Showing posts with label Irish Government debt. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Irish Government debt. Show all posts

Tuesday, December 30, 2014

30/12/2014: Who Owns Government Debt?


An interesting chart via DB, mapping sovereign debt holdings across the advanced economies:

As the chart clearly shows, Irish Government debt is disproportionately held in the Central Bank. Other countries with similar proportion of CB-held debt - UK, US and Japan - all deployed direct QE. Ireland, of course, deployed virtually the same QE-like stimulus predominantly to the IBRC.

Another interesting feature is the share of Government debt held by foreign agencies: roughly 20% of the total, or 11th lowest in the sample of 21 countries. That is pretty low, given the amount of PR-talk the Government has been deploying around foreign buyers of Irish bonds.

In contrast, predictably, we rank the third after Greece and Portugal in the share of Government debt held by foreign official sector. This will decline once the IMF 'repayment' is finalised. Domestic banks' holdings of Irish debt are third lowest in the sample, and domestic non-banks holdings are 5th lowest. This is unlikely to change, given the sheer quantum of Government debt outstanding, relative to the overall economy's capacity and demand, and given the low yields on Government debt being generated.

The kicker of all of this is that owing to years of mismanaged bailouts, we are now saddled with the legacy of rescuing private debt holders in the banks. This legacy is simple: instead of private debt we have official debt, held predominantly by official sectors and our own CB, guaranteed by the Irish State. In other words, more of our debt is now super-senior in both rights and default terms.

Friday, September 26, 2014

26/9/2014: 'Cartoon Economics'? You bet...


Priceless is the best way to describe financial instrumentation antics of Irish Government.

The IMF loan early 'repayment' is really a re-financing. It has its good sides and no one argues it shouldn't be done (see here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/09/992014-imf-loans-deal-can-be-win-win.html) but 'repayment' this is not.

Still more of the bizarre machinations were publicised today in an Irish Times piece: http://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/move-on-anglo-debt-set-to-boost-exchequer-earnings-1.1942119#.VCUUnz_O6bw.twitter. The idea is that those Anglo/INBS/IBRC 'shut down' bonds that are being held in the Central Bank (with interest on them payable to the CB and thus recycled back to the State, implying zero cost financing of the bonds) can be sold at a rate faster than that required by the original schedule. Which, of course, means two things:

  1. Selling these bonds today is likely to generate a capital gains return to the Exchequer, as Irish bonds are currently trading at lower yields than when issued, which means that the Government can sell these bonds and pocket the price difference over par.
  2. But,... the proverbial but, once sold, the bonds ill be paying declared coupon (interest payments) of Euribor + 263 bps to their new holders, and not to the Central Bank. Which means that new interest payments will be an addition to the already hefty interest bill of the Government. What used to be 'free funding' prior to sale will become 'Euribor+263bps' funding after. 
There is an added caveat to all of this. If the Government spends the capital gains on anything other than reduction of debt, interest costs under above pricing become net costs. In effect, we will be funding a quick-fix-drug addiction with a credit card.

Back in 2013, after the Promo Notes deal, myself and others have cautioned as to the risks associated with accelerated sales of bonds. And now this risk is upon us. And beyond all of this looms the largest question of them all: These bonds were issued to cover Irish Government liability to the ECB (Eurosystem) arising from the nationalisation of Anglo and INBS (not nationalisation, per se, but from our state assuming all liabilities of the two failed banks and refusing to burn their bondholders). So, as we all know, Ireland 'took one on the chin' for Europe. 

A symmetric response from the ECB would have been to allow us hold these bonds in perpetuity, so no repayments need to be made at all. Instead, we created these bonds with an intent of selling every year a bit of this debt into the markets to generate cash to close the liability to the ECB (in other words, to raise money to burn money to appease ECB balancesheet exercise). This 'burning' of money means two things:
  1. ECB gets accounting 'cancelation' of liability which has zero material impact on the Eurosystem regardless of whether it remains open or is closed; and
  2. Irish taxpayers have to fund the debt sold - which means more real pain and suffering for taxpayers and people of Ireland.
With the new move, we are going to accelerate (1) and (2) above and the Irish Times is cheerleading this?! 

The Irish Times misses all of the above points in its article. But one man doesn't: Diarmuid O'Flynn:


As he said, this is 'cartoon economics'...

Thursday, September 4, 2014

4/9/2014: Repaying Ahead of Schedule: Ireland & IMF Loans


Last week Portugal's Expresso published a big article on Irish plans to repay earlier the IMF loans. The link is here: http://fesete.pt/portal/docs/pdf/Revista_Imprensa_30_e_31_Agosto_2014.pdf (pages 37-38)

My view on the subject in full:

1-      The Irish hurry is politically engineered or they understand that the present low sovereign bond yields mood can be a short-term window of opportunity in the Euro area?

In my view, Irish Government interest in refinancing IMF loan is driven by both political and economic considerations. On political front, following heavy defeats in the European and Local elections, the ruling coalition needs to deliver new savings in Exchequer spending to allow for a reduction in austerity pressures in Budget 2015 and more crucially support increased giveaways in the Budgets in 2016 and 2017. Savings of few hundred millions of euros will help. And an ability to claim that the IMF loans have been repaid, even if only by borrowing elsewhere to fund these repayments can go well with the media and the voters tired of the Troika. On economic incentives side, the Government clearly is forwarding borrowing and re-profiling its bonds/debt maturity timings to minimise short-term pain of forthcoming repayments and to safeguard against the potential future increases in the rates and yields. In addition, there is a very apparent need to refinance the IMF loans as the interest charges on these is out of line with the current funding costs for the Government. It is worth noting here that the Irish Government is far from being homogeneous on the incentives side. For example, from Minister for Finance, Michael Noonan's statements, it is pretty clear that the incentives to refinance the IMF loans are predominantly economic and financial. On the other hand, for majority of the Labour Party ministers and a small number of the Fine Gael Cabinet Ministers, the incentives are more political.


2-      The move is also a way of reducing the “official sector” debt in the overall sovereign debt composition (higher than 50 per cent)?

The issue of the 'official sector' debt as opposed to the total public debt is less pressing for the Irish state. Larger share of the official sector debt in total debt composition provides short-term support for bonds prices, as higher official sector debt holdings imply lower private sector debt holdings in the present. However, in the future, the expectation in the markets is that the official sector debt will be refinanced via private markets, thus higher share of official sector debt today is a net negative for the future debt exposures. The result is that higher official share of debt is supporting lower current yields, but rises future yields, making the maturity curve steeper, ceteris paribus. In the current environment, Irish government is not significantly exposed to shorter-term debt markets, but it is exposed to longer termed debt roll-over demands that are consistent with political cycle. Reducing official exposures, therefore, can be supportive of the longer-term view of the debt issuance by the state. However, the issue is marginal to Irish policymakers and certainly secondary to the political and economic benefits the early repayment of the IMF loans brings.


3-      This initiative is useful to upgrade the sovereign debt sustainability?

In the short run, if successful, the initiative will provide improvement in the sovereign cash flows, but will cause the rebalancing of some private portfolios of Irish government debt. In the longer run, the direct effect of a successful refinancing of the IMF loans will most likely lead to little material change in the Government debt dynamics. The issue of the greater longer term concern is what the Irish Government is likely to do with any savings achieved through the debt restructuring. If the funds were to be used to fund earlier closing off of other official loans, there is likely to be a positive impact in terms of markets expectations on supply of Government bonds in the future and the direction of Irish fiscal reforms, both of which will support better risk assessments of the sovereign debt and Irish bonds. This is unlikely, however, due to the strong political momentum in favour of spending the new savings on reversing in part past savings achieved via public sector spending cuts and wages costs moderation. Such a move would likely be detrimental to Ireland's debt sustainability in the longer run. A third alternative is to deploy savings to reduce austerity pressures in the Budget 2015 across tax and spend areas. Tax reductions can be productive in stimulating sustainable growth and thus improving the fiscal position of the state in the longer run; spending cuts reductions will simply be consumed by remaining inefficiencies within the public sector.


4-      The Irish had some interesting political initiatives during the bail-out and post-bail-out period. First they change the annual promissory notes repayments into very long long debt (a kind of soft debt restructuring of 25 billion, 12 per cent of total public debt); then they decided for a “clean” exit opting out from the OMT constraints; and now they take the move to get out of IMF loans. In the framework of the Euro are peripheral countries this is an “innovation”?

The Irish government has taken a clearly distinct path from other euro area 'peripheral' states. However, this path is contingent on a number of relatively idiosyncratic features of the crisis in Ireland. Restructuring of the IBRC Promissory Notes was required due to political pressures of facing continued and clearly defined cost of the IBRC restructuring, but also by the significant pressures from the ECB to close off the ELA lines to IBRC, as well as Frankfurt's unhappiness with the structure of the Promissory Notes. In the end, this policy 'innovation' basically traded off short term savings for longer term costs and increased longer term uncertainty. It achieved substantial improvements in cash flow up front, but, depending on the schedule of bonds sales into the future, created little real savings over the life time of the loans. In the case of 'clean exit', Ireland benefited from the fact that a bulk of its deficits were incurred in extraordinary supports for the banks through 2011. In this sense, the Government had two years of relative stabilisation and decline in fiscal pressures before exiting the Troika programme. No other country in the euro 'periphery' had such deficit and debt dynamics. The move to refinance the IMF loans, however, is probably the first significant policy lead that Ireland deployed, as this move (if successful) will be paving the way for Spain, Portugal and Greece to follow in the future. Throughout the second stage of the euro area sovereign debt crisis (2012-present), the Irish Government deserves the credit for being recognised as being the one most actively seeking marginal improvements in the cash flow and rebalancing of debt costs and maturities within the euro area 'periphery'. But in part, this activism is also down to the fact that Ireland had a longer run in the debt crisis than any other 'peripheral' states and it deployed a plethora of various programmes, creating a policy map that is a patchwork of temporary and poorly structured programmes, like the IBRC Promissory Notes. Repairing these programmes offers Ireland a rather unique chance to get an uplift on some of its exposures.

Thursday, September 26, 2013

26/9/2013: Even with Hopium injections, we are not that far from Greece...

Irish Fiscal Council paper "The Government’s Balance Sheet after the Crisis: A Comprehensive Perspective" authored by Sebastian Barnes and Diarmaid Smyth is an interesting read.

The paper sets out a strong promise: "While discussion often focuses around the debt-to-GDP ratio as referenced by the EU Stability and Growth Pact, the reality is far more complex. This paper takes a comprehensive look at the Government’s balance sheet following the financial crisis. This involves assessing assets and liabilities of the General Government sector, off-balance sheet contingent and implicit liabilities as well as the wider public sector."

Alas, the side of the assets equation is a bit wanting...

While it is good to see the broader approach taken by the authors to the problem of fiscal sustainability of public finances in Ireland, too often, broadening of the coverage of the crisis-impacted sovereign balance sheet slips into the stream of extolling the riches of state-owned assets, whitewashing the liabilities using imaginary assets. The paper does not do this. Which is good. However, the paper is still creating loads of confusion because it provides no clear tabulation of the assets and the way they are accounted for in the analysis.

Instead of a concise tabulation, assets analysis is presented in two parts, both overlapping. This makes it nearly impossible to disentangle what the authors include where and to what specific value.

Let's start from the top:

Per authors: "General Government financial liabilities have increased four-fold since 2007, reaching €208 billion (127 per cent of GDP) in 2012. Over this period, Ireland experienced the largest increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio of any Euro Area country." Yep. Nothing controversial here.

"The Government has substantial holdings of financial assets. These increased modestly over the same period to reach €73 billion (45 per cent of GDP) in 2012. The main assets are cash balances, holdings of semi-state entities and investments in the banking sector."

Now, that's a bit of a statement, in my opinion, open to questions.

Firstly, it creates an impression that most of the assets Government has are liquid. Not so, in my view.

Secondly, it creates an impression that the Government has a functional power to seize these assets. Also a bit of stretch in my view.

Thirdly, is suggests that even if individually liquid and recoverable, these assets can be sold in the market or used as collateral in the case of distress. Again, not something I would agree with.

The authors conclude that "The Government’s net financial assets (NFA), subtracting financial liabilities from financial  assets, gives a broader measure of the financial position of government. NFA have  declined from a position of balance in 2007 to a net liability of €135 billion (82 per cent of GDP) in 2012. Using this broader measure, the Irish government was the third most indebted country in the Euro Area in 2012 (as a share of GDP)."

I am not so sure that EUR73 billion is the real number we should be using in computing Government net financial position. My gut feeling is that we are lucky if we can count EUR50 billion in somewhat liquid and accessible funds. And even then we are at a stretch. With that, our Government's net financial assets position rises to a  deficit of 95-96% of GDP and this means that we are now challenging Greece to the Euro area's title of the second most-indebted country. And that is before Greece Bailout 3.0 which will probably result in some sort of a debt write down for the Greeks (see here:http://english.capital.gr/News.asp?id=1877516) even if small.


Here are some details on my sceptical assessment. The paper lists the following Government 'assets' (comments outside quotation marks are obviously mine):

(A.) Shares and Other Equity. "This broad asset category was valued at €24 billion. It includes: (1) the value of semi-state assets, including the equity of General Government in the Central Bank; (2) a portion of the NPRF; and (3) other equity
holdings." (1) is at least in part imaginary. The valuations of semi state companies are 'hoped for' and are not tested in the market. They also do not account fully for the shortfalls in pension funds and the knock on effects to any purchaser of equity in these companies from the role these pension funds play in running the companies' strategies. They also ignore the fact that with transfer of ownership, the semi-states are unlikely to continue enjoy state protection of their dominant market positions. All in, (1) covers EUR12 billion of semi-states equity, plus EUR2 billion of balances in the Central Bank - of which, my guesstimate is, no more than EUR5-6 billion is recoverable. The authors state clearly that "Considerable uncertainty, however,surrounds the value of these assets." per CB reserves, these are euro system money and I wonder how much of this even technically belongs to the Irish state. (2) covers NPRF-held equities and banks shares. Equities component is small, with total EUR9 billion in NPRF 'assets' accounted for mostly by banks shares (excluding preference shares). National Accounts assign EUR11 billion to the total Government holdings of banks assets. These valuations are off the mark, in my view, as the only value of the banks (ex-Bank of Ireland) today is the value of capital injected into them, net the losses they will sustain on mortgages. The rest is awash on revenue side v cost side. At any rate, these assets are not exactly liquid and if released into the market in any appreciable quantity will cause severe dilution of their value. All-in, say EUR9-10 billion of this 'stuff' is a hoped-for value in any scenario of sovereign distress.

Bit (3) above: 'Other equity holdings' "valued at approximately €3 billion. This includes the value of direct holdings of bank equity by the Exchequer, investments in the insurance sector and capital contributions to the European Stability Mechanism." Seriously? We'd get a rebate on ESM contributions? Insurance sector 'investments'? Shave off some EUR1 billion here for a dose of realism.

(B.) Currency and deposits. "The Government holds a substantial amount of relatively liquid  assets, which are managed by the NTMA. These were valued at €24 billion at end-2012. This figure includes cash balances held by the Exchequer (€18 billion), local government (€1.4 billion) and cash balances held by other Government bodies(such as the NPRF)." Can the Government expropriate the funds belonging to local authorities? Legally and actually? Can the Government capture all balances held by the Government bodies? May be. May be not. Surely it depends on contractual obligations of these bodies and the nature of assets? So suppose that EUR2.4 billion of the above is not subject to capture/recovery.

(C.) Amongst gloriously liquid Irish Government 'assets' the paper (and it is accepted methodology, I must say, which of course doesn't mean it makes any sense beyond purely theoretical exercise) list: "Loans and Other Assets(such as Accounts Receivable). This category was valued at €15 billion and includes a broad range of assets, namely loans from the Housing Finance Authority (HFA)(€4 billion), other Government loans,tax accrual adjustments (mainly VAT and PAYE (€3 billion) and a range of smaller assets such as collaterals, EU transfers and mobile spectrum receipts." Good luck, as one might say, selling these or pledging them as a collateral. The entire notion that all of these assets have the stated face value in the market is questionable. That they might have a stated value in an environment of distress sufficient enough to warrant their seizure is plain bonkers.

And so on… The point is that a claim that EUR73 billion represents assets that can be used to fund any shortfall in Irish Government funding or that they provide any yield that is NOT accounted for on the balance sheet already (remember, current debt is driven by deficits and these are driven by operating costs and revenues of the Government, which in turn are accounting for all asset yields that currently accrue from all of the above assets) is a bit of a stretch and double-counting.

In light of this 'net liabilities' discussion, we need to see some serious, detailed, models-based liquidity and legal title risks analysis of the assets that (a) in total amount to EUR73 billion and (b) amount to EUR45 billion that remains unaccountable in the paper in any appreciable details.


But never mind - on the net, the paper is very useful and worth a read. Here are two little gems (I will blog on rest later):




Ouch! You don't need to be a nuclear scientist to spot the problem above…

The true value of the above is that it shows clearly that even on the 'net liabilities' basis, with all the hopium injected into valuations of assets, Ireland is not that much different from Greece... Have a nice day, ya all...

Monday, July 22, 2013

22/7/2013: That Growing Debt Pile...

In the week when Irish debt/GDP pushes above 125% that some of the luminary 'green jerseyists' said it will never do, let's say loudly to ourselves: "Ireland is not Greece..."


A gentle reminder to stay calm and not to worry, because, as we now know, debt does not matter at all... what matters is pants,.. bright pink pants...

Chart source: http://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2013e1.pdf

Thursday, July 18, 2013

18/7/2013: Ireland's Government Deficit & Debt Up in Q1 2013


Good news: CSO is doing its job well covering Irish Government Financial stats. Bad news: the stats aren't exactly encouraging:

I will be blogging on this later tonight, so stay tuned. But for now, the table above should do: year on year:

  • Deficit is up (from EUR5.029bn to EUR5.387bn)
  • General Government Debt (GGD) is up (from EUR174.15bn to EUR204.05bn)
  • GGD is now in excess of 125% of GDP (few years back when I predicted it will be above that marker, there was a sound of hissing and sniggering coming from the 'outraged economists' corner of Irish academia)
  • General Government Net 'Worth' is down to EUR81.13 bn. 
Small corrective bit: based on Q1 2013 GDP/GNP gap the above level of debt is at 149% of GNP.

Most of the deficit increase is accounted for by payments under the Eligible Liabilities Guarantee Scheme arising from liquidation of IBRC, and due to higher interest spending. In fact, interest spending rose by EUR543 million year-on-year, while deficit rose EUR358 million over the same period of time.

Tuesday, April 23, 2013

23/4/2014: Irish Government Net Debt

Not that I am looking for it, but the data just jumps out to shout "All this malarky about Ireland's Government debt sustainability being ahead of all in the 'periphery' is just bollocks". And indeed it is.

Recall that the last bastion of 'our debt is just fine' brigade used to be the rarely cited metric of Net Debt (debt less cash reserves and disposable assets available to the State). Recall that our 'assets' - largely a pile of shares in AIB and Ptsb et al - is officially valued at long-term economic value (not current value, which would be way, way lower than LTEV). And now, behold Ireland's relative position in terms of net debt to GDP ratio, courtesy of the IMF WEO projections for 2013 published this month:


So: third worst in the euro area and worse than that for Italy. And, incidentally, it is expected to be third worst in 2014 as well.

Good thing Benda & Loonan are not running around saying 'Ireland is not Italy', yet...

Wednesday, December 5, 2012

5/12/2012: Pre-Budget 2013 tunes


Ireland's pre-Budget 2013 arithmetic:

  • Budget 2013 Cuts & Tax hikes = €3.5 billion
  • IL&P (bust state-owned 'bank') bonds repayments January 2013 = €2.45 billion
  • Promo Note (IBRC - toxic loans dump) repayment March 2013 = €3.1 billion
  • Interest on Government debt: 2011 = €3.9 billion, 2012 = €5.7 billion, 2013 = €8.1 billion, 2012-2013 increase of €2.4 billion
  • Adding things up: -€3.5 billion adjustment + €5.55 billion 'banks' wastage + €2.4 billion increase in Ireland financing for "our partners' help" = net €4.45 billion will be sucked out of this economy by pure policy psychosis.
  • 69% of the entire annual adjustment on fiscal side, even assuming it will be delivered in the end, will go to fund increases in Government debt servicing in 2013 compared to 2012. These funds will be largely remitted to Ireland's new 'best friends' - the Troika and Franklin Templeton funds.
Now, good luck listening to today's Budget 2013 announcements by our Minister for 'Friends' Finance.

Wednesday, October 10, 2012

10/10/2012: Irish Real Economic Debt - Busting Records


Last night I came across the latest data from the IMF on the overall levels of indebtedness and leverage across a number of countries. Here's the original data:


Much can be taken out of the above. For the purpose of discussion below, I define real economic debt as a sum of household, non-financial corporate and government debts, excluding financial firms' debts. This real economic debt is liability of the Irish economy: households, private enterprises and public sector providers of goods and services.

First up, total debt levels:

Ireland's total real economic debt runs at a staggering 524% of our GDP and 650% of our GNP. In fact, I use 24% GDP/GNP gap as a basis for adjustment which is significantly less than the current gap, but is consistent with 2011-2012 (to-date) average. Put into perspective:

  • Our economy's overall indebtedness is 1.73 time higher than the euro area levels in GDP terms and if GNP is used as a basis it is 2.14 times higher
  • Our real economic debt is 14.4% ahead of that of Japan (second most indebted country on the list) if GDP is used and is 41.9% ahead of Japanese debt if GNP is used.

Our real economic debt can be decomposed into the following three components contributions:


In other words, the above chart clearly shows that Ireland's core debt overhang arises not from the Government finances, but from accumulation of liabilities on the side of the companies. More than that:

  • Ireland's Government debt levels are 25.5% ahead of the euro area
  • Ireland's Household debt levels are 64.8% above the euro area
  • Ireland's corporate debt levels are at 209% of the euro area levels.
Thus, with the Government policy firmly focused on taxing households to save own balancesheet, we have a perverse situation that the economy is dealing with debt overhang in Government debt that is more benign than the debt overhangs in the sectors the Government is obliterating. Households faced with increased taxation to pay for Government debts and deficits implies lower spending on goods and services and lower ability to repay household debt. Thus higher taxes on households (direct and indirect, including aggressive extraction of income via semi-states' charges) imply growing burden of the debt overhang in the private sectors (firms and households).


Adding financial debts to the overall real economic debt in the economy forces Ireland into a truly unprecedented position vis-a-vis other countries in the sample. (Note - adjustment for IFSC is mine).


Using the bounds for debt of 90% (consistent with upper range for Checchetti, Mohanty and Zampolli (2011) and Reinhart, Reinhart & Rogoff (2012)), the levels of cumulated real economy debts that are consistent with reducing future long-term potential growth in the economy are taken to be 270% of GDP. Hence:


and


In the above, the larger the size of the bubble, the greater is the drag on future economic growth from debt. The further to the right on the chart the bubble is located, the greater is the problem associated with Government debt (as opposed to other forms of debt). What the above shows is that Ireland's debt crisis is truly unique in size, but it also shows that the most acute crisis is not in the Government debt, but in private sectors debt.

Now, at 4.5% per annum cost of funding overall debt, irish economy interest rate bill on the above levels of real economic indebtedness runs at ca 29.2% of our GNP. Do the comparative here - interest rate bill equivalent to the total annual output of the Irish Industry (that's right - all of our Industrial output in 2011 amounted to less than 29.3% of our GNP. This is deemed to be 'long-term sustainable'... right...


Note: In my presentation at a private dinner event yesterday I referenced by earlier estimate of the total economic debt in Ireland at 420% of GDP. My 2011 estimate was ca 400% GDP. These figures have been published by me in the Sunday Times and also correspond closely to the 2010 figures cited by Minister Noonan in the Dail and made public here on this blog. They also were confirmed by Peter Mathews TD. My estimates were based on publicly available data which is less complete than data available to the IMF.

Tuesday, July 17, 2012

17/7/2012: Fiscal Monitor Update - another chart


Here’s an interesting chart from the Fiscal Monitor update released by the IMF yesterday that is worth some attention on its own (see more analysis here).


Basically, this shows that in 2008-2010 period, Irish bonds valuations were not as much divorced from the immediate fiscal sustainability fundamentals as our politicos claimed. If anything, they were virtually in line with the fundamentals, pricing almost no longer-term structural underperformance of the economy.

This is not to say that we lack in the room for structural reforms, or that we were well on the way to delivering such reforms. Markets perception of Ireland even during the deeply crisis-ridden days of 2008-2010 seemed to have been much better than that of Portugal, Italy and Spain. Whether that was justifiable or not – is an entirely different question. But what is clear is that compared to other peripherals, our Government had no one else but itself to blame for our bonds spreads.


Monday, July 16, 2012

16/7/2012: IMF Fiscal Monitor Update - Ireland

IMF just published its Fiscal Monitor Update for July 2012 with some interesting data. I will focus here on forecast changes and updates to Advanced Economies, including Ireland.

 Chart above shows changes in the cyclically adjusted fiscal balances (structural deficits) which clearly highlight Ireland as a relative laggard in the fiscal adjustment process. Despite this, IMF concludes in the case of Ireland that:

Not exactly time to grab champagne yet... In its Table 1 IMF supplies Fiscal Indicators for the countries for 2008-2013 period, inclusive of revisions from April 2012 report to July 2012 report. And I plotted these in the charts below:

First chart covers Overall Fiscal Deficits for 2011, 2012 and 2013 per latest (July 2012 forecasts):


Clearly, Ireland had the worst fiscal deficit in 2011 of all EA17 states covered by the IMF update.  But we are also expected to post the worst deficit in 2012 and 2013.

Adding insult to injury, chart below shows that IMF downgraded our deficit cutting prospect for 2013 by 0.2 ppt, which is the worst case (on par with Spain) of a downgrade for an EA17 state covered. Note: we did get an upgrade from April to July forecasts for 2012 results.


Let's take a look at Cyclically-Adjusted Deficits measured as % of potential GDP (aka structural deficits):


Again, per chart above, Ireland had the worst EA (covered states) cyclically-adjusted deficit in 2011, followed by the expected worst deficits in 2012 and 2013. We posted the second worst downgrade for 2013 forecast (Spain was first). As before, we got an upgrade on cyclically-adjusted deficit forecast for 2012 - which is good news.


Now, what about that fabled Irish leadership in austerity? Chart below shows the depth of structural deficits reductions from 2009 through 2012 (forecast consistent with July update):


It turns out, per chart above, that our championship in austerity is really behind that of Greece (-14%),  Portugal (-6.7%) and Spain (-4.7%).

And the really worrisome update is reserved for Government debt levels. Back two years ago I predicted that Irish debt/GDP ratio will top over 120% marker. Back then, I was criticized for this because an army of our 'green jersey' economists and commentators decided that 120% is a magic number we will never reach. The reason for their ardent defense of this imaginary line in the sand is that they bought into the ECB and EU line that 120% is 'sustainability bound' for public debt. Of course, I never aligned with the idea that 120% debt/GDP ratio is a magic 'sustainability bound'. But, now, take a look at chart below:


Per IMF latest forecast, Ireland's 2012 Government debt will reach 117.6% of GDP (up on 113.2% forecast for 2012 back in April) and in 2013 it will peak at 121.1% of GDP (up on 117.7% forecast for 2013 back in April).


Note that for all our efforts, our Government debt/GDP ratio will be relatively close in 2013 to that of Italy (126.4% of GDP) and above Portugal (118.6% of GDP).

Pretty ugly.

Sunday, April 1, 2012

1/4/2012: Flightless dodo - the Hunt of Chief Noonan

I am not usually prone on updating my past posts, but the Promissory Notes 'deal' announced last week by Minister Noonan just keeps on giving more and more backlash and analysis. So:

  • My original post here.
  • Note the updates in the above
  • FT Alphaville view here which is broadly in agreement with my view and with links I posted in the original post updates.
  • Interesting information coming out of ECB on Minister Noonan's claims that the 'deal' is a part of some 'broader plan' - via the Irish Times, here.
Reiterating my view:
  • Promo Notes have been paid, not deferred
  • Payment of Promo Notes was originally to be based on Government borrowing cash from the Troika. Under the 'deal' it has been replaced by the Government borrowing cash from BofI
  • Payment of Notes under the 'deal' cost us more in new debt and increased deficit in 2012, but will decrease interest payment in 2013 compared to original arrangement. Net effect on interest cost - nearly a wash.
  • The 'deal' is NOT (see ECB official statement) a part of any 'broader deal'.
  • The ECB are now clearly on a defensive - which means they will be unlikely to support any further 'deals'.
Having gone out with a brave claim to spot a bald eagle soaring in the sky and get a feather for his war bonnet, Chief Noonan came back with a smudgy mud-print of a dodo, a bill for €400mln+, and a promise to go hunting again. Next stop, trading gold for glass beads... oh, they sparkle so nice.

(Obviously - an allegorical analogy. For those rare readers lacking in humor department.)

On a serious note - I find it discomforting and sad that an excellent seasoned politician and a very promising Minister for Finance has been forced into this position of defending the failure. Let's hope his luck (and progress) change in the nearest future.

Thursday, March 29, 2012

29/3/2012: Promissory Note 'deal' 2012


Trying to sort out the convoluted 'deal' announced by the Minister today and juggle two kids, plus struggle against the computer on a strike from too many files open is a challenge. I might be missing something, but here's my understanding of the thing.

  1. €3.06bn will be delivered not i cash, but in a long-term Government bond of the equivalent fair value
  2. We do not know maturity, but 2025 was mentioned before. Ditto for coupon rate, though Prof Honohan mentioned 5.4% coupon.
  3. Current pricing in around 88% of the FV, so €3.06*0.88=€3.47bn issuance to deliver fair value. If average  over longer term horizon is taken - that would go up. If yield is higher - that will go up. It is unclear what fees will be involved as the transaction is complicated (see following).
  4. As is - at current market pricing, there will be an increase in Government debt of roughly €410 million, plus the cost of transactions.
  5. As described above, and as indicated by Minister Noonan, Government deficit will increase by €90mln (approximately: 5.40%*410mln=€22mln plus margin on Government bond yield over interest rate holiday under Promo Notes in 2012).
  6. IBRC will receive the bonds and will repo them to Bank of Ireland on a 1 year deal. In other words, Bank of Ireland will buy the bond from IBRC then put it into ECB repo operations. LTRO being now closed, this will have to be normal repo with ECB. Bank of Ireland will repo IBRC-owned Government bond at ECB Repo rate (1%) + 1.35% margin. In effect, margin is the gross profit to the Bank of Ireland on this transaction.
  7. Before Bank of Ireland formally approves the transaction, bond will be financed by NAMA against IBRC collateral (now, imagine that - NAMA holds IBRC's assets and has a working relationship with IBRC. IBRC has no collateral that is equivalent to Government bonds - hence it cannot repo anything at ECB. So by definition, the collateralized pool backing NAMA-IBRC repo will have to be stretched). A year later, BofI might reconsider and roll the deal, but one has to assume that the margin will remain either fixed or go up, plus whatever the repo rate will be then?
  8. NAMA, as far as I understand, has no mandate to carry any of these operations, thus potentially acting outside its legal mandate.
  9. Minister for Finance will guarantee the entire set of transactions, including Bank of Ireland exposure. In effect, Minister will guarantee Government bonds (which is silly), collateral from IBRC, NAMA exposure, Bank of Ireland exposure and so on.
  10. NAMA will use own cash to finance the bridging transaction.
  11. Having received the funds from the repo, IBRC will remit these to (€3.06bn) to the CBofI to cancel corresponding amount in ELA.
  12. Has Net Present Value of the debt been altered? We do not know. We need to have exact data on bond maturity and the coupon rate, plus on overall profile of the rest of the notes to make any judgement here. Any change in the NPV under the above outline (1-5) is immaterial. 
  13. The positive factor of so-called 'more flexible fiscal buffer' is a red herring, in my view. The idea is that we are 'saving' cash allocation of €3.06bn this year, making it 'available' for borrowing in 2013. This is rather stretching the reality - the 'cushion' has been pre-provided to us by the Troika deal and is specific to the Promissory Notes. There is no indication that it can be used for any other purposes. Even if it were to be used for any other purpose, it would be an addition to the bond issued, so our debt will increase by the amount we use from the 'cushion'. Furthermore, the deal runs out in 2013 and thereafter no 'cushion' is available. So on the net, we have just paid 400mln increase in debt, plus 90mln in deficit to buy ourselves an 'insurance' policy that should we need 3bn in 2013, we will be able to ask for it from the kindness of the EU and have it for no longer than a year. That's pretty damn expensive insurance policy.
  14. The negative factor is that we now have almost 3.5bn worth of extra debt that is senior to the promissory notes it replaced and once it is repoed at the ECB it will be senior to ELA exposure. 
  15. Furthermore, this debt is in the form of Government bonds. So suppose we want to return to the debt markets in 2014. We have higher stock / supply of Government bonds (albeit 3.47bn isn't much - just a few percentage points increase) that markets will price in. Higher supply, ceteris paribus, means lower price, higher yield on bonds we are to issue in 2014. 
  16. Minister Noonan and a number of other Government parties' members have mentioned 'jobs creation' capacity expansion as the result of this deal. The only way, in theory, this deal can lead any jobs creation is if the Government were to use €3.1bn allocation available for Promo Notes under the Troika deal for some sort of public spending programme. Which, of course, means our debt will increase by the very same amount used.
Brian Hayes on Today FM described the 'deal' (H/T to Prof Karl Whelan) as 'A creative piece of financial engineering.' Presume safely that Brian Hayes has a firm idea that this description is a 'net positive' for the Government.

Following the announcement by the Minister, there were no questions allowed by Dail members and the Minister moved on to the really important stuff - straight to press briefing in the Department of Finance. He might have opted for the right move, however, since the Dail, without any interrruption vigorously engaged in a debate on this important topic:



On that note, the last word (for now) goes to Prof Whelan: "Ok, after exchanges with very wise @OwenCallan I have decided that this deal defers the 3.1bn payment by only one year. Worse than hoped for" (quoting a tweet).

Welcome to the wonderland of wonderlenders.


Updates:

Adding to the above, it is worth postulating directly - as I have argued consistently, ELA is the only debt we can - at least in theory - restructure and promo notes are a perfect candidate for such a restructuring. By converting a part of these into Government debt we are now de fact increasing probability of a sovereign default or restructuring.

Karl Whelan has an excellent post on the 'deal' - here.

ECB statement on Ireland's 'deal' is here. This clearly states that there is no deferral of any payment on Promo Notes and that the Noonan's 'deal' is a one-off. Thank gods it is - because at a cost of €400mln in added debt, plus €90mln in deficit, repeating this exercise in PR spin would be pretty expensive.


Update 30/03/2012:


Today Irish Times is reporting that:

"Minister for Finance Michael Noonan said the big benefit was the money would not have to be borrowed to pay this year’s instalment on the promissory notes, the State IOUs paying for the bailouts."

A truly extraordinary statement, given the state will borrow the money (some €410mln more in principal and €90 mln more in interest than actually it had to borrow) using a Government bond to pay said IOU!

The Irish Times headline reads: "Government wins backing on €3.06bn payment". Yet there is no any 'backing' from anyone on this deal, because the deal does not change the payment itself. Read the above-linked ECB statement on the 'deal'.

In another extraordinary statement, the Irish Times (this is their own claim) says: "Further talks on a long-term deal on the remaining repayments as part of a wider restructuring of the banks will continue between the Government and the troika of the EU Commission, the ECB and the International Monetary Fund." Is there ANY evidence that any such negotiations are ongoing? Where is this evidence? Please, produce!


And an excellent piece from Namawinelake on the above: here.

Friday, January 20, 2012

20/1/2012: Non-News from a Road to the Second Bailout

This story in the Irish Times yesterday clearly requires a comment. So here it goes.

Here's the best time-line and explanation as to Minister Noonan's 'efforts' to secure 'savings' on the Promissory Notes.

Now, consider the following from the Irish Times today:

"We think there’s a less expensive way of doing [restructuring of the Promissory Notes] by financial engineering, and we’re not talking about private-sector involvement or restructuring,” said Mr Noonan in Berlin "...it is about pointing out to the troika that there are difficulties and that it could be less expensive – and everyone still gets their money.”


"A senior German official said Berlin could envisage extra programme funding being used for the Irish banking sector not currently earmarked for this purpose."

The above might mean many things:

  1. Ireland still has some funds due under the original 'bailout' that were earmarked for banking measures, but were not yet used in the last recapitalizations round in July 2011. This will not in itself constitute any new measures materially impacting Ireland's Government debt projections. It will not constitute a second bailout (as the funds are already earmarked under the first bailout), but by reducing funding available for fiscal and other banking requirements it will increase the probability of such a bailout in the future.
  2. Ireland can be allowed to borrow more from the EFSF/ESM, swapping the Notes for marginally cheaper funding. This too will not constitute any material impact on Ireland's Government debt projections. But it will constitue a second bailout.

Neither option involves any possibility for 'private sector involvement' and at any rate, Minister Noonan's reference to PSI is a red herring - there can be no PSI in relation to the Promissory Notes as these do not involve private investors or lenders at all.

However, both (1) and (2) have material impact in terms of Ireland requiring a second bailout - both increase materially the probability of such an eventuality.

Lastly, there is a catch. The problem of capital adequacy, highlighted by Minister Noonan, means that 'financial engineering' can only involve temporary relief in terms of payments timing, not material relief in terms of NPV of the debt assumed by the state under the Promissory Notes. We will be allowed to borrow more time. At a cost of longer loans, and more repayments in the end. Which, of course, does nothing to achieve sustainability of the 'solution' from the point of view of us, taxpayers, who Minister Noonan expects to pay for all of this. But it probably does give him a chance of holding a 'triumphant' pressie announcing some sort of a 'deal'.

So in the nutshell, the Irish Times story is... errr... a non-story. A sort of traditional Spin that comes out of the Government every time they are caught... errr... fantacising the reality. As NamaWineLake put is so excellently:
"...it has been four months since Minister Noonan’s meeting with the ECB and others in Wroclaw where he, to use his own words “had a ball to kick around” and has proposals. It is two months since Enda Kenny discussed the matter with Angela Merkel. It is more than two months since Minister Noonan said that “technical discussions” were ongoing. And yet the Troika yesterday downplayed any progress in the matter saying that Minister Noonan had merely “requested discussions”."


Or maybe, just speculating here, Minister Noonan is bringing up the Promissory Notes once again this week because next week we are about to repay another tranche of Anglo bonds? Last month, around the time of the repayment, there was much-a-do-about-nothing going on in referencing the very same Promissory Notes?

However, there is, in the end, something openly honest about Minister Noonan's windy trip down the 'Imagine the Superhero, ya Villain' lane.

"[Minister Noonan] said he hoped that the ECB would extend its programme of low-interest loans beyond next month to improve euro zone bank liquidity in the hope it would stimulate the market in longer-term sovereign debt papers."

Point 1: LTRO-2 was already announced, so Minister Noonan is either uninformed, or pretends to be uninformed to posit himself as a a heroic 'rescuer' proposing a real 'solution'.

Point 2: Minister Noonan clearly shows that his sole concern is how to raise more debt for Ireland. Not how to balance the books (in which case he shouldn't need banks to pawn their assets as ECB to buy Government bonds with this fake cash), or reform the economy (in which case growth would resume and the State shall not require the said scheme, again) and not with restoring functional banking system to health (since functional healthy banking system lends to the real economy, not to Minister Noonan).

At last, truth revealed?

20/1/2012: Deputy Peter Mathews v Minister Noonan

Here are some extracts from an excellent contribution by Peter Mathews TD (FG) from yesterday's topical debates in the Dail (full record available here). This was comprehensively overlooked in the media reporting which focused solely on the non-event (save for Vincent Browne's questions) of the Torika 'approving' Ireland's 'progress'. My comments in italics.


Deputy Peter Mathews: 
      Next Wednesday, 25 January, is the due date for the redemption of a bond issued originally by Anglo Irish Bank Corporation, now the Irish Bank Resolution Corporation. 
      We are at an important financial crossroads in the history of our country. Anglo Irish Bank has been insolvent and supported by financial engineering, promissory notes and the emergency liquidity assistance of the European Central Bank and funds from our Central Bank.  The debt that lies embedded in what was Anglo Irish Bank was not created by the citizens of this country.  It has been meted out onto their backs by a mixture of incompetence and mismeasurement over a certain period under the past Administration.
      We are at a moral crossroads.  We should bring to the attention of the creditors holding the bond the facts that the bank is insolvent and that, in effect, it is not a case of our not wanting to pay but of our not being able to do so...
      Consider the debt of €1.25 billion.  The attention of the creditors will be in sharp focus because the banking system, the Irish-owned banks, are in debt to the ECB and our Central Bank at a level of approximately €150 billion.  It is the forbearance and tolerance of citizens that keeps the financial edifice and engineering of the eurozone and the greater financial system of the developed world in place.  We have been doing considerable work, facing enormous challenges.  Through the great work of the Minister for Finance, Deputy Noonan, and the Taoiseach, we are bearing the load of trying to bring about a fiscal adjustment in line with the troika agreement signed in November 2010.  All that work is important and must be done but the legacy debt is outside the responsibility of the people of this State.
      One and a quarter billion euro is almost half the budget [measures] introduced in December.  It is eight times the sum that will be raised from the household charge and twice that which will be raised by the VAT increase.  The debt crisis in Ireland and other countries cannot be solved by adding more debt...  Loading more debt on this country to pay legacy debt is like suggesting a drink problem can be solved by another whisky.

Minister for Finance (Deputy Michael Noonan): 
      I thank Deputy Mathews for raising this very important issue.  The repayment of the bond in question is an obligation of the bank and will be repaid by the bank.  It is important to be clear that it is the bank and not the Exchequer which will meet this obligation. [Need anyone point the following to the Minister, that the 'bank' has no own assets or capital over and above that which has been committed to it by the State and that the Promissory Notes are being financed by the Exchequer?]
      The Government has committed to ensuring that there is no forced or coerced involvement by the private sector burden sharing on Irish senior bank paper or Irish sovereign debt without the agreement of the ECB.  This commitment has been agreed with our external partners and is the basis on which Ireland's future financing strategy is built.  While the cost to the Irish taxpayer has been and will remain significant, the Government clearly recognises the need to work as part of the eurozone in order to ensure a return to the funding markets in the future.  The only EU state where private sector involvement will apply is Greece.
      The following was agreed by all 27 member states at the euro summit last October:
      15. As far as our general approach to private sector involvement in the euro area is concerned, we reiterate our decision taken on 21 July 2011 that Greece requires an exceptional and unique solution.
      16. All other euro area Member States solemnly reaffirm their inflexible determination to honor fully their own individual sovereign signature and all their commitments to sustainable fiscal conditions and structural reforms.  The euro area Heads of State or Government fully support this determination as the credibility of all their sovereign signatures is a decisive element for ensuring financial stability in the euro area as a whole.
      This was agreed by the Heads of State and Government at their meeting in October, and Ireland was included in the 27 states that agreed to it. [Minister Noonan fails to note here that it was on insistence of his own Taoiseach that article 15 does not include Irish banking sector resolution-related debts. And he deflects the arguments made by Deputy Mathews on feasibility of repaying these debts.]
      It is not correct to state that only taxpayers have borne the burden of rescuing the Irish banks.  Holders of equity in the banks have been effectively wiped out in burden sharing while holders of subordinated debt have incurred a €15.5 billion share of the burden to date, including €5.6 billion since this Government took office less than a year ago. [Again, Minister Noonan is dis-ingenious in his comments. Equity holders and bond holders are contractually in line for these losses. Taxpayers are not. In effect, Minister suggests that there is some sort of equivalence between treating harshly contracted parties to an undertaking and treating harshly an innocent by-stander. There is no such equivalence.]
      To impose burden sharing on senior bondholders, or to postpone the repayment of this bond at this point in time, is not in Ireland's best interest.  What is in the Irish people's best interest is that we regain our financial independence and that we place ourselves in a position to re-enter the financial markets at the earliest possible date...  We do not need to scupper our recovery, scupper the goodwill generated or alienate our partners by taking unilateral action which in the medium to long term will prove wholly counterproductive. [This is an outright conjecture by the Minister that is unfounded in fact. It is not in the interest of the Irish people to simply regain access to financial markets. It is only of such interest if we can regain it at a lower cost than alternative funding provided. Furthermore, his statement assumes that not repaying Anglo bondholders will cause the detrimental impact on 'goodwill' and the 'financial markets'. This remains to be tested and proven.]
      If we were to postpone or suspend payments to creditors of IBRC, this would have a significant impact on both the bank and, ultimately, the State. The senior debt, unsecured as it is, is an obligation of the bank. If the bank does not meet such an obligation, it would lead to a default and, following that, most likely insolvency. Insolvency would result in a very significant increase in the cost to the State to resolve the IBRC. [What cost? The Minister scaremongers the public, but cannot name a single tangible expected cost. Why is the interest of the bank aligned with the interest of the State, Minister?] ... Further, the financial market's view of Ireland as a place to do business or invest would be seriously undermined. [Is Minister Noonan seriously suggesting that Ireland's reputation as a place to do business or invest dependent so critically on a bust bank with worst history of speculative decision-making ability to repay its insolvent borrowings? Would IDA confirm they are directly referencing Irish taxpayers willingness to cover private sector losses in any undertaking, no matter how risky, as some sort of the 'investment promotion' positive for Ireland? Can Minister Noonan confirm that he has done the analysis of the effects that bonds repayments by Anglo, and the resultant increases in the sovereign debt have on sustainability of our Government's reputation in the bond markets? Does he not know/ understand that any investor looking at his statements will immediately price into their valuation of Government bonds the possibility that the Irish Government can at will, out of the blue simply hike its own debt pile in the future to suit some other risky private sector fiasco? What does that risk alone do to our 'reputation'?]

Deputy Peter Mathews: 
      While I will not get into a long debate, Greece will be the beneficiary of at least a 60% write-down of its debt obligations. The Greeks got the attention of their creditors by going out in the streets and having riots and by people being killed. We have knuckled down to correcting a fiscal imbalance and, at the same time, we have stayed silent. We have been straitjacketed by the legacy debt. Our loan losses in the banking system were €100 billion. While I know the shareholders and some of the subordinated bondholders suffered, the remaining losses were in the banks without being declared. The ECB stepped in to redeem bondholders to date, which was a mistake. We are compounding the mistake by going along the same route now.
      We have got to be honest about it and open up the discussion. We are not defaulting; we are opening a discussion. I made the point that we cannot pay. I use the word "we" euphemistically or collectively in regard to the bank and the State. We cannot pay because of the guarantee that extends over the bank. It is a case of us lifting the telephone and asking, "Can we have your attention, please?"  We cannot pay and we want to open a discussion and explain to exactly how the creditor liabilities of our banking system remain, and how they should be written down. There is further writing down to do. We have a €60 billion to €75 billion of write-down to organise and negotiate.
      To use an analogy, we have a steeplechase race with about four miles to go.  We have big jumps ahead.  Normally, a steeplechase horse will start with about 12 stone on its back.  Ireland's legacy debt of private debt, non-financial corporate debt and national debt when it peaks out at €120 billion is the equivalent of 24 stone on the back.  It is not a possible race to run.

Deputy Michael Noonan: 
      I do not disagree with Deputy Mathews' analysis.  However, we are in a situation which we inherited from our predecessors, who entered into solemn and legally enforceable commitments in respect of Anglo Irish Bank, as it was then.  Of course, Deputy Mathews is correct that we should do everything possible to reduce the debt burden on the taxpayers of Ireland and to enhance Ireland's capacity to repay its debts.  We are working on that and making some progress. [So that's it, folks. The Last Refuge of the Scoundrel = the arguments the Minister puts forward for expropriating personal property and income through higher taxation and reduced services for which we paid and continue to pay is: We are where we are. This alone should be very re-assuring to the future investors here.]