Showing posts with label Irish financials. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Irish financials. Show all posts

Monday, July 18, 2011

18/07/2011: Some thoughts on Irish stocks bubble

There is a classic defined relationship between the various stages of bubble formation and markets responses, as illustrated in the chart from (source here) below.

Of course, there is an argument to be made that ‘normal’ bubbles are driven by either information asymmetries or behavioural ‘exuberance’ or both, and are, therefore, significant but temporary departures from the steady state ‘mean’ growth trend. The return to the mean, thus implies the end of the correction phase, as also shown in the chart below.


Of course, one can make an argument that what we have experienced in the case of Ireland is more than a simple bubble, but a structural break underwritten by underlying fundamentals, such as lower permanent rate of growth.

Irish GDP grew 8.82% cumulative in the period 2003-2010 in terms of constant prices or annualized rate of growth of 1.215%. In per capita terms current prices it grew by 14.85% cumulatively and at an annualized rate of 1.998%. Taken from these rates, from 2003 on through today, the average expected value of IFIN should be around 8,898 (mid-point between 8,659 and 9,139 implied by above rates from the ‘Smart Money’ period mid-point valuation). Note that, crucially, the new mean post-bubble bursting should be at least at or above the ‘Smart Money’ end-of-period valuations.

This is certainly not the case with Irish financials as shown in figure below:
Note that three forecasts (my own calculations, so treat as indicative, rather than absolute) provided assume that the average annual growth rate of 1.998% (upper forecast from the starting point at 2003-2004 average), mean forecast (based on 1.215% annualized average growth, starting from 2003-2004 average) and lower forecast (based on 1.215% annualized growth, starting from 2000-2003 average). All three are well above the post-Despair peak.

What about other signs of a classic bubble?
In the run up to the Public Money phase, it is clear that IFIN shows a number of sell-offs and shallow bear traps, but these can be linked to higher overall volatility of the index.

For any period we can take, IFIN exhibits more volatility than either S&P or FTSE bank shares sub-indices. Historically, across indices (to assure comparable scale), IFIN standard deviation stands at 65.40 against S&P’s BIX at 36.84 and FTSE A350 Banks at 32.70. January 2003 through June 2006, IFIN standard deviation was 25.16 against that for BIX of 10.29 and FTSE A350B at 12.07. For the run up to the crisis period between June 2006 and June 2007, IFIN standard deviation was 15.66 against S&P’s BIX of 4.64 and FTSE A350B of 5.22. Lastly, during the crisis – from July 2007 through today, IFIN standard deviation was 56.40 against 28.07 for S&P BIX and 27.83 for FTSE A350B.

To see the relationship, or the lack there of between the volatilities, consider the following chart.
Even from the simple consideration of the rates of change, week on week, IFIN has the lowest correlation with the S&P Banking BIX index – with relatively low explanatory power. Things are even worse if we are to look at the downside risks. Chart below plots downside weekly movements for the three indices that correspond to market declines of 2% or more week-on-week. Again, you can see that both before and during the crisis, there is little relationship between downside risk to Irish financials and to S&P measure.
And the same story is formally confirmed by the Chart below which plots the pair-wise relationships between S&P BIX and FTSE A350 and IFIN.
So overall, IFIN data strongly suggests that we are not in a “normal” financial bubble scenario.

But what about that claim that Lehman's Bros collapse had influence on our banks shares? Recall, Lehman was in trouble since Spring 2008 and went to the wall on September 15, 2008. Also recall that the issues started with Bear Sterns troubles in March 2008 and JPMorgan Chase completed its acquisition of Bear Stearns on May 30, 2008. So let's take the data subset on extreme downward volatility for the period from May 2008 through September 2009. If Lehmans and/or Bear had much of an effect on Irish financials we should expect either one of the following two or both to hold:
  1. Correlation between IFIN and S&P BIX to be large and significant
  2. Correlation between IFIN and BIX to be larger in the period considered than over the history from 2003 through today.
Overall, evidence suggests that actually the opposite of both (1) and (2) above holds. In fact, based on data for weekly market declines greater than 2% (relatively significant events, but not really too dramatic by far), the period between Bear & Lehman collapse and the next 12 months, Irish financials were less impacted by the US financial shares movements than in the period of 2003-present overall. The impact of Lehmans & Bear on UK financials was stronger, although not dramatically strong, however.

Sunday, September 19, 2010

Economics 19/9/10: Irish banks - Government intervention still has no effect

Returning to my old theme - let's take a fresh look at the Government and its policy cheerleaders success rate with repairing our banking sector. Here is a quick snapshot of history and numbers as told through the lens of Irish Financials index.
So clearly, we have some really powerful analysts out there and keen commentariat (actually one and the same in this case) on the future prognosis for our banks.

But what about recent moves in the index itself?
Take a look at the chart above, which maps the Financials Index for two subperiods:
Period 1: from Guarantee to March announcement of the 'final' recapitalization of our banks,
Period 2: from Guarantee to today.
Now notice the difference between two equations. That's right, things are not getting any better, they are getting worse.

Next, let's put some historical markers on the map:
Surely, our financials are getting better, the Government will say, by... err... not getting much, much worse. The reality, of course is, any index has a natural lower bound of zero. In the case of Irish Financials Index, this bound is above zero, as the index contains companies that are not banks. As far as the banks go, there is a natural lower limit for their share values of zero. Our IFIN index is now at 80% loss relative not to its peak, but to its value on the day of Guarantee!

Having pledged banks supports to the tune of 1/3 of our GDP already, the Government policy still has not achieved any appreciable improvement in the index.

Forget longer term stuff - even relative to Q4 2009, Government policies cannot correct the strategic switchback away from Irish banks shares that took hold:
A picture, is worth a 1000 words. Unless you belong to the upbeat cheerleaders group of the very same analysts who missed the largest market collapse in history, that is.

Friday, May 28, 2010

Economics 28/05/2010: Welfare fun in the Credit Unions land

There are three things one must wonder about when it comes to the Credit Unions in Ireland:
  1. Why aren't we hearing more about the going-ons in these fine credit institutions that play a significant role in this economy? After all, credit unions have assets of ca €14.5bn per end of 2009 figures. €6.8bn of this is in loans and €7.3bn in investments. And they act as, in effect, second tier lenders (correcting per a tip from a reader: not in terms of quality of borrowers but in terms of types of loans), with most loans going to unsecured lending on cars, home improvements, personal spending, etc. Could they have miraculously escaped the fate of the banks in the current crisis? Highly unlikely.
  2. Why do we have a separate regulatory regime for these organizations, if their basic business model is virtually identical to prudentially justified banking?
Well, folks - in the land of endless quangoes (aka, Ireland) we have a financial regulator and a separate credit union regulator. The latter, James O Brien, now reportedly wants new additional provisions to be made by the 20 unions (out of 414 - a whooping 5%) operating in Ireland that face “serious solvency issues”. Oops. That was a sudden one. In effect, back in 2008 the Irish League of Credit Unions (yeah, I know, sounds like a Klingon gathering) issued annual report full of concerns for the Credit Unions' state of health on their investment side. Then there was a report into the impairments charges. Which promptly followed by a dramatic decline in the surprise spot inspections of the Credit Unions - the only real tool for assessing just how bad the loan books might be.

Now, we are being told that there are Credit Unions out there which have 'serious solvency issues' - or translated into common language 'might be trading in insolvent conditions'.
Apparently, arrears levels in the Irish credit unions rose from 6% in 2008 to 13.5% in 2009. The Credit Unions Klingon-styled response to this was to lobby Brian Lenihan to allow them continue lending for holidays in the sun to households, some of which can easily be on the verge of running into trouble with the banks. You see, credit unions provide credit after the banks provide secured loans to the punters (again, correcting per a tip from a reader: this does not mean that credit unions lend to a less worthy client than the banks, it means that they supply lower priority - in household budget terms - and largely unsecured loans. Neither does it mean that credit unions provide loans to people who were turned down by the banks. However, it is known that credit unions did provide top up loans for house purchasers who have exceeded mortgage allocation and borrowed to either supply a deposit or cover closing costs on property from the credit unions).

Credit unions do so by taking deposits from the same punters in exchange for the promise of a dividend - an annual payment that is there to replicate deposit rates paid by the banks. Alas, when a company runs into red, unless the company is AIB, the normal practice is to withhold the dividend and use the company earnings to replenish capital base. The credit union movement in Ireland disagrees, arguing that a dividends withdrawal for funding of higher reserves and offsetting losses on loans would damage their 'competitiveness' vis-a-vis the banks.

There is, of course, one major issue with the Unions operations - in effect, absent restoration of the proper functional business banking in this country, Credit Unions are now becoming more actively involved in small businesses operating capital management. This is a risky undertaking for all parties involved and we do not have much data on the matter. Small businesses - sole proprietorships in particular - can blend business cash flow management with personal banking, inducing risk spill-overs from business side to household finances. Increasing reserves requirements on Credit Unions will be likely to put the boot into this, rather atavistic, practice, made necessary by the lack of functional business financing in the core banking sector.


But one must be concerned about the end game here. If the regulator were to listen to the unions, what alternative ways can be found to cover the losses then? None other than a direct injection of cash from the taxpayers. So here we have it - welfare junkies in Ireland have reached a new high. We are being indirectly told that Credit Unions should be allowed to pay dividends out by keeping reserves low, even as they face mounting losses. Surely the taxpayers can provide a cover for these, should the trading environment continue to deteriorate into the future. Happy times, folks!

Monday, April 19, 2010

Economics 20/04/2010: IMF report on global financial stability

IMF's GFSR report for Q1 2010 is out today, and makes a fantastic, albeit technical reading of the global financial system health. Ireland features prominently.

First, Ireland, alongside with Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium are the four leading countries responsible for contagion of markets shocks to the rest of the Euro area. Own fundamentals drove, per IMF team, Irish sovereign bond spreads more than those for any other country in the common currency area, dispelling the Government-propagated myth that our crisis was caused by the US and the global financial markets collapse. Chart below - from the report - illustrates:
Between October 2008 and March 2009, Ireland's contribution to cross-Euro contagion was 12.3% of the total Euro area distress probability - second highest after Austria (16.7%). For the period of October 2009 - February 2010, the picture changed. Greece came in first in terms of distress contagion risk - at 21.4%, Portugal second with 18.0%. Ireland's role declined to 8.1% - placing us 6th in the list of the worst contagion risk countries. A positive achievement, beyond any doubt. But again, IMF attributes the entire probability of the risk of contagion from Ireland to the Euro zone down to domestic fundamentals, not external crisis conditions.

This progression has not been all that rosy for the sovereign bonds:
Notice that Ireland's term structure of CDS rates has barely changed in Q4 2009-Q1 2010. Why is that so? Despite the Budget 2010 being unveiled in between, the markets still perceive the probability of Ireland defaulting on sovereign debt in 5 years times relative to 1 year from now as pretty much unchanged. This would suggest that the markets do not buy into the Government promise to deliver a significantly (dramatically and radically) improved debt and deficit positions by 2015! In other words, the Budget 2010 has not swayed the markets away from their previous position, leaving Ireland CDS's term structure curve much less improved than that of the other PIIGS.

Here is another nice piece of evidence. Guess who's been hoovering up ECB lending?
And if you want to see just why Irish banks will be raising mortgage rates regardless of what ECB is doing, look no further than this:
The chart above, of course, covers 2008 - the year when Anglo posted spectacular results and AIB raised dividend. Imagine what this would look like if we are to update the figure to today. Also notice that in terms of return on equity, Irish banks were doing just fine with low margins back in 2008 and before. The reason for this is that our lending model allowed for that anomaly: banks were literally sucking out tens of billions of Euro area cheap interbank loans and hosing down a tiny economy with cash. As long as the boom went on, it didn't matter whether the bankers actually had any idea why and to whom they were lending. Now, the tide has gone out, and guess who's been swimming naked?

Interesting note on the equity markets. looking at historic P/E ratios, the IMF staff concludes that back in February 2010 "For advanced economies, equity valuations are within historical norms". Except for Ireland, which deserves its own note: "Forward-looking price-to-earnings ratios of Ireland appear elevated due largely to sharp downward revisions in earnings projections."

So, read this carefully: Irish stocks were overvalued - based on forecast forward P/Es - back in the time of the paper preparation. Using z-scores (deviation of the latest measure from either the historical average or the forward forecast based on IMF model) for Irish equities are: +2.1 for shorter horizon (a simplified 96% chance of a downward correction) and +0.9 for longer term forecasts (roughly 63% chance of downward adjustment). In other words, the market is overpriced both in the short term and in the long run. Worse than that, we have the highest short and long term horizon over pricing in the world!

In housing markets, our price/rent ratio z-score is +1.1 (74% probability of deterioration), which means we are somewhat close to the bottoming out but are not quite there. How big is the 'somewhat' the IMF wont tell, but it looks like we are still 1.1 standard deviations above the equilibrium price. Price to income ratio - the affordability metric is at +0.8 stdevs, so prices might still have to fall further to catch up with fallen incomes (57% probability).

Sunday, January 17, 2010

Economics 17/01/2010: Back to the future in risk-aversion?

Are markets settling for a renewed pressure of higher risk aversion strategies?

Given the fact that the US (and generally OECD) economic conditions remain extremely weak, the markets might be signaling a reversal of the risk attitudes - overdue after the rallies of the second half of 2009. The first signals came in from the bond markets, where even sick puppies, such as Ireland, have enjoyed some bounce in recent weeks. One can argue that the Greeks are getting away with a murder, as their CDS and spreads are following much shallower dynamic than one would have expected in light of continued concerns as to the credibility of their fiscal adjustment plans.

But the real ticker for troubles potentially brewing ahead is the overall markets behavior.

Here is one interesting chart:
 
For last week: TIPS up, bonds up, everything else - down. Not exactly a confidence game. And this is compounded by the January effect not playing out this year so far.

Now, VIX:


Now, not yet as pronounced as on level performance for the markets themselves, but note MCAD cross over and reduced divergence in the last 5 trading days, teamed up with S&P negative movement. Both suggest that VIX downward trend might be breaking.

Irish data is yet to show a clear trend/pattern or resistance breaks -


IFIN is pointing to a gently rising momentum in volatility, ISEQ broader index shows a gentle decline. Plus the highest frequency data I do have relates to daily close prices.  But, of course, there are lags relative to the US markets, so something to watch here.

Friday, March 20, 2009

Daily Economics Update 21/03/2009

Weekly analysis: Irish shares

The volume of shares traded on the New York Stock Exchange has topped the 50-day moving average on six of the seven days that the stock market has been up since March 6 (the day on which the S&P 500 touched its most recent low). The broad benchmark index has gained 15% since that low, sparking hopes of a recovery. The significant issue here is in the volume figure, not in the actual rise in the index, as stronger volumes on a rising trend tend to support more risk-taking and signal investors' support for the trend.

Interestingly, the same, but less pronounced, process has been starting on Friday in the Irish markets.
Chart above shows last week's movements in ISE Total Price Index (IETP), Irish Financials Index (IFIN), AIB, BofI and IL&P shares. Strong upward trajectories here, with significant volatility. But all underpinned by good (well above the average) volumes, as per chart below.This is less pronounced when we normalize daily volumes by historical average, as done in the chart below.
Less extraordinary change is underway above, because we are using moving averages as normalizing variable, implying that we actually capture the inherently rising volatility in volumes traded here. So the above chart actually suggests that while Friday up-tick in share prices (and pretty much the last three day's rally) was reasonably well underpinned, it will take some time to see if market establishes a solid floor under the share prices.

Monthly results so far remain weak. Only BofI was able, so far, to recover all monthly losses and post some gains. AIB is just hitting the point of return to late February valuations. Given that at the point of sale - at the end of February, beginning of March - the volumes traded were 5-7 times those of the current week's peak, it is hard to see the present recovery as being driven by pure psychology and the spillover from the broader global markets (US' momentary lapse of optimism).

Two more charts: recall that in mid February I argued that downgrades in all three financials will come to an end by February's expiration and all three will settle into a nice slow bear rally, running at virtually parallel rates of growth. Chart below shows that this is happening, indeed.Once we normalize prices and account for volumes traded, there is nothing surprising in the share prices movements since the beginning of March. And this is exactly where, as I argued before, the markets should be: awaiting news catalysts...

Friday, February 27, 2009

IL&P: next in line? Update III

And it all is going so swimmingly along the lines of my predictions... except...

Volumes on IL&P were actually up relative to the markets per the first chart below (most likely due to the retail investors still running through some spare cash),and subsequently, correlation between IL&P and the broader sector is staying out of the range where IL&P price deterioration can be attributed to the market-wide downgrade alone (chart below),
but the general price direction of IL&P is pretty much bang on my forecast (per second chart below): after a short uptick earlier in the week, we are again in the rapid downward momentum relative to other banks stocks.The twin stories unfolding alongside each other:
  • renewed Bear market momentum for the Irish banking sector, and
  • more severe downgrades in IL&P than in the sector itself
are not over yet, so expect a bumpy ride today and more downgrades next week. This week, the catalyst for the sector was a clearly anemic bond issue signaling a threat to the banks guarantee scheme and to the capacity of the state to continue injecting capital into the banking system. Next week - balance sheet worries, lack of any coherent plan on bad assets on behalf of the State plus the Live Register figures - out on Wednesday - will be back to the fore... Oh, and there is an added pressure emerging as well - the rising risk premium on political instability...