Showing posts with label Irish credit. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Irish credit. Show all posts

Friday, October 30, 2015

30/10/15: Repaired Irish Banking: Betting Your House on Corporate Deleveraging


I have not been tracking more recent changes in Irish banking sector aggregate balance sheets for quite some time now. However, preparing for a brief presentation on Irish banking crisis earlier this week, I had to update some of my charts on the topic. Here is some catching up on these.

Take a look at Central Bank’s data on credit and deposits in Irish banking system. These figures incorporate declines in both due to sales of loan books by Irish banks, so step-changes down on credit lines reflect primarily these considerations. As superficial as the numbers become (in this case, the aggregate numbers no longer fully reflect the true quantum of debt held against Irish households and companies), there are some positive trends in the figures.



  1. Over the 3 months through August 2015 Irish households have reduced the level of outstanding debt by some 7.1% compared to the same 3mo period in 2014. Total level of household debt now stands at the average of December 2004-January 2005. This is a massive reduction in debt burden, achieved by a combination of repayments, defaults and sales of loans to non-banking entities (e.g. vulture funds). However, loans for house purchases have declined by a more moderate 4.5% over 3mo through August 2015 compared to the same period in 2014. This brings current pile of house mortgages outstanding to the average level of February-March 2005. Which is impressive, but, once again factoring in the fact that quite a bit of these reductions was down to defaults and sales of loans, the overall organic deleveraging has been much slower than the chart above indicates. Over the last 3 months (though August 2015), total volume of household debt declined, driven down by deleveraging in mortgages debt and ‘other debt’ against a modest increase in consumer credit. It is interesting to note that over the last 12 months (based on 3mo average), volume of ‘other loans’ has dropped by a massive 38%, suggesting that this category of credit is now also subject to superficial debt reductions, for example originating from insolvencies and bankruptcies. For the record, there are at least three highly questionable reductions in recorded household debt on record: November-December 2010 drop of EUR7.5 billion, September-October 2011 drop of EUR17.2 billion, and May-June 2014 decline of EUR4.1 billion. This suggests that the official accounts of household deleveraging may be overstating actual degree of deleveraging by upwards of EUR28 billion which could bring our debt levels back to September-October 2011 and signify little material reduction in total debt over recent years.
  2. Over the 3 months through August 2015, loans outstanding to the Non-financial corporations in Ireland fell 19.4% compared to the same period average in 2014. Most of this decline was driven by the 19.5% drop in loans, with debt securities outstanding declining by only 5.7%. This marks 12th consecutive month of m/m declines in credit outstanding to the corporate sector. Current level of corporate credit brings us back to the levels last seen in 3Q 2003. Just as with households there are at least 3 episodes of significant declines in credit volumes since the start of the Global Financial Crisis, although the path for corporate loans has been more smooth overall than for household debt. This suggests that banks have prioritised resolving corporate arrears over household arrears, as consistent with 2011 PCAR strategy that also prioritised corporate loans problems. 


Total credit outstanding to the real economy (excluding Government and financial intermediaries) has fallen 12% y/y in the three months through August 2015. The official register now stands at EUR145.3 billion, a level comparable to the average for June-July 2004.The truly miraculous thing is that, given these levels of deleveraging, there is no indication of severe demand pressures or significant willingness to supply new credit.

As shown in the chart below, Irish banking sector overall has been enjoying steadily improving loans to deposits ratios.


Over the July-August, household loans to deposit ratios dropped to 99% - dipping below 100% for the first time since the Central Bank records began in January 2003. Loans to deposit ratio for non-financial corporates declined to 120% also the lowest on record. However, this indicator is of doubtful value to assessing the overall health of the financial sector in Ireland. To see this, consider the following two facts: household loans/deposit ratios have been below pre-crisis lows since October 2011, while corporate loans/deposits ratios have been below pre-crisis lows since July 2014. Reaching these objectives took some creative accounting (as noted above in relation to loan book sales), but reaching them also delivered practically no impetus for new credit creation. In other words, deleveraging to-date has had no apparent significant effect on banks willingness to lend or companies and households willingness to borrow.

By standards set in PCAR 2011, Irish banks have been largely ‘repaired’ some months ago. By standards set in PCAR 2011, Irish banks are yet to start their ‘participation in the economy’.

Meanwhile, take a look at the last chart:


As the above clearly shows, Irish banking system is nothing, but a glorified Credit Union, with credit outstanding ratio for household relative to corporates at a whooping 177%. This, again, highlights the simple fact that during this crisis, banks prioritised deleveraging of corporate debt and lagged in deleveraging household debt. Irish economic debt burden, thus, has shifted decisively against households.

Someone (you and me - aka, households) will have to pay for the loans write downs granted to companies over the years. And the banks are betting the house (our houses) on us being able to shoulder that burden. 






Sunday, February 1, 2015

1/2/15: Oh, those largely repaired Irish banks...


What do foreign 'experts' like BofE Mark Carney forget to tell you when they say that Ireland's banking system has been [largely] repaired?

Oh a lot. But here are just two most important things:



Both, in level terms and in growth terms, Irish banks remain zombified. 'Repaired' into continuously shrinking credit supply and stagnant household deposits base, the banks have been flatlining ever since the beginning of the crisis. In the last 6 consecutive quarters, household deposits posted negative rates of growth - a run of 'improvement' that is twice longer than the 'recovery period' of Q3 2012 - Q1 2013 when the deposits rose (albeit barely perceptibly).  Meanwhile, credit continues to shrink in the system with not a single quarter of positive growth (y/y) since Q4 2009. In four quarters through Q3 2014, credit for house purchases shrunk at just around 3.05% on average - the steepest rate of decline since the start of the crisis.

"Yep, [largely] repaired, Mr. Carney", said undertaker firming up the dirt on top of the grave...

Monday, July 28, 2014

28/7/2014: Of Savings, Cash and Hedge Funds...


The current crisis, on monetary aggregates side, can be characterised by the rising prevalence of cash over savings. In other words: shrinking stock of credit and deposits relative to cash.

The current crisis, on media commentary side, can be characterised by the endless talk about high savings rates in the private sector.

Here is the problem: savings = inflows into stock of savings (aka, deposits) or investment or divestment out of loans (including forced restructurings, bankruptcies, insolvencies and foreclosures). We know that Irish investment is not growing at the rates worth even mentioning. Which means that Either deposits should be growing to reflect 'high savings' or debt should be shrinking.

Take a look at the difference between M3 money supply and M1 money supply.

By definition:

  • "Money Supply (M1) to euro area -M1 is the sum of overnight deposits and currency issued (this comprises the Central Bank's share of euro banknotes issued in the Eurosystem, in proportion to its paid-up shares in the capital of the ECB, plus coin issued by the Bank less holdings of issued euro banknotes and coin by the MFI sector). " 
  • "Money Supply (M2) to the euro area -M2 is the sum of M1 plus deposits (with agreed maturity of up to 2 years; redeemable at notice of up to 3 months and Post Office savings bank deposits)."
  • M3 is M2 plus deposits with maturity over 2 years.
So the gap between M1 and M3 is deposits.


The M3-M1 gap has fallen since the onset of the crisis. It has fallen along the steady trend line, with some volatility around the dates of banks recapitalisations. And it continues to fall. In fact, between December 2013 and May 2014 we have the longest uninterrupted decline in deposits in history of the series. Current level of the gap is sitting only EUR7 billion above the all-time historical record low. In fact, during this 'historically high savings rates' period, Irish monetary system has managed to reduce the stock of deposits, compared to pre-crisis levels, by EUR85.91 billion.

But while savings (deposits) are falling, 'savings' (debt deleveraging) is all the rage:


You can see what has been happening in the Money Supply territory and private credit here:


With all of these 'high savings' promoted by the official statistics and 'new lending' promoted by the Banking Federation, the Central Bank is now officially giving up on getting those 'repaired and recapitlaised banks' to lend into the real economy (something they were supposed to do since early 2009 - based on the promise of the October 2008 Guarantee, then since early 2010 - based on the various Government programmes, then since first half 2011 - based on the banks recaps and PCARs, then since 2012, based on Government programme agreed with the Troika, then since early 2013, based on Government spin of a turnaround in the economy...). Instead of hoping for the Pillar Banking System to miraculously come back to life, the Central Bank is opening up the floodgates for the hedge funds (here courtesy of fire sales of assets by Nama) to lend into economy, despite the fact that such lending is considered to be a high-risk activity. Nothing like selling pennies on the euro and then celebrating euros on pennies debt reload...


Friday, May 9, 2014

9/5/2014: Cost of Credit in Ireland Kept Rising in Q1 2014


Latest data from the Central Bank shows continued increases in cost of credit in Ireland in Q1 2014:
- Overdrafts rates for households are up 0.46 percentage points in Q1 2014 compared to Q1 2013;
- Loans for house purchases with original maturity up to 1 year: up 0.29 percentage points
- Loans for house purchases with original maturity of over 1 year and up to 5 years: up 0.08 percentage points
- Loans for house purchases with original maturity over 5 years: down 0.2 percentage points

- Consumer loans with original maturity up to 1 year: up 0.82 percentage points
- Consumer loans with original maturity of over 1 year and up to 5 years: up 0.3 percentage points
- Consumer loans with original maturity over 5 years: down 0.02 percentage points

- Non-financial corporations loans with original maturity up to 1 year: up 0.1 percentage points
- NFC loans with original maturity of over 1 year and up to 5 years: up 0.16 percentage points
- NFC loans with original maturity over 5 years: up 0.01 percentage points
- NFC overdrafts rates down 0.36 percentage points.

Thus, Irish 'repaired' banking system continues to extract higher costs out of households and businesses already strained by debt burdens.

Friday, January 3, 2014

3/1/2013: Irish Private Sector Credit: November 2013


Central Bank of Ireland published series of data today covering deposits and credit in Irish banking system through November 2013. Here are the highlights.

Overall, household credit outstanding at the end of November 2013 stood at EUR107.763 billion, down EUR1.354 billion on October 2013 and up EUR2.547 billion on November 2012. Compared to November 2011, outstanding credit to Irish households is down EUR3.069 billion (-2.77%). On a more stable, 3mo average basis, Q4 2013 average credit outstanding was EUR2.886 billion ahead of the same period in 2012.

Monthly decline in overall credit supplied to Irish households can be broken down into a decline of EUR1.226 billion in loans for house purchase, EUR119 million decline in consumer credit and EUR9 million decline in other loans. In other words, monthly decline was broad across all three categories of household credit.

Year on year, credit to households fell EUR1.336 billion for consumer credit, and is down EUR110 million for credit extended via other loans. There was a rise of EUR4.680 million for loans for house purchase. However, this increase itself is fully accounted for by a massive EUR6.233 billion jump in credit for house purchase extended in just one month: December 2012. Since December 2012, however, credit remained slightly lower, averaging EUR 83.978 billion over 11 months of 2013 as compared to EUR84.973 billion back in December 2012.

In summary: house purchase loans are slightly down over the 12 months from December 2012 through November 2013, Consumer credit loans are down over the same period, and other loans are also down. In all three cases, declines were moderate, implying that over December 2012-November 2013, overall credit to Irish households declined from EUR111.076 billion to EUR107.763 billion.

Compared to H1 2008:

  • Household credit overall was more than 30% down in November 2013 compared to H1 2008 average;
  • Credit for house purchases was more than 32% down in November 2013 compared to H1 2008 average;
  • Consumer credit was more than 39% down in November 2013 compared to H1 2008 average;
  • Other loans were 139% up in November 2013 compared to H1 2008 average.


Non-financial corporations total credit outstanding in November 2013 stood at EUR81.129 billion, down EUR143 million on October 2013 and down EUR3.676 billion on November 2012. Q4 average stock of credit to non-financial companies in Ireland declined in Q4 2013 y/y by some EUR3.734 billion (-4.38%). Compared to November 2011, credit to NFCs in Ireland is down EUR7.225 billion (-8.18%). More than half of this drop took place over the last 12 months.

In summary: credit to NFCs extended in the Irish system is down y/y in November and over Q4 2013 overall and the rate of decline did not decline over the last 12 months, compared to previous 12 months.

Compared to H1 2008:

  • Credit to NFCs overall was more than 50% down in November 2013 compared to H1 2008 average.




Next post will cover deposits and loan/deposit ratios.

Monday, October 31, 2011

31/10/2011: IRL5 banks - no signs of real improvements in September

Few posts back I looked at the latest data for Irish banking system stability from the CBofI. Here, I complete my analysis by focusing on 5 covered institutions or IRL 5 (previously known as IRL 6 before the merger of Anglo & INBS into IBRC).

Here's the data:

  • Borrowing from the euro system by IRL5 has risen from €68,430mln in August to €70,340mln in September. Year on year, this is still down 4.73% or €3,489mln, but at that rate of unwinding IRL6 liabilities to euro system will take, oh, some 20 years (!)... Mom, the increase in borrowing from the euro system was €1,910mln or more than 50% of the reductions achieved yoy.
  • Deposits from Irish residents in IRL6 were up from €192,431mln in August to €193,929mln in September, prompting cheers from the Irish Times and Department of Finance, among others. Mom rise of 0.78% or €1,498mln contrasts a 22.22% decline yoy in very same deposits or €55,393mln loss. In other words, to get us back to September 2010 levels (not exactly healthy ones) at current rate of mom increase would take 37 months. In the last three months, on average, deposits were down €26,337mln compared to 3 months through June 2011 (-12.05%).
  • The mystery of rising deposits is explained easily by looking at their composition: Monetary and financial institutions (aka other banks) have seen their deposits in IRL5 rising €1,298mln in September (+1.47%) mom, although these deposits are down €32,308mln or -26.53% yoy. This explains 87% of the entire increase in the overall deposits.
  • In addition, General government deposits also rose €333mln in September (+16.28%) mom, explaining the remainder of the rise in overall deposits, heralded by our Green Jerseys as 'signs of improvement/stabilization' in Irish banks.
  • In contrast to the above two sub-categories, private sector deposits in Irish banks (IRL 5) have shrunk in September by €133mln (-0.13%) mom and are down 18.12% (-€22,589mln) yoy. September marked 5th consecutive month of declines in private sector deposits, which have shrunk by €6,135mln since April 2011.


As mentioned above, borrowings from the euro system have gone up in September. In contrast, as shown in the chart below, total borrowing from the ECB & CBofI have declined slightly in September to €123,596mln from €124,379mln in August (a mom drop of 0.63%). Year on year, the borrowings are still up massive €28,572mln or 30.7%. Over the last 3 months (July-September), average borrowings from the euro system and CBofI declined 1.39% or €1,748mln compared to 3 months from April through June.


Loans to irish residents have contracted once again in September, reaching €294,224mln against August levels of €294,503. The declines were accounted by drops in loans to MFIs and increases in loans to the General Government (+€58mln) and Private Sector (+€95mln). hardly anything spectacular.


Now to the last bit - recall that the comprehensive reforms of the Irish banking sector envision deleveraging Irish banks to loans-deposits ratio of 125.5%. These targets were set in PCARs at the end of March 2011. back in march 2011, LTD ratios stood at 143.25% for all of the IRL6/IRL5 and 173.71% for private sector LTD ratio only. Since then, if anything was going up to the CBofI / Government plans, we should have seen at least some reductions in LTDs.


As chart above illustrates:

  • Overall LTD ratio for IRL5 at the end of September 2011 stood at 151.72% - below August reading of 153.04%, but well ahead of March 2011 reading of 143.25% and certainly much ahead of the target of 125.5%.
  • For private sector loans and deposits, LTD ratio was 174.61% in September - ahead of 174.29% in August and still above 173.71% back in March.

And the summary is: there's no real stabilization or improvement I can spot in the above for IRL5.



Sunday, July 3, 2011

03/07/2011: SMEs and Corporate Credit: April 2011 data

In the previous post I looked at the latest data on lending rates and volumes for Irish households, which, among other things, showed
  • lack of any significant easing in rates themselves (except for consumer credit), and
  • lack of any uptick in credit issuance (in fact, there has been contraction in lending volumes in 3 out of 4 categories examined)
Here, let's take a look at business lending. First, loans up to € 1 million in volume (primarily loans that are focused on SMEs). Keep in mind the objectives of:
  • creating Nama
  • pumping countless billions into IRL-6 zombies
  • setting aside specially designated funds within AIB & BofI for small business lending, and
  • increasing various seed programmes (EI) and targeted tax reliefs
were to increase supply of credit to Irish SMEs.

Top line numbers for loans under €1 million are:
  • Average rates charged on loans under €1 million in volume with up to 1 year fixed duration (or floating) has risen from 4.27% t0 4.74% between March 2011 and April 2011. The rate now stands just-shy of 4.906% historical average and 4.801 average for crisis period of January-2008 through present. 12mo MA is now below April 2011 rate at 4.087%. Volatility of these rates has risen from 1.002 standard deviation for historical period to 1.302 standard deviation for the crisis period. In short, there are no signs of any improvement in the rates charged during the crisis.
  • At the same time, volume of non-financial corporate loans under €1 million with floating or up to 1 year fixed rates has fallen from €404 million in March to €250 million in April 2011. Volumes of new loans written in this category now stand well below historical monthly average of €919 million, crisis period average of €832 million and 12mo MA of €448.4 million.
  • Fixed-rate loans (with rate fixed for more than 1 year) also became more expensive in April (6.17%) than in March (5.86%). These are now well above the historical average rates of 5.234%, the crisis average of 5.329% and the 12mo MA of 5.008%. Volatility of these rates also rose during the crisis.
  • Volumes of over 1 year fixed smaller loans has shrunk to €45 million in April, down from €64 million in March and down on historical average of €160 million, crisis period average of €110 million and 12mo MA of €70.25 million.

So to sum this up, small businesses are seeing higher charges and shrinking volumes of loans across both types of loans under €1 million in volume. Anyone wondering why the hell all the above measures are failing to deliver on the promise?

But wait, what about larger loans? Next, consider loans issued to non-financial corporations that are over €1 million in volume:
  • Rates charged on loans of €1 million and more that are floating or under 1 year fixed have fallen from 3.51% in March to 3.22% in April and are now standing well below 4.407% historical average, 4.01% crisis period average, but above 12mo MA of 3.048%. Volatility of these loans rates have risen during the crisis from historical 1.159 standard deviation to a standard deviation of 1.518 during the crisis.
  • So more of those loans should be pursued by businesses, you'd think? Not really. At least not when it comes to actual issuance of these loans. Volume of larger loans issued on floating or fixed up to 1 year rate basis has fallen in April to €626 million, down from €1,119 million in March. Both numbers pale in comparison with historical average of €3,948 million and crisis period average of €4,654 million and both are below 12mo MA of €1,784 million.
  • Rates charged on loans of €1 million and more in volume with fixed interest rate over 1 year have also declined from 2.30% in March to 2.27% in April. The rates are now well below 4.054% average over historical period and 3.666% average over crisis period. 12mo MA is also higher than the current rates - at 2.772%. Lower rates here again come with higher volatility.
  • Volumes of these loans, however, fell precipitously, reaching €45 million in April, down from €169 million in March. Historical monthly average of new loans of this type issued stands at €632.3 million, while crisis period average is €488.5 million and 12mo MA is €190 million.


Lastly, let's take a look at the spreads between the rates based on loan volume:
  • Spreads on corporate loans under €1 million, flexible rate & under 1 year fixed over and above those for over €1 million, should - in theory - be negative, unless there is a selection bias of SMEs predominantly taking smaller loans. At any rate, we would expect the spread to be moving in the direction of lower spreads if Government 'get credit flowing to SMEs' policies were working. Alas, in April 2011, the spread stood at 1.52pp up from March 0.76 percentage points and well above the historical average of 0.499pp and crisis period average of 0.791pp. It was also above 12mo MA reading of 1.039pp. Spread volatility has declined marginally during the crisis. So no, Government policy does not help selecting in favor of smaller corporate borrowers and does not provide support for working capital lending.
  • Spreads on corporate loans under €1 million with fixed rate (>1 year duration) over and above similar loans of volume in excess of €1 million stood at 3.9pp in April up from 3.56pp in March. The spread is now massively above historical average of 1.180pp and crisis period average of 1.663pp, as well as 12mo MA of 2.237pp. Spread volatility has risen during the crisis. Again, no evidence here that SMEs are getting any support from Government policy 'instruments' listed above when it comes to gaining smaller loans as opposed to larger corporates access to credit.

03/07/2011: Household Credit: latest data

Some more analysis of new lending - based on CBofI data through April 2011.

Household loans and consumer loans are covered in this post. So house purchase loans first:
  • Rates for the loans for House Purchases floating and up to 1 year fixation have risen from 3.09% to 3.20% in April 2011, relative to March. Historical average rate is 3.743% and the average rate since the beginning of the crisis (January 2008) is 3.574%. Current rates are above their 12mo MA of 2.959%. It is interesting to note that this data clearly shows that there is no statistically significant easing of rates during the crisis as crisis period average rates are not statistically significantly different from those for the entire history of the data series. Another interesting point is that when house purchasers are concerned, volatility of retail rates has risen during the crisis: the historical standard deviation of the series is 0.827 while post-January 2008 standard deviation is 1.072.
  • Volumes of loans in the above category has declined from €1.190 billion issued in March 2011 to €1.092 billion in April 2011. Again, current rates of issuance are signaling continued credit tightening: historical monthly average issuance stands at €2.577 billion, while issuance since January 2008 averages €2.0 billion.
  • Rates for the loans for House Purchases, over 1 year fixation have also increased mom in April from 4.23% to 4.29%. The rates are now above their historical average of 4.213% but below their crisis period average of 4.34%. April rate is above 12mo MA of 4.115%. As in the case of floating rate loans, fixed rate loans rates also risen in volatility during the crisis with overall historical standard deviation for the rates at 0.641 and January 2008-present standard deviation of 0.723.
  • However, good luck to anyone trying to get these loans. Fixed rate loans for House Purchases issuance fell from €568 million in March to €331 million in April. New issuance of these loans is now well below historical average monthly volumes of €705 million and below crisis-period average of €521 million. Although 12mo MA is above the crisis average at €526 million.
A chart:
But what about consumer loans not designated for house purchases?
  • Cost of consumer credit for floating loans and loans up to 1 year fixation fell from 6.02% in March 2011 to 5.23% in April. Thus, April rates were below their historical monthly average of 5.584%, their crisis period average of 5.565% and their 12mo MA of 5.640%. Note that crisis period was associated with higher volatility of rates in this category as well, with standard deviation rising from historical 0.836 to crisis-period 1.099.
  • In terms of volumes of loans issued in the above category, the volume increased from €134 million to €156 million between March 2011 and April. However, volume of new loans issuance remains well below its historical average of €393 million, crisis-period average of €378 million and 12mo MA of €193 million.
  • Cost of consumer credit for fixed loans (over 1 year) has fallen from 10.09% in March to 9.90% in April 2011, with current rate still above historical average of 8.589% and crisis period average of 9.494%, but is now below 12mo MA of 10.217%. Interestingly, volatility of rates charged on these types of loans has fallen from historical standard deviation of 0.962 to crisis-period standard deviation of 0.695.
  • Again, good luck securing such loans, though, as volumes issued declined from €60 million in March 2011 to €51 million in April. Historical average issuance stands at €169.5 million, while crisis period average is €96 million. Current issuance however remains above 12mo MA of €48.8 million.
A chart to illustrate:

Wednesday, March 2, 2011

02/02/2011: Credit and Deposits of Irish residents: January 2011



Let's get back to the credit stats released yesterday by the CBofI. This is the second post (earlier post - here - focused on foreign depositors flight), so let's update the core charts and review some monthly changes in the data.

Credit side:

  • Irish households credit contracted mom by €948mln in January 2011 (a drop of 0.73%) against a monthly contraction of 5.29% in December 2010 - so deleveraging has slowed down
  • Year on year, Irish households total outstanding debt fell to €129,370 mln in January 2011 or yoy decline of €10,392mln (7.44%) while in December yoy decline was 6.97%.
  • Irish household's outstanding mortgages amounted to €99,289mln, down in January by €289mln (-0.29%) against a monthly drop of 7.05% in December 2010
  • Year on year, mortgages were down 9.78% (or €10,766mln) in January against a yoy decline of 9.65% in December 2010.
  • Non-financial corporations outstanding debts amounted to €92,652mln in January up 0.1% mom (+€90mln), but down 35.67% yoy (-€51,363mln).
  • Total private sector credit fell 0.57% (-€1,908mln) mom in January (December 2010 saw mom decline of 0.98%) and fell 10.6% yoy (-€39,427mln) in January (December 2010 saw yoy decline of 10.73%).
So on credit side by category:
And growth rates:

Next, deposits for Irish residents (remember - non-resident deposits were highlighted in the previous post linked at the top):

  • Total private deposits down 0.82% mom (-€1,387 mln) in January and yoy down 9.05% (-€16,613 mln). Steep. Deposits were down 2.24% mom in December 2010 (8.41% yoy).
  • Households deposits contracted 0.7% mom in January (-€663mln) and 5.56% yoy (-€5,531mln). There go our 'savings rates', folks. In December 2010, yoy drop was 4.57% so things are accelerating downward. Month on month deposits were down 0.71% in December 2010.
  • Non-financial corporations deposits rose 0.12% (VAT carry overs and seasonal receipts and payments, especially for MNCs being most likely drivers) month on month (+€41mln), but were down 16.57% yoy (-€6,670mln). In December 2010 corporate deposits were down 4.93% mom and 17.42% yoy.

Now, let's consider the degree of leverage we carry in this economy:
As charts above show:
  • Leverage rose 0.26% mom and fell 1.7% yoy in January 2011 across the entire economy. In December, leverage rose 0.51% mom and fell 3.44% yoy
  • Overall leverage trend is up and currently this economy is leverage 199.32%
  • For households, leverage fell 0.03% mom and 1.99% yoy in January 2011, having fallen 0.04% mom and 2.79% in December 2010. So deleveraginng is slowing down
  • Currently Irish households are leveraged 137.69%
  • Non-financial corporations leverage was formidable 275.93% in January, down 0.02% on December 2010 and 1.99% on January 2010. In December 2010 corporate leverage was down 0.04% mom and 2.79% yoy. So deleveraging is slowing down for corporates as well.
Deposits composition by maturity:
Clearly, longer maturity has fallen off the cliff and a slight bounce in longer maturities this month follows a catastrophic drop off in months before. This cliff is a clear indication that households are moving cash into shorter maturities - either to withdraw deposits all together or as a form of short term precautionary savings. So:
  • Overnight deposits were down -0.9% (-€788mln) mom and -4.42% yoy (-€3,998mln) in January
  • Deposits with maturity up to 3 months were down -1.26% (-€197mln) mom and -6.16% (-€1,011mln) yoy in January 2011
  • Deposits with maturity up to 2 years were up 1.15% (+€780mln) mom and down -16.67% (-13,374mln) yoy.

Finally, credit cards debt fell 1.84% mom (€53.48mln) and -5.8% (-€175.81mln) yoy in January 2011. Good news for one of the most expensive forms of debt.

Wednesday, February 2, 2011

2/02/2011: Irish interest rates

For the last post on monthly data release from the CBofI, let's take a look at the interest rates environment at the retail level.

First up - lending rates:

As of November 2010 (latest data available):
  • House purchases lending floating rate was at 2.95% (up 0.34% mom and 13.03% yoy - note, these are percentages, not percentage points); rates for over 1 year fixed were 4.10% average (up 0.24% mom and 14.53% yoy)
  • Consumer credit rate was 6.06% floating (up 1% mom and 30.32%yoy)
  • Non-financial corporations faced a floating rate for <€1mln loans of 4.49% (up 10.86%mom and 13.96%yoy) and over 1 year fixed rate for same level of loans of 5.14% (up 4.26%mom and 18.16%yoy)
  • The trends are up for all two borrower types year on year
Now, deposits:
So for deposit rates:
  • Household deposits attracted an average rate of 1.75% (up 6.06% mom and 17.45% yoy)
  • Non-financial corporations attracted an average rate of 1.25% (down 0.79% mom and up 39.98% yoy)
Now, consider the difference between deposit rate and borrowing rate:
For households, the gap between earnings on savings and cost of financing mortgages (I used house purchase, floating rate or up to 1 year fixed) has moved in favor of savers until November 2008, and there after switched in the direction of favoring borrowers. The switch is extremely volatile and since August 2010 the direction has changed once again. Thus, since August 2010 the banks are moving into more aggressively charging mortgage holders and rewarding relatively more savers.

Corporate rates differential has been moving in the direction of penalizing corporate deposits holders. This process in now being reinforced since July 2010.

So here we have it - deposit rates are becoming less attractive to the corporates, just as more and more of them abandon Irish banks... who would have thought that charging our customers out existence can be a bad thing?

Finally, using CBofI breakdown on loans by type and maturity, I conducted a simple exercise - what happens if the interest rates on new and ARM mortgages charged by banks go up by 1 percentage point (incidentally - PTSB is doing just that, apparently). By my calculation, added cost of interest finance will translate into roughly additional €1.67bn being taken out of the economy. That's like having another Leni's tax hike over again for Irish households.

2/02/2011: Irish termed deposits and credit cards

In the previous two posts I updated data on credit and deposits levels and flows. In this post, let's tidy up by taking a look at deposits by maturity and credit cards.

First deposits by maturity:
Clearly, longer term maturity is exiting, medium term maturity deposits are now shrinking as well, while short term maturity deposits remain steady. This suggests that
  1. Irish depositors are exiting Irish banks when longer term savings mature;
  2. Irish pool of savings available for investment - remember, banks can more safely lend out of longer maturity deposits than out of shorter maturity ones (lower risk of maturity mismatch) - is also shrinking.
  3. Overall, overnight deposits have increased 2.11%mom in December 2010, but fell 4.35% yoy
  4. Up to 3 months deposits fell 4.33% in December 2010 mom and 2.77% yoy
  5. Up to 2 years deposits fell 9.64% mom and 17.32% yoy.
Not very good trends.

On credit cards, the picture is What the data suggests is:
  • Irish credit cards balances are declining, but this decline is relatively mild - down 0.81% mom in December 2010 (latest data) and -6.28% yoy.

Tuesday, February 1, 2011

1/02/2011: Growth rates in credit and deposits

Having looked at the levels of credit and deposits through December 2010 in the previous post (here) lets take a look at the rates of change.
Credit growth rates above clearly show the following trends:
  • Household loans rate of contraction has accelerated from 4.8% yoy in October and November to 5.2% in December. Thus December 2010 marked the worst month in the entire series history since 2004.
  • Rate of decline in mortgages lending was also accelerating to 1.9% in December from 1.7% in November and 1.6% in September and October.
  • Rate of decline in credit for non-financial corporations eased in December to 1.6% yoy from 2.4% in November.
Next, deposits rates of change:
The chart above shows:
  • A dramatic exist from Irish banks by non-financial corporate deposits. This flight is accelerating - having gone from -9.2% yoy fall in July, to -13.1% in August, -14.8% in September, -15.4% in October, -14.9% in November and a whooping -16.1% in December.
  • Household deposits are also accelerating in the rate of decline from -2.4% in October to -4.5% in November and -4.7% in December
To highlight these dynamics and to dispel the myth of 'savings are rising' often perpetrated by some banks analysts, let's come back to the data on deposits. In December 2008-January 2009 there was a discrete jump in household deposits to the tune of just over €12.4bn. This jump is never really noticed by the analysts, but it reflects addition of the credit unions to the database. These are not new deposits, but rather the deposits that were held in institutions previously not covered by the dataset.

Now, let' remove this 'hump' and see what the banking sector deposits really look like today:
The chart abvoe does exactly this. And it clearly shows that:
  • Over 2010, Irish households have suffered a loss of savings, not a gain, pushing our deposits to the comparable level of December 2007
  • Over the entire crisis total private sector deposits have fallen to the levels comparable to those in May-June 2006.
And yet, we keep hearing (admittedly whimpered) calls for taxing 'sky-high' deposits/savings to 'release spending into consumption markets'.

1/02/2011: Credit supply and deposits in Ireland

CBofI released monthly data for December 2010 on credit supply and deposits in the Irish financial institutions.

Updated charts and some analysis:
Irish private sector credit continued to contract in December, having fallen 0.98% mom and -10.7% yoy in total. Overall, credit outstanding fell €3.33bn in December mom and €40.23bn yoy.
Credit has fallen across all categories, except one:
  • Household credit fell 4.72% (-€6.49bn) mom and 6.41% (-€8.98bn) yoy
  • Mortgages credit fell 7.05% (-€7.55bn) mom and 9.65% (-€10.63bn) yoy
  • Non-financial corporations credit fell 2.63% (-€2.5bn) mom and 37.08% (-€54.34bn) yoy
  • Insurance and pension funds sector credit rose 5.36% (€5.66bn) and was up 26.18% (€23.09bn) yoy
  • Combined non-financial sectors and households credit fell a massive €63.32bn in 12 months to the end of December 2010.

Onto deposits next:

Headline figure is that total deposits fell 2.24% (-€3.86bn) mom and 8.41% (-€15.46bn) yoy. This was backed by deposits declines across two out of three core components:
So:
  • Household deposits rose 0.71% (€669mln) mom but fell 4.57% (-€4.53bn) yoy
  • Non-financial corporate deposits were down 5.18% (-€1.83bn) mom and 17.64% (-€7.17bn) yoy
  • Insurance and pension funds sector deposits fell 6.29% (-€2.7bn) mom and 8.57% (-€3.77bn) yoy
  • Non-financial sector and household deposits fell €11.693bn in 12 months through December 2010.
The relative changes in deposits and loans outstanding implied changes in the ratio of loans to deposits - an instrument for the leveraging taken on by the economy at large.

Overall, Irish economy achieved a very modest reduction in the ratio in 2010:
  • Total private sector credit to deposits ratio fell 2.53% in 12 months to the end of December 2010 reaching 198.81%
  • Lowest deleveraging took place in the household sector, where the ratio fell 1.93% in 12 months and currently stands at 138.56%
  • Highest degree of deleveraging was achieved in the non-financial corporate sector, where the ratio declined 23.6% yoy in December (though it rose by 2.69% mom) reaching 275.68%
  • Insurance and pensions funds sector actually increased overall leverage ratio by 38% in 12 months to the end of December, reaching the ratio of 276.6%
Overall, outstanding loans exceeded domestic deposits by 98.81% in the end of 2010.

Saturday, July 31, 2010

Economics 31/7/10: Credit flows in Ireland

Central Bank quarterly was published yesterday. Here are some updated charts on credit flows (data through May). The main conclusions are:
  1. Private sector credit continues to contract and is again accelerating in the annual rate of decline (-10.4% yoy in May as compared to -9.3% declines in April and March).
  2. Mortgage credit contractions are steadily declining (-1.8% in May against -1.6% in April & 1.4% in March).
  3. Non-mortgage credit is accelerating in the rate of decline (-12.8% in May compared to -11.4% in April)
  4. Nama - now through 50% of the loans purchases - has had no positive impact on credit supply. If anything, as charts for households lending show blow, it is being accompanied by a dramatic increase in the cost of borrowing for ordinary families.
Charts:
Aggregate private sector credit above. Disastrous trends of the last 2 year continue unabated, despite the already significant contraction in the credit supply. This suggests that we are in a continued downward spiral when it comes to business and household investment (future capacity is under continued pressure down and the only thing that provides some positive support to capital side is, most likely, MNCs own inter-company investments). This goes to explain why one cannot accept earlier DofF projections for 2013-2015 potential rates of growth. We are in a situation very similar to Japan in the mid-1990s, where existent production is being driven at the expense of capital stock.

Mortgages:Clearly, no signs of moderation in the rates of decay anywhere here. But the picture is more sluggish than that for non-mortgages lending:
The reason for the different dynamics is that it is easier for households to cut back on smaller credit demand than on massive mortgages burden. Hence, non-mortgages lending is a leading indicator for what we can expect to follow in the mortgages markets. Not exactly a bright future for the housing markets, then.

Deposits side of our financial system:
Notice that deposits are down, mom, across the board, except for shorter term maturity corporate deposits. But yoy all deposits are down. Combined decline in all deposits in volume since January 2010 is €1,869 mln, or 3.4%. Not a small change. All deposit rates are down year on year - we are being paid less to save, but are charged more to borrow.

Loans stats next.
Loans for house purchases are falling, while mortgages rates are rocketing. The orange line above shows just what is happening with the cost of financing one's own home in Ireland, courtesy of our regulators (keen on talking about 'moral hazard'), all the special 'Working Groups' aiming to address the problems in the housing markets, and Nama. Remember - our Government (by now pretty much every minister in the cabinet) had sworn to us that Nama will restore functional banking. May be this is what they had in mind...

Last year I predicted that the game in the mortgages markets will play as follows:
  • Once Nama starts transfers, incentives for the banks to play a Good Fella will diminish - repossessions will remain low, but rates will rise. We now can see this happening around us.
  • Once Nama completes transfers, banks will go in earnest at rebuilding their margins & capital, meaning - repossessions will accelerate dramatically and rates will rise to the levels where the burden of financing mortgages will become a driver for more repossessions.
  • 3-6 months after the above stage, banks will start hoarding repossessed property on their books. They will be forced to start selling it ca 6-9 months after February 2011 (completion date for Nama purchases).
  • Combined effect of massively more expensive mortgages credit and inflow of repossessed properties into the market will drive prices in housing markets even further down.
So far, we are through the 1st bullet point and getting closer to the second one.

Meanwhile, in the land of short term loans, rates are more steady and credit supply is falling gently.
Now, let me ask you this question. What should be the priority here? Making sure people are not being skinned to pay for their homes, or making sure that credit cards rates and car loans are being underpinned by more stable interest rates?

Credit to non-financial corporations is continuing to slide. Year on year, shorter term (working capital) credit is now off a massive 19.3%. Longer term credit is off 2.7% yoy. What does this tell me about the economy?
  1. Capital investment is going nowhere fast, with any rosy figures on volumes we might hear over the coming weeks being most likely driven by the MNCs own in-house investment flows; and
  2. Companies have no capacity to refinance shorter term credit obligations, resulting in a cash flow pressures and lack of operating capital.
Not exactly a success story for our financial system administrators and regulators, then.