Showing posts with label Irish trade. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Irish trade. Show all posts

Saturday, July 27, 2019

27/7/19: A Cautionary Tale of Irish-UK Trade Numbers


Per recent discussion on Twitter, I decided to post some summary stats on changes in Irish total trade with the UK in recent years.

Here is the summary of period-averages for 2003-2017 data (note: pre-2003 data does not provide the same quality of coverage for Services trade and is harder to compare to more modern data vintage).


So, overall, across three periods (pre-Great Recession, 2003-2008), during the Great Recession (2009-2013) and in the current recovery period (2014-2017, with a caveat that annual data is only available through 2017 for all series), we have:

  • UK share of total exports and imports by Ireland in merchandise trade has fallen from an average annual share of 23.31 percent in pre-Great Recession period, to 18.06 percent in the post-crisis recovery period.
  • However, this decline in merchandise trade importance of the UK has been less than matched by a shallower drop in Services trade: UK share of total services exports and imports by Ireland has fallen from 64.86 percent in pre-crisis period to 62.97 percent in the recovery period.
  • Overall, taking in both exports and imports across both goods and services trade flows, UK share of Irish external trade has risen from 41.43 percent in the pre-crisis period to 45.4 percent in the current period.
  • Statistically, neither period is distinct from the overall historical average (based on 95% confidence intervals around the historical mean), which really means that all trends (in decline in the UK share in Goods & Services and in increase across all trade) are not statistically different from being... err... flat. 
  • Taken over shorter time periods, there has been a statistically significant decline in UK share of Merchandise trade in 2014-2017 relative to 2003-2005, but not in Services trade, and the increase in the UK share of Irish overall trade was also statistically significant over these period ranges. 
  • Overall, therefore, Total trade and Services trade trends are relatively weak, subject to volatility, while Merchandise trend is somewhat (marginally) more pronounced.
Here are annual stats plotted:

Using (for accuracy and consistency) CSO data on Irish trade (Services and Merchandise) by the size of enterprise (available only for 2017), the UK share of Irish trade is disproportionately more significant for SMEs:

In 2017, SMEs (predominantly Irish indigenous exporters and importers who are the largest contributors to employment in Ireland, and thus supporters of the total tax take - inclusive of payroll taxes, income taxes, corporate taxes, business rates etc) exposure to trade with the UK was 51.2 percent of total Irish exports and imports. For large enterprises, the corresponding importance of the UK as Ireland's trading partner was 13.62 percent. 

In reality, of course, Irish trade flows with the UK are changing. They are changing in composition and volumes, and they are reflecting general trends in the Irish economy's evolution and the strengthening of Irish trade links to other countries. These changes are good, when not driven by politics, nationalism, Brexit or false sense of 'political security' in coy Dublin analysts' brigades. Alas, with more than half of our SMEs trade flows being still linked to the UK, it is simply implausible to argue that somehow Ireland has been insulated from the UK trade shocks that may arise from Brexit. Apple's IP, Facebook's ad revenues, and Google's clients lists royalties, alongside aircraft leasing revenues and assets might be insulated just fine. Real jobs and real incomes associated with the SMEs trading across the UK/NI-Ireland border are not.

Whilst a few billion of declines in the FDI activity won't change our employment rosters much, 1/10th of that drop in the SMEs' exports or imports will cost some serious jobs pains, unless substituted by other sources for trade. And anyone who has ever been involved in exporting and/or importing knows: substitution is a hard game in the world of non-commodities trade.

Monday, April 13, 2015

13/4/15: Dublin Port Shipments at New Record in Q1 2015


Some strong growth numbers for Dublin Port volumes in Q1 2015:

Per Dublin Port, the volume shipped now 3% ahead of previous record set in 2007.

Friday, March 13, 2015

13/3/15: Irish Bilateral Trade in Goods with BRIC: 2014


Full year 2014 data on Irish bilateral trade in goods with the BRIC countries is showing some interesting changes to historical patterns worth highlighting. Let's start with country-specific analysis:

Russia: 


Irish exports to Russia (goods only) reached EUR722 million in 2014, up 13.3% y/y from EUR637 million in 2013. Over the last five years, Irish exports to Russia almost doubled, rising 198%. Russia now accounts for 21.6% of Ireland's total exports to BRIC economies, up from 8.2% in 2009. Trade balance with Russia (goods only) has risen more modestly to EUR496 million, up just 1.43%, marking the second highest bilateral trade balance with Russia (the highest one was achieved in 2012 at EUR503 million). Still, Ireland's trade balance with Russia is the largest for all BRIC and Irish exports to Russia now exceeds the combined exports from Ireland to Brazil and India for the fourth year in a row. Over the last 5 years, cumulative trade in goods surplus in favour of Ireland in trade with Russia stands at EUR2.085 billion.

Brazil:


Irish exports to Brazil fell from EUR262 million in 2013 to EUR256 million in 2014 (a drop of 2.3% that effectively reverses the rise of 2.34% recorded in 2013). As the result, 2014 exports to Brazil exactly matched EUR256 million level of exports achieved in 2013. Over the last 5 years, Irish exports to Brazil have grown only 21.2% cumulatively - the second worst performance in BRIC. As the result of sharper contraction in imports, Irish trade balance with Brazil actually managed to improve in 2014. 2014 trade in goods surplus for Ireland's trade with Brazil was EUR97 million as opposed to a deficit of EUR12 million recorded in 2013 and a deficit of EUR260 million recorded in 2012. Over the last 5 years, cumulative trade in goods deficit against Ireland in trade with Brazil stands at EUR7.9 million.


India:


Irish exports to India fell from EUR304 million in 2013 to EUR248 million in 2014 (a drop of 18.4% that significantly reverses the rise of 29.4% recorded in 2013). As the result, 2014 exports to India almost matched EUR235 million level of exports achieved in 2013. Over the last 5 years, Irish exports to India have grown only 56.5% cumulatively - the second best performance in BRIC after Russia. As the result of a small rise in imports, Irish trade balance with India actually managed to deteriorate in 2014. 2014 trade in goods deficit for Ireland's trade with India was EUR154 million as opposed to a deficit of EUR83 million recorded in 2013 and a deficit of EUR130 million recorded in 2012. 2014 was the worst deficit year in our bilateral trade with India since the data on bilateral trade became available in 1998. Over the last 5 years, cumulative trade in goods deficit against Ireland in trade with India stands at EUR673.7 million.


China:

Irish exports to China rose from EUR1,941 million in 2013 to EUR2,111 million in 2014 (a rise of 8.8% that largely reverses the fall of 10.4% recorded in 2013). As the result, 2014 exports to China almost matched EUR2,167 million level of exports achieved in 2013. Over the last 5 years, Irish exports to China have shrunk by 9.4% cumulatively - the worst performance in BRIC. Adding insult to the injury, as the result of a small rise in imports, Irish trade balance with China actually managed to deteriorate in 2014. 2014 trade in goods deficit for Ireland's trade with China was EUR1,370 million as opposed to a deficit of EUR1,150 million recorded in 2013 and a deficit of EUR693 million recorded in 2012. 2014 was the worst deficit year in our bilateral trade with China since 2008. Over the last 5 years, cumulative trade in goods deficit against Ireland in trade with China stands at EUR3,849 million.


Combined bilateral trade with BRIC:


Irish exports to BRIC markets (goods only) rose to EUR3,337 million in 2014, rising 6.2% y/y from EUR3,114 million in 2013 and virtually reversing the losses sustained between 2013 and 2012 to almost match 2011 level of EUR3,324 million. Over the last 5 years, exports from Ireland into BRIC economies rose 13.4% cumulatively - hardly an impressive performance. Meanwhile, Irish imports from BRIC rose from EUR3,900 million in 2013 to EUR4,268 million in 2014. As the result, Irish trade deficit with BRIC economies rose from EUR756 million in 2013 to EUR931 million in 2014. Thus, 2014 marked the worst trade deficit with BRIC economies since 2008. 5 year cumulative trade deficit between Ireland and BRIC currently stands at EUR2,445.8 million


Quite surprisingly, Irish bilateral trade in goods with Russia - subject to EU sanctions, US sanctions-induced lower propensity for US multinationals to engage in Russia, and subject to severe disruption of financial flows, including trade credits and insurance - has managed to substantially outperform our trade with other BRIC economies and expand by 20.8% y/y in terms of combined trade flows and 13.4% in terms of exports to Russia. The reason for this the longer-term nature of our exporters engagement in the Russian markets and more partnership-based approach to trade. Irish exports to Russia are strongly dominated by indigenous, smaller exporters who tend to secure longer-term relationship-based engagement in the market. In addition, Irish exports to Russia are strongly developed in the areas of food production and agri-food technologies - two sectors that saw growth in investment in Russia.

Sunday, October 26, 2014

26/10/2014: Ireland's trade in goods with BRICS


Summary of the latest trade in goods for bilateral trade between Ireland and BRICS:


Keep in mind: trade balance is what counts in GDP, GNP and GNI calculations. Data above reflects some impact of the Russian counter-sanctions of July 2014.

Thursday, March 20, 2014

20/3/2014: Trade in Goods & Trade Balance Dynamics for Ireland: January 2014

As noted in the earlier post, CSO released new data on Irish merchandise trade, covering January 2014. I discussed the validity of the argument that improved competitiveness is a driver of Irish exports here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/03/1932014-competitiveness-might-have.html and as promised, now will discuss top-level data on trade flows.

Starting from the top:

Based on unadjusted (seasonally) data:

  • Total imports into Ireland (goods only) amounted to EUR4.528 billion in January 2014, which is up 1.93% y/y. This is shallower rate of increase in imports than the one recorded in December 2013 (+16.9% y/y).
  • 3mo cumulated imports for the period November 2013-January 2014 were up 8.2% on the same period of 2012-2013.
  • January 2014 marks the highest level of monthly imports since March 2012 and the busiest imports January since 2008.
  • Total exports from Ireland (goods only) stood at EUR7.0306 billion in January 2014, up 4.48% y/y, which is a shallower increase than 13.41% rise recorded in 12 months through December 2013.
  • 3mo cumulated exports for the period November 2013-January 2014 were up 2.05% on the same period of 2012-2013.
  • January 2014 levels of exports are not remarkable by any means possible, representing only the second highest level of January exporting activity since January 2008.
  • Trade balance in January 2014 stood at EUR2.5026 billion, up 9.42% y/y which is an improvement on December 2013 annual rise of 7.18%.
  • 3mo cumulated trade balance for the period November 2013-January 2014 was down 6.64% on the same period of 2012-2013.
Three charts to illustrate:



In the chart above, notice disappointing performance in exports relative to trend (red line) and to 6mo MA (black line). Also note poor performance of trade balance relative to trend and the seeming breaking out of trade balance away from the trend line down.

The same is confirmed in the seasonally-adjusted series plotted below:


So exports have risen y/y, primarily due to a truly abysmal January 2012. But exports are still trending below an already virtually flat trend. You might think of this as being a story of some short term improvement, amidst ongoing long term weakness.

Friday, January 17, 2014

17/1/2014: Goods Exports: A Story of Irish Tax Arbitrage Mode of Growth?


I covered monthly and annual trends in Irish Trade in Goods statistics yesterday (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/01/1612014-trade-in-goods-november-2013.html), noting that

  1. Irish exports of goods are continuing to shrink - not grow at a slower rate, but grow at a negative rate - over 2013
  2. Irish trade surplus in goods is now in negative growth territory for the third year in a row.
  3. Past resilience of Irish trade in goods statistics was predominantly down to the collapse in imports.
In the past, I have argued that we are likely to witness further deterioration in external balance for Ireland once the domestic economy moves back into growth cycle (imports of consumer goods and capital goods will all rise). Given the overall problematic situation with domestic disposable after-tax income, this implies that we can lose the only pillar supporting our debt sustainability (external balance) if capex ramps up, while employment creation and wages growth is lagging. In other words, a jobless recovery on foot of capex expansion can end up being a pyrrhic victory for Ireland.

To see this, consider imports/exports ratio in the economy (to remove monthly volatility, we use half-yearly aggregates):


Following a large jump in the ratio of exports to imports on foot a significant decline in imports, we are now running below the historical trend. This suggests that our exports of goods are becoming less, rather than more, tax-efficient (which, of course, is consistent with pharma sector decline in our exports of goods). Good news is that this means our exports are also potentially becoming better anchored to real value added carried out in this economy, and less tax arbitrage-driven. But the bad news is that at the same time, exports growth rates are collapsing:


And the decade-averages, shown in the chart above are telling this story.

This is worrying... doubly so because what is taking place of our good exports is the 'success' story of our ICT services sector, which is growing on foot of tax arbitrage. We are replaying the same 'advantage' as before - instead of developing successful, value-added based exporting model we are just switching from one tax arbitrage play to another. ICT manufacturing tax arbitrage of the 1990s gave way to Pharma tax arbitrage play of the 2000s, which is now giving way to ICT services tax arbitrage play of the 2010s... 

Thursday, January 16, 2014

16/1/2014: Trade in Goods: November 2013


Ireland's seasonally adjusted trade surplus for trade in goods only (excluding services) was down 15% in November compared to October.

Per CSO, there was "a decrease in seasonally adjusted exports of €327 million (-5%) to €7,009 million" in November 2013 compared to October. Seasonally
adjusted imports rose by €132 million (+3%) to €4,472 million. Thus, seasonally adjusted trade surplus fell to €2,538 million - "the lowest seasonally adjusted trade surplus since August 2008."

Year on year, "the value of exports decreased by €607 million (-7%) to €7,710 million. The main drivers were decreases of €572 million (-25%) in the exports of Medical and pharmaceutical products and €158 million (-8%) in the exports of Organic chemicals. … Comparing November 2013 with November 2012, the value of imports rose by €335 million (+8%) to €4,377 million. Imports of Machinery specialised for particular industries increased by €121 million (+175%)."

With 11 months of data in, we can provide a reasonable approximation for H2 2013 data and full year outlook. Caveat - these are simple extrapolations from 11 months data.

The first chart shows annual data for exports. Based on January-November data:

- Annual imports are set to rise by ca 0.4% y/y, after having posted a 1.76% rise in 2012 and 5.55% rise in 2011. On a cumulative basis, imports rose by EUR3.582bn over 2011-2013 period.
- Annual exports of goods are set to post a contraction of approximately 4.3% y/y against 2012 annual growth of 0.5% and 2011 annual expansion of 1.70%. Cumulatively from January 2011 through the end of 2013, exports of goods are set to shrink by EUR1.975bn.
- Note that in all three years: 2011, 2012 and 2013 exports growth under performed imports growth and this is before any significant uptick in domestic consumption demand for imports or domestic capes demand for imported capital goods.
- Trade surplus for 2013 is expected to decline by around 9.8% on 2012 levels, after having posted a decline o 0.9% in 2012 and a decline of 2.3% in 2011. Cumulatively over the last 3 years, the decline in trade surplus amounted to EUR5.557bn.


The next chart plots annual rates of growth and 10-year growth rates averages. This shows that the current decade is the worst in the history of the state with exception of the 1930s, with the decade of 2000-2009 being the third worst.



This puts into perspective the problem with the assumed debt sustainability framework based on growth in exports. The chart above shows exports of goods only, omitting exports of services. Two points, however:
1) In the 1990s, recovery was led by exports which were predominantly on the goods side, so the average rates in the chart for the decade of the 1990s are closely correlated with total exports growth rates. Today, growth in services exports outpacing growth in goods services has much lower impact on the economy overall, since exports of services are less anchored to the domestic economy and are more reflective of the aggressive tax optimisation strategies of the MNCs operating in the ICT and IFS services areas.
2)Services exports growth is slowing so far as well. This was covered here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/12/20122013-how-real-is-that-gdp-and-gnp.html

Finally, the last chart plots exports of goods adjusted for prices changes and exchange rates using Trade Price Index for Exports, expressed in 2006 euros.



The upward correction in 2009 and 2010 period now is almost fully erased by declines since 2010. And the decline seems to be accelerating.

Most of the above declines in exports in the last two-three years has been driven by the pharmaceuticals sector. I will be covering this topic when dealing with more detailed composition of exports once we have data for December 2013. In the mean time, you can see CSO data for January-November 2013 y/y comparatives in Table 3 here: http://www.cso.ie/en/media/csoie/releasespublications/documents/externaltrade/2013/gei_nov2013.pdf

Sunday, December 1, 2013

1/12/2013: The Age of Great Stagnation: Sunday Times, 24/11/2013

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times column from November 24, 2013.


In recent months, the hope-filled choir of Irish politicians raised to a crescendo the catchy tune of the return of our economic fortunes. Their views are often echoed by some European leaders, themselves eager to declare the euro crisis to be over. Earlier this year, as the euro area remained mired in official recession, the perpetually optimistic Economics Commissioner, Olli Rehn, summarised the economic environment as follows: “…we have disappointing hard data from the end of last year, some more encouraging soft data in the recent past and growing investor confidence in the future.”

Since then, we had ever-disappointing hard data through September this year, un-interpretable volatile soft data, and an ever-booming confidence in the future. This pattern of rising expectations amidst non-improving reality has been with us for over two years.

Which raises two questions. Firstly, is the fabled recovery we are allegedly experiencing sustainable? Second, are we betting our economic house on a right horse in the long run?


In our leaders’ imagination, this country’s prospects for a recovery remain tied to those of the euro area. The official theory suggests that growth in our major trading partners will trickle down to our exports, which, in turn, will drive domestic economy via improving investment and consumer spending. This theory rest on the fundamental belief that things have hit their bottom in Ireland and the only way from here is up.

These are the two core theories behind the short-term projections that underpinned Budget 2014. And, taken with risk caveats highlighted this week by the Fiscal Council assessment of the Department of Finance projections, the views from the Merrion Street represent a rather optimistic, but reasonably feasible forecast for 2014.

Alas, in the longer run, a lot is amiss with the above two theories. The most obvious point of contention is that we've heard them before. And so far, both turned out to be wrong.

Over 2009-2013, cumulative real GDP across the euro area shrunk by 2.1 percent, and expanded by 3.5 percent across the G7 countries. In Ireland, over the same period, GDP fell by 4.7 percent. The tail of Ireland was wagging the dog of the EU on the way down into the Great Recession.

The converse is true on the way up. Unlike in the early 1990s, the improving economic fortunes abroad are not doing much good for Ireland’s exports either. Over the last four years, volumes of imports of goods by the euro area countries grew by almost 15 percent and for G7 these went up 21 percent. Irish exports of goods over the same period of time rose just 2.2 percent. Global trade, having shrunk in 2008 and 2009 has been growing since then. Again, Ireland missed that momentum.

Over the crisis period, growth in our exports of goods and services did not translate into strong growth in our GDP and was completely irrelevant to the dynamics of our GNP or national income. The reason for this paradox is that our goods exports have shrunk 3.57 percent in 2012, having posted declining rate of growth 2011 compared to 2010. The rate of their decline is now accelerating. In January-September this year our exports of goods fell 6.7 percent compared to the same period a year ago. Goods trade is the core employer of Irish workers amongst all exporting sectors and the main contributor to the economy at large.

Instead of goods trade, our external balance expansion became dependent solely on ICT services and a massive collapse in imports.

Much of the former represent transfer pricing and have little real effect on the ground. As the result, our exports growth came with virtually zero growth in employment, domestic demand or investment. We don't need to dig deep into the statistics to see this: over the period of our fabled exports-led recovery, Irish private sector prices and domestic demand both followed a downward path.

The latter, however, presents a serious risk to the sustainability of our debts. To fund our liabilities, we need long-term current account surpluses to average above 4 percent of GDP over the next decade or so. We also need economic growth of some 3-3.5 percent in GDP and GNP terms to start reducing massive unemployment and reversing emigration. Yet, to drive real growth in the economy we need domestic investment and demand uplifts. These require an increase in imports of real capital and consumption goods. Should our exports of goods continue down the current trajectory, any sustained improvement in the domestic economy will be associated with rising imports and, as a corollary, deterioration in our trade balance.

This, in turn, will put pressures on our economy’s capacity to fund debt servicing. And given the levels of debt we carry, the tipping point is not that far off the radar.

In H1 2013 Ireland's external real debt (excluding monetary authorities, banks and FDI) stood at almost USD1.32 trillion - the highest level ever recorded in history. Large share of this debt is down to the IFSC and MNCs sector. However, overall debt levels in the Irish system are still sky high. More importantly, the debt levels are not declining, despite the claims to the aggressive deleveraging of our households and banks. At the end of H1 2013, total real economic debt in Ireland - debt of Irish Government, excluding Nama, Irish-resident corporates and households - stood at over EUR492 billion - down just EUR8.5 billion on absolute peak attained in H3 2012. In other words, our current debt levels are basically flat on the peak and are above the highs attained before the crisis.


With all the talk about positive forecasts for the economy and the world around us, we are desperately seeking to escape three basic truths. One: we are facing the risk that neither exports growth nor the reversals of our foreign trade partners' fortunes are likely to do much for our real economy. Two: the real break on our growth is the gargantuan burden of combined household, government and corporate debts. And three: we have no plan to deal with either the former risk or the latter reality.

Instead of charting our own course toward achieving sustainable long-term competitiveness in our economy, we remain attached at the hip to the slowest horse in the pack of global economies – the euro area. This engine of Irish growth is now seized by a Japanese-styled long-term stagnation with no growth in new investment and consumption, and glacially moving deleveraging of its banks and sovereigns.

Governments across the EU are pursuing cost-cutting and re-orienting their purchasing of goods and services toward domestic suppliers. In this zero-sum competition, small players like Ireland are risking being crushed by the weight of financial repressions and domestic protectionism in the larger economies.

These forces are not going to disappear overnight even if growth returns to Europe. According to the global survey by Markit, released this week, one third of companies worldwide expect their business to rise over the next 12 months. By itself - a low number, but a slight rise on 30 percent at the end of Q2 2013. Crucially, however, improving sentiment does not translate into improving economic conditions: only 14 percent of companies expect to add new employees in 2014.

As per financial repression, euro area banks remain sick with as much as EUR 1 trillion in required deleveraging yet to take place and some EUR350-400 billion worth of assets to be written down. Should the banks stress tests uncover any big problems there is no designated funding to plug the shortfalls. According to the Standard Bank analysts' research note, published this week: "Increasingly, European governments are resorting to tricks to resolve the problems of their banking systems, including inadequate stress tests, overly optimistic growth and asset price forecasts, and some unusual accounting stratagems."

Which foreign government or private economy is going to start importing Irish goods and services or investing here at an increasing rate when their own populations are struggling to find jobs and their banks are fighting for survival.


Meanwhile, we remain on a slow path to entering new markets, despite having spent good part of the last 6 years talking about the need to 'break' into BRICS and the emerging and middle-income economies. In January-September 2012, Irish exports to BRICS totaled EUR2.78 billion. A year later, these are down EUR240 million. Controlling for exchange rates valuations, our exports to the key developing and middle-income markets around the world are flat since 2010.

We are also missing the most crucial element of the growth puzzle: structural reforms that can make us competitive not just in terms of crude unit labor costs, but across the entire economic system. Since 2008 there has been virtually no changes made to the way we do business domestically, especially when it comes to protected professions and state-controlled sectors. Legal reforms, restructuring of semi-state companies’ and the sectors where they play dominant roles, such as health, transport and energy, changes to the costs and efficiencies in our financial services – these are just a handful of areas where promised reforms have not been delivered.

Political cycle is now turning against the prospect of accelerating such reforms with European and local elections on the horizon. Reforms fatigue sets in. The relative calm of the last 9-12 months has pushed all euro area governments into a false sense of security.

The good news is that the collapse phase of the Great Recession is over. The bad news is that with growth of around 1.5 percent per annum on GDP we are nowhere near the moment when the economy starts returning to long-term health. I warned about this scenario playing out over the next decade in these very pages back in 2008-2009. Given the latest projections from the Department of Finance and the IMF, we are firmly on the course to deliver on my prediction.

Welcome to the age of the Great Stagnation.




Box-out:

Recent research paper from the European Commission, titled The Gap between Public and Private Wages: New Evidence for the EU assessed the differences between public sector and private sector earnings across the 27 member states over the period of 2006-2010. The findings are far from encouraging for Ireland. In 2010, Irish public wages were found to be some 21.2 percent higher than the comparable wages paid in the private sector. The study controlled for a number of factors impacting wages differentials, including gender, age, tenure in the job, education and job grades. Strikingly, the study found that wages premium in the public sector was higher for women, for younger workers and for less skilled employees. A positive public wage premium was also observed at all levels of educational attainment with the largest premium paid to workers with low education and the lowest to workers with medium levels of education. If in 2006 Irish public sector wage premium stood on average at 20.5 percent, making our public sector wage premium second highest in the EU27, by 2010 we had the highest premium at 21.2 percent. It is worth noting that in all Nordic countries of Europe, the wage premium to public sector workers was found to be negative in 2010.

Thursday, August 15, 2013

16/8/2013: H1 2013 Trade in Goods & Balance Dynamics for Ireland

On foot of my post detailing Irish cumulated figures for trade in goods for H1 2013, some asked me to post on the relationship between exports and trade balance. Here are few charts, taking snapshot from H12000 through H1 2013:

First, two charts showing levels of exports and trade balance for trade in goods:



Note that in the first chart, there is barely any difference between the 2000-2013 average level of exports (at EUR44.145bn) and 2009-2013 period average (at EUR45.077bn). The gap is only 2.1% of EUR932mln. At the same time, the second chart shows that there is a massive gap between the average trade balance over the period of 2000-2013 (EUR17.184bn) and for the period of 2009-2013 (EUR20.728bn) -  a gap of 20.6% or EUR3,544 mln. The core reason for this is that much of the 2009-2013 'stellar' performance in our trade surplus was driven by collapse in imports, rather than a rise in exports. 

To see this, let us plot exports against trade balance:


The last chart clearly shows that in 2009-2013, on average, exports were tracking changes in trade balance, but they were not doing so 1:1.

More interestingly, the chart shows that trade in goods in Ireland is in trouble. In 2009-2013 period, Irish Government policy has been to rely solely on exports (of goods and services) in driving the economy toward recovery and debt sustainability. This hope rests on growth in exports and simultaneously positive trade balance and growing trade balance as the key parameters for consideration when it comes to both economic growth and debt sustainability.

Alas, in years 2010, 2012 and 2013 (in other words in 3 out of 5 years), measured by H1 figures alone, Irish goods traded operated in the 'pain spot' region - the region of shrinking exports and shrinking trade surpluses.

In other words, in terms of levels our merchandise trade is performing well. But in terms of growth it is performing poorly. And this is despite a huge drop-off in imports, something that is not likely to last when the economy goes back to capital investment (imports of capital goods will rise) and/or consumption recovery (imports of consumption goods will rise).

15/8/2013: H1 2013 Trade in Goods data for Ireland


Latest data for Merchandise trade for June 2013 allows us to make some comparatives for the first half of the year. Here are some stats, all covering only merchandise trade:

  • Total Imports rose in H1 2013 by 3.12% on H2 2012 and were down 2.39% on H1 2012. Imports were up 3.11% in H1 2013 compared to the 6 months cumulative averages over the three years from H1 2010 through H2 2012. H1 2013 levels of imports were 23.2 below their peak for any 6 months period since H1 2000.
  • Total Exports fell in H1 2013 by 4.35% on H2 2012 and were down 6.55% on H1 2012. Exports declined, in absolute terms by EUR3.045 billion year-on-year. This marked the largest 6-mo cumulative drop in exports since H1 2003, marking the H1 2013 the worst year-on-year 6 months period since then.
  • Exports were down 4.48% in H1 2013 compared to the 6 months cumulative averages over the three years from H1 2010 through H2 2012. H1 2013 levels of exports were 12.43% below their peak for any 6 months period since H1 2000.
  • Trade Surplus fell 12.62% on H2 2012 and was down 11.47% in H1 2013 compared to H1 2012. In level terms, trade surplus was down EUR2.442 billion in H1 2013 compared to H1 2012, marking the worst 6 months period since H1 2005.
Charts below illustrate the trends:


Good news, per chart above, Trade Surplus is still running above 2000-present average, although Exports are now running below their 2000-present average. Bad news, the above chart does not adjust for inflation.

Not-too-good news is, exports are now in the negative territory in terms of y/y changes. Remember, we need positive growth in total (merchandise and services) exports of ca 5% per annum to maintain any semblance of sustainability. Here's the tricky bit:


As chart above shows, we really need rapid, very rapid growth in services exports to return our total exports and trade balance to where we need them to be to maintain economic activity at the levels that will be consistent with long-term gradual reduction of public debt.  Over the last 5 years, merchandise exports in Ireland grew on average at 0.59% y/y and over the last 10 years this growth was 0.94%. Owing to the recent collapse in our imports, our trade balance grew on average at 11.73% in the last 5 years. However, over the last 10 years the growth in our trade balance was much less dramatic 3.18%.

Tuesday, July 2, 2013

2/7/2013: Sunday Times June 23, 2013: G8 and Ireland


This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from June 23, 2013


As G8 summits go, the latest one turned out to be as predictable as its predecessors – an event full of reaffirmations of well-known conflicts and pre-announced news. In terms of the former, the Lough Erne meeting delivered some fireworks on Syria. On the latter, there was a re-announcement of the previously widely publicized Free Trade pact between the US and Europe. Another pre-announced item involved the EU, UK and US push for corporate tax reforms.

The two economic themes of the Logh Erne Summit agenda are tied at the hip in the case of our small open economy heavily reliant on FDI attracted here by the opportunities for tax arbitrage. As such, the G8 meeting agreement poses a significant threat for Ireland's model of economic development. Although it will take five to ten years for the shock waves to be felt in Dublin, make no mistake, the winds of uncomfortable change are rising.


The trade agreement, first announced by the Taoiseach months before the G8 summit, promises to deliver some EUR120 billion in net benefits for the EU economy. Roughly 90% of these are expected to go to the Big 5 economies of the EU, leaving little for the smaller economies to compete over. Behind these net gains there are also some regional re-allocations of trade that will take place within the EU itself.

In the short term, Ireland is well-positioned to see an increase in exports by the US multinationals operating from here and to some domestic exporters. The uplift in trade flows between Europe and the US may even help attracting new, smaller and more opportunistic US firms' investments. While tens of billions in trade for Ireland, bandied around by various Irish ministers, are unlikely to materialize, a small boost will probably take place.

However, over time, the impact of the EU-US trade and investment liberalisation can lead to sizeable reductions in MNCs activity here. Under the free trade arrangements, longer-term investment and production decisions will be based on such factors as cost considerations, as well as concerns relating to access to the global markets, and taxes.


Consider these three drivers for future trade and economic activity in Ireland in the context of the G8 summit and other recent news.

On the cost competitiveness side, we have had some gains in terms of official metrics of labour productivity and unit labour costs. Major share of these gains came from destruction of less productive jobs in construction and domestic services. Increase in revenues transferred via Ireland by some services exporters since 2004-2007 period further contributed to improved competitiveness figures.

Once when we control for these temporary or tax-linked 'gains' Ireland is still a high cost destination for investors compared to the majority of our peers.  As reflected in Purchasing Managers Indices, since the beginning of the crisis, Irish producers of goods and services have faced rampant cost inflation when it comes to prices of inputs. Earnings and wages data for 2009-2012, released this week, show labour costs rising across the exports-oriented sectors. Lack of new capital, R&D and technological investments further underlines the fact that much of our productivity gains are related to jobs destruction and transfer pricing by the MNCs.

When the tariffs and other barriers to EU-US trade come down, some multinationals trading into Europe will have fewer incentives to locate their production in Ireland. This effect is likely to be felt stronger for those MNCs which trade increasingly outside the EU, focusing more on growth opportunities around the world. Based on experiences with other free trade areas, such as NAFTA and the EU, this can lead to increased on-shoring of FDI back into the US and into core European states, away from smaller economies that pre-trade liberalization acted as entrepots to Europe.


The tax dimension of the G8 agreement will be the most significant driver for change in years to come.

The G8 clearly outlined the reasons for urgency in dealing with the issues of both tax evasion (something that does not apply in Ireland's case) and tax avoidance (something that does have a direct impact on us). These are structural and will not dissipate even when the G8 economies recover.

All of the G8 economies are struggling with heavy public and private debt loads and/or high domestic taxation levels. All are stuck in a demographic, social security and pensions costs whirlpools pulling them into structural insolvency. In other words, not a single G8 nation can afford to lose corporate revenues to various tax havens.

In line with the longer-term nature of the drivers for tax reforms, G8-proposed agenda can also be seen in the context of quick, easier to implement changes and longer-term structural realignment of tax systems.

The first wave of tax reforms outlined in principle by the G8 Summit will focus on tightening some of the more egregious loopholes, usually involving officially recognised tax havens. On the European side, this will spell trouble for the likes of Gurnsey and Jersey. The first round will also target easy-to-spot idiosyncratic tax arrangements, such as the Double Irish scheme and similar structures in Holland. Shutting down Double Irish will impact around a quarter of our trade in services, or roughly EUR13-15 billion worth of exports – much more than the EU-US Free Trade Agreement promises to unlock. The cut can be quick, as much of this trade involves electronic transactions - easy to shift and costless to re-domicile.

Over time, as changes in tax systems bite deeper into the structure of European tax regimes, losses of exports and FDI are likely to mount. To raise substantive new tax revenues, the EU members of G8 will have to severely cut back tax advantages accorded to countries like Ireland by their competitive tax rates.

Free Trade zones are notorious for amplifying the role of comparative advantage in determining where companies choose to domicile. Thus, to achieve a level the playing field for trade-related investments within the EU, either the effective tax rates will have to be brought much closer to parity across the block, or the basis for taxation must be redistributed more evenly across producers and consumers of goods and services.

Forcing all EU countries to harmonise the rates of tax would be politically difficult. Instead, there is a ready-to-use solution to the problem of redistributing tax revenues available since 2009 - the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB).

Under this mechanism companies selling goods and services from Ireland into European markets will report separate profits by each country of sales. These profits will then be reassigned back to the countries where each company has operations on the basis of a complex formula taking into the account company sales, employment levels and capital structure on the ground. The re-allocated profits will then be subject to a national tax rate. The end game from the CCCTB for Ireland will be effective end to the transfer pricing that goes along with the current system.

The EU Commission analysis claimed that with full cooperation, the enhanced CCCTB implementation will lead to an 8% rise in tax revenues across the EU. The main beneficiaries of these gains will be the Big 5 member states. The total net impact of CCCTB on all EU member states is expected to be nearly zero.

This suggests some sizeable reallocations of economic activity and tax revenues away from the smaller member states, like Ireland, in favour of the larger member states. January 2011, study by Ernst & Young for the Department of Finance concluded that Ireland can sustain one of the largest drops in tax revenues in the euro area due to CCCTB implementation. The estimates range up to 5.7% Government revenue decline, with our effective corporate tax rate rising to 23%, GDP falling by 1.6%-1.8%, and employment declining by 1.5%-1.6%.

The Ernst & Young report was compiled based using data for 2005. Since then, Irish economy's reliance on services exports grew from EUR 49.5 billion or under 31% of GDP to EUR90.7 billion or close to 56% of GDP. With services exports being a prime example of a tax-sensitive sector in the economy, we can safely assume that the above estimates of the adverse impact of CCCTB on Irish economy are conservative.

The CCCTB matches nearly perfectly the G8 Action plans relating to the issues of tax avoidance. It also fits the objectives of the OECD plan on addressing taxation base erosion and profit shifting which the OECD is preparing for the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of the G20 in July.

While much of the impact of this week's G8 summit remains the matter for the future, there is no doubt that the G8 push toward curtailing aggressively competitive tax regimes is real.  In my view, Ireland has, approximately between five and ten years before our competitive advantage is severely eroded by the EU and the US efforts to coordinate the effective rates of taxation and consolidate reporting and payment bases for corporate profits. We must use these years wisely to build up our technological capabilities and develop a skills-based high-value added and highly competitive economy.



Box-out:

The latest data on the duration of working life (a measure of the number of years a person aged 15 is expected to be active in the labour market over their lifetime) shows that in 2000-2002, on average, European workers spent 32.9 years in employment or searching for jobs. This number rose to 34.7 years by 2011. In Ireland, the same increase in duration of working life took Irish workers from spending on average 33.3 years in labour market activities in 2000-2002 to 34.0 years in 2011. The increase in years worked in the case of Ireland was the third lowest in the euro area. In 2011, duration of working life ranged between 39.1 and 44.4 years in the Nordic countries and Switzerland – countries with much more sustainable pensions costs paths than Ireland. The significance of this is that given our pensions, housing and investment crises, Irish workers can look forward to spending some four-to-five years more working to fund their future retirement. Aside from a dramatic greying of our working population this means that even after the economic recovery takes hold, there might be no jobs for today's younger unemployed, as the older generations hold onto their careers for longer.

Friday, June 28, 2013

28/6/2013: Exports-led recovery: Q1 2013

I covered the headline numbers and trends for the GDP and GNP in previous two posts: here and here. Now, onto some more detailed analysis.

Remember, from the very beginning of the crisis, Irish and Troika leaders have been incessantly talking about the 'exports-led recovery'. Position on this blog concerning this thesis consistently remained that:

  1. Exports growth is great, but
  2. Exports growth is unlikely to be sufficient to lift the entire economy, and
  3. Exports growth projections were unrealistic, while
  4. Exports re-orientation toward services, away from goods was less conducive to delivering real growth in the economy.
Q1 2013 data continues to confirm my analysis.

In Q1 2013, based on real valuations (expressed in constant market prices),
  • Exports of Goods & Services shrunk 6.47% q/q and fell 4.09% y/y. This compares to +1.19% q/q growth in Q4 2012 and +1.28% expansion y/y. Compared to Q1 2011, when the current coalition took over the reigns in the Leinster House, total exports of goods and services are down 0.88% in real, inflation-adjusted terms. Troika sustainability projections envisioned growth of over 6% over the same period of time.
  • Imports of Goods and Services showed pretty much the same dynamics as exports in both Q4 2012 and Q1 2013, but owing to sharper contractions in 2011-2012 these are now down 4.34% compared to Q1 2011.
  • Exports of Goods fell in Q1 2013 by 3.83% q/q and 9.37% y/y, while there were declines of 2.68% q/q and 2.33% y/y in Q4 2012.
  • Exports of Services were down 8.75% q/q but up 1.27% y/y in Q1 2013, and these were up 4.77% q/q and 4.63% y/y in Q4 2012.


  • Trade Balance in Goods and Services fell 4.96% q/q and was down 3.63% y/y in Q1 2013, with Q4 2012 respective changes at -15.91% q/q and +0.98% y/y. Compared to Q1 2011, trade balance is up 15.91%
  • Trade Balance in Goods was down 6.63% q/q in Q4 2012 and this deteriorated to -10.73% growth in Q1 2013. Y/y, trade balance in goods contracted 0.05% in Q4 2012 and shrunk 10.59% in Q1 2013. On Q1 2011, trade balance in goods is down 14.04%.
  • Trade Balance in Services fell from EUR1,130mln in Q3 2012 to EUR132mln in Q4 2012 before improving to EUR601mln in Q1 2013. In Q1 2012 the balance stood at EUR28 million.


Saturday, October 27, 2012

27/10/2012: Irish Exports to Emerging Markets


Some good news (via Citi Research):


The above shows the sizable extent of Ireland's trade with Emerging Asian economies.

However, not all is great in the field of Irish trade diversification:

If you look closely in the chart above (here's a snapshot):

It is pretty clear that Ireland's exports as a share of GDP have declined in 2000-2011 period for Asia, Mid East, Africa and Latin America. This represents a worrying trend, since these are the regions of future growth and, more importantly, these are also the regions more suited for our indigenous exporters. Much of the decline, in my view, is probably driven by exits of some MNCs from servicing these markets via Ireland.

Sunday, September 9, 2012

9/9/2012: Ireland's stellar exports performance?


Three charts that put to the test one of our greatest claims to fame - the claim that Ireland is one of the world leaders in exports performance.



Charts above clearly show that Ireland's performance in exports growth was rather spectacular in the 1990s, strong in 2000-2004 period and below average in 2005-2009 period. However, in 2010-2012 period - the very period when, according to our Government we are experiencing dramatic growth in exports - Ireland's exports performance is, in fact, well below the average for our peers.

As the result of this, despite an absolutely massive collapse in imports, Irish current account performance (external balance that is supposedly - per Government and official analysts, and the likes of Brugel think-tank heads - going to rescue us from the massive debt overhang we have) is underwhelming:


Monday, June 18, 2012

18/6/2012: Russian Ruble Note

For the ongoing Irish trade mission to Russia, IRBA issued the following note to our members concerning the current FX environment relating to Russian ruble (click on individual slides to enlarge):




Tuesday, April 3, 2012

3/4/2012: Sunday Times 1/4/2012 - Deep Reforms, not Exports-led Recovery, are needed


This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from 1/4/2012.


After four years of the crisis, there are four empirical regularities to be learned from Ireland’s economic performance. The first one is that the idea of internal devaluation, aka prices and wages deflation, as the only mechanism to attain debt deleveraging, is not working. The second is that the conventional hypothesis of a V-shaped recovery from the structural crisis, manifested in economic growth collapse, debt overhang and assets bust, is a false one. The third fact is that Troika confidence in our ability to meet ‘targets’ has little to do with the real economic performance. And the fourth is that exports-led recovery is a pipe dream for an economy in which exports growth is driven by FDI.

Restoring growth requires structural change that can facilitate private companies and entrepreneurs search for new catalysts for investment and consumption, jobs creation and exports.

For anyone with any capacity to comprehend economic reality, Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) results for Q4 2011, showing the second consecutive quarterly contraction in GDP and GNP, should have come as no surprise. In these very pages, months ago I stated that all real indicators – Purchasing Managers indices, retail sales, consumer and producer prices, property prices, industrial turnover figures, banking sector activity, and even our external trade statistics – point South. Yet, the Government continues to believe in Troika reports and statistical aberrations produced by superficial policy and methodological changes.

The longer-range facts about Ireland’s ‘successes’ in managing the crisis, revealed by the QNA, are outright horrifying. In real (inflation-adjusted) terms, in 2011, every sector of Irish economy remains below the pre-crisis peak levels. Agriculture, forestry and fishing is down almost 22%, Industry is down 3%, Distribution, Transport and Communications down 17%, Public Administration and Defence down 6%, Other Services (accounting for over half of our GDP) are down 8%. In Q4 2011, Personal Consumption was 12% below Q4 2007 levels, Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation was 57% down on 2007. The only positive side to Irish economic performance compared to pre-crisis levels was Exports of goods and services, which were just 1.2% ahead of Q4 2007 level.

Meanwhile, factor income outflows out of Ireland – profits transfers by the MNCs – were up 19% relative to pre-crisis levels. Despite a rise of 0.7% year on year, Irish GDP expressed in constant prices is still 9.5% below 2007 levels. Our GNP, having contracted 2.53% year on year in 2011, is down an incredible 14.3% on the peak. All in, Irish economy has already lost nine years of growth in this crisis, once inflation is controlled for.

We are now three years into an exports boom and the recovery remains wanting. Here’s why. Between 2007 and 2011 exports of goods rose €2.5 billion or just 3%, while imports of goods fell 31.3% - a decline of €19.6 billion. Over the same period, exports of services rose €5 billion, while imports of services increased €5.5 billion. All in, rising exports of goods and services accounted for just 35% of the increase in Ireland’s trade surplus. Almost two thirds of our trade surplus gains since 2007 are accounted for by collapse in imports. Taken on its own, the dramatic fall-off in imports of goods amounts to 91% of the total change in trade surplus in Ireland.

Both the Government and the Troika should be seriously concerned. Taken in combination with accelerating profits transfers out of Ireland by the MNCs, these numbers mean that Irish economy is struggling with mountains of private and public debts that exports cannot deflate.

Remember all the noises made by the external and domestic experts about Ireland’s current account surpluses being the driver of our debt sustainability? Last week, the CSO also published our balance of payments statistics for 2011. In 2010, Irish current account surplus stood at a relatively minor €761 million. In 2011, current account surplus fell to €127 million. If the entire current account surplus were to be diverted to Government debt repayments, it will take Ireland 579 years to bring our debt to GDP ratio to the Fiscal Pact bound of 60%.

The immediate lesson for Ireland is that we need serious changes in the economic fundamentals and we need them fast.

First, Ireland needs debt restructuring. We must shed banks-related debts off the households and the Exchequer. In doing this, we need drastic restructuring of the banking sector. Simultaneously, an equally dramatic reform of taxation and spending systems is required to put more incentives and resources into human capital formation and investment. Income tax hikes must be reversed, replaced by a tax on fixed and less productive capital – particularly land. All land, including agricultural. Entrepreneurship-retarding USC system must be altered into a functional unemployment insurance system.

Policy supports should shift on breaking the systemic barriers to domestic firms exporting and restructuring dysfunctional internal services markets that are holding companies back. Public procurement changes and markets reforms in core services – energy, water, transport, public administration, etc – must focus on prioritising facilitation of inward and domestic investment, entrepreneurship and jobs creation.

Delivery of health services must be separated from payment for these services, with Government providing the latter for those who cannot afford their own insurance. Private for-profit and non-profit sector should take over delivery of services. Exports-focused private innovation, such as for example International Health Services Centre proposal for remote medicine and ICT-related R&D, should be prioritized.

In education, we need a system of competing universities, colleges and secondary education providers. A combination of open tuition fees plus merit and needs-based grants for domestic students will help. We should incentivise US universities to locate their European campuses here, and shift more of the revenue generation in the third level onto exports. In the secondary education, we need vouchers that will encourage schools competition for students. In post-tertiary education we need to incentivise MNCs to develop their own corporate training programmes and services here.

This will simultaneously expand our skills-intensive exports and provide for better linkages between formal education and, sectoral and business training – something the current system is incapable of delivering.

One core metric we have been sliding on is sector-specific skills. This fact is best illustrated by what is defined as internationally traded services sector, but more broadly incorporates ICT services, creative industries and associated support services.

Eurostat survey of computer skills in the EU27 published this week, ranked Ireland tenth in the EU in terms of the percentage of computing graduates amongst all tertiary graduates. Both, amongst the 16-24 years olds and across the entire adult population we score below the average for the old Euro Area member states in all sub-categories of computer literacy. Only 13% of Irish 16-24 year olds have ever written a computer programme – against 21% Euro area average. Over all survey criteria, taking in the data for 16-24 year old age group, Ireland ranks fourth from the bottom just ahead of Romania, Bulgaria and Italy in terms of our ICT-related skills.

Not surprisingly, at last week’s Digital Ireland Forum 2012 the two core complaints of the new media and ICT services sector leaders were: lack of skills training domestically and draconian restrictions placed on companies ability to import key skills from abroad.

The Irish economy and our society are screaming for real change, not compliance with Troika targets and ego-stoking back-slapping ministerial foreign trips.






Box-out:

On the foot of my last week’s questions concerning the role of securitizations and covered bonds issuance by the Irish banks in restricting banks’ ability to control the loans assets they hold on their balancesheets, this week’s move by Moody’s Investors Services to downgrade the ratings of RMBS (Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities) notes issued by two of the largest securities pools in the country come as an additional warning. On March 26th, Moody’s reduced ratings on RMBS notes issued by Emerald Mortgages and Kildare Securities on the back of “continued rapid deterioration of the transactions, Moody’s outlook for Irish RMBS sector; and credit quality of key parties to the transactions [re: Irish banks] as well as structural features in place such as amount of available credit enhancement.” The last bit of this statement directly references the concerns with over-collateralization raised in my last week’s note. Although Moody’s do not highlight explicitly the issue of declining pools of collateral further available to shore up security of the asset pools used to back RMBS notes, the language of the note is crystal clear – Irish banks are at risk of running out of assets that can be pledged as collateral. This, of course, perfectly correlates with the lack of suitable collateral for LTRO-2 borrowings from the ECB by the Irish banks, other than the Bank of Ireland last month. As rated by Moody’s, half of the covered RMBS notes were downgraded to ‘very high credit risk’ or below and all the rest, excluding just one, were deemed to deteriorate to ‘high credit risk’ status. Surprisingly, the Central Bank’s Macro-Financial Review published this week makes no mention of either the RMBS, covered bonds or the impact of securitization vehicles on banks’ balance sheets. See no evil, hear no evil?