Showing posts with label Russia sanctions. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Russia sanctions. Show all posts

Friday, September 29, 2017

28/9/17: Pimco on Russian Economy: My Take


An interesting post about the Russian economy, quite neatly summarising both the top-line challenges faced and the resilience exhibited to-date via Pimco: https://blog.pimco.com/en/2017/09/Russia%20Growth%20Up%20Inflation%20Down. Worth a read.

My view: couple of points are over- and under-played somewhat.

Sanctions: these are a thorny issue in Moscow and are putting pressure on Russian banks operations and strategic plans worldwide. While they do take secondary seat after other considerations in public eye, Moscow insiders are quite discomforted by the effective shutting down of the large swathes of European markets (energy and finance), and North American markets (finance, technology and personal safe havens). On the latter, it is worth noting that a number of high profile Russian figures, including in pro-Kremlin media, have in recent years been forced to shut down shell companies previously operating in the U.S. and divest out of real estate assets. Sanctions are also geopolitical thorns in terms of limiting Moscow's ability to navigate the European policy space.

Banks: this issue is overplayed. Bailouts and shutting down of banks are imposing low cost on the Russian economy and are bearable, as long as inflationary pressures remain subdued. Moscow can recapitalise the banks it wants to recapitalise, so all and any banks that do end up going to the wall, e.g. B&N and Otkrytie - cited in the post - are going to the wall for a different reason. That reason is consolidation of the banking sector in the hands of state-owned TBTF banks that fits both the Central Bank agenda and the Kremlin agenda. The CBR has been on an active campaign to clear out medium- and medium-large banks out of the way both from macroprudential point of view (these institutions have been woefully undercapitalised and exposed to serious risks on assets side), and the financial system stability point of view (majority of these banks are parts of conglomerates with inter-linked and networked systems of loans, funds transfers etc).

Yurga, another bank that was stripped of its license in late July - is the case in point, it was part of a real estate and oil empire. B&N is another example: the bank was a part of the Safmar group with $34 billion worth of assets, from oil and coal to pension funds.

The CBR knowingly tightened the screws on these types of banks back in January:

  • The new rules placed a strict limit on bank’s exposure to its own shareholders - maximum of 20% of its capital, forcing the de-centralisation of equity holdings in banking sector; and
  • Restricted loans to any single borrower or group of connected borrowers to no more than 25% of total lending.
I cannot imagine that analysts covering Russian markets did not understand back in January that these rules will spell the end of many so-called 'pocket' banks linked to oligarchs and their business empires.

The balance of the banking sector is feeling the pain, but this pain is largely contained within the sector. Investment in Russian economy, usually heavily dependent on the banks loans, has been sluggish for a number of years now, but the key catalyst to lifting investment will be VBR's monetary policy and not the state of the banking sector. 

Here is a chart from Reuters summarising movements in interbank debt levels across the top 20 banks:


The chart suggests that net borrowing is rising amongst the top-tier banks, alongside deposits gains (noted by Pimco), so the core of the system is picking up strength off the weaker banks and is providing liquidity. Per NYU's v-lab data, both Sberbank and VTB saw declines in systemic risk exposures in August, compared to July. So overall, the banking system is a problem, but the problem is largely contained within the mid-tier banks and the CBR is likely to have enough fire power to sustain more banks going through a resolution. 


Saturday, October 4, 2014

4/10/2014: IMF on Russia: What Never Hurts Repeating...


As predicted (see here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/09/2992014-russian-economy-briefing-for.html) IMF came in weighing heavily on the doom for its outlook for Russian economy this week.

In its "Russian Federation: Concluding Statement for the September 2014 Staff Visit" report from  October 1, 2014, the Fund notices (quite a sharp eyesight there) that: "Geopolitical tensions are slowing the economy already weakened by structural bottlenecks."

According to the IMF, the solution is for the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) to "tighten policy rates further to reduce inflation and continue its path towards inflation targeting underpinned by a fully-flexible exchange rate." Investment is falling down, capital flight de-accelerated but remains a problem, deposits are desperately needed for the banks to stay liquid (absent foreign funding sources and coming bonds maturities), so has to kill the economy to keep economy alive dilemma...

On fiscal side, things are ok-ish: "While the projected overall fiscal stance is appropriately neutral in 2015, the needed fiscal consolidation should resume in the following years… The proposed federal budget, which is consistent with the fiscal rule, envisions a loosening in 2015. However, this is offset by a tightening at the sub-federal levels. This strikes an appropriate balance between the need to consolidate in the medium term, with the non-oil deficit remaining near historical high, and the need for supportive fiscal policy in the face of the current downturn." And as I noted in the note linked above: "The use of the National Wealth Fund for domestic infrastructure projects may be appropriate to consider if done in the context of the budget process and subject to appropriate safeguards. The diversion of contributions from the fully-funded pillar weakens the viability of the pension system, creates disincentives to save, and dilutes the credibility of the fiscal rule."

On growth: "The economic outlook appears bleak. GDP is expected to grow by only 0.2 percent in 2014 and 0.5 percent in 2015." Not as gloomy as the World Bank but uuuuugly…
Drivers, predictably are:

  • "Consumption is expected to weaken as real wages and consumer credit growth moderate." No… wait… they are already weak and moderated… 
  • "Geopolitical tensions—including sanctions, counter-sanctions, and fear of their further escalation—are amplifying uncertainty, depressing confidence and investment. Capital outflows are expected to reach USD 100 billion in 2014 and moderate somewhat but remain high in 2015." Again, no surprises here.
  • "Inflation is projected to remain over 8 percent by the end of 2014 mostly due to an increase in food prices, caused by import restrictions, and depreciation of the ruble. In the absence of further policy actions, inflation is expected to stay above target in 2015." That we know too. No surprises here. 

On banks, pretty much same as I have been saying: "Increased oversight and heightened financial stability remain a priority. Banks and the corporate sector are facing a challenging environment due to the weak economy, limited access to external financing, and higher financing costs. Existing financial buffers together with appropriate policy responses by the CBR have limited financial instability thus far. Nonetheless, the current uncertain environment could create difficulties in individual banks and businesses, even in the near term. In case of acute liquidity pressures, emergency facilities should be temporarily offered to eligible counterparties, against appropriate collateral, priced to be solely attractive during stress periods."

On structural side, I would have expected more clarity. Instead, we have more generalities: "Despite the slowdown, the economy is expected to have limited excess capacity owing to structural impediments to growth… Even if [geopolitical] uncertainty dissipates next year, domestic demand and potential growth are projected to remain weak in the medium term due to insufficient investment and deterioration in productivity. Potential growth is projected to be about 1.2 percent in 2015, reaching 1.8 percent in 2019, with downside risks. Structural reforms are needed to provide appropriate incentives to expand investment and allocate resources to enhance efficiency. Protecting investors, reducing trade barriers, fighting corruption, reinvigorating the privatization agenda, improving competition and the business climate, and continuing efforts at global integration remain crucial to revive growth."

Then again, all this you could have heard at our briefing breakfast for IRBA… to stay ahead of the IMF analysis… 

Monday, September 8, 2014

8/9/2014: Russia's Agrifood Sector: In Need of Serious Investment


In a recent note on the state of Russian economy (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/08/2882014-state-of-russian-economy.html) I wrote about the need for significant increases in investment in logistics and SCM in agri-food sectors in Russia. Here is the latest Government view on the subject: http://en.itar-tass.com/economy/748513

My estimation is that to effectively develop production of substitutes for banned imports, Russia will require much more significant allocations. Production supports alone will have to rise by USD2.3 billion by Russian Ministry of Agriculture estimates starting with 2015 (Minister Nikolai Fyodorov's own estimate back in late August was for USD3.8 billion), on top of USD5.4 billion already budgeted for annual supports for 2013-2020 development. But investments in food processing, storage and transport capabilities will also be required. My estimate is that the rate of investment in auxiliary capabilities to accompany production expansion will have to run at least at 50% of the agricultural supports and this implies annual investment of ca USD3-4 billion. This comes on top of recent surveys, conducted prior to the onset of the sanctions, which put Russian logistics and SCM markets at the top of global growth curve (here is a slide on the sector potential from my earlier presentation deck):



The opportunity space in these areas is huge. And the market itself offers so much potential that faced with imports bans, producers are still attempting to maintain their long-term relations, as suggested by this article: http://en.itar-tass.com/economy/748296.



Wednesday, August 6, 2014

6/8/2014: Italy's New Old Recession...


In Q1 2014, Italian GDP shrunk 0.1%, in Q2 2014 it fell 0.2% just as all indicators were suggesting that the Italian economy was starting to regain some growth momentum.

Meanwhile, latest data for new orders in Germany posted a fall of 3.2% in June compared to May.

Much has been made of the effects of Russia-EU trade sanctions on both figures. And much has been made of the effects of slower global growth on both figures. Little has been made of the fact that absent foreigners' demand for European goods, there is no real growth in Europe. That is because this fact hides horrific truth - European consumers and households have been hit by a freight train of banks bailouts, Government deficits adjustments and the need to support EU and national politically connected cronies - corporate, sectoral and individual. While pensions provisions for currently working middle classes shrink, taxes rise, indirect taxes, crates and levies climb sky high, there is hardly any decline in subsidies pots distributed by Europe to predominantly wealthy landowners, industrialists and an entire class of NGOs/R&D/Social Enterprises.

Thus, European investors' confidence is a feeble organism so vulnerable to shocks that a war in Ukraine's East can knock it out of its tracks. Thus, the only hope still remaining in European capitals is for the ECB to prime the proverbial printer. On the eve of the ECB monthly interest-rate-setting meeting, European banks still prefer to lend to the Governments rather than to the real companies. Why? May be it is because of some technical mumbo-jumbo of 'markets fragmentation' or may be it is because the real economy is left holding the bag for banks bailouts and Governments bailouts and cronies bailouts and as the result, European producers need Russian, Ukrainian, Chinese, Turkish and so on consumers?

Spanish economy, in contrast with Italian, posted 0.6% growth in GDP, but much of this (and previous 3 quarters) growth is down to the rate of economic activity destruction in previous years.

Meanwhile, Bundesbank is prepping the public to what might be a lacklustre growth release for Q2 figures due on August 14. Consumer and producer confidence indicators in Germany are pointing to a slowdown in economic activity there. Ifo German business sentiment indicator posted three consecutive months of declines in July 2014, falling to the levels last seen in October 2013. German investor confidence index published by ZEW has been now on the decline for seven consecutive months.

All in, the much-publicised recovery in euro area economy remains fragile and prone to reversals on foot of external shocks. Meanwhile, internal growth dynamics remain weak and unyielding to the PR blitz promoting the reversals of the crisis. Italy is just a proverbial canary in the mine… the only question is whether it is motionless from something that hit it before it was brought to the ICU in 2013, or from something new it caught in the ICU… 

Wednesday, July 30, 2014

29/7/2014: Pause that hype about Russian reserves draining... for now


There is a lot of media 'noise' around Russia's foreign exchange reserves and the alleged links to sanctions as a causative driver for, what some report as dramatic, declines in Russian reserves.

Here is analysis of the official data.

Two charts first:

Total reserves:



As of the week of July 18, 2014, these stand at 472,500 million USD, down 4.2% on March 1, 2014 (20 days before the first round of sanctions announcements) and down 7.3% on January 1, 2014 (time around which the crisis in Ukraine started to take on sinister character, threatening directly the previous regime and drawing Moscow into it). Year on year the reserves are down 8%, which means that:

  1. Only around 1/2 of the entire decline in reserves can be linked to sanctions; and
  2. The declines down to sanctions were hardly dramatic.
The above (and below) does not deal with changes in foreign exchange valuations or gold price valuations, which can be significantly more than 4-8% swings in the recorded reserves.

Now, onto composition of reserves:



Table below summarises movements in all reserves (we only have official data through July 1, 2014 so far):


Note that while Russian reserves declined on foreign exchange side, they rose on gold side, so the net (combined) effect is shown in the last column of the table. At very worst, sanctions can account for roughly 3% decline in reserves. Again, hardly 'dramatic'.

I will update the above once August 1 data is out.

Update: Here is a chart plotting evolution of Russia's gold reserves:


Tuesday, July 29, 2014

29/7/2014: Latest Round of EU Sanctions: Mirroring the U.S. and upping the ante...


EU finally agreed on the new round of sanctions against Russia - the full document is available here: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/144159.pdf

"In order to restrict Russia's access to EU capital markets, EU nationals and companies may no more buy or sell new bonds, equity or similar financial instruments with a maturity exceeding 90 days, issued by state-owned Russian banks, development banks, their subsidiaries and those acting on their behalf. Services related to the issuing of such financial instruments, e.g. brokering, are also prohibited." This is basically symmetric to the previous US sanctions (see: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/07/1772014-more-russia-sanctions-same.html note: updated link to US sanctions here: http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/jl2572.aspx) though EU sanctions are covering all "state-owned Russian banks, development banks, their subsidiaries" not just those covered in the US sanctions.

"In addition, an embargo on the import and export of arms and related material from/to Russia was agreed. It covers all items on the EU common military list." These involve military equipment and equipment modified for military use, albeit some Mercedes G-Wagon retrofits, favoured by Russian vintage mafiosi, might qualify as well. Maybachs with protective plating will probably escape, unless someone orders an all-wheel-drive one...

"…prohibition on exports of dual use goods and technology for military use in Russia or to Russian military end-users." These are problematic as the lists are more ambiguous and broader. I am not an expert on this subject, but overall, such blanket prohibitions under what often amounts to relatiist testing procedures can have a much broader impact than intended.

"Finally, exports of certain energy-related equipment and technology to Russia will be subject to prior authorisation by competent authorities of Member States. Export licenses will be denied if products are destined for deep water oil exploration and production, arctic oil exploration or production and shale oil projects in Russia." This is symmetric to the US sanctions. It is interesting to note that the sanctions are designed specifically to hurt Russian energy sector in areas where the sector competes head-on with US and Canada: shale oil and arctic oil. On-shore traditional oil is not impacted.

Materially, and speaking strictly personally, I do not expect the new round of sanctions to have a direct impact on Irish bilateral trade with Russia, relating to goods, but we can see significant impact on transactions via IFSC (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/07/2172014-sources-of-fdi-into-russia-2007.html). You can see breakdown of goods flows with Russia here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/07/1772014-irish-bilateral-trade-in-goods.html. The impact is intended, as in the case of the US sanctions, to be longer-term, restricting funding opportunities for major Russian companies and reducing their free cash flows (by forcing them to use cash flow to close off maturing debt). Ironically, also in the longer term, this can lead to Russian companies issuing more equity and debt domestically, deepening domestic financial markets, and carrying less debt overall, making their balancesheets stronger. The short-term impact is likely to be reputational and risk-related as some exporters and investors will opt to stay out of the Russian market in fear of future additional sanctions and faced with a prospect of dealing with EU and US bureaucracy (not to mention the prospect of dealing with their Russian counterparts).

On a geopolitical note, the sanctions are now starting to ramp up pressure on Russian leadership. What the reaction might be is anyone's guess, but I suspect we are not likely to see major and rapid de-escalation soon (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/07/2872014-double-up-or-stay-course-in.html). Which is not a good outcome for all parties concerned and especially for the Ukrainian people.


Updated: the US has now matched the broader EU sanctions: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/29/us-ukraine-crisis-sanctions-obama-idUSKBN0FY27Q20140729?utm_source=twitter U.S. sanctions on banks remain in the area of funding, but not in the area of transactions.


Thursday, July 17, 2014

17/7/2014: More Russia Sanctions, Same Pains, Same Strategies


Another set of sanctions and another tumble in Russian shares. This time around, sanctions have impacted major Russian companies with significant ties to the global economy. However, no broad sectoral sanctions were introduced.

The following companies are hit:

  • Rosneft - largest oil producer in Russia
  • Gazprombank - largest bank in Russia outside retail sector
  • VEB - Vnesheconombank 
  • Novatek - largest independent natural gas producer
  • Federal State Unitary Enterprise State Research And Production Enterprise Bazalt, 
  • Feodosia Oil Products Supply Company (in Crimea)
  • Radio-Electronic Technologies Concern KRET 
  • Concern Sozvezdie
  • Military-Industrial Corporation NPO Mashinostroyenia  
  • Defense Consortium Almaz-Antey
  • Kalashnikov Concern
  • KBP Instrument Design Bureau
  • Research and Production Corporation Uralvagonzavod 

Full list here: http://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/ssinew14.pdf

The U.S. Treasury Department said that under new sanctions, the U.S. companies are only prohibited from dealing in "new debt of longer than 90 days maturity or new equity" with the listed non-defence firms. There are no asset freezes, no prohibitions or restrictions on export/import transactions. The sanctions do not impact U.S. and other multinationals' work in Russia, unless Moscow retaliates with such measures (which is unlikely).

This contrasts with previous sanctions under which sanctioned companies were prevented from conducting any transactions, including export/import and clearing with the U.S. firms.

So we are having a clear attempt to undercut some Russian companies' access to the U.S. debt and equity markets, while preserving their ability to trade.

VEB will unlikely feel the pinch. The bank converted the National Wealth Fund deposits into capital recently, so it can offset the shortfall on foreign funding.

Gazprombank is a different issue. Last month, Gazprombank raised EUR1 billion at 4% pa in the foreign markets via a bond sale on the Irish Stock Exchange. Gazprombank has one of the largest exposures to international funding markets of all other Russian financial institutions - it has 78 outstanding eurobond issues demented in a number of currencies. So the real problem with the sanctions is that they may open the way for EU to follow, which can shut Gazprombank from the Euro-denominated debt markets too.

When it comes to Rosneft, sanctions are weak. The U.S. simply cannot afford shutting flows of Russian gas and oil to global markets. Reason? Imagine what oil price will be at, if Rosneft was restricted from trading. The company is responsible for roughly 40% of the total Russian oil production which runs at around 10.5-10.9 million barrels per day. Get Rosneft supply access cut and you have an equivalent of entire Iraq's 2013 output (that's right - total output of Iraq is lower than that of Rosneft alone) drained from the global production. Rosneft pumps more oil than Canada and more than double the output of Norway.

You can read on geopolitics of Russian oil & gas here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/07/1772014-geopolitics-of-russian-gas-oil.html

The real target of the sanctions are pre-paid contracts that Rosneft and Novatek have on future supplies of oil and gas. These are de facto forward loans, repayable with future oil and gas supplies. Rosneft exposure to these currently sits at around USD15 billion. Another target: long term funding for energy companies. Rosneft raised USD30 billion in two loans in 2012 and 2013, in part to co-fund buyout of TNK-BP which cost Rosneft USD55 billion in 2013.

In reality, while short- and medium-term borrowing costs for two Russian energy companies is likely to rise, the effect in the longer term will be to push more and more trade and finance away from the U.S. dollar and U.S. markets. Plenty of potential substitutes are open: Hong Kong and Singapore being the most obvious ones. London is a less likely target. For example, in June partially state-owned UK Lloyds Bank cancelled a USD2 billion prepayment facility with Rosneft. The loser is, of course, Lloyds as it foregoes substantial revenues, while Rosneft can secure (albeit also at a price) similar funding from any number of larger trading companies it deals with, e.g. Glencore, Vitol or Trafigura.

Bloomberg covers some of the immediate reactions in corporate debt markets here: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-17/rosneft-bonds-sink-most-on-record-as-sanctions-shut-debt-markets.html

All in, there is still ca USD60 billion worth of maturing corporate debt that Russian companies need to roll over before the end of 2014. This is a bit of a tight spot for Russian economy going forward, but it can be offset by releasing some of the liquidity accumulated on Russian banks balance sheets in 2013.


There is a bit of a silver lining for Russia from the U.S. sanctions too. To-date, higher oil prices worldwide (primarily driven by the Middle East mess, but now also with a support from the latest Russia sanctions) pushed up Federal Budget surplus to 1.4% of GDP (see latest arithmetic here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/07/1772014-geopolitics-of-russian-gas-oil.html) over January-May 2014. This means Moscow can afford a bit more of a stimulus this year, offsetting any sanctions-related adverse effects on its economy in the short run.

On another positive side, sanctions have triggered renewed interest in Moscow in developing domestic enterprises with a view of creating a buffer for imports risks (http://en.itar-tass.com/world/741073). Imports substitution is a norm for Russian economy during strong devaluations of the ruble. This time around, we can expect a push toward more domestic investment and enterprise development to drive imports substitution growth to compensate not for Forex changes, but for the risks of deeper and broader sanctions in the future.


So I would re-iterate my previously made call: 

  1. Russian economy is in a short- medium-term decline in terms of growth
  2. Growth slowdown is compounded by rising borrowing costs and adverse news flow
  3. With correct course of actions (monetary & fiscal policies and potentially some regulatory changes), Moscow can steer the economy into recovery in 2015
  4. Ukraine crisis abating during the rest of 2014 is likely to support (3) above

All of the above suggest the markets will be oversold by the time Russian equities corrections hit 8-10% mark, assuming, of course, no further escalation in Ukraine (both with and without Russian influence, Ukraine's internal problems have now been firmly pushed by the EU into Russian domain).

There has been no cardinal change in the Western strategy with respect to Ukraine (support at any cost of Poroshenko push East) and with respect to Russia (blame at any opportunity for anything happening in Ukraine). The latest sanctions are simply a replay of the previous ones, which means that the U.S. is relatively satisfied with the progress in Ukraine, while the EU has moved to the back seat, having finalised the association agreement and unwilling to expand on this.


As a side note: there are implications building up for Western companies, relating to the U.S. and EU sanctions:


On political front, here is an interesting report on President Putin approval ratings: http://en.itar-tass.com/russia/740817. I have not seen the original study cited in the report, yet.