12 months to July 2010=2,783. July 2010 monthly increase was 8,500.
  

Economics 5/8/10: Good news - we might be 'one-off' broke?

Good morning, folks. As a day starter, please take a note: We are bust! Yesterday’s Exchequer returns are a worthy reading on the theme of the day and hence I am writing a third post on the subject. Let me recap where we are at:

Tax receipts are now under €17.2bn cumulative for the first seven months of the year. As far as our ‘ever optimistic’ official analysts go, things are going on swimmingly. But in reality, we are on track to meet my December 2009 forecast for a shortfall of €500-700mln on the year. And that despite the fact that Ireland has ‘turned the corner’ on growth – highlighting the fact that the read through from GDP to tax revenue is not a straight forward thing. Of course, most of the shortfall is due to our real economic activity – as measured by GNP – is still tanking.

So relative to profile, here’s the picture:Good news on expenditure – overall voted expenditure was 2.6% below anticipated for the period to July. But this ‘achievement’ was driven solely by the cuts to capital spending. Thus, net voted capital expenditure for the first seven months of the year now stands at €2.2bn – full €660mln (-23%) below target. Net voted current expenditure is so far on target, while national debt is costing us slightly less (-€213mln) than DofF anticipated.

So overall, we are on track to deliver the Exchequer deficit of ca €19bn in 2010, close to the target €18.78bn, as capital spending accelerates in H2 2010. But we won’t reach the overall target to GDP. Most likely, we are going to see a 12% deficit to GDP ratio.

And this does not include the full extent of funding for Anglo and INBS. Brian Lenihan has already committed the state to supply €22bn to Anglo alone, of which €14.2bn was already allocated, but only ca €4bn went on the Exchequer accounts. Of the still outstanding €7.8bn, the question is how much of this amount is going to be directly shouldered by official deficit figures. The second question is – will €22bn cover Anglo demand for capital post Nama Tranches II and III transfers – recall that Anglo is yet to move loans for Tranche II. The third question now relates to AIB – given its interim result announced yesterday, one has to wonder if the bank will need more capital. What is beyond question now is that the State will be standing buy with a cheque book ready, should AIB ask for cash.

All in, Ireland Inc’s sovereign accounts this year are likely to come out with a 20% plus deficit relative to GDP. That’s a massive number implying that over a quarter of domestic economy will be accounted for by the shortfall in public finances. Our debt can easily reach over 87% of GDP and close to 110% of GNP (and that’s just including the full Anglo amount of €22bn and excluding Nama and the rest of recapitalizations liabilities).

Scary thought. But don’t worry – the Government will come out to say that it was all due to one-off measures. One-off in 2008, 2009, 2010, and one can rationally expect 2011 and even possibly 2012. By which time Nama liabilities will begin to unwind… serializing the one-offs into the future.

Economics 4/8/10:Exchequer July receipts

Note: Corrected version - hat tip to Seamus Coffey!

As promised in the previous post (which focused on the Exchequer balance, here), the present post will be focusing on actual tax receipts.

I have resisted for some time the idea that Budget 2010 targets are somehow analytically important. Hence, you will not find targets-linked analysis here. But the main tax heads - their comparative dynamics over 2008-2010 to date are below.

First, take a look at the actual cumulative to date levels.Overall tax receipts are now running below 2009 numbers, and are still way off 2008 numbers (off €1,536mln on 2009 and €5,520mln on 2008). This means we are now 8.22% below 2009 and 24.35% on 2008.

Two largest contributors to the receipts are Vat and Income Tax:Vat is now €483mln below 2009, and still €2,453mln behind 2008, which means we are now 6.9% down on 2009 and 27.5% behind 2008. One wonders how much of this Vat intake in 2010 is due to automotive sales increases driven (as I explained in earlier posts) predominantly by the 'vanity plates' with '10' on them. Income tax shows a similar pattern: down €537mln on 2009 (-8.45%) and €1,060 on 2009 (-15.4%).

Corporate tax and Excise are the next largest categories.Cumulative year to date, corporate tax receipts are performing weaker than in 2009 (-€260mln and -13.8%) and ahead of 2008 (+€192mln and 13.4%), but this is due to timing issues and financial markets recoveries in H1 2010. Excise taxes are still under-performing: down €87mln on 2009 (-3.37%) and €773mln (-23.7%) on 2008.

Stamps
Transactions taxes are not faring well. Stamps are down €75mln on 2009 (-18.3%) and down €808mln on 2008 (-70.7%).

Surprise surprise, Capital Gains Tax is singing similar song:
So CGT is down €89mln (-44.3%) on 2009 - despite being beefed up by bull markets in financial assets, and is down €544mln (-83%) on 2008.

Year on year changes show stabilisation around 2009 levels.
Usually, the Exchequer returns publications now days provoke a roaring applause from our banks and other 'independent' analysts and the remarks about 'turning a corner'. This time - no difference. Nope, folks - let me stress - there is not even a stabilization around horrific results for 2009. Exchequer revenues are heading south. We haven't gotten anywhere close to resolving the crisis.

But let me show you what this bottom will look like, once we are there.
It is a horrific place in which personal income and consumption-related taxes bear roughly 75.2% of all tax burden (up from 62.5% in 2008 and 68.6% in 2009). Meanwhile, physical capital taxes contribution to the budget have shrunk from 14.7% in 2008 to 9% in 2009 and 4.2% in 2010. Corporate tax, despite the robust performance now contributes only 9.5% of total tax receipts down from 2009 level of 12.4% and 2008 level of 13.5%.

In other words, those who benefit less of all demographic and economic groups, from public services - the upper middle classes - are now paying more than 50% of the total tax receipts bill. This, in the words of some of our illustrious guardians of social justice is called 'protecting the poor'. In other times, in other lands, it was also called 'taxation without representation'.

I would rather call it a tax on human capital - the very core input into 'knowledge economy' that we need to get us out of the long term economic depression.

Economics 4/8/10: Exchequer July results

Exchequer figures for July 2010 are out. Here are trends and some details. Analysis of revenue (by line) will follow later tonight.

Month on month changes first:
Notice seasonality. Seasonally adjusted surplus/deficit is not replicating the V-patterned change over three months. Instead, we are showing persistent worsening of the deficit. This is not due to a surprise expenditure deterioration, as current expenditure side held quite well relative to 2008 (down from €27,565mln to €27,039mln).

One interesting feature, however, on expenditure side is that May-July 2010 saw a net rise in overall expenditure, while same period in 2009 saw a contraction.

Convergence of tax and total receipts was in line with previous years:
This was achieved primarily by relative under-performance of tax revenues, down from €18,689mln in same period of 2009 to €17,153mln this year, plus slowdown in capital receipts mom (although still up yoy cumulatively). Automatic stabilizers are now in action.

Putting receipts against deficit:
Total receipts are persistently down in the last 3 months, and with them, exchequer deficit is rising. This again runs counter to the seasonal trends. Notice also that mean reversion on receipts side is now completed, while deficits are trending still above the long term trend line, primarily due to the fact that 2009 figure includes banks recapitalization costs, but 2010 figures so far do not account for these in full (more on this below).

The broken seasonality pattern on receipts side is evident in the chart above.

On to cumulative results for the year:
Tax revenue is significantly under-performing 2009, let alone 2008. Remember, with all tax increases on 2009 we should have been somewhere between the red and blue lines. Is this suggesting that higher taxes (certainly on the books for Budget 2011) might be counterproductive to revenue objectives?
Total receipts are still coming out slightly above 2009 - thanks to stronger performance in June.

Total cumulative expenditure is running below 2008 levels. That's thanks to cuts in capital spending and under-provisioning for banks in year to date 2010 (more on this below).

Now, deficits:
For a moment there, it looked like we were heading toward abysmal 2008 levels (but not as abysmal as 2009). That's because the Government booked all its capital spending savings into April-June. With these savings now exhausted, our deficit has taken a nose dive.

Shall we compare with banks in across the board?
Hmmm... were capital expenditures (inc banks supports) through 2010 so far running at 2009 levels, we would be worse off in terms of spending than last year.

Now, remember, we (well, actually IMF) were promised by the DofF that the bank recapitalization funds since January 2010 "are now reflected in deficit projections for the year". Actually - they are not. Not 6 in the Exchequer Statement details what is covered in banks recapitalization to date:So in brief - no actual capital injection of any variety is covered in Exchequer data. No purchases of equity in AIB and BofI are covered either. It looks like the Government might be waiting to push these numbers through at the last minute, say forcing recognition into December 2010. Such a move would allow it to pre-borrow funding from the markets without anyone raising too much fuss about contagion from banks balance sheets to the sovereign. Once 2011 arrives, the Government can turn to the markets and say 'Well, that was one-off stuff. Business as normal now."

One way or the other - look at the 2009 figure in the table above: that's the benchmark for our real performance.