Showing posts with label Irish debt crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Irish debt crisis. Show all posts

Monday, December 7, 2015

7/12/15: A new study on psychology of crisis response & the role of the media


This is a new study developed by an excellent young Irish psychologist - Seamus Power - at the University of Chicago. 

All Irish people, over the age of 18, are eligible to take part in this survey and all walks of life, ages, demographics etc are really needed. The survey should take under 15 minutes to complete.

Seamus is interested in your responses to a range of questions and your reactions to a randomly assigned media article covering the topics relating to policy responses to the recent crisis.

I can't really stress enough how important this topic is for Ireland and for social sciences, so please, take a few minutes to complete it. We need data-based evidence and Seamus will be sharing his findings with all of us.

Study link here: http://ssd.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_bKESEHr6IXjkXGt .

Wednesday, March 25, 2015

25/3/15: IMF on Irish household debt crisis


IMF on Irish household debt crisis (from today's Article IV paper):

"Household balance sheets are healing gradually, yet loan distress remains high and over half of arrears cases are prolonged. Households have cut nominal debts by 20 percent from peak through repayments primarily funded by a 4 percentage point rise in their trend savings rate. Debt ratio falls have been large by international standards but debt levels remain relatively high at 177 percent of disposable income. Household net worth has risen 25 percent
from its trough."


One note of caution: IMF statement ignores sales of household debt out of the Central Bank-covered statistics to vulture funds. Furthermore, repossessions, insolvencies, bankruptcies, voluntary surrenders and some mortgages restructurings have also contributed to the reduction in household debt. Thus, not all of the debt reduction is down to organic debt repayment by households.

It is also worth noting that per chart above, Irish household debt is currently at the levels of 2005-2006 - hardly a robust reduction on crisis-peak.

More from the IMF: "A recent survey finds household debts concentrated among families with mortgages, having 2 to 3 children, with the reference person aged 35 to 44, and in the two top income quintiles. Yet, their debt servicing burden is still similar to other groups, reflecting the high share of long-term “tracker” mortgages, with an average interest rate of 1.05 percent at end 2014."

The problem is that the recent survey IMF cites covers data through 2013 only! (http://www.cso.ie/en/media/csoie/releasespublications/documents/socialconditions/2013/hfcs2013.pdf).

Overall issues, therefore, are:

  1. Irish household debts remain extreme relative to disposable income;
  2. Distribution of household debts is adversely impacting the most productive segment of Irish population and the segment of population in critical years for pensions savings; and
  3. Deleveraging of the households is by no means completed and remains exposed to the risk of rising interest rates in the future.


All points I raised before and all points largely ignored by Irish policymakers.

Monday, January 13, 2014

13/1/2014: Seeking MEPs support for legacy debt resolution?


Today, Irish Times is covering the intention of the Minister Noonan to seek support for a retrospective debt deal for Ireland from the EU MEPs. Here's the full article: http://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/noonan-to-seek-meps-support-for-debt-relief-over-banks-1.1652911

Couple of thoughts in relation to this intention:

  1. This is the 7th year since the ill-fated banks guarantee that started the process of transfer of banking sector losses away from (some) investors in the banks (majority of unsecured and all secured and senior bondholders)  to the taxpayers. This, it appears, is the first instance in which the Irish Government is officially attempting to enlist support for the retroactive resolution of these transfers from the EU MEPs. Why? The Ireland Says No campaign of ordinary citizens and residents of the state have requested such assistance in a number of meetings with the MEPs. People like myself, whenever asked to brief the MEPs on the issues relating to the banking crisis have done so on a number of occasions. Irish Government, it seems, is only now coming around to a realisation that having MEPs support can be of value in addressing the problem? Why? I spoke to the ECON committee members some 6-8 months ago and asked them to support Ireland's efforts. Why is the Irish Government only now officially attempting to do the same?
  2. Per article: "The argument that Ireland’s significantly high debt to GDP ratio of almost 120 per cent means that it needs further debt relief has emerged in recent months as a key strand of the Government’s campaign to secure support on legacy bank debt." Why? Sustainability of our debt has been , allegedly, tested by the Department of Finance, by the Central Bank, the Troika etc, and yet none of these entities and organisations ever once voiced any serious concern with sustainability of debt. How can the same Government that continues to claim that everything is sustainable, that Ireland is in a recovery, that we will repay every red cent of our debts etc etc etc now turn around and credibly claim that "it needs further debt relief"? What has changed "in recent months" to alter Government position? Did Government alter its position?
  3. In June 2012, Irish Government announced that it has reached - claiming its own effort to credit - a 'seismic deal'. There were no qualifiers used, no caution given, no room for 'may be it won't happen' doubts allowed. The deal was the deal and that was it: Ireland was to get retroactive debt relief. Since June 2012, this 'seismic' deal was thrown like a proverbial banana peel into every gathering of voices doubting the Government achievement or debt sustainability dogma. And now, is Minister Noonan finally admitting there is no deal? Because if the deal is just a matter of time - an 'when' not an 'if' - and has only to wait until the SSM comes into force, then why does Minister Noonan need the MEPs support?

Lastly, as the readers know, this blog position has been that Ireland's total economic debt levels (household, Government and non-financial corporate, combined) are not sustainable. Non-sustainability  of debt in the context of my arguments always involved the view that Ireland is facing a choice: either fund current levels of debt and face long term structural collapse of growth in this economy, or we will need to restructure our debts. In terms of restructuring our debts, I have consistently suggested that the best target would be banks liabilities. The opposing side in the argument always put forward the planned/projected declines in debt/GDP ratio starting with 2014 as a sign of debt sustainability. the cost of such 'reductions' in debt liabilities on the economy (growth and investment effects) and society (health, psychological costs, social costs etc) never phased those who argued that the debt is sustainable. The Government has expended significant effort attempting to argue against the view that our debt is not sustainable. Is the same Government now directly agreeing with the positions they disputed? Are they really saying that we are facing a risk to our debt sustainability?

Setting aside the above issues, if Minister Noonan is indeed committed to seeking MEPs support for a retroactive debt relief for Ireland in relation to the debts related to our banking crisis, I am happy to help in any way I can. it's been long (too long) overdue.

Sunday, December 1, 2013

1/12/2013: The Age of Great Stagnation: Sunday Times, 24/11/2013

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times column from November 24, 2013.


In recent months, the hope-filled choir of Irish politicians raised to a crescendo the catchy tune of the return of our economic fortunes. Their views are often echoed by some European leaders, themselves eager to declare the euro crisis to be over. Earlier this year, as the euro area remained mired in official recession, the perpetually optimistic Economics Commissioner, Olli Rehn, summarised the economic environment as follows: “…we have disappointing hard data from the end of last year, some more encouraging soft data in the recent past and growing investor confidence in the future.”

Since then, we had ever-disappointing hard data through September this year, un-interpretable volatile soft data, and an ever-booming confidence in the future. This pattern of rising expectations amidst non-improving reality has been with us for over two years.

Which raises two questions. Firstly, is the fabled recovery we are allegedly experiencing sustainable? Second, are we betting our economic house on a right horse in the long run?


In our leaders’ imagination, this country’s prospects for a recovery remain tied to those of the euro area. The official theory suggests that growth in our major trading partners will trickle down to our exports, which, in turn, will drive domestic economy via improving investment and consumer spending. This theory rest on the fundamental belief that things have hit their bottom in Ireland and the only way from here is up.

These are the two core theories behind the short-term projections that underpinned Budget 2014. And, taken with risk caveats highlighted this week by the Fiscal Council assessment of the Department of Finance projections, the views from the Merrion Street represent a rather optimistic, but reasonably feasible forecast for 2014.

Alas, in the longer run, a lot is amiss with the above two theories. The most obvious point of contention is that we've heard them before. And so far, both turned out to be wrong.

Over 2009-2013, cumulative real GDP across the euro area shrunk by 2.1 percent, and expanded by 3.5 percent across the G7 countries. In Ireland, over the same period, GDP fell by 4.7 percent. The tail of Ireland was wagging the dog of the EU on the way down into the Great Recession.

The converse is true on the way up. Unlike in the early 1990s, the improving economic fortunes abroad are not doing much good for Ireland’s exports either. Over the last four years, volumes of imports of goods by the euro area countries grew by almost 15 percent and for G7 these went up 21 percent. Irish exports of goods over the same period of time rose just 2.2 percent. Global trade, having shrunk in 2008 and 2009 has been growing since then. Again, Ireland missed that momentum.

Over the crisis period, growth in our exports of goods and services did not translate into strong growth in our GDP and was completely irrelevant to the dynamics of our GNP or national income. The reason for this paradox is that our goods exports have shrunk 3.57 percent in 2012, having posted declining rate of growth 2011 compared to 2010. The rate of their decline is now accelerating. In January-September this year our exports of goods fell 6.7 percent compared to the same period a year ago. Goods trade is the core employer of Irish workers amongst all exporting sectors and the main contributor to the economy at large.

Instead of goods trade, our external balance expansion became dependent solely on ICT services and a massive collapse in imports.

Much of the former represent transfer pricing and have little real effect on the ground. As the result, our exports growth came with virtually zero growth in employment, domestic demand or investment. We don't need to dig deep into the statistics to see this: over the period of our fabled exports-led recovery, Irish private sector prices and domestic demand both followed a downward path.

The latter, however, presents a serious risk to the sustainability of our debts. To fund our liabilities, we need long-term current account surpluses to average above 4 percent of GDP over the next decade or so. We also need economic growth of some 3-3.5 percent in GDP and GNP terms to start reducing massive unemployment and reversing emigration. Yet, to drive real growth in the economy we need domestic investment and demand uplifts. These require an increase in imports of real capital and consumption goods. Should our exports of goods continue down the current trajectory, any sustained improvement in the domestic economy will be associated with rising imports and, as a corollary, deterioration in our trade balance.

This, in turn, will put pressures on our economy’s capacity to fund debt servicing. And given the levels of debt we carry, the tipping point is not that far off the radar.

In H1 2013 Ireland's external real debt (excluding monetary authorities, banks and FDI) stood at almost USD1.32 trillion - the highest level ever recorded in history. Large share of this debt is down to the IFSC and MNCs sector. However, overall debt levels in the Irish system are still sky high. More importantly, the debt levels are not declining, despite the claims to the aggressive deleveraging of our households and banks. At the end of H1 2013, total real economic debt in Ireland - debt of Irish Government, excluding Nama, Irish-resident corporates and households - stood at over EUR492 billion - down just EUR8.5 billion on absolute peak attained in H3 2012. In other words, our current debt levels are basically flat on the peak and are above the highs attained before the crisis.


With all the talk about positive forecasts for the economy and the world around us, we are desperately seeking to escape three basic truths. One: we are facing the risk that neither exports growth nor the reversals of our foreign trade partners' fortunes are likely to do much for our real economy. Two: the real break on our growth is the gargantuan burden of combined household, government and corporate debts. And three: we have no plan to deal with either the former risk or the latter reality.

Instead of charting our own course toward achieving sustainable long-term competitiveness in our economy, we remain attached at the hip to the slowest horse in the pack of global economies – the euro area. This engine of Irish growth is now seized by a Japanese-styled long-term stagnation with no growth in new investment and consumption, and glacially moving deleveraging of its banks and sovereigns.

Governments across the EU are pursuing cost-cutting and re-orienting their purchasing of goods and services toward domestic suppliers. In this zero-sum competition, small players like Ireland are risking being crushed by the weight of financial repressions and domestic protectionism in the larger economies.

These forces are not going to disappear overnight even if growth returns to Europe. According to the global survey by Markit, released this week, one third of companies worldwide expect their business to rise over the next 12 months. By itself - a low number, but a slight rise on 30 percent at the end of Q2 2013. Crucially, however, improving sentiment does not translate into improving economic conditions: only 14 percent of companies expect to add new employees in 2014.

As per financial repression, euro area banks remain sick with as much as EUR 1 trillion in required deleveraging yet to take place and some EUR350-400 billion worth of assets to be written down. Should the banks stress tests uncover any big problems there is no designated funding to plug the shortfalls. According to the Standard Bank analysts' research note, published this week: "Increasingly, European governments are resorting to tricks to resolve the problems of their banking systems, including inadequate stress tests, overly optimistic growth and asset price forecasts, and some unusual accounting stratagems."

Which foreign government or private economy is going to start importing Irish goods and services or investing here at an increasing rate when their own populations are struggling to find jobs and their banks are fighting for survival.


Meanwhile, we remain on a slow path to entering new markets, despite having spent good part of the last 6 years talking about the need to 'break' into BRICS and the emerging and middle-income economies. In January-September 2012, Irish exports to BRICS totaled EUR2.78 billion. A year later, these are down EUR240 million. Controlling for exchange rates valuations, our exports to the key developing and middle-income markets around the world are flat since 2010.

We are also missing the most crucial element of the growth puzzle: structural reforms that can make us competitive not just in terms of crude unit labor costs, but across the entire economic system. Since 2008 there has been virtually no changes made to the way we do business domestically, especially when it comes to protected professions and state-controlled sectors. Legal reforms, restructuring of semi-state companies’ and the sectors where they play dominant roles, such as health, transport and energy, changes to the costs and efficiencies in our financial services – these are just a handful of areas where promised reforms have not been delivered.

Political cycle is now turning against the prospect of accelerating such reforms with European and local elections on the horizon. Reforms fatigue sets in. The relative calm of the last 9-12 months has pushed all euro area governments into a false sense of security.

The good news is that the collapse phase of the Great Recession is over. The bad news is that with growth of around 1.5 percent per annum on GDP we are nowhere near the moment when the economy starts returning to long-term health. I warned about this scenario playing out over the next decade in these very pages back in 2008-2009. Given the latest projections from the Department of Finance and the IMF, we are firmly on the course to deliver on my prediction.

Welcome to the age of the Great Stagnation.




Box-out:

Recent research paper from the European Commission, titled The Gap between Public and Private Wages: New Evidence for the EU assessed the differences between public sector and private sector earnings across the 27 member states over the period of 2006-2010. The findings are far from encouraging for Ireland. In 2010, Irish public wages were found to be some 21.2 percent higher than the comparable wages paid in the private sector. The study controlled for a number of factors impacting wages differentials, including gender, age, tenure in the job, education and job grades. Strikingly, the study found that wages premium in the public sector was higher for women, for younger workers and for less skilled employees. A positive public wage premium was also observed at all levels of educational attainment with the largest premium paid to workers with low education and the lowest to workers with medium levels of education. If in 2006 Irish public sector wage premium stood on average at 20.5 percent, making our public sector wage premium second highest in the EU27, by 2010 we had the highest premium at 21.2 percent. It is worth noting that in all Nordic countries of Europe, the wage premium to public sector workers was found to be negative in 2010.

Friday, May 17, 2013

17/5/2013: Welcome to Surreal Irish National Accounts


A significant, but only because it is now 'official', confirmation that Ireland's GDP and GNP figures are vastly over-exaggerated by the distorting presence of some MNCs in Ireland has finally arrived to the pages of FT: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/eb114bda-be3f-11e2-9b27-00144feab7de.html#axzz2TYJudjwo

As one of those who said this time and again, starting with my work in the Open Republic Institute in 2001 and through today, I am grateful to Jamie Smyth for pointing this out.

The ESRI, which - being tasked directly with doing research on Irish economy and being paid for doing such research - has slept through the years of boom as the Government wasted resources in chasing imaginary investment/GDP and spending/GDP targets. After years of the Social partnership bulls**t, we only now, driven into desperation by necessity of the crisis, are beginning to face the reality that we are poorer than our GDP and GNP levels actually imply.

I take heart that all those who never once before voiced their concern about the distorting nature of our MNCs-dependent economic variables are now quoted in the FT voicing that concern. Since the beginning of the crisis I put forward consistently a three-points position countering Ireland's official sustainability analysis when it comes the economy being able to sustain current levels of Government debt:

  1. Despite all the focus in Irish and international media and official circles, it is the total economic debt mountain (household, government and non-financial corporate debts) that matters in determining sustainability of our economic development;
  2. Irish economy's capacity to carry the above debt burden is determined not by GDP, but by something closer to an average of GNP and Total Domestic Demand which, in 2012, stood at 81.54 and 75.21% of our official GDP.
  3. Irish exports growth is now becoming decoupled from the real economy as it is primarily driven by services exports which are dominated by a handful of tax arbitrage plays with little real connection to value added generated in this country.
The ESRI note cited in FT - detailed and well-research as it is - only scratches the surface of tax arbitrage effects on our official statistics. 

Saturday, April 27, 2013

27/4/2013: Sunday Times : March 31, 2014

The first of three consecutive posts to update on my recent articles in press.

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from March 31, 2013.

What a difference a week, let alone nine months, make. 

Nine months ago, on June 29th, 2012, the eurozone leaders pledged "to break the links between the banks and the sovereign" prompting the Irish Government to call the results of the euro summit 'seismic' and ‘game-changing’. 

Fast-forward nine months. The number of mortgages in arrears in Irish banks rose at an annualised rate of 25%, the amounts of arrears have been growing at 65%. The number of all mortgages either in arrears, or temporarily restructured and not in arrears, or in repossessions is up 23% per annum. 
Deposits held in Irish ‘covered’ banks have fallen 13.9% between June 2012 and January 2013. In three months through January 2013 average levels of Irish residents' private sector deposits was down 2.34% on three months through June 2012, clocking annualised rate of decline of 4%. Over the same period of time, loans to Irish private sector fell 1.54% (annualised drop of 2.7%).

Smoothing out some of the monthly volatility, average ratio of private sector loans to deposits in the repaired Irish banking system rose from 145.8% in April-June 2012 to 147.0% in three months through January 2013.

Put simply, in the nine months since June 29th last year, the urgency of implementing the eurozone leaders' 'seismic' decisions on direct recapitalization of the banks and on examining Irish financial sector programme performance has been rising. 

Yet, this week, in the wake of yet another crisis this time decimating the economy of Cyprus, a number of EU officials have clearly stated that the euro area main mechanism for funding any future bailouts - the European Stability Mechanism fund - will not be used for direct and/or retrospective recapitalization of the banks. The willingness to act is still wanting in Europe.

First, chief of the euro area finance ministers group, Jeroen Djisselbloem, opined  that the ESM should never be used for direct capital supports to failing banks. Mr Djisselbloem went on to add that Cypriot deal, imposing forced bail-in of depositors and bondholders, is the template for future banks restructuring programmes. This pretty much rules out use of ESM to retroactively recapitalize Iriosh banks and take the burden of our past banks’ supports measures off the shoulders of the Irish taxpayers.
On foot of Mr Djisselbloem's comments, the EU Commission stated that it too hopes that direct recapitalisation of the banks via ESM will be avoided. In addition, the EU Internal Markets Commissioner Michel Barnier, while denying Mr Djisselbloem's claim that Cypriot 'deal' will serve as a future template for dealing with the banking crises, said that "Under the current legislation for bank resolution . . . it is not excluded that deposits over €100,000 could be instruments eligible for bail-in". Finnish Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen weighed in with his own assertion that the ESM should not be used to deal with the banking crises, especially in the case of legacy banks debts assumed. Klaus Regling, the head of the ESM, made a realistic assessment of the viability of the June 29, 2012 promises by stating that using ESM to directly recapitlise troubled banks will be politically impossible to achieve.  German officials defined their position in forthcoming talks on ESM future as being consistent with excluding legacy banks debts from ESM scope.

All of this must have been a shocker to the Irish Government that presided over the Cypriot bailout deal structuring which has shut the door on our hopes for Europe to come through on June 2012 commitments. After last weekend, uniqueness of Ireland is surpassed by the uniqueness of Greece where sovereign bonds were thrown into the fire and Cyprus where depositors and bondholders were savaged and not a single cent of Troika money was allocated to support the banks recapitalisations. 
The slavish conformity to the EU diktat that prompted the Irish Government to support disastrous application of the Troika programmes in Greece and Cyprus is now bearing its bitter fruit.

Which means that three years into what is termed by the Troika to be a 'successful adjustment programme', Ireland is now facing an old question: absent legacy banks debts restructuring, can we sustain the current fiscal path to debt stabilisation and avoid sovereign insolvency down the road?

Let’s look at the banking sector side of the problem.

Latest reports from the Irish banks show lower losses for 2012 compared to 2011, prompting many analysts and the Government to issue upbeat statements about the allegedly abating banking crisis. Such claims betray short foresight of our bankers and policymakers. Even according to the Central Bank stress tests from 2011, Irish banks are not expected to face the bulk of mortgages-related losses until 2015-2018. Latest data from CSO clearly shows that residential property prices across the nation were down for three months in a row through February. Prices have now fallen almost 23% since the original PCAR assessments were made. Even at the current levels, prices are still supported to the upside by the banks' inability to foreclose on defaulting mortgagees. Meanwhile, there are EUR45.3 billion worth of mortgages that are either in repossessions, in arrears or restructured and performing for now. Taken together, these facts mean that at current rates of decline in property values from PCAR valuations, we are already at the top of the envelope when it comes to banks ability to cover  potential mortgages losses. Add to this the effect of increasing supply of distressed properties into the market and it is hard to see how current prices can remain flat or rise through 2014-2015. 

All of the above suggests that before the first half of 2014 runs its course we are likely to see renewed concerns about banks capital levels starting to trickle into the media. Thereafter, the natural question will be who can shoulder any additional losses, given the entire Euro area banking system is moving toward higher capital ratios and quality overall. The answer to that is, of course, either the ESM or the Irish State.  The former is being ruled out by the euro area core member states. The latter is already nearly insolvent as is.

The headwinds to Irish debt sustainability argument do not end with the mortgages saga. 

Take a look at the economic growth dynamics. Back at the end of 2010, when Troika structured Irish ‘bailout’, our debt sustainability depended on the 2011-2015 forecast average annual growth at 2.68% for GDP.  By Budget 2013 time, these expectations were scaled back to 1.76%, yet the Troika continued to claim that our Government debt is sustainable. To attain medium-term sustainability, defined as declining debt/GDP ratios, between 2013 and 2017, IMF estimates that to stay the course Ireland will require average nominal GDP growth of 3.9% annually. To satisfy IMF sustainability assumptions, Irish economy will have to grow at 4.5% on average in 2016-2017 to compensate for slower rates of growth forecast in 2013-2015. So far, in 2011-2012 recovery we managed to achieve average growth rate in nominal GDP of just under 2.25%  - not even close to the average rates assumed by the IMF.

And the real challenge will come in 2015-2017 when we are likely to face sharp increases in mortgages-related losses. In other words, growth is expected to skyrocket just as banks and households will engage in massive mortgages defaults management exercise. 

There are additional headwinds in the workings, relating to the shifting composition of our GDP in recent years. Between 2007 and 2012, ratio of services in our total exports rose from 44.8% to 51.2%, while trade balance in services went from EUR2.75bn deficit to EUR3.1bn surplus. Trade in services is both more imports-intensive (with each EUR1 in services imports associated with EUR1.03 of services exports, as opposed to EUR1 in goods imports associated with EUR1.73 in exports) and has lower impact on our real economy. Irish tax system permits more aggressive, near-zero taxation of services trade against higher effective taxation for goods trade. This implies that while services-exporting MNCs book vastly more revenue into Ireland, most of the money flows through our economy without having any tangible relationship to either employment here or value added or any other real economic activity. In recent years, a significant share of our already anemic growth came from activities that are basically-speaking pure accounting trick with no bearing on our economy’s capacity to sustain public debt levels we have. If this trend were to continue into 2017, we can see some 5-7 percent of our GDP shifting to services-related tax arbitrage activities. 

Which, of course, would mean that the ‘sustainability’ levels of nominal growth mentioned above must be much higher in years to come to deliver real effect on our government debt mountain.
Take these headwinds together and there is a reasonable chance that Ireland will find itself at the point of yet another fiscal crisis with reigniting underlying banking and economic crises. Far from certainty, this high-impact possibility warrants some serious consideration in the halls of power. Maybe, continuing to sit on our hands and wait until the euro area acts upon its past promises is not good enough? Is it time we start building a coalition of the states willing to tackle the Northern Core States’ diktat over the ESM and banks rescue policies?



Box-out: 

Following the High Court judgment in the case involving rent review for Bewley’s Café on Dublin’s once swanky now increasingly dilapidated Grafton Street, one of the premier commercial real estate brokerages issued a note to its clients touching upon the expected or potential fallout from the case. The note mentions the stress the case might be causing many landlords sitting on ‘upward only rent review’ contracts and goes on to decry the possibility that with the Court’s decision in some cases rents might now revert to open market valuations. One does not need a better proof than this that Irish domestic sectors are nowhere near regaining any serious competitiveness. Instead of embracing self-correcting supply-demand reflecting market pricing, Irish domestic enterprises still seek protection and circumvention of the market forces to extract rents out of their customers. That’s one hell of a ‘the best small country to do business in’ culture, folks.

Tuesday, April 23, 2013

23/4/2014: Irish Government Net Debt

Not that I am looking for it, but the data just jumps out to shout "All this malarky about Ireland's Government debt sustainability being ahead of all in the 'periphery' is just bollocks". And indeed it is.

Recall that the last bastion of 'our debt is just fine' brigade used to be the rarely cited metric of Net Debt (debt less cash reserves and disposable assets available to the State). Recall that our 'assets' - largely a pile of shares in AIB and Ptsb et al - is officially valued at long-term economic value (not current value, which would be way, way lower than LTEV). And now, behold Ireland's relative position in terms of net debt to GDP ratio, courtesy of the IMF WEO projections for 2013 published this month:


So: third worst in the euro area and worse than that for Italy. And, incidentally, it is expected to be third worst in 2014 as well.

Good thing Benda & Loonan are not running around saying 'Ireland is not Italy', yet...

Wednesday, April 10, 2013

10/4/2013: IMHO Submission on the Review of Code of Conduct on Mortgages Arrears



The Irish Mortgage Holders Organisation Ltd.,
www.mortgageholders.ie
Not for profit organisation.

Submission on the review of code of conduct on mortgage arrears consultation paper CP 63

Irish Mortgage Holders Organisation, April 9th 2013.

Attention: Mr. Bernard Sherridan, Central Bank of Ireland.



Dear Mr Sheridan,

We would like to thank you and your team for meeting us recently about issues and concerns we have at the treatment by banks of Mortgage Holders.


We are very concerned by the statements made by Mr. Elderfield at the launch of the “targets” (set by government and the Central Bank) for banks, with respect to dealing with those in arrears as well as comments surrounding the changing of the Code Of Conduct on mortgage arrears to allow banks to take swifter action against mortgage holders.

It is our view that the process of mortgages arrears resolution is being facilitated in an unsupervised and unstructured way, without due regard to the need for transparency and openness which would be consistent with the best practices for arrears resolution and consumer protection. The process – as outlined to-date – leaves the mortgagees fully exposed to banks putting their own objectives and strategies ahead of the needs of the Irish economy, society and borrowers, and provides a large deficit in consumer protection.

We would like to make the following specific points regarding the review of the code of conduct on mortgage arrears notwithstanding the fact that it may already be predetermined as demonstrated by Mr. Elderfield’s comments as referenced above.


Legal standing:

In the first instance and reluctantly we have to raise the issue of the legality of the Code Of Conduct. This issue has been discussed behind closed doors for some time now and it is an issue of the utmost importance as the legal status of the code of conduct on mortgage arrears is by no means certain. We wish to reaffirm our concerns about the legality of the code which we expressed originally in our email to Governor Honohan last month.

A number of recent high court cases refer to this issue including Irish Life and Permanent v Duff where Justice Hogan raised “the somewhat troublesome issue of the precise legal status of the code of conduct”. Justice Hogan followed recent high court precedent in the Fitzell case and warned The question, for example, of what constitutes a “reasonable effort” on the part of the lender does not easily lend itself to judicial analysis by readily recognisable legal criteria. How, for example, are “reasonable efforts” to be measured and ascertained? If, moreover, non-compliance with the Code resulted in the courts declining to make orders for possession to which (as here) the lenders were otherwise apparently justified in seeking and obtaining, there would be a risk that by promulgating the Code and giving it a status that it did not otherwise legally merit, the courts would, in effect, be permitting the Central Bank unconstitutionally to change the law in this fashion’.

The Code itself has no specific legislative status. It is neither a piece of primary legislation in the form of an act of the Oireachtas nor a secondary piece of legislation in the form of a ministerial regulation issued by the Minister for Finance. The Code is not even stated to be admissible in legal proceedings. It is a Code issued under the terms of Section 117 of the Central Bank Act 1989 and therefore lenders who infringe its terms may be subject to the Central Bank’s Administrative Sanctions Procedure. This is an internal process that allows the Bank to control the conduct of and helps to define its regulatory relationship with financial service providers, but it is not one that a consumer as a borrower has any involvement in. This we believe is a matter of extreme urgency that needs addressing.


Right of Appeal:

Section 49 & 52 as proposed allows for a lender to have 3 senior staff act as an appeals board. This is completely unacceptable and allows for no independent oversight. The appeal process must be fully detached from the banks or banking sector representative institutions and vested with an independent authority acting to protect the interests of all parties involved in a dispute. The process must be made explicitly transparent and any asymmetries in representation during the dispute that may arise due to (a) nature of the processes that lead to the appeal, and (b) resources available to the parties prior to and during the appeal should be removed. In practical terms, this requires provisioning for the independent and fully funded counsel for borrowers who cannot afford such professional help, and an appeals board that is fully operationally and membership-wise independent from both borrowers and lenders.


Moratorium:

The proposed and current code is flawed in not being prescriptive in defining the periods of time over which the moratorium clock is ticking. No time is given for gathering of financial information or indeed an exchange of offers between the lender and the borrower. This will become a significant issue when the legislation is introduced to reverse the Dunne Judgement, which will lead to a significant rise in repossession applications. Lenders can initiate delays in corresponding with borrowers, as they have done on many occasions to-date, and such periods of delays will account for time eaten into a moratorium period. Borrowers, however, are not accorded similar powers. Again in the absence of prescriptive process and recording of times borrowers can be seriously and unfairly disadvantaged by losing time that is taken off them ahead of potential repossession proceedings.

Provision 37 proposes ‘Prior to completing the full assessment of the borrower’s standard financial statement, a lender may put a temporary arrangement in place where a delay in putting an arrangement in place will exacerbate a borrower’s arrears or pre-arrears situation. Such a temporary arrangement should not last for more than three months. Any subsequent arrangement should be based on a full assessment of the standard financial statement’.

This provision should state that the duration of this temporary arrangement does not count for the purposes of the 12 month moratorium on repossession proceedings. Similarly, Provision 57 should state in relation to the twelve month moratorium that ‘the twelve month period does not include any time period where a proposal for an alternative repayment arrangement is being negotiated’.


Unsolicited Contact by Lenders with Borrowers:

The Central Bank “themed inspections” as to the banks adherence to the previous rule of no more that 3 unsolicited contacts in one month was typical of light touch supervision. The lenders seem to have
had significant influence in this proposal and the Central Bank seem to have accepted the industry’s lobby position on this. In addition the Central Bank gave advance notice to banks before their “inspection”.

‘Feedback from industry would indicate that the current requirements, particularly the limit of three successful contacts, are preventing lenders from making contact and engaging with borrowers and are therefore impeding the consideration and resolution of borrower’s cases. The Central Bank does not believe that this is in the best interests of borrowers’.

There are no provisions for the engagement with mortgage holders in this feedback system. Similarly, there are no explicit, transparent and enforceable provisions to ensure that lenders engagements with the borrowers will be “proportionate and not excessive”. There are no data disclosure provisions relating to inspections and any remediation measures applied to institutions violating code of conduct.

The new unlimited contacts must not be “aggressive or intimidating”. Once again, how is it proposed to ensure this will be the case? How will it be proven that all attempts to contact the borrower have been made and that these attempts have been made within the confines of the Code-permitted procedures? The removal of this limited protection of mortgage holders is a significant regressive step in consumer protection and has left the borrowers unprotected against potential abuses by the banks.

Debt collectors acting on behalf of lenders are still unregulated within the existent structure and under the proposed code. How does this code cover their activities or can they adopt any means they deem appropriate to recover monies?

The Central Bank will have failed to provide symmetric protection of the interests of the borrowers and the lenders unless it allows for explicit, enforceable and transparent safeguards to protect many vulnerable people who are in arrears and will be set upon by lenders who have been given a free rein.


Unsustainability: 

Many actions taken by the bank to repossess property are predicated on a decision by a lender that a loan underlying the property is unsustainable. The Code should include prescriptive rules defining what is sustainable and what is not sustainable. This may involve some sort of expenditure guidelines. These rules and guidelines should be transparent, public, enforceable and compulsory for all banks, and applicable to all borrowers.


Trackers:

It is vital that provision 12 (d) is not changed unless there is a clear system for borrowers to seek advice to ensure that any removal off a tracker is of benefit to the borrower. Such advice should be delivered on a professional basis and borrowers in need of funding for procuring such advice should have access to such funding. Page 4 of the consultation paper suggests that the removal off a tracker might have merit if in the interest of the borrower. This determination cannot be solely in the remit of the lender nor can it be left subject to the appeal system that incorporates explicit conflict of interest between the appeals process and the bank interests per note above.


Engagement:

Our experience, confirmed by the experience of other organisations working on behalf of the borrowers in distress, is that lenders do not respond in a timely manner to borrowers proposals or engagements, which is unacceptable. What happens to a lender who does not engage, who does the borrower appeal or complain to, other than the bank, which is alleged to engage in the abuse of the system?

Engagement by lenders with borrowers can be painfully slow, tedious and difficult leaving the borrower exhausted, their financial resources significantly reduced and without a resolution. There needs to be a clear code of conduct enforcement by the central bank on lenders for their behaviour and engagement and such enforcement should be transparent, effective, verifiable and not based on an ad hoc system of inspections, criteria and judgements.


Borrower representation and advice:

Even in normally functioning bankruptcy regimes around the world, those in debt are at a significant disadvantage compared to the might of creditors. They face corporate strength and power that can crush any debtor financially, emotionally, socially and psychologically. Observed by passive regulators, as in Ireland, compounded by the insolvency regime that is both under the current statutes and in its ‘reformed’ reincarnation nothing short of draconian, leaves the debtor in great peril.

When this financial crisis happened it was the citizen who suffered where the regulated entities and regulators enjoyed protected pay, conditions and functionality. Now, the very same citizen is facing the immense power of the state backing the already significant powers of the banks when it comes to the personal debts.

Bankers have a Banking Federation that represents them. Bankers are also availing of the weaknesses in the Irish competition laws to sustain and even consolidate their market powers at the expense of the taxpayers. They discuss issues and present their views publicly and to the government rather effectively and are assisted by a receptive media. They tend to be in sync with government announcements and findings and have direct access to the Social Partnership process and all other avenues of policy formation.

Debtors lack any statutory or institutional power. They need assistance and protection, care and support. This is best achieved by a coming together of advocates and organisations that provide services and assistance to debtors. Organisations and bodies such as MABS, The Irish Mortgage Holders Organisation, Flac, Phoenix Project and others are providing exceptionally effective and professional services to debtors usually on the basis of voluntary engagement of experts and ordinary citizens, and in the majority of cases, with no cost to the state. These and other organisations have a combined knowledge, experience and passion of their volunteers to help those is debt.

Mabs has been effectively assisting debtors for the last few decades and they have experience and a national foot print from where services and supports could be head quartered.

Yet, even with these organisations behind them, Irish debtors do not have the resources needed to deal with aggressive and disruptive creditors. With many commentators and practitioners expressing concerns and uncertainty as to how the new personal insolvency act will work there is a need to address the imbalance that exists today between debtors and lenders, as well as prevent the exacerbation of this imbalance threatened by the new legislation.

The new Insolvency regime will add additional hurdles for debtors, allowing vultures prey on the hundreds of thousands of households saddled with excessive debts, while providing little certainty to the debtor or any chances for a renewal to the economy.

Successive governments have chosen to ignore the one constant support debtors have had which is Mabs, in favour of diluting their effectiveness and giving banks and creditors a strengthened hand. Successive governments have also opted to ignore all other organisations currently working on the frontlines of the debt crisis. Despite the governments’ best efforts these organisations continued to offer a better balance and chance for debtors to be represented and protected effectively. These organisations deserve to be recognised as the de facto debtors’ representatives and be allowed to fund professional provision of services to debtors by linking arrears and insolvency resolution savings delivered to the economy at large via their efforts to the resources available to them to achieve such savings.

The insolvency bill raises a serious question of how those deeply in debt will be able to afford professional representation to assist them deal with their debt in favour of those with cash flow who can avail of professional services. This will promote a two tiered system leaving the most vulnerable to fend for themselves in unchartered waters full of predatory creditors and commercial service providers.

What would be helpful to debtors in the years ahead would be a number of organisations that compete to provide a full suite of services to debtors including legal, financial, negotiation, mental health, conveyancing and creditor payment services. These organisations should be modelled around Mabs, with Mabs established on a stand alone basis with an independent Board filled with experienced directors. A Board with a strategic plan that addresses the needs of debtors in the years to come.

Mabs is currently funded from the department of social protection to the tune of EUR18,5 million per annum. This funding could be directed towards the new organisation and additional funding could be raised by charging creditors as is done in many other jurisdictions. Many consumer credit counselling services agree voluntary payment arrangements with creditors on behalf of debtors and facilitate the cash transactions for a fee. A truly independent and well-resourced Mabs can act as a coordinator and supervisor over other organisations that compete with each other for representation of debtors in the
process of developing systemic resolution to the debtor arrears or insolvency.

Given the disproportionate powers granted to the banks by the new legislation, existent debtors’- representing organisations will undoubtedly try their best to help but they are not adequately funded to achieve significant scale and scope of their operations to fully function as representatives of families and people in difficulty. Indeed, majority of them are not funded at all. There is an urgent need to consolidate these organisations’ efforts, provide them with proper supervision and supports, and allow them to raise resources to deliver meaningful and effective change.


Yours sincerely,
David Hall
Dr. Constantin Gurdgiev
Directors
Irish Mortgage Holders Organisation.
Dublin, Ireland
April 9, 2013

THE IRISH MORTGAGE HOLDERS ORGANISATION LIMITED is Registered in Ireland No: 517549 Directors: Arthur Mullan, David Hall, Lucy Cronin, Tracy Mullan, Constantin Gurdgiev

10/4/2013: EU Commission on debt-overhang in Europe


A new paper on the effects of debt and deleveraging in Europe was published by the EU Commission. The paper can be accessed here.

Some nice charts summarising the debt overhang in the real economy (households and non-financial corporates):


Gross level relative to GDP, Irish households are 3rd most indebted in the euro area by 2011 measure. However, adjusting for GDP/GNP gap puts us at the top position, well ahead of Cyprus and even ahead of the EU27 'leader' - Denmark.


Now, much is usually being said about Irish net debts being lower due to immense wealth accumulated by the households. Table above shows that, actually, that is not true. We rank second from the top. Interest burden has declined, but it remains the third highest in the euro area.

Now to non-financial corporations:
 Irish corporates are second most indebted (after Luxembourg) in the EU and adjusting for GDP/GNP gap, the difference to the third most-indebted country is even more dramatic than the chart above indicates. Irish corporates debt rose in 2008-2011, rather dramatically - marking the highest increase in the euro area.

Detailed decomposition:
Again, adjusting for GDP/GNP gap, Irish economy is the most indebted in the euro area and the EU when measured relative to overall economy size (note: Luxembourg comparatives are wholly meaningless due to massive presence of brass-plates operations in the economy).

More fun charts:

Again, Ireland is in top first (corporates ex-Luxembourg) or second (households) positions.

Deleveraging household debt overhang will be extremely painful for Ireland:

And although asset valuations suggest the pain will be milder, in reality, one has to consider the fact that Irish household assets valuations are not exactly (a) fully reflective of real extent of price contractions in the housing sector, and (b) liquid.
 Here's EU Commission view:
"as regards households capacity to repay (figure 12), Ireland, Spain, Estonia, the Netherlands, Latvia, Denmark, the United Kingdom and, to some extent, Cyprus are amongst those that experienced a rapid increase in household indebtedness before the crisis. Despite the varying starting position in terms of household debt, the information content of the level dimension also points to the same set of countries as potentially prone to suffer from deleveraging pressures, on top of Portugal and Sweden. Ireland, Latvia and Estonia also appear as subject to high  pressures when considering actual leverage as well as its build-up (figure 13)".

And on non-financial corporates deleveraging:
"on the firms' side, there is also a clear positive relationship between the  accumulation and the level factors when considering the capacity to repay (figure 14). Countries like Belgium, Ireland, Spain, Cyprus, Portugal and Bulgaria stand out as presenting vulnerabilities related to their firm's indebtedness. This snapshot is highly nuanced when looking at firm's asset side (see figure 15). Belgium and Cyprus present a healthier picture while firms in countries like Greece, Italy, Slovenia and Latvia appear as subject to higher pressures. As a robustness check, this exercise was also run with consolidated data and the results are consistent but for the case of Belgium, where the relevance of intra-company loans calls for further qualifications when assessing non-financial corporates debt sustainability"

Using more sophisticated analysis, the Commission paper concludes that:
"The following countries can be identified as more prone to face deleveraging pressures in the household and non-financial corporation sectors: Cyprus, Denmark, Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom on the household side and Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Spain, Hungary, Ireland,  Italy, Portugal, Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom on the corporate side."

Of all countries listed above only Ireland, Cyprus, Spain, Portugal, Estonia, Latvia, Sweden and the UK fall into both groups, but only Ireland falls into extreme scenarios of debt sustainability in both categories:


In EU Commission calculations (see link above), Ireland has the greatest gap to sustainability (35.2%) when it comes to debt overhang in the entire euro area, and second highest in the EU.

Thursday, April 4, 2013

4/4/2013: Real Debt: European Crisis in 4 charts

Some interesting charts from Liu, Yan and Rosenberg, Christoph B., World Economic Outlook, April 2013. IMF Working Paper No. 13/44. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2229653

Chart 1 below details the extent of the debt overhang in a number of countries:


Charts 2 and 3 outline the problem relative to financial assets available to offset the debt (theoretical offset, obviously):


Non-performing loans problem...


Quite telling, with no commentary needed, imo.

Saturday, March 30, 2013

30/3/2013: Irish Debt Deleveraging 2012: Not much happening


Over the recent years we have been told ad nausea that all the economic suffering and pain inflicted upon us was about 'deleveraging' our debt overhang, 'paying down our debts', 'repairing balancesheet of the economy' and so on. Well, surely, that should mean reduction in our total economic debt levels, right?

Wrong! Our debt levels, vis-a-vis the rest of the world are up on the crisis trough and on pre-crisis peak (EUR580bn in 2007 to EUR651.2bn in 2012), and our net position (foreign assets less foreign liabilities) is down from EUR119.4bn deficit in 2007 to EUR153.7bn deficit in 2012:

 The above exclude IFSC.

Meanwhile, IFSC continues to grow in size, both in absolute and relative terms:

  • Foreign assets up from EUR1,810bn in 2007 to EUR2,319bn in 2012
  • Foreign liabilities up from EUR1,727bn in 2007 to EUR2,322bn in 2012
  • Proportionally to our total foreign assets and liabilities the IFSC has grown from 79.7% in 2007 to 82.3% in 2012 on assets side and from 74.9% in 2007 to 78.1% in 2012 on liabilities side.


Back to non-IFSC balancesheet (as our policy makers and civil servants love treating ISFC as some sort of a pariah when it comes to counting its liabilities, and as some sort of a hero when it comes to referencing it in terms of employment, tax generation etc):


Chart above shows frightening trends in terms of our foreign liabilities as a share of GDP and GNP. Put simply, in 2007, non-IFSC foreign liabilities stood at a massive 357.5% of our GNP. Last year, they reached a n even more dizzying 488.1%.

You might be tempted to start shouting - as common with our officials and 'green jerseys' - that the above are gross figures and that indeed we have vast assets that are worth just so much... Setting aside the delirium of actually thinking someone can sell these 'assets' to their full accounting / book value etc, err... things are not looking too bright on the net investment position (assets less liabilities) side:


In 2007, Irish net investment position vis-a-vis the rest of the world was a deficit of 63.3% of GDP and 73.6% of GNP. In 2012 the net position was in deficit of 93.9% of GDP and 115.2% of GNP. Put differently, even were the Irish state to expropriate all corporate, financial and household assets held abroad and sell them at their book value, Ireland would still be in a deficit in excess of 115% of our real economy.

But back to that question about 'deleveraging' our debt overhang, 'paying down our debts', 'repairing balancesheet of the economy' and so on... the answer to that one is that Ireland continues to increase the levels of its indebtedness. The composition of the debt might be changing, but that, folks, is irrelevant from the point of view that all debts - government, banking, household, corporate, etc - will have to be repaid and/or serviced out of our real economic activity, aka you & me working...

Friday, March 22, 2013

22/3/2013: Sunday Times, 17/03/2013


This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from March 17.


Economics is an art of contention. In so far as economics body of knowledge is concerned, the world is largely composed of an infinite number of things that are either uncertain, or open to interpretation. One of the very few near-certainties that economists do hold across the ideological and philosophical divisions is that an economy undergoing deleveraging of household debt is likely to experience a lengthy period of below-trend growth. The greater the debt pile to be deleveraged, the faster was the period of debt accumulation, the longer such a recession or stagnation will last.

Another near-certainty is that in a debt crisis, economy is unlikely to recover on foot of either monetary or fiscal stimuli. Monetary easing can help the deleveraging process if and only if low policy rates translate into cheaper mortgages on the ground. This requires a functioning banking system, in addition to monetary policy independence. Fiscal stimulus can only help to the extent to which it can temporarily stimulate growth, and even then the impact on more indebted households is unlikely to be any stronger than on less-indebted ones. Longer-term effects of a significant debt-financed fiscal stimulus in an economy already struggling with government and household debt, are more likely to be detrimental to the overall process of deleveraging. Higher debt today necessary to fund economic stimulus translates into higher burden of that debt in the future.

Meanwhile, deleveraging of the households in and by itself, even absent banking and other crises, is a process associated with dramatically reduced economic activity and growth.

Households struggling with a debt overhang are effectively removed from being active participants in the economy. Indebted households do not save, thus depleting their future pensions provisions and reducing overall levels of investment in the economy. Indebted households tend to cut back their consumption, both in terms of large-ticket durable goods and in terms of everyday items. They also reduce consumption of higher-quality higher-cost goods, adversely impacting domestic producers in higher-cost economies, like Ireland, favoring more competitively priced imports.

With banks beating on their doors, indebted households abstain from entrepreneurship and engage less actively in seeking improved employment opportunities. The latter means that indebted households, fearing even a short-term spell in unemployment, do not seek to better align their skills and talents, as well as future prospects for promotion with jobs offers. This, in turn, implies loss of productivity for the economy at large. The former means slower rate and more risk-averse entrepreneurship resulting in further reduction in future growth potential for the economy.

Last, but not least, household debt overhang results in increased rates of psychological and even psychiatric disorders, incidences of self-harm, suicide, stress and social dislocations. These effects have a direct and adverse impact on public services, the economy and the society at large.

In Irish context, the effects of household debt overhang (most acutely expressed in mortgages arrears) are likely to be significantly larger than in normal debt crises episodes and last longer.

Consider the sheer magnitude of the problem. In an average debt crisis, household debt arrears peak at around 7-10% of the total debt outstanding. Per latest data from the Central of Bank of Ireland, at the end of 2012, 143,851 private residential mortgages accounts and 37,995 buy-to-let accounts were in arrears. Total number of mortgages in arrears represented 19% of all mortgages outstanding.  Total balance of mortgages in arrears amounted to EUR35.4 billion, or 25% of the entire mortgages-related debt. Mortgages at risk of default or defaulted (defined as all currently in arrears, relating to properties with repossession orders and mortgages restructured during the crisis, but currently not in arrears) amounted to 238,663 accounts and EUR45.3 billion of the outstanding debt, or 25.3% and 31.9% of the respective totals.

Given expected losses from the above mortgages in the case of repossessions and/or insolvency, and inclusive of the interest costs due on this unproductive debt, over the next 3 years Irish economy is likely to face direct losses from this mortgages crisis to the tune of EUR20 billion. This will reduce our current level of gross fixed capital formation in the economy by 40 percent in every year through 2015.

In indirect costs, the crisis currently is impacting some 650,000-700,000 individuals living in the households with mortgages at risk, as well as countless others either in the negative equity or arrears on unsecured debt (credit cards, credit unions’ loans, utility bills etc).  Using basic cost of health insurance coverage, the relationship between health insurance spend in Ireland and cost of public healthcare, and assuming that annual cost of higher stress associated with debt overhang amount to just 10% of the total annual insurance costs, direct health costs alone from the debt crisis can add up to EUR400-500 million per annum. Factoring productivity losses due to stress, the total social, psychological and psychiatric costs of the mortgages arrears can run over a billion.

Costs of foregone entrepreneurship are even harder to quantify, but can be gauged from the overall decline in investment. In 2012 the shortfall in aggregate domestic investment activity compared to 1999-2003 annual average (taking the period before the rapid acceleration in property bubble) was running at ca EUR6.9-7.0 billion. This shortfall is roughly comparable to the above estimated annualized cost of servicing defaulting and at risk mortgages. Gross investment in Ireland is now running at a rate not seen since 1997.  Meanwhile, net expenditure by the local and central Government on current goods and services is running above 2005 levels, same as personal consumption of goods and services. This suggests that our current rates of domestic investment and associated entrepreneurship are down more significantly than personal and Government spending.

In some sectors, things are even worse.  Construction sector is clearly seeing no turnaround with new residential construction permits down 88% in 2012 on the peak, heading for historical low of estimated full-year 14,022 permits based on data through Q3 2012. Extending mortgage arrears crisis or deepening the households’ already significant debt overhang through the means of forcing them into repaying the unsustainable loans will only exacerbate the crisis in Irish construction sector and in all sectors of domestic economy.

In years to come, the mortgages crisis today is likely to cost Irish economy around 10% of our GNP.

And it is unlikely to ease significantly any time soon, since the above costs exclude the effects of likely acceleration in mortgages defaults in months and years to come due to the adverse policy and economic headwinds.

Firstly, ongoing fiscal consolidation is shifting more burden of paying for our State onto the shoulders of Irish households, including those subsumed by the debt crisis. This process is not going to end with Budget 2014.

Secondly, reform of the personal insolvency regime will add fuel to the fire by giving banks disproportional powers over the households in structuring long-term solutions to the mortgages distress. Changes to the Central Bank code of conduct for the banks in dealing with borrowers, along with the accelerated targets for restructuring non-performing mortgages announced this week are likely to push the banks to more aggressively deal with the borrowers. These factors will amplify the rate of mortgages arrears build up, driving more households into temporary relief measures. These measures will structured by the banks in absence of transparent and efficient consumer protection to suit banks’ objectives of extracting all resources out of households for as long as possible before forcing the households into bankruptcy in the end.

Finally, mortgages arrears will continue to rise on foot of weak economic growth and continued re-orientation of the Irish economy away from domestic activity toward MNCs. This headwind closes the loop from the household debt overhang to depressed domestic investment to higher unemployment and lower domestic growth to an even greater debt overhang.

In order to deal with the mortgages crisis, we need a prescriptive approach to long-term solutions based on principles of borrower protection, standardization and transparency.

All lenders operating in Ireland should be required to publish a full list of solutions offered to the distressed borrowers which complies with the minimum standards set out by the Central Bank and a borrowers’ protection watchdog, such as reformed and independent Mabs. The financial criteria and conditions that qualify borrowers for such solutions should be disclosed. The process of finalizing the details of solutions should involve borrowers supported by an adviser, fully resourced to deal with the lender and independent from the lender and the state.

Only by matching borrower and lender powers and resources in a transparent and strictly supervised manner can we achieve a resolution to this crisis. Until then, this economy will continue operating well below its potential rate of growth, condemning generations of Irish people to debt slavery. The status quo of the state granting ever increasing powers to the banks in dealing with mortgages arrears is not sustainable and is likely to lead to both economic misery, continued emigration, and in the long run to political and social discontent. Sixth year into the mortgages crisis of extremely acute nature, we can not afford another round of half-measures and fake solutions.




Box-out:

This week auction of Irish bonds put to some test the theory of yields divergence with the euro area periphery. Compared to Italian Government bonds auction carried out on the same day, Irish 10 year bonds were greeted by the markets with a cheer.  While supportive of the analysts’ consensus view that Ireland is decoupling from the peripheral states, such as Italy, Portugal and Spain, the results of the auction were at least in part driven by factors outside the Irish Government control. This was the first 10 year bond issuance for Ireland in 3 years and the issue came without much of the adverse newsflow surrounding the economy. Complete absence of 10 year bonds in the secondary market prior to the auction assured some of the demand. For Italy, this was the first auction following Fitch downgrade of the sovereign to Baa1 rating – fresh in the memory of the markets. Italian newsflow has also been disappointing recently with elections outcome unnerving the markets and with GDP figures (Italy has reported its 2012 full year growth almost a month ahead of Ireland, which is still to post results for Q4 2012).

Just how much of this week’s result for Ireland can be accounted for by the factors unrelated to the Government policies or real economic performance is impossible to determine. Nonetheless, Minister Noonan’s cheerful references to the auction as ‘extraordinary’ in nature sounds more like a political PR opportunism than of financial realism.

23/3/2013: Sunday Times 10/03/2013


This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from March 10.


Some two years ago in these very pages, I have described the prospects for the Irish economy as following a flatline trend with occasional volatility. In other words, back in the beginning of 2010, the economy’s prospects for the near-term future were consistent with an L-shaped recovery: stabilization followed by near-zero growth.

Taking the first three quarters of 2012, in headline terms, the above prediction has translated into 2009 to 2012 GDP growth of just 0.22% per annum, GNP decline of  0.16% per annum and domestic demand drop of 4.81% per annum. Again, let’s take a look at the above numbers from a different angle. Compared to the pre-crisis levels, the latest GDP data shows that over 2011-2012, Irish economy was able to close just 22% of the gap between GDP peak and the Great Recession trough, implying that it will take Ireland through the end of 2014 before we get our GDP back to the half-point of the Great Recession. At the same time, Domestic demand continued to hit crisis period lows in 2012 and all international projections show that 2013 will be another post-2007 low for these data series.

With these rather depressing statistics in mind, one is warranted to take with a grain of salt ever-more frequent and boisterous pronouncements from the Government that Irish economy has ‘turned the corner’. Ditto for the ever-more saccharine messages from the EU policymakers to the ‘best pupil’ in their austerity policies ‘class’.

And the most recent data – through Q4 2012 and January-February 2013 – is offering no signs of any statistically significant improvements in the economy compared to the rather abysmal 2012.

Mortgages arrears were once again up in the last quarter of 2012. While the rate of increases was markedly slower than in previous quarters, number of accounts currently in arrears 21.4% year on year. As of the end of 2012, some 186,785 private residencies-related mortgages are either in arrears, in temporary restructuring or in the process of repossessions – almost 25% of all accounts outstanding  if we were to use as the base total accounts numbers comparable across the 2009-2012 horizon.  All in, some 650,000-700,000 Irish residents are currently under water when it comes to paying on their original mortgages. Some turnaround in the economy to witness.

Data for January-February 2013 on new cars registrations shows that not only the motor trade is continuing to suffer from on-going collapse in sales, but that there is no indication of any substantial improvement in either the Irish households or the Irish SMEs outlook for the future. New private cars registrations are down 20% year-on-year over the first two months of 2013, while new goods vehicles registrations are down 21.4%. This shows clearly that Irish consumers are not engaged in purchasing large-ticket items and, supported by the declines in durable goods consumption evident in the retail sales data, signals that consumers have little real credence in the ‘green shoots’ theory espoused by our Government officials and business leaders. Lack of demand uplift in goods vehicles, on the other hand, shows that when it comes to capital investment, Irish businesses are also refusing to buy the hype of economic turnaround. In any cyclical recovery, capital expenditure, especially on rapidly depreciating items such as vehicles used in transporting goods for wholesale and retail trade, logistics and transportation services, is one of the leading indicators of improving economic conditions. Data for the first two months of this year shows no such uplift.

Core retail sales, once stripping out motor sales, are showing a slightly more upbeat activity. While all retail business activity has declined on average over 3 months through January 2013 compared to year ago, some encouraging signs of uplift were present in the Department Stores sales, and sales of electrical goods when it comes to volume and value of sales. Nonetheless, two factors continue to characterize Irish domestic consumption: extremely low activity from which any increases might take place, and exceptionally anemic trend in any rises we do record.

On the investment front, gross domestic capital investment remained basically unchanged in the first 3 quarters of 2012 compared to 2011,ann there are currently no signs that this situation has changed since the end of Q3 2012. We are now into the fourth consecutive year of gross investment failing to cover amortisation and depreciation of the capital stock accumulated over the years of the Celtic Tiger. Recalling that our growth success over 1992-1998 was predicated on a rapid catching up in capital stock and quality relative to our, at the time more prosperous European partners, this means that the ongoing crisis is effectively erasing any capital gains achieved post 1999.

In short, domestic side of the economy shows no green shoots of any harvestable variety. And the potential headwinds we are likely to face in the near-term future are still severe.

In property markets and when it comes to mortgages arrears, we face a long list of risks that are yet to play out.  Impacts of property taxes introduced in the Budget 2013, the upcoming lifting of the banking guarantees,  and the saga of the Personal Insolvency regime reforms all represent distinct threats to the fragile stabilisations achieved in these areas of the economy.

On business investment front risks are also mounting, rather than abating. Continued lack of bank credit and strong indications that in the near term Irish banks are likely to follow their other Euro area counterparts in dramatically hiking the retail interest rates for both existent and new loans.

When it comes to consumers’ appetite for spending, latest consumer confidence data shows significant deterioration in confidence in February, compared to January 2013 and to 2012 average. If anything, when it comes to consumers’ reported outlook for 2013, things are getting worse relative to 2012, rather than better.

Which leaves us with the Government’s old favorite signal of the recovery: Irish exports.  The hype about Irish external trade prowess is such, that even a usually somber IMF has recently waded in with a lengthy paper outlining how Ireland is likely to turn back to Celtic Tiger era prosperity on foot of booming exports.  In summary, the IMF missive, titled Boosting Competitiveness to Grow Out of Debt – Can Ireland Find a Way Back to Its Future concluded that “Ireland is poised to return to its path of strong growth and low imbalances” on foot of “enhanced competitiveness”.

The idea that ‘exports-led recovery’ is Ireland’s only salvation from the systemic and structural crises we face is not new. Previous Government put as much credence into this proposition as the current one. Alas, this idea – as I have pointed out repeatedly – is simply not reflected in the reality of the Irish economy for a number of reasons.

It is true that Irish exports growth has improved significantly during 2009-2012 period, rising from negative 3.75% in 2009 to a positive 6.25% in 2010 and 5% in 2011. In the first three quarters of 2012, exports of goods and services were up 6.8% on the same period of 2011.

Alas, the composition of our exports has shifted dramatically toward more services exports, as opposed to goods exports. In addition to reducing the overall level of real economic activity and employment associated with every euro worth of exports, this shift also has meant a number of changes that further divorce our external trade activity from economy. Firstly, most of employment creation in the exports-oriented services sectors, such as International Finance and ICT services, is oriented toward specialist, highly educated foreign employees, instead of domestic unemployed or underemployed individuals. Secondly, services exports are associated with greater cost (or imports) intensities as they require higher payments for patents and intellectual property, which are neither taxed in Ireland, nor are developed here. This means that while exports of services generate high revenues, much of these revenues is not captured within our economy. Thirdly, exports of services, as opposed to exports of goods, are more concentrated in a handful of giant MNCs. This fact, known as the ‘Google effect’ drives up the cost of hiring skilled workers for Irish SMEs, reduces margins at Irish enterprises, lowers investment into Irish SMEs, and actually undermines our competitiveness, rather than improving it.

In short, booming exports along the current trend can actually cost this economy its ability to sustain indigenous entrepreneurship and investment in the long run. Instead of supporting growth and recovery, the green shoots of some of our exporting activities can turn out to be super-strong weeds of the economy suffering from a classical Dutch disease where resources flow to an increasingly inefficient use in specialist sectors, exposing the society and the economy at large to future adverse shocks.

Lastly, as with other indicators, the latest data, covering only goods exports, shows that our external trade is suffering from a significant slowdown in global demand and the pharmaceutical sector patent cliff. Once again, I warned about both of these factors more than a year ago.

At the same time, on the more positive note, the ongoing US and global economic recovery should provide some support for goods exports from Ireland, especially in the areas relating to capital investment goods and equipment in months ahead.

In short, the miracle of the ‘exports-led recovery’ is simply nowhere to be seen at this point in time, despite the fact that exporting activity continues to expand and despite the fact that this activity represents the only bright spot on our economic horizon.

After five years of the greatest economic crisis in the modern history of this nation, it is time to ask our political leaders a question: at what point in time does one’s rhetoric of economic turnarounds becomes an unbearable burden to one’s political and social reputation? For the previous Government it took just under 3 years to face the music of its own making. For this Government, the clock is ticking on.




Box-out:

Having achieved a relatively underwhelming progress on restructuring the Promissory Notes of the IBRC, the Government has turned its attention in recent weeks on attempting to restructure our debts to the European sides of the Troika. However, the issue of the Promissory Notes is still an open topic. Last week at a conference in Brussels I had a chance to speak to some senior decision makers from the European Parliament and the EU Commission who unanimously voiced their concern over the potential for the ECB to alter the terms and conditions of the Irish Promissory Notes restructuring deal. ECB has two material powers to do so. Firstly, it can simply alter by a majority decision the technical aspects of the deal. Secondly, the ECB has the ultimate power to determine the overall schedule of the sales of the long-term bonds issued to replace the Promissory Notes to the private investors. This latter power is very significant. Under the current arrangement, the Central Bank of Ireland has committed to an annual schedule of minimum disposals of bonds. Based on this schedule, the cumulative long-term benefit of the deal to Ireland can be estimated in the range of Euro 4.5-6.3 billion over the 40 years horizon. Accelerating the rate of disposals by a third on average over the deal horizon can see the net gains to the Exchequer declining by more than a quarter. Hardly a confidence-inspiring outcome for the Government that put so much hype behind the deal.