Showing posts with label Knightian uncertainty. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Knightian uncertainty. Show all posts

Thursday, July 20, 2017

20/7/17: U.S. Institutions: the Less Liberal, the More Trusted


In my recent working paper (see http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2017/06/27617-millennials-support-for-liberal.html) I presented some evidence of a glacial demographically-aligned shift in the Western (and U.S.) public views of liberal democratic values. Now, another small brick of evidence to add to the roster:
The latest public opinion poll in the U.S. suggests that out of four 'net positively-viewed' institutions of the society, American's prefer coercive and non-democratic (in terms of internal governance - hierarchical and command-based) institutions most: the U.S. Military and the FBI. as well as the U.S. Federal Reserve. Note: the four are U.S. military, the FBI and the Supreme Court and the Fed are all institutions that are not open to influence from external debates and are driven by command-enforcement systems of decision making and/or implementation. Whilst they serve democratic system of the U.S. institutions, they are  subject to severely restricted extent of liberal checks and balances.

Beyond this, considering net-disfavoured institutions, executive powers (less liberty-based) of the White House are less intensively disliked compared to more liberty-based Congress.

Tuesday, June 27, 2017

27/6/17: Millennials’ Support for Liberal Democracy is Failing


New paper is now available at SSRN: "Millennials’ Support for Liberal Democracy is Failing. An Investor Perspective" (June 27, 2017): https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2993535.


Recent evidence shows a worrying trend of declining popular support for the traditional liberal democracy across a range of Western societies. This decline is more pronounced for the younger cohorts of voters. The prevalent theories in political science link this phenomena to a rise in volatility of political and electoral outcomes either induced by the challenges from outside (e.g. Russia and China) or as the result of the aftermath of the recent crises. These views miss a major point: the key drivers for the younger generations’ skepticism toward the liberal democratic values are domestic intergenerational political and socio-economic imbalances that engender the environment of deep (Knightian-like) uncertainty. This distinction – between volatility/risk framework and the deep uncertainty is non-trivial for two reasons: (1) policy and institutional responses to volatility/risk are inconsistent with those necessary to address rising deep uncertainty and may even exacerbate the negative fallout from the ongoing pressures on liberal democratic institutions; and (2) investors cannot rely on traditional risk management approaches to mitigate the effects of deep uncertainty. The risk/volatility framework view of the current political trends can result in amplification of the potential systemic shocks to the markets and to investors through both of these factors simultaneously. Despite touching on a much broader set of issues, this note concludes with a focus on investment strategy that can mitigate the rise of deep political uncertainty for investors.


Monday, January 16, 2017

15/1/17: 2016 was a year of records-breaking policy uncertainty in Europe


When it comes to economic policy uncertainty, 2016 was a bad year for the Big 4 European states, except for one: Italy.


Consider the above chart showing indices of Economic Policy Uncertainty across Europe's Big Four states, as represented by period averages across four main periods, plus 2016.

German economic policy uncertainty rose from 87.9 average for the period of 2002-2007 to 144.5 for the period of 2008-2011 and 152.1 over 2012-2015. In 2016, the index averaged 230.5. While not in itself indicative of a crisis, the trajectory is consistent with systemic rise in uncertainty, especially since 2016 was not a political outlier year (there were no major elections or external shocks, other than shocks related to German policy itself, such as the refugees crisis). That German index increase took place during one of the strongest years for growth and employment is, in itself, quite revealing.

Like Germany, France also experienced increases in uncertainty index over the recent years, with index rising from 109.7 in 2002-2007 period to 189.2 average over the period of 2008-2011 and to 235.6 over the years 2012-2015. In 2016, the index averaged 309.6. Once again, as in the Germany's case, there were no external or political catalysts to this, other than the dynamics of internal / domestic policies. And, as in the German case, economic cycles cannot explain this rise either. Thus, it is quite reasonable to conclude that systemic uncertainty is rising within the French society at large.

Perhaps surprisingly - given the outrun of the Italian Constitutional Referendum and the dire state of the Italian economy - Italy's Economic Policy Uncertainty Index has managed to eek out a small (statistically insignificant) reduction in 2016, falling to 129.3 in 2016 from 2012-2015 average of 130.9. However, December 2016 referendum is not fully factored in the 2016 average, yet (there are lags in Index adjustments and revisions that are yet to show up in the data), and both 2016 average and 2012-2015 average are well above 2008-2011 average of 113.7 and 2002-2007 average of 94.3.

Perhaps the only European country where index readings in 2016 can be clearly linked to internal structural shocks is the UK, where 2016 average index reading reached 528.8, compared to 2012-2015 average of 228.5. Chart below clearly shows that the increase in uncertainty started around the date of the Brexit referendum.


Overall, taken over longer term horizon, and smoothing out some occasionally impressive volatility, index averages across all four European economies shows structural increases in uncertainty relating to economic policy since the start of the Global Financial Crisis. These structural increases are not abating since the onset of economic recoveries and, as the result, suggest that the improvement in the European economies sustained since 2011 onward is not seen as being well anchored (or structurally sustainable) on the ground and amongst the newsmakers.

Wednesday, May 7, 2014

7/5/2014: Simple vs Complex Financial Regulation under Knightian Uncertainty

Bank of England published a very interesting paper on the balance of uncertainty associated with complex vs simplified financial regulation frameworks.

Titled "Taking uncertainty seriously: simplicity versus complexity in financial regulation" the paper was written by a team of researchers and published as Financial Stability Paper No. 28 – May 2014 (link: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Documents/fspapers/fs_paper28.pdf), the study draws distinction between risk and uncertainty, referencing "the psychological literature on heuristics to consider whether and when simpler approaches may outperform more complex methods for modelling and regulating the financial system".

The authors find that:
(i) "simple methods can sometimes dominate more complex modelling approaches for calculating banks’ capital requirements, especially if limited data are available for estimating models or the underlying risks are characterised by fat-tailed distributions";
(ii) "simple indicators often outperformed more complex metrics in predicting individual bank failure during the global financial crisis"; and
(iii) "when combining information from different indicators to predict bank failure, ‘fast-and-frugal’ decision trees can perform comparably to standard, but more information-intensive, regression techniques, while being simpler and easier to communicate".

The authors key starting point is that "financial systems are better
characterised by uncertainty than by risk because they are subject to so many unpredictable factors".

As the result, "simple approaches can usefully complement more complex ones and in certain circumstances less can indeed be more."

The drawback of the simple frameworks and regulatory rules is that they "may be vulnerable to gaming, circumvention and arbitrage. While this may be true, it should be emphasised that a simple approach does not necessarily equate to a singular focus on one variable such as leverage… [in other words, simple might not be quite simplistic] Moreover, given the private rewards at stake, financial market participants are always likely to seek to game financial regulations, however complex they may be. Such arbitrage may be particularly
difficult to identify if the rules are highly complex. By contrast, simpler approaches may facilitate the identification of gaming and thus make it easier to tackle."

Note, the above clearly puts significant weight on enforcement as opposed to pro-active regulating.

"Under complex rules, significant resources are also likely to be directed towards attempts at gaming and the regulatory response to check compliance. This race towards ever greater complexity may lead to wasteful, socially unproductive activity. It also creates bad incentives, with a variety of actors profiting from complexity at the expense of the deployment of economic resources for more productive activity."

The lesson of the recent past is exactly this: "These developments [growing complexity and increased capacity to game the system] may at least partially have contributed to the seeming decline in the economic efficiency of the financial system in developed countries, with the societal costs of running it growing over the past thirty years, arguably without any clear improvement in its ability to serve its productive functions in particular in relation to the successful allocation of an economy’s scarce investment capital (Friedman (2010))."

And the final drop: clarity of simple systems and implied improvement in transparency. "Simple approaches are also likely to have wider benefits by being easier to understand and communicate to key stakeholders. Greater clarity may contribute to superior decision making. For example, if senior management and investors have a better understanding of the risks that financial institutions face, internal governance and market discipline may both improve."

Top line conclusion: "Simple rules are not a panacea, especially in the face of regulatory arbitrage and an ever-changing financial system. But in a world characterised by Knightian uncertainty, tilting the balance away from ever greater complexity and towards simplicity may lead to better outcomes for society."