Showing posts with label monetary policy dilemma. Show all posts
Showing posts with label monetary policy dilemma. Show all posts

Saturday, June 13, 2020

13/6/2020: What Do Money Supply Numbers Tell Us About Social Economics?


What do money supply changes tell us about social economics? A lot. Take two key measures of U.S. money supply:

  • M1, which includes funds that are readily accessible for spending, primarily by households and non-financial companies, such as currency outside the U.S. Treasury, Federal Reserve Banks, and the vaults of depository institutions; traveler's checks; demand deposits; and other checkable deposits. 

  • MZM, which is M2 less small-denomination time deposits plus institutional money funds, or in more simple terms, institutional money and funds available for investment and financial trading.
Here we go, folks:



Does this help explain why Trumpism is not an idiosyncratic phenomena? It does. But it also helps explain why the waves of social unrest and protests are also not idiosyncratic phenomena. More interesting is that this helps to explain why both of these phenomena are tightly linked to each other: one and the other are both co-caused by the same drivers. If you spend a good part of 20 years pumping money into the Wall Street while largely ignoring the Main Street, pitchforks will come out. 

The *will* bit in the sentence above is now here.

Friday, January 10, 2014

10/1/2014: Top 5 Global Economic Risks of 2014: Sunday Times, January 5

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times column for January 5, 2013.


2014 is the year of hope, arriving on foot of a renewed momentum in the economies of the U.S., U.K. and, since the beginning of the last quarter, the euro area. As welcome as these positive developments might be, any serious case for the economic fortunes revival in 2014 will have to stand against a rigorous analysis of risks and opportunities that are likely to emerge this year. Some are short-term; others are longer running themes signifying profound evolutionary transformations in the world of advanced economies.

Here are my top five picks for the economic risks and opportunities that are likely to mark 2014 the Year of Change.


1. Growth Challenge in Advanced Economies:

Core challenge faced by Ireland over 2014 and beyond is delivering sustainable rates of growth in excess of those recorded over the last decade.

Looking at growth in the GDP per capita reveals several worrisome trends.

Irish growth rates from 2005-through 2013 are running below the levels observed during 1980-1994. With a period of structural catching up with the euro area standard of living well behind us, the task ahead for Ireland is finding new sources for long-term growth.

The above challenges are compounded by the fact that our core trading partners are experiencing structural slowdown in their own economies. We are witnessing continued structural decline in the longer-term rates of growth in real GDP per capita across the advanced economies of the euro area that started in 1995. More immediately, the US and UK economies' recovery in the wake of the latest recession is slow, compared to the recessions experienced in the early 1990s and 1980s. Thus, Ireland is also facing the challenges of opening up new geographies, beyond our traditional trading partners in advanced economies, for exports and shifting more indigenous firms to exporting.

Currently, Irish medium-term growth outlook (2014-2018) implies growth rates that are some 3 times lower than those recorded in 1990s. A sustainable recovery from the crisis will require us delivering economic growth rates closer to those attained in the 1990s. Meanwhile, we are struggling to reach growth levels of the 1980s.



2. Medium-term Changes in Employment and Skills Demand

Significant reshaping of the advanced economies' labour force expected in 2012-2022 reflects the shifts in growth toward more human capital-intensive growth.

Increasing specialisation is changing Manufacturing and challenging both the U.S. companies operating in Ireland and Irish indigenous producers. In addition, the ICT Services sector is increasing demand for narrowly-defined specialist capabilities, leading to accelerating depreciation of the ICT sector skills and potential for reduction in overall levels of employment in the sector. The resulting contraction in demand for older skills will be magnified by the widening gap between in-demand new workers and legacy ICT employees.

The downsizing of the state sector will continue. The first wave of reductions during the Great Recession was driven by organic attrition, implying little improvement in productivity amidst staff losses. In the December Gallup poll, 72 percent of U.S. respondents identified 'Big Government' as the biggest threat to the country future, up from 52 percent in 2009. In Ireland, per Edelman Trust Barometer, trust in Government has remained at 15 percent in 2012-2013, ranking the Government alongside the banks as the least trusted institutions. The next wave will see a push for improved productivity, resulting in gradual reduction in employment levels in the sector and simultaneous shift in demand toward higher-skilled public sector workers.

On the other hand, Ireland is likely to gain from the Leisure and Hospitality, and Healthcare sectors growth on foot of ageing population across the major economies. The latter presents both a challenge and a major opportunity. Capturing global demand growth for Healthcare and Social Assistance services will require greater deployment of e-Health, remote health and other data-intensive, ICT-reliant healthcare tools. We are also likely to gain from renewed capital investment in the wake of strengthening global economic recovery. Financial services (chiefly IFSC), and Professional and Business services (especially innovation-focused internationally traded services), will gear up for rising demand. Education will remain a core driver for skills development and human capital investment.



3. Governments' Leverage Up, Banks Leverage Down

With its banking sector deleveraging largely completed, the U.S. economy is enjoying a credit-driven recovery. Both, the U.S. banks and the Federal Government are also increasing their access to global funding markets.

In contrast to the U.S., euro area banks are continuing deleveraging, while financial fragmentation is pushing national banks into greater isolation. With credit on decline for nineteen consecutive months, euro area economies remain starved of working and investment capital and capital markets integration is rapidly collapsing.

All along, buildup in public debt continues unabated without delivering a meaningful uplift in domestic investment activities. While in the U.S. public debt increases are supporting public investment and private consumption, euro area government leveraging up is primarily funding unemployment supports, public pensions and banks, with share of investment spending in total Government expenditure declining. As the result, euro area gross investment as percentage of GDP has declined from 21 percent over 2000-2002 to less than 18 percent in 2013. In the advanced economies ex-euro area gross investment slightly rose from just under 24 percent of GDP in 2000-2002 to 24.2 percent in 2013.

These trends act to reduce Irish exports of capital goods and investment-related services and undercut availability of credit in the domestic economy. The risk for 2014 is that the forces of financial fragmentation will remain at play across the euro area. The opportunity is the market readiness for entry of new investment and lending intermediaries.



4. Irish Labour Income Trends

Between 2008 and 2013, labour income share of Irish GDP has declined from 48 percent to 41 percent, implying a loss of roughly EUR3.3 billion in the domestic economy. This decline was driven primarily by re-orientation of GDP growth away from labour-intensive domestic sectors to MNCs-led exports of ICT and financial services.

As the result, declines in labour income have outpaced declines in value added in the economy, implying a transfer of income from the employees to the corporate and state sectors.

Taxes increases have compounded this effect, leading to a significant decline in household investment and consumption.

Over 2014-2016, Ireland faces a major challenge in rebuilding household financial positions and income to achieve sustainable levels of household debt, private investment and consumption. This can only be delivered by reducing the burden of taxation faced by the households, which puts us straight on the collision path between our corporate and wealth taxation policies, and the income tax policies reforms needed to restart the domestic economy.

Good news: by taking radical approach to rebalancing our tax system, we can do both – deliver sustainability-focused reforms and reboot the domestic economy. Bad news: our political and economic elites are too reliant on the status quo to secure their power to be able to structure and implement such reforms.



5. Monetary Policy Unraveling

2014 will mark the beginning of the end to unorthodox monetary policies deployed during the crisis.

This month, the U.S. Fed will begin gradual tapering of its purchases of the Government bonds. In advance of this, futures on 3 months Treasuries have been losing value since November. Meanwhile, euribor - the interest rate charged by top euro area banks for loans to each other - has been moving up relative to the ECB policy rate.

The ECB rates have now been in divergence from their historical mean for record 60 months. For now, Frankfurt is concerned with deflationary risks in the economy. Short-term eurodollar 3 month forward curve is pricing in euro devaluation in the short term and higher yields in the U.S. However, the return to historical norms for the ECB is only a matter of time. This will see rates rising over time toward the pre-crisis average of 3 percent from the current 0.25 percent.

For Ireland, normalisation of monetary policies presents significant risks. Rising interest rates, especially if compounded by the banks' drive to increase their lending margins, can derail nascent recovery, depress investment and destabilise once again the residential mortgages, including many that are deemed to have been ‘sustainably restructured’ prior to interest rates rises. In addition, higher yields on Government bonds will take a huge toll on Exchequer finances.

Unless this re-pricing in the bonds markets comes at the time of high growth in the Irish economy, the process of unwinding of global accommodative monetary policies can put us through a severe test, possibly as early as late 2014.


Thursday, October 31, 2013

31/10/2013: NAIRU or NDRU? Euro Area Inflation Hits 0.7% in October

So Euro area unemployment rate remained stuck at 12.2% in September, same as in August 2013 and up on 11.6% in September 2012. 18,451,000 Euro area residents were unemployed back in September 2012 and this rose to 19,447,000 a year later. Meanwhile, in the US, unemployment rolls fell from 12,093,000 to 11,254,000 and the rate dipped from 7.8% to 7.2%.

With inflation (HICP) coming at 0.7% in October, so we are now no longer in the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU) environment, but rather closing on what I would call a Near-Deflationary Rate of Unemployment (NDRU)... welcome to the madness of European econo-politics, where the Central Bank is powerless to do much to re-inflate the economy and fiscal authorities are powerless to restart growth, while households and companies struggle under the weights of debts.

Two charts:

Leading growth indicator Eurocoin (see more detailed analysis in the next blogpost) has improved somewhat in October, but monetary policy remains stuck in zero-bound, zero-power corner. And ditto for inflationary signals:


We are now at the lowest rate since November 2009 when it comes to HICP.

Good news, ECB can now easily move to 0.25% rate... but will it? Ask Angela...

Monday, June 24, 2013

24/6/2013: The Great (Credit) Wall of China

China is now in the anteroom of the 'This Time is Different' sauna... hot seat awaiting:
http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/06/21/say_hello_to_chinas_brewing_financial_crisis

Keep in mind, in China total credit increased from USD9 trillion in 2008 to USD23 trillion now. Credit to GDP ratio went up ca 95% and now stands at 221% of GDP. In the US, in 2002-2007 period, credit/GDP ratio grew by 40 percentage points. And we have no real idea just how deep the real rabbit hole goes: http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21578668-growth-wealth-management-products-reflects-deeper-financial-distortions

Here's the contagion trigger: once China gets seated on the hot bench in the TTisD sauna, Chinese purchases of US and euro area bonds will evaporate. With this, yields will be going up even if current QE is retained by the Fed. And what the cost? BIS estimated last 1 trillion. And with yields rising across the board, 15-35 percent of GDP can go up in smoke in France, Italy, the UK and Japan.

Meanwhile, the euro area banks are sitting on a massive pile of dodgy assets (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/06/1862013-size-of-eurotanics-bad-assets.html) backed by funding secured against... right... the aforementioned government bonds.

In this blog parlance, the Impossible Monetary Dilemma will then hit the Great Wall of China. And there are no airbags...


Friday, June 21, 2013

21/6/2013: Dukascopy TV interview

My interview with Dukascopy TV, Switzerland on Fed's FOMC and monetary policy dilemma, G8 and its implications for Europe and Ireland, and the Russian economy: http://www.dukascopy.com/tv/en#104517 and http://youtu.be/ir9701EHeOU


Wednesday, June 12, 2013

12/6/2013: Bond Markets: Is Canary Kicking the Bucket?


I have written before about the prospect of the Fed starting unwinding of the QE operations. Here's my summary forward view.

Stage 1: the Fed will reduce the rate of QE print ('taper on'). This is inevitable and it is already driving 10-year Treasury yields up - in last 40 days, by some 50bps. The same is also inevitable for the Euro area, albeit via a different mechanism (unwinding of excess liquidity supply to the banks, plus scaling down of any expectations for OMT to kick in), driving the Bund up some 35bps.

In both cases, macro news-flows and inflationary pressures pointed to the opposite direction for yields. This is confirmed by the differences in risk pricing indices in the bond markets (MOVE index: Merrill Lynch Option Volatility Estimate (MOVE) Index on US Treasuries) as opposed to the equity market volatility index (VIX). MOVE has gone almost double from around 47-48 in early May to over 80 recently. Levels around 80 are consistent with the height of the peripheral euro area crisis back in 2012. Over the same period of time, VIX is up from around 13.0 to 16.0 and during the height of the euro area crisis it was averaging closer to 40.

Stage 2: In the follow up stage, the Fed will have to engage in more than simply scaling back new purchases. Here, the unwinding will begin in earnest and the Fed will have to sell longer-dated bonds into the market.

For now, we are just embarking on Stage 1. Emerging markets and corporate bonds, as well as euro periphery bonds are all signalling the same story: yields are pressured up. During May, US investment corporate bonds fell 2.7%, while junk bonds were down 2.3%.

Now, in the longer term,  when US gross interest rate rises relative to the euro area, forward exchange rate must rise relative to the spot and dollar will weaken forward. This covered parity relationship tends to hold over the longer periods of time under normal market conditions. In May-June so far, Dollar is 5% weaker than EUR, and over 2% weaker than CHF (linked to EUR). However, Dollar is stronger 22% than JPY and virtually unchanged on GBP, dollar strengthened with respect to the emerging currencies.

However, in the short run we are not in a normal economy. As US economy continues to improve, few things will happen:
1) The Fed will continue tapering on the QE in the short-term
2) Expected unwinding of QE (rising rates, instead of lower speed of purchasing of Treasuries as in (1)) will enter expectations in the market but in a longer term, rather than any time soon
3) Bond yields will continue rising and volatility will remain amplified. Long-term US equilibrium is for 10 years at 3.0-3.2% and short-term overshooting that range, for Bund - at current rates, around 2.5-2.8%.
4) Fed will be watching the speed of increases and manage unwinding process accordingly to keep yields from overshooting 3%-or-so target by a significant margin.

All of this means that news-flow will be crucial in months to come as it will be signalling both short-term and long-term changes to the Fed position (usual stuff about the rates), but also strategy (severity of (1) above, or switch to (2) from (1)).

In the short term, dollar will see pressures to appreciate as interest rates will remain intact at policy level and it will take time for higher Treasury yields to transmit into higher real interest rates in the US, inducing slowdown in the economy. Until that happens, economic recovery will be pushing up equities and USD.

In the longer run, however, this pattern will be altered: improved economic news will signal forward switch from (1) taper off to (2) unwinding. Yields will put pressure on real interest rates (3) and policy rates will move up. This will lead to subsequent devaluation of the USD toward equilibrium and a slamming of the breaks on the recovery.

The emerging markets and corporate bonds squeeze are not simple reallocations of liquidity. Truth be told, there is nowhere for liquidity to 'reallocate', given yields. Instead, these are early warning systems at work. Now, to see the underlying iceberg we are heading for, recall this http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/04/2242013-who-funds-growth-in-europe.html


Updated: series of very interesting interviews on the issue of monetary exit: http://www.voxeu.org/article/exit-strategies-time-think-ahead

and an interesting post on term premia due to QE:
http://www.econbrowser.com/archives/2013/06/update_on_the_y.html

Thursday, June 6, 2013

6/6/2013: US House Prices: Trouble Brewing for Monetary Policy Dilemma

Now, QE seems to be feeding through into the real assets, not just financial ones, in the case of the US. Here's a chart from Pictet on CoreLogic house prices index changes and underlying house prices fundamentals:



And the same adjusting for inflation, annualised 3mo series (q/q):


CoreLogic rose 3.2% m/m in April, following a +2.2% m/m rise in March. Based on Pictet seasonal adjustments, "the increase remains surprisingly high: +1.6%, after +1.7% in March. Since the end of last year, house prices have risen by 6.4% (after seasonal adjustments), an astonishing annualised rate of 20.4%. On a y-o-y basis, the increase reached 12.1%, the highest since April 2006."

Although as the chart below shows, things are still ok in 'affordability' terms (index of house prices), with recent rises from the trough returning the index to mid-2009 levels. It would take a further 28% rise to hit pre-crisis peak of March 2006:


Lest we forget - unwinding the QE will hammer interest rates on longer maturities (see: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/05/1652013-on-that-impossible-monetary.html) which will spell trouble for debt-funded assets, like property.

Thursday, May 30, 2013

30/5/2013: Future Interest Rates & the 'Impossible Monetary Policy Dilemma'

Recently, I wrote about the monetary policy exit dilemma (here) on foot of IMF research. This week, BIS published another paper on the issue of long-term interest rates problem presented by the need to eventually unwind the extraordinary monetary policy measures (including this). Do note that the dilemma also covers the problem of unwinding banking sector leverage overhang (see presentation covering, among other things, this matter here).

BIS paper is linked here.

We might want to believe in the permanence of the low (negative currently) long term rates, but, alas, that is not so. I have written about this on a number of occasions, including in my Sunday Times columns. But a reminder from BIS:

Or even at policy rates level (here), or per BIS:

I don't know about you, but any reversion to the mean will end the bond bubble like the property bust ended the REITs bubble - solidly and overnight. And when the IMF said 6% swing up on yields, they weren't kidding:

Ditto for term premium uplift on reversion:


So unless you are into 'This Time It'll Be Different, For Sure' argument, then brace yourselves for the ride - it is coming. May be not in 2013-2014, but one day it is...

The quality risk-free paper mountain has grown... just as all the ABS and RMBS and other BS... and we know even absent excel errors from R&R 2010 how that stuff ended...