Showing posts with label Nama SPV. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Nama SPV. Show all posts

Wednesday, January 5, 2011

05/01/2011: Exchequer returns - part 1

So the Exchequer returns are out and I will blog on these in detail over the next couple of days with in-depth annual data analysis. In the mean time, let's take a quick look at the official statement. Couple of things - other than headline figures - come to the forefront:
1) Minister Lenihan statement, and
2) Nama news

First, Minister statement (emphasis and commentary are mine):
"On the spending side, overall net voted expenditure at €46.4 billion was over €700 million below the level recorded in 2009, reflecting the ongoing tight control of public spending. While day-to-day spending was marginally ahead of target in the year, this is due to a shortfall in Departmental receipts rather than overruns in spending.

[In fact, DofF data shows that overall spending savings this year relative to 2009 were €729mln, consisting of a cut of €990mln on capital spending side and an overspend of €261mln on current spending side. This, by any possible means, does not constitute any real 'tight control' over public spending. In fact, the net savings achieved in 2010 on 2009 amount to 0.463% of GDP. Given the Government is aiming to cut some 7% off 2014 GDP in deficit reductions through 2014, this means that at the pace of 2010 'tight control' savings, Minister Lenihan's budgetary measures can be expected to deliver 3% deficit in 20.1 years or by 2031, not by 2014.

Or let my suggest the following arithmetic Minister Lenihan should have engaged in in judging his own performance (remember, 'tight control' is something he was supposed to deliver over the last 3 years and 4 Budgets): if we take an increase from the average bond yields of 2009 to the average bond yields of 2010,
  • In the course of 2010, the interest cost of financing our 2010 deficit, rose by ca €750mln;
  • In the course of 2010, Minister Lenihan achieved net savings of €729mln
  • Conclusion: Minister Lenihan's 'tight control' doesn't even cover the rising interest rate bill on our deficits, let alone our debt!]

... The Government has consistently identified export-led growth as the strategy that will return this economy to growth and generate jobs. This strategy is working thanks to the improvement of competitiveness, and the flexibility and adaptability of the Irish economy. Exports in 2010 were at an all time high and represented growth of 6.2% on 2009. This strong performance was particularly positive in the manufacturing and agri-food sectors.

[So Minister Lenihan has 'identified' export-led growth as the strategy to deliver on 2014 fiscal targets. This is true. Achieving 3% deficit in 2014, per Government own white paper for 2011-2014 (I refuse to call this fiction a National Recovery Plan), will require creation of 300,000 exporting jobs. Now, using past historical data, creation of 300,000 exporting jobs in 4 years will require a 50% increase in overall exports, implying an annual average growth rate in exports of ca 10.8%. Every year, folks. Not 6.2% achieved in 2010 that delivered historically high levels of exports of €161 billion, but 10.8%. You be the judge how realistic Government's fiction is.]

Now on to Nama-related news.

Cornerturned blog has posted on the change in Nama ownership from 49% State-owned to only around 33% State-owned. This constitutes a public asset give away to private shareholders in Nama SPV - aka 3 Irish banks. Nama is now maximising returns rather than repairing the banking system, this implies that the latest change of ownership structure is indeed a transfer of an asset.

However, even more revealing is the charade that this latest twist in Nama situation reveals. Per latest change, Nama is now owned (67%) by banks, of which one is outright owned by the taxpayer, another has significant taxpayer stake and the third - well, the third will probably also require taxpayer equity injections at certain point in time. Two of these banks have received state aid which was also used to 'invest' in Nama SPV. Hence we have:
  1. Taxpayers pay banks to 'invest' in Nama SPV and 'invest' in the SPV directly as well via Exchequer 49% stake;
  2. Nama uses taxpayers money to 'repair' the banks;
  3. Taxpayers write off part of their share in favor of banks which are themselves on life support courtesy of taxpayers funds;
  4. Banks - not taxpayers - will reap any potential upside from the SPV.
Which means, really, that in Nama SPV we have an Enron-ized Parmalat - dodgy accounting tricks used to conceal the real nature of ownership leading to a reverse commissariamento disclosed today... Well done, lads.

Friday, April 30, 2010

Economics 30/04/2010: Minister Lenihan's statements in the Dail

Some interesting points on Nama, coming out of Minister Lenihan's answers to Dail questions this Wednesday, April 28 (emphasis is mine):

"The NAMA SPV structure has a subscribed capital of €100m. As explained to the Dail at the time of the legislation, and subsequently agreed with the EU, 49% of this capital was advanced by NAMA and 51% by private investors.


Three private investors, namely, Irish Life Investment Managers, New Ireland Assurance and a group of clients of Allied Irish Banks Investment Managers, have each invested €17m in the vehicle. It is important to note that in each case the beneficial owners of the investment are pension funds or other clients of these investment companies and not the parent credit institution.
[It is equally important to note that in each case the full owner of each one of these entities is an institution directly involved either in Nama or in Banks Guarantee scheme, which, of course, under normal rules of engagement would imply potential conflict of interest]

The SPV has been established in accordance with Eurostat rules. The Board of the SPV is chaired by the CEO of NAMA and has three NAMA nominated directors with the private investors retaining the right to nominate a further three directors. Thus the SPV is structured in such a manner that NAMA representatives will maintain an effective veto over decisions of the SPV Board. [Thus the so-called 'veto' is a de facto, not de jure. Should one of the Nama representatives on the board fall ill, be delayed in travel or be absent on some state-sponsored junket, in absence of the said member, it is quite possible - even if only in theory - that the veto power can pass over to the 'private' owners of SPV.]

Further:

"
In line with my statement to the House on 30 March on the banking situation, I subsequently issued Promissory Notes on 31 March to Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide Building Society. These Notes will ensure that both institutions continue to meet their regulatory capital requirements. The initial principal amount of the Note that issued to Anglo Irish Bank is €8.3bn and to INBS it is €2.6bn. As I indicated in my recent statement, it is likely that Anglo will need further capital in due course but the extent and timing of such further support remains to be determined.

The terms of the Promissory Notes that issued to both institutions on 31 March are substantively the same and, inter alia, provide that 10% of the principal amount will, if demanded by the institution, be paid each year and that the first such payment will fall due for payment from the Central Fund on 31 March 2011. An annual interest coupon, related to Government bond yields, is also payable on the Promissory Notes which the Minister has absolute discretion to pay on the due date or to add to the principal amount. [So, in contradiction to the deeply-informed Dara O'Brien TD, it is the state who will be paying interest to the banks. Not the other way around]

This ensures that the Note meets accounting requirements to be “fair valued” at the principal amount in the annual accounts of each institution, consistent with the regulatory capital requirements. [This sentence is an example of Minister's habitual abuse of financial terminology, in so far as it makes absolutely no rational sense to anyone even vaguely familiar with finance. 'Fair valued' must refer to a benchmark, being a comparative/relative term. 'Fair valued at the principal amount' is gobbledygook as principal amount - the face value of the bond/note can only be valued in relation to the price of the bond or yield on the bond, none of which are referenced in Minister's statement. Furthermore, fair value concept does not refer to the regulator capital requirements. It refers only - I repeat, only - to the market value of the bond/note.]

In the event of a winding-up of either institution, the aggregate of the outstanding principal amount and any unpaid interest that has accrued on the institution’s Note falls due for immediate payment. [So, at least in theory, the Exchequer might face an immediate call for billions of euros in cash... what provisions have been made to ensure we will have this covered? How will Minister Lenihan be able to raise such funding even if the economy is not in crisis? What will be the additional cost of having to raise such funding in a fire-issue of a new state bond? Has the Minister established adequate pricing scheme to charge the banks for the taxpayers assuming such a risk or has he 'gifted' this risk premium away, thereby potentially exposing taxpayers to added hundreds of millions in new costs of such emergency issuance?]


The Deputy may also wish to note that, as indicated in my banking statement of 30 March, the use of Promissory Notes means that the institution’s capital requirements are met in a way which spreads the cash payments over a number of years and thereby reduces the funding burden on the Exchequer that would otherwise arise in the current year. [This statement clearly shows that Minister Lenihan does not understand the basics of interest rate/yield curve relationships. He implicitly assumes that in the future, the state borrowing costs will be lower than they are today. There is absolutely no reason for such an assumption.]

Tuesday, October 20, 2009

Economics 21/10/2009: Ireland = the most leveraged SPV on Earth?

And so we now learn than Nama beast has mutated into a high-risk derivative game with ghost investors, imaginary assets and illusionary payoffs. We are, for all intent and purpose, in the BaNama Republic.


Here is the story: per Annex H of the original statement of intent to establish Nama (April Supplementary Budget 2009 : here), the state will set up a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to issue bonds (Nama bonds) that will be guaranteed by the State. Per Eurostat analysis (here) these bonds will not be counted as Irish Government debt.


First point to be made – we are now the first developed country in history that is about to throw the weight of its entire economy behind a private undertaking of extremely risky financial engineering nature.



€54bn worth of Nama Bonds will be issued by this SPV. SPV will be 51% owned by private equity investors who will supply €51mln worth of capital. Total capital base of SPV will be €100mln. This SPV will be borrowing (by issuing bonds) €54bn – which means that on day 1 of its running, the SPV will be 54,000% leveraged or geared. This will imply that Irish Nama-SPV will be leveraged in excess of LTCM – the infamously riskiest of all major investment propositions that anyone saw in financial history before Nama SPV idea came to being.


Point two: the Irish state will be engaged in the riskiest derivative instrument undertaking of all known to man to date.



To cover up the farcical arrangement (with folks with €51mln buying €77bn worth of risky (but recoverable, by Minister Lenihan’s assertions) assets), maximum 10% of SPV value can be distributed in profits. 10% of what you might ask?


CSO submission to Eurostat states that: “The profits earned by the SPV will be distributed to the shareholders according to the following arrangement, which reflects the fact that the debt issued by the Master SPV will be guaranteed by the Irish Government:

  • The equity investors will receive an annual dividend linked to the performance of the Master SPV.
  • On winding up of the Master SPV, the equity investors will only be repaid their capital if the Master SPV has the resources; they will receive a further equity bonus of 10% of the capital if the Master SPV makes a profit.
  • All other profits and gains of the Master SPV will accrue to NAMA.”

Two possibilities: 10% of expected (by DofF) Nama profits or 10% of Nama assets?


In the unlikely event of 10% of assets, the lucky ‘private equity’ folks can get 10%*€54bn*51% share – or €2.754bn – on the original investment of €51mln. They face no downside other than their initial capital injection less whatever dividends they collect prior to default, as bonds are guaranteed by the State. I assume this is a fantasy land. But one cannot make any rational assumptions about Nama anymore.


In a more likely event, it will be 10% of Nama profits. Ok, per DofF, Present Value of Nama profit is €4.7bn * 10% * 51% = €239.7mln. With principal repayment this means they will collect a cool €291mln on day last of Nama existence if DofF projections stack up.


We know nothing about the dividends, but we do know that the dividends will be paid out over 10 years. For some sort of decorum the Irish Government will have to allow SPV to appear to be legitimate and therefore it will allow it to pay a dividend on assets managed. Suppose the dividend will be around ½ of the standard management fee for assets, or roughly 100bps on revenue generating loans or 2.5% on net cash flow. Per DofF Table 5 of Nama business plan, this will add up to €12bn*1%*51%=€61.2mln using the first method or €61mln computed using the second method. In present value terms. Thus €51mln in initial investment will generate:


Scenario 1 – Nama works out per DofF assumptions = €352mln (inclusive of principal) – a handy return over 10 years of 690% or 21.3% annualized. Not bad for a government guaranteed scheme…


Scenario 2 - Nama loses money and is pronounced insolvent. Investors lose €51ml of original investment, but keep €61mln in dividends. 100% security, 0% risk...


Which brings us to the third point: as Irish taxpayers, we are now in a business of paying handsome returns to private equity folks (more on those below) in exchange for them covering up the true nature of our public finances. A good one, really.



Who owns this SPV? This is an open question. 51% will be held by ‘private investors’. 49% by Nama. 100% of liability will be held by you and me. Is this a Government throwing the entire weight of the sovereign state behind a privately held investment scheme? You bet.


But wait. Who are those ‘private investors’? Can Sean Fitzpatrick be one of them? Why not? Of course he can. Can Ireland’s non-resident non-taxpayers be amongst these? Why not? Of course they can. So as taxpayers we will be issuing a guarantee to tax exiles? Possibly. But wait, it gets even better – can the banks themselves be investors in SPV? Well, of course they can. Wouldn’t that be a farce – banks get to unload toxic waste on taxpayers and then make a tidy profit on doing so…


One way or another – parents struggling to put their kids through schools, elderly people struggling to pay medical care costs, single parents trying to balance work and raising family, young folks studying to better their lives – all of them and all of the rest of us will be bearing 95% responsibility of assuring that some ‘private investors’ will make a nice tidy profit, so Minister Lenihan and Taoiseach Cowen can go around the world claiming that Irish bonds that underpinned Nama were not really Irish bonds!


Which brings us to the fourth point: Why is Eurostat assured by this massive deception scheme to accept it?



Globally, G20 summits one after another have been focusing on how we will have to deal with the risks of the traditional SPVs and other ‘alternative investment’ assets classes that spectacularly imploded during the current crisis. Yet here, in a Eurozone country, a Government is actively setting up the most leveraged, highest risk SPV known to humankind. Surely there is a case to be made that the EU authorities should be actively stopping such reckless financial engineering instead of encouraging it?


The entire SPV trickery works because the Government has managed to convince the Eurostat that SPV will be fully operationally independent of the state. So far so good. But, Nama will sit on the board with a right of veto over SPV managerial and operational decisions: “The NAMA representatives on the Board will maintain a veto over all decisions of the Board that could affect the interests of NAMA or of the Irish Government.” Furthermore, Minister Lenihan and his successors will have veto power over Nama decisions and will be the final arbiters of Nama. Is that arms-length getting to finger-length?



At this point, there is only one institution still standing between the madness of the runaway train of Nama and the crash site of the SPV-high leveraged high finance gables with taxpayers money. That institution is ECB. The ECB will have to be concerned with non-transparent (Enron-like) accounting procedures that are being created by the Irish Government when it comes to accounting for Nama bonds. It has to be concerned if only for the sake of the Eurozone stability and its own reputational capital. Will ECB step in and tell this Government that enough is enough?