Showing posts with label Irish lending. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Irish lending. Show all posts

Monday, July 28, 2014

28/7/2014: Of Savings, Cash and Hedge Funds...


The current crisis, on monetary aggregates side, can be characterised by the rising prevalence of cash over savings. In other words: shrinking stock of credit and deposits relative to cash.

The current crisis, on media commentary side, can be characterised by the endless talk about high savings rates in the private sector.

Here is the problem: savings = inflows into stock of savings (aka, deposits) or investment or divestment out of loans (including forced restructurings, bankruptcies, insolvencies and foreclosures). We know that Irish investment is not growing at the rates worth even mentioning. Which means that Either deposits should be growing to reflect 'high savings' or debt should be shrinking.

Take a look at the difference between M3 money supply and M1 money supply.

By definition:

  • "Money Supply (M1) to euro area -M1 is the sum of overnight deposits and currency issued (this comprises the Central Bank's share of euro banknotes issued in the Eurosystem, in proportion to its paid-up shares in the capital of the ECB, plus coin issued by the Bank less holdings of issued euro banknotes and coin by the MFI sector). " 
  • "Money Supply (M2) to the euro area -M2 is the sum of M1 plus deposits (with agreed maturity of up to 2 years; redeemable at notice of up to 3 months and Post Office savings bank deposits)."
  • M3 is M2 plus deposits with maturity over 2 years.
So the gap between M1 and M3 is deposits.


The M3-M1 gap has fallen since the onset of the crisis. It has fallen along the steady trend line, with some volatility around the dates of banks recapitalisations. And it continues to fall. In fact, between December 2013 and May 2014 we have the longest uninterrupted decline in deposits in history of the series. Current level of the gap is sitting only EUR7 billion above the all-time historical record low. In fact, during this 'historically high savings rates' period, Irish monetary system has managed to reduce the stock of deposits, compared to pre-crisis levels, by EUR85.91 billion.

But while savings (deposits) are falling, 'savings' (debt deleveraging) is all the rage:


You can see what has been happening in the Money Supply territory and private credit here:


With all of these 'high savings' promoted by the official statistics and 'new lending' promoted by the Banking Federation, the Central Bank is now officially giving up on getting those 'repaired and recapitlaised banks' to lend into the real economy (something they were supposed to do since early 2009 - based on the promise of the October 2008 Guarantee, then since early 2010 - based on the various Government programmes, then since first half 2011 - based on the banks recaps and PCARs, then since 2012, based on Government programme agreed with the Troika, then since early 2013, based on Government spin of a turnaround in the economy...). Instead of hoping for the Pillar Banking System to miraculously come back to life, the Central Bank is opening up the floodgates for the hedge funds (here courtesy of fire sales of assets by Nama) to lend into economy, despite the fact that such lending is considered to be a high-risk activity. Nothing like selling pennies on the euro and then celebrating euros on pennies debt reload...


Sunday, May 29, 2011

29/05/11: Who's to be blamed?

Here's an interesting chart based on ECB data for lending rates charged on various types of loans:
What does this hart tell us? Several interesting things:
  1. In so far as the euro area retail rates are linked to the ECB rates, it appears that the lenders were factoring in a positive risk premium on Irish companies for large loans and small loans alike 9as reflected by the positive premia on corporate lending of both types). throughout the 2003-2010 period, Irish companies borrowings were priced at a risk premium relative to the Euro area average.
  2. This premium has declined (bizarrely) for larger loans (as the risk of borrowers rose during the crisis, the premium fell) and it rose for smaller loans (presumably the SME effect - with SMEs being more risky as borrowers in the crisis).
  3. On the net, it is hard to make an iron-clad case that ECB was driving over-lending to Irish corporates, as these corporates did face a risk premium on their borrowings.
  4. Where things really break down is in the housing mortgages lending. Here, there was and remains a deep discount on Euro area average when it comes to Irish lenders rates. Only during 2010 did this discount briefly turned to a premium. The trend is still on an increasing discount, which would be consistent with a lenders' perception that Irish house purchasers are lower risk than Euro area average. Which, of course , is a farce.
  5. So the net result is that it is hard to make a real direct case that the ECB reckless interest rates policy was the sole or the main driver of Irish over-lending. Instead, the evidence suggests that it was our own lenders' (banks) enthusiasm for underpricing risk in housing finance that was at pay consistently before the crisis onset and since then.

Wednesday, March 2, 2011

02/02/2011: Credit and Deposits of Irish residents: January 2011



Let's get back to the credit stats released yesterday by the CBofI. This is the second post (earlier post - here - focused on foreign depositors flight), so let's update the core charts and review some monthly changes in the data.

Credit side:

  • Irish households credit contracted mom by €948mln in January 2011 (a drop of 0.73%) against a monthly contraction of 5.29% in December 2010 - so deleveraging has slowed down
  • Year on year, Irish households total outstanding debt fell to €129,370 mln in January 2011 or yoy decline of €10,392mln (7.44%) while in December yoy decline was 6.97%.
  • Irish household's outstanding mortgages amounted to €99,289mln, down in January by €289mln (-0.29%) against a monthly drop of 7.05% in December 2010
  • Year on year, mortgages were down 9.78% (or €10,766mln) in January against a yoy decline of 9.65% in December 2010.
  • Non-financial corporations outstanding debts amounted to €92,652mln in January up 0.1% mom (+€90mln), but down 35.67% yoy (-€51,363mln).
  • Total private sector credit fell 0.57% (-€1,908mln) mom in January (December 2010 saw mom decline of 0.98%) and fell 10.6% yoy (-€39,427mln) in January (December 2010 saw yoy decline of 10.73%).
So on credit side by category:
And growth rates:

Next, deposits for Irish residents (remember - non-resident deposits were highlighted in the previous post linked at the top):

  • Total private deposits down 0.82% mom (-€1,387 mln) in January and yoy down 9.05% (-€16,613 mln). Steep. Deposits were down 2.24% mom in December 2010 (8.41% yoy).
  • Households deposits contracted 0.7% mom in January (-€663mln) and 5.56% yoy (-€5,531mln). There go our 'savings rates', folks. In December 2010, yoy drop was 4.57% so things are accelerating downward. Month on month deposits were down 0.71% in December 2010.
  • Non-financial corporations deposits rose 0.12% (VAT carry overs and seasonal receipts and payments, especially for MNCs being most likely drivers) month on month (+€41mln), but were down 16.57% yoy (-€6,670mln). In December 2010 corporate deposits were down 4.93% mom and 17.42% yoy.

Now, let's consider the degree of leverage we carry in this economy:
As charts above show:
  • Leverage rose 0.26% mom and fell 1.7% yoy in January 2011 across the entire economy. In December, leverage rose 0.51% mom and fell 3.44% yoy
  • Overall leverage trend is up and currently this economy is leverage 199.32%
  • For households, leverage fell 0.03% mom and 1.99% yoy in January 2011, having fallen 0.04% mom and 2.79% in December 2010. So deleveraginng is slowing down
  • Currently Irish households are leveraged 137.69%
  • Non-financial corporations leverage was formidable 275.93% in January, down 0.02% on December 2010 and 1.99% on January 2010. In December 2010 corporate leverage was down 0.04% mom and 2.79% yoy. So deleveraging is slowing down for corporates as well.
Deposits composition by maturity:
Clearly, longer maturity has fallen off the cliff and a slight bounce in longer maturities this month follows a catastrophic drop off in months before. This cliff is a clear indication that households are moving cash into shorter maturities - either to withdraw deposits all together or as a form of short term precautionary savings. So:
  • Overnight deposits were down -0.9% (-€788mln) mom and -4.42% yoy (-€3,998mln) in January
  • Deposits with maturity up to 3 months were down -1.26% (-€197mln) mom and -6.16% (-€1,011mln) yoy in January 2011
  • Deposits with maturity up to 2 years were up 1.15% (+€780mln) mom and down -16.67% (-13,374mln) yoy.

Finally, credit cards debt fell 1.84% mom (€53.48mln) and -5.8% (-€175.81mln) yoy in January 2011. Good news for one of the most expensive forms of debt.

Wednesday, February 2, 2011

2/02/2011: Irish interest rates

For the last post on monthly data release from the CBofI, let's take a look at the interest rates environment at the retail level.

First up - lending rates:

As of November 2010 (latest data available):
  • House purchases lending floating rate was at 2.95% (up 0.34% mom and 13.03% yoy - note, these are percentages, not percentage points); rates for over 1 year fixed were 4.10% average (up 0.24% mom and 14.53% yoy)
  • Consumer credit rate was 6.06% floating (up 1% mom and 30.32%yoy)
  • Non-financial corporations faced a floating rate for <€1mln loans of 4.49% (up 10.86%mom and 13.96%yoy) and over 1 year fixed rate for same level of loans of 5.14% (up 4.26%mom and 18.16%yoy)
  • The trends are up for all two borrower types year on year
Now, deposits:
So for deposit rates:
  • Household deposits attracted an average rate of 1.75% (up 6.06% mom and 17.45% yoy)
  • Non-financial corporations attracted an average rate of 1.25% (down 0.79% mom and up 39.98% yoy)
Now, consider the difference between deposit rate and borrowing rate:
For households, the gap between earnings on savings and cost of financing mortgages (I used house purchase, floating rate or up to 1 year fixed) has moved in favor of savers until November 2008, and there after switched in the direction of favoring borrowers. The switch is extremely volatile and since August 2010 the direction has changed once again. Thus, since August 2010 the banks are moving into more aggressively charging mortgage holders and rewarding relatively more savers.

Corporate rates differential has been moving in the direction of penalizing corporate deposits holders. This process in now being reinforced since July 2010.

So here we have it - deposit rates are becoming less attractive to the corporates, just as more and more of them abandon Irish banks... who would have thought that charging our customers out existence can be a bad thing?

Finally, using CBofI breakdown on loans by type and maturity, I conducted a simple exercise - what happens if the interest rates on new and ARM mortgages charged by banks go up by 1 percentage point (incidentally - PTSB is doing just that, apparently). By my calculation, added cost of interest finance will translate into roughly additional €1.67bn being taken out of the economy. That's like having another Leni's tax hike over again for Irish households.

2/02/2011: Irish termed deposits and credit cards

In the previous two posts I updated data on credit and deposits levels and flows. In this post, let's tidy up by taking a look at deposits by maturity and credit cards.

First deposits by maturity:
Clearly, longer term maturity is exiting, medium term maturity deposits are now shrinking as well, while short term maturity deposits remain steady. This suggests that
  1. Irish depositors are exiting Irish banks when longer term savings mature;
  2. Irish pool of savings available for investment - remember, banks can more safely lend out of longer maturity deposits than out of shorter maturity ones (lower risk of maturity mismatch) - is also shrinking.
  3. Overall, overnight deposits have increased 2.11%mom in December 2010, but fell 4.35% yoy
  4. Up to 3 months deposits fell 4.33% in December 2010 mom and 2.77% yoy
  5. Up to 2 years deposits fell 9.64% mom and 17.32% yoy.
Not very good trends.

On credit cards, the picture is What the data suggests is:
  • Irish credit cards balances are declining, but this decline is relatively mild - down 0.81% mom in December 2010 (latest data) and -6.28% yoy.

Tuesday, February 1, 2011

1/02/2011: Growth rates in credit and deposits

Having looked at the levels of credit and deposits through December 2010 in the previous post (here) lets take a look at the rates of change.
Credit growth rates above clearly show the following trends:
  • Household loans rate of contraction has accelerated from 4.8% yoy in October and November to 5.2% in December. Thus December 2010 marked the worst month in the entire series history since 2004.
  • Rate of decline in mortgages lending was also accelerating to 1.9% in December from 1.7% in November and 1.6% in September and October.
  • Rate of decline in credit for non-financial corporations eased in December to 1.6% yoy from 2.4% in November.
Next, deposits rates of change:
The chart above shows:
  • A dramatic exist from Irish banks by non-financial corporate deposits. This flight is accelerating - having gone from -9.2% yoy fall in July, to -13.1% in August, -14.8% in September, -15.4% in October, -14.9% in November and a whooping -16.1% in December.
  • Household deposits are also accelerating in the rate of decline from -2.4% in October to -4.5% in November and -4.7% in December
To highlight these dynamics and to dispel the myth of 'savings are rising' often perpetrated by some banks analysts, let's come back to the data on deposits. In December 2008-January 2009 there was a discrete jump in household deposits to the tune of just over €12.4bn. This jump is never really noticed by the analysts, but it reflects addition of the credit unions to the database. These are not new deposits, but rather the deposits that were held in institutions previously not covered by the dataset.

Now, let' remove this 'hump' and see what the banking sector deposits really look like today:
The chart abvoe does exactly this. And it clearly shows that:
  • Over 2010, Irish households have suffered a loss of savings, not a gain, pushing our deposits to the comparable level of December 2007
  • Over the entire crisis total private sector deposits have fallen to the levels comparable to those in May-June 2006.
And yet, we keep hearing (admittedly whimpered) calls for taxing 'sky-high' deposits/savings to 'release spending into consumption markets'.

1/02/2011: Credit supply and deposits in Ireland

CBofI released monthly data for December 2010 on credit supply and deposits in the Irish financial institutions.

Updated charts and some analysis:
Irish private sector credit continued to contract in December, having fallen 0.98% mom and -10.7% yoy in total. Overall, credit outstanding fell €3.33bn in December mom and €40.23bn yoy.
Credit has fallen across all categories, except one:
  • Household credit fell 4.72% (-€6.49bn) mom and 6.41% (-€8.98bn) yoy
  • Mortgages credit fell 7.05% (-€7.55bn) mom and 9.65% (-€10.63bn) yoy
  • Non-financial corporations credit fell 2.63% (-€2.5bn) mom and 37.08% (-€54.34bn) yoy
  • Insurance and pension funds sector credit rose 5.36% (€5.66bn) and was up 26.18% (€23.09bn) yoy
  • Combined non-financial sectors and households credit fell a massive €63.32bn in 12 months to the end of December 2010.

Onto deposits next:

Headline figure is that total deposits fell 2.24% (-€3.86bn) mom and 8.41% (-€15.46bn) yoy. This was backed by deposits declines across two out of three core components:
So:
  • Household deposits rose 0.71% (€669mln) mom but fell 4.57% (-€4.53bn) yoy
  • Non-financial corporate deposits were down 5.18% (-€1.83bn) mom and 17.64% (-€7.17bn) yoy
  • Insurance and pension funds sector deposits fell 6.29% (-€2.7bn) mom and 8.57% (-€3.77bn) yoy
  • Non-financial sector and household deposits fell €11.693bn in 12 months through December 2010.
The relative changes in deposits and loans outstanding implied changes in the ratio of loans to deposits - an instrument for the leveraging taken on by the economy at large.

Overall, Irish economy achieved a very modest reduction in the ratio in 2010:
  • Total private sector credit to deposits ratio fell 2.53% in 12 months to the end of December 2010 reaching 198.81%
  • Lowest deleveraging took place in the household sector, where the ratio fell 1.93% in 12 months and currently stands at 138.56%
  • Highest degree of deleveraging was achieved in the non-financial corporate sector, where the ratio declined 23.6% yoy in December (though it rose by 2.69% mom) reaching 275.68%
  • Insurance and pensions funds sector actually increased overall leverage ratio by 38% in 12 months to the end of December, reaching the ratio of 276.6%
Overall, outstanding loans exceeded domestic deposits by 98.81% in the end of 2010.