Showing posts with label Irish cds spreads. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Irish cds spreads. Show all posts

Sunday, October 27, 2013

27/10/2013: Irish CDS spreads: a reason to smile for a change...

It might be disheartening sometimes (often) to read the newsflow involving Irish economy. But occasionally, there are some really worthy decent news... Here's an example: 12 months difference in CDS spreads:

First Q3 2012:


Now, Q3 2013:

That's a huge change... even though we are still far from where we want to be, the change is impressive.

Tuesday, February 26, 2013

26/2/2013: 'Italy effect"


Mid-day 'Italy effect' or may be 'democracy effect' or 'No Goldie Sachs Boy in Rome effect'? CDS markets (via CMA) the EU has not banned... yet



Also, note that everyone in the periphery is being clubbed: Ireland and Portugal inclusive (we can safely assume that Tunisia, Sweden, Russia and Bulgaria have been coupled into the group on ad hoc bases).

Friday, February 15, 2013

15/2/2013: Irish CDS mid-day


Mid-day CMA update on CDS markets: Ireland slipping slightly after good rally and so are other peripherals:


Not a game-changer, but then again, Sovereign CDS are hardly a 'game' anymore, given thin trading and other constraints. Still, pleasant to see 167.01 5-year spread.

Tuesday, February 12, 2013

12/2/2013: Small step down, but doesn't hurt either...


Nice move in CDS markets for Ireland earlier today - not large, but good positive. Also, note relative distance in implied probabilities of default between Ireland and Portugal:


Wednesday, January 23, 2013

23/1/2013: CDS markets in Q4 2012 - CMA report


CMA published Q4 2012 report on sovereign CDS markets and there are some interesting trends and stats highlighted.

First 25 top riskiest sovereigns (CPD referes to cumulative probability of default over 5 years):


Note that Ireland is no longer in top 10 riskiest states. Good news. A bit more on this below.


Per CMA: "Global CDS prices ended the year on a strong note, tightening 16% overall as Europe rallies strongly and Greece repurchases debt allaying fears of an exit from the Euro. Only Argentina and Egypt widen significantly on the quarter."

"Argentina CDS ended a volatile quarter as the most risky sovereign reaching a high of 4832bps at the end of November on concerns over USA debt guarantees, but rallied to finish on 1450bps. CDS spreads in Spain tightened from 384bps to 295bps as spreads in Western Europe as a whole tightened 19%."


Next, top 25 least riskiest states:

Note that only 3 euro afea states make it into top 10.

Per CMA:
"Sweden edged Norway off the top spot of the least risky table by 1bps, as the Scandinavian countries ended a strong quarter on the back of a good performance in Europe as a whole. The USA slipped two positions, as a solution to the “Fiscal Cliff” and debt ceiling concerns continue into year end. Austria and Netherlands enter the table with the spreads aligning with the strong economies of Germany and Switzerland." The latter rationale is most bizarre one I heard - the Netherlands are in a serious economic recession, deeper and longer than the rest of the euro area, so I have no idea what CMA are talking about.

Now, some interesting charts relating to Western Europe. Per CMA: "Western Europe continued on the rally from Q3 into Q4, with spreads tightening 19% overall and Greece looking more likely to stay in the Euro. Spreads in Portugal creeped over the 600bps level mid-November but ended the year at 436bps, 13%  tighter. Ireland tightened 31% closing the year at 218bps as the turnaround story continues. Spain and Italy, seen as the key economies in southern Europe, tightened 23% and 19% respectively."

Recall that European CDS overall tightened 19% in Q4 2012 and overall global momentum was very strongly on tightening side.



Note that Ireland experienced comparable (in levels) declines in CDS to all other peripheral countries excluding Cyprus (which saw an increase) and Portugal (where declines were more pronounced, when considered relative to peak reached in the Quarter. It is hard to tell - in this environment - whether Irish performance is driven by own fundamentals or by a combination of these said fundamentals and overall improved investor tolerance for risk.

In terms of percentages declines, we did perform stronger than other peripherals (ex-Portugal) and the Western Europe as a whole.

However, it is still too early to claim that Ireland - based on CDS valuations - is not a part of the 'peripheral' euro area group. Hopefully, more progress in near future will get us decoupled from this camp.

Sunday, July 29, 2012

29/7/2012: Irish Competitiveness



Unedited version of my Sunday Times article from July 22.



These days, with nearly 15 percent unemployment, and almost 530,000 currently in receipt of some unemployment supports, the minds of Irish policymakers and analysts are rightly preoccupied with jobs creation. Every euro of new investment is paraded through the media as the evidence of regained confidence in the economy. This week, even the insolvent Irish Government got into the game of ‘creating jobs’ with an ‘investment stimulus’.

Alas, economics of jobs creation is an entirely different discipline from the political PR accompanying it. In the real world, some private and public jobs are created on the basis of sustainable long-term demand for skills. Others are generated on the foot of tax advantages and subsidies, including stimulus. In the short run, the latter types of jobs can still yield a positive boost to economic activity. But in the longer run, they are not sustainable and drain resources that can be better allocated to other areas. The ultimate difference between the two types is found in productivity growth associated, or the competitiveness gain or loss generated in the economy.

The prospects of Irish economic recovery have been rhetorically coupled with the improvements in our cost competitiveness since early 2008. And for a good reason. Rapid deterioration in competitiveness in years before the crisis is what got us into the situation where structural collapse of the economy was inevitable.

During the Celtic Garfield era of 2001-2007, Irish Harmonized Competitiveness Indicators (HCIs) have deteriorated by some 26%. Our productivity growth, stripping out effects of MNCs transfer pricing and tax arbitrage, has been running well below the rate of the advanced economies average. In years of the property bubble, Ireland was the least competitive economy in the entire euro area.

Structurally, our lack of competitiveness was underpinned by the labour costs inflation in relation to producer and consumer prices. Consumer costs-related competitiveness indicator for Ireland deteriorated by 38 percent between the end of 2001 and mid-2008, more than one-and-a-half times the rate of deterioration in producer costs-linked measure. Another, even more pervasive and long-term force at play was creation of hundreds of thousands of jobs in the sectors, like building and construction, domestic retail and finance that lagged in value-added well behind the exporting sectors.

This was not a model of sustainable jobs creation. Instead of incentivising investment in real skills and aptitude to work and entrepreneurship, we taught our younger generation to expect a €40-45,000 starting gig in a ‘professional’ occupation or laying bricks at a construction site. Not surprisingly, uptake of degrees in harder sciences and more mathematically intensive fields of business studies slumped, while degrees in ‘softer’ social and cultural studies were booming. The workforce we were producing had a rapidly expanding mismatch between pay expectations, career prospects, and reality of an internationally competitive economy.

Placated by the opportunity to locate in the corporate tax haven, our MNCs were drumming up the myth of the superior workforce with great skills and education. The Government and its quasi-official mouthpieces of economic analysis in academia, banks, and financial and professional services were only happy to repeat the same line.

The crisis laid bare the truths about our fabled competitiveness outside the corporate tax arbitrage opportunities.

Since then, the focus of the Government labour market reforms, in rhetoric, if not in real terms, has been on regaining cost competitiveness. Sadly, this process so far replicates, rather than corrects the very same errors of judgement we pursued before the crisis erupted.

In terms of headline metrics, things are looking up. Our harmonised competitiveness indicator (HCI) has improved by 5% between January 2009 and April 2012 – the latest data available. However, these gains are accounted for by two drivers. Firstly, jobs destruction in the construction and retail sectors has led to rapid elimination of less productive – from economic value-added point of view – activities. Secondly, domestic business activity collapse added price deflation to the equation, distorting gains from any real productivity improvements. Thus, our HCI deflated by producer prices has fallen 7.7% over the above period of time, while consumer prices-deflated HCI dropped 12.5%.

Thus, much still remains to be done on the competitiveness front, especially since deflationary pressures in the economy are no longer rampant. The momentum of gains in competitiveness experienced in 2008-2010 has slowed dramatically and is likely to continue declining.

On the one hand, jobs destruction has moderated markedly, while across the economy overall earnings are rising. Wages inflation in several sectors where skills shortages are present, such as ICT and internationally traded services, now complements declining competitiveness of individual tax policies.

Year on year, Q1 2012 saw average weekly earnings rising in Ireland by 0.7%. Weekly earnings in the private sector went up 1.5% annually, while there was an increase of 2.0% in the public sector over the year. Between Q1 2008 and Q1 2012, average weekly earnings fell 3.5% in the private sector and rose 0.8% in the public sector.

The skills crunch is evident both via the earnings inflation within the larger size enterprises and by occupational categories. earnings of Managers, professional and associated professionals rose 5.7% y/y in Q1 2012 and are now 1.1% ahead of where they were in Q1 2009. Earnings for clerical, sales and service employees are up 2.4% y/y and down almost 2% on 2009.

The real problem with our labour costs competitiveness is that with rising tax burdens it is becoming increasingly difficult to import skills and our system of training and education simply cannot deliver on the growing demand for specialist knowledge. The former problem has been repeatedly highlighted by the indigenous exporters. The latter has been a major talking point for the larger MNCs. The latest example of this is PayPal, whose global operations vice-president Louise Phelan warned this week that Ireland needs to focus on language skills, especially in German, Dutch and Nordic languages “to protect our status as a European gateway”.

Sadly, the Government is listening to the latter more than to the indigenous entrepreneurs.

Reforming education system is a long-term process and should not be tailored to the current demand for narrow skills. Instead, it should aim to provide broad and diversified education base, including leading (not obscure) modern languages, proper teaching of core subjects, such as history, philosophy, arts and sciences.

Such reforms will not have a direct impact on the likes of PayPal’s ability to hire people with very narrow skill sets. Which means that Ireland will have to systemically reduce the costs of importing human capital.

To derive real competitive advantage anchored in sustainable jobs creation and productivity growth, we need to focus on creating the right mix of tax incentives, educational supports and immigration regulations to lower the cost of employing highly skilled workers and increase returns to individual investments in education and training. Let us then leave the job of selecting which areas of study should be pursued to those who intend to succeed in the market place.






Box-out
The CMA Global Sovereign Credit Risk Report for the second quarter 2012 shows Ireland improving its ranking position from the 7th highest risk sovereign debt issuer in the world in Q1 2012 to the 8th – a gain that is, on the surface, should signal that the country Credit Default Spreads (CDS) were improving compared to its peers. While Ireland’s CDS have indeed improved during the quarter falling below 600 basis points (bps) in the last two days of June for the first time since the first week of May, in effect Ireland ended Q2 2012 pretty much where it started it in terms of CDS levels. What really propelled Irish rankings gain was the return of Greece to the CDS markets few weeks after the country ‘selective default’. In fact, Ireland’s rate of improvement (by 1 notch) is identical to that of Cyprus and marks below average performance for the group of the highest risk sovereigns. Perhaps even more revealing is the comparative between Ireland and Iceland. The latter is ranked 20th in the risk league table, improving in Q2 2012 by two ranks. At the end of June, Icelandic 5 year CDS were trading at 290 bps, with implied cumulative probability of country default over the 5 years horizon of 22.9%. Ireland’s CDS were trading at 554 bps with implied cumulative probability of default of 38.6%.

Monday, November 30, 2009

Economics 30/11/2009: Budget scope

For those of you who missed my yesterday's article in the Sunday Times, here it is in un-edited version.SUMMARY Note: updated below for estimated probabilities of default.

In their recent note, Fitch has singled out our massive public deficit and rising debt as the drivers for Irish sovereign bonds downgrade to a lowly AA- rating. This warning was in line with broader international markets concern about the mounting public debt liabilities around the world.


After days of falling prices on Chinese and Greek debts, this Tuesday it was Spain’s turn. October figures from Spain have revealed that the country deficit is now set reaching 9.5% of its GDP. The Spanish Government has gone out of its way to assure the markets that it plans to bring the deficit to 3% Euro zone limit by 2012. The plan involves raising VAT and capital gains tax. But the main measures will deal with public expenditure cut of 12-15%.


Spain, or course, is facing a public deficit that is some 3 percentage points shy of Ireland’s. But, unlike Ireland, Spain is planning to take its medicine in full and swiftly. Take another example. Denmark’s deficit is 7 percentage points below ours. In contrast to us, Danish government passed tax breaks and a major tax reform package encouraging more labour supply. The country also used its pension reserves to boost household income in this recession. To keep things under control – Danes cut public expenditure by up to 20% in some areas.


Latvia, Estonia, Iceland, and Hungary – all have implemented IMF-mandated cuts in public spending with some inflicting cuts up to 30% on public sector wages. All have seen subsequent rounds of upgrades from economic forecasters and bond markets.


But the signs are, after 27 months of severe crises, the Leinster House is still in the denial as to the full realities of our perilous fiscal position. Even after all the tough talk, Minister Lenihan is now appearing to accept Unions’ compromise for a temporary symbolically modest cut to public sector wages. Yet, the depth of our economic crisis requires nothing short of a drastic and permanent reductions in public spending.


Ireland’s promised €4bn cut in the Budget 2010 – contentious as it might seem to us – is pittance compared to what is needed to restore credibility in our economy.


Per latest set of accounts, we are in the need of raising almost a half of our current spending financing through borrowing. The latest forecasts from the EU Commission and the OECD state that Ireland's general government deficit is expected to be 12.2-12.5% of GDP in 2009 and 11.3-14.7% of GDP in 2010-2011. There is no snowball’s chance in hell that Ireland can reach the required 3% target by 2014 or, for that matter 2015, unless we deal with that share of the deficit that is known as structural deficit.


Any deficit arising in real life, therefore, can be decomposed into a cyclical deficit – that share of the deficit that arises due to a temporary recession – and structural deficit. The latter, of course, is the deficit that arises from structural overspending and cannot be expected to disappear when the economy reaches its long run growth potential.


Hence, the extent of our structural deficit is crucially dependent on the assumptions for the natural rate of growth in Irish GDP. So far this year, our Department of Finance forecasters have assumed that the natural rate of growth for Irish economy lies around the simple average for the 2000-2008 levels –close to 3.8% per annum. Their friends in the ESRI are slightly less optimism, predicting that the natural rate of growth is somewhere around 3% of GDP. All of this suggests that the structural component of our deficit is around 8-9% of GDP per annum or under €14bn. The cyclical component is in the region of 3-4% of GDP or up to €7bn. Hence, the current preferred adjustment path to fiscal solvency envisions cuts of €4bn in 2010 and 2011. Thereafter, reckon our mandarins, things will come back to ‘normal’ and Irish economy will miraculously churn out more tax revenue to cover the remaining hole.


But this bet assumes that Ireland is somehow an outsider to the entire Euro area club of smaller open economies. How else can our potential GDP growth be almost 300% above that of Denmark, 250% greater than Belgium’s, 60% above that for the Netherlands and for the Euro area as a whole? Or why should we assume that Irish economy will overshoot potential growth rate in the first year of recovery, when the majority of European economies are expected to reach theirs some 3-5 years after the end of a recession?


If our potential GDP growth is really in line with the small Euro area countries’ average, then our output gap (the difference between the potential and current GDP) is closer to 6% rather than 7.25% that the Department of Finance builds into its forecasts. This in turn implies that our cyclical deficit is around 2.5%, yielding a structural deficit of ca 9.5-10% of our GDP or €16-17bn in 2009 terms.


To get close to a realistically feasible path to solvency, Brian Lenihan should be aiming to cut some €8bn in public deficit in 2010 alone, followed by €3-4bn cuts in 2011 and 2012 each.


This is the real legacy of excessive exuberance with which Bertie Ahearn handed out cash to various Social Partners constituencies. And it is now manifested in purely toxic extent of deficits that cannot be corrected by any means other than savage cuts. The structure of our expenditure – manifested by the fact that some two thirds of it goes to finance wages, pension and social welfare payments – implies that the cuts must happen in exactly these areas.


Painful as this may be, there is simply no alternative. No productivity increases in the public sector will help deflate the actual costs of the sector. The costs that keep on rising. Per CSO’s latest data, 2009 was a bumper crop year for our servants of the state. Average public sector earnings are up 3.2% in a year to the end of Q2 2009, while average private sector wages are down 6.8% over the same time - a swing of 10 percentage points. Survivorship bias – the fact that earnings figures do not reflect the jobs losses and do not net out resulting redundancy payments in the private sector – suggests that the actual earnings growth differential is much wider than that
.

Restoration of our economic health at this junction requires swift and significant cut – of the magnitude of 15-20% - in the total pay bill of the public sector. This can only be achieved through a combination of reduced employment and earnings cuts. It should be accompanied by a 10% cut in social welfare and a 30-40% cut in capital spending.


This is an urgent task that cannot be delayed for future Governments to tackle. Since May this year the Government has gone on a PR offensive arguing that the markets have treated Budgets 2009 as serious efforts to correct deficit.


Most of this is political sloganeering. As the chart clearly shows, although markets estimates of our probability of default on sovereign debt have declined in time from a historic peak in February 2009, this decline was far less significant than the overall market gains experienced by other countries with similar budgetary problems. Having peaked well ahead of all other Euro zone countries, Irish CDS spreads have stayed persistently at the top of the common currency area distribution. And there they remain with a significant risk to the upside.


Here are some index pics, all countries CDSs (5-year) set at 100 on 18/07/2008:

And here is an interesting chart for actual CDSs
The markets are now putting estimated probability of our default above that of Peru!

To put these into perspective, using OECD and EU Commission latest forecasts, taking €8bn in deficit financing out this year will save Irish taxpayers some €3-5bn in interest payments alone over the next 5 years.

The costs of our inaction are mounting.

Here are two charts on estimated probabilities of sovereign default for various CDSs, using a linear formula (not a more accurate PV of contingent claim =PV of fixed payment approach and no bootstrapping).

The above chart shows the cumulative probability of default over 5 year term of life of bonds... we are back in double digits and above Spain and Greece...