Showing posts with label Irish Government. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Irish Government. Show all posts

Friday, July 21, 2017

21/7/17: What Irish Civil Service is Good For?..


Recently released data on 2011-2016 Irish Government financial metrics shows that despite all the reports concerning the adverse impact of austerity on Irish Government employees, there is hardly any evidence of such an effect at the pay level data.

Specifically, in 2011, total compensation bill for the Irish Government employees stood at EUR 19.389 billion. This 5.39% between 2011 and the lowest point in the cycle (2014 at EUR18.344 billion), before rising once again by 2016 to EUR 19.354 billion. Total savings achieved during 2012-2016 period compared to 2011 levels of expenditure amounted to EUR2.759 billion on the aggregate, or 2.85% (annualized rate of savings averaged less than 0.57% per annum.


Statistically, there simply is no evidence of any material savings delivered by the 'austerity' measures relating to Government compensation bills.

But, statistically, there is a clear evidence of Irish public sector employment poor performance. Oxford University's 2017 International Civil Service Effectiveness Index, http://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/international-civil-service-effectiveness-index, ranked Ireland's Civil Service effectiveness below average when compared across 31 countries covered in the report.

Spider chart below shows clearly two 'outlier' areas of competencies and KPIs in which Irish Civil Service excels: Tax Administration and Human Resource Management. Rest of the metrics: mediocre, to poor, to outright awful.

In fact, Ireland ranks 20th in terms of overall Civil Service Effectiveness assessment, just below Mexico and a notch above Poland. Within index components, Ireland ranked:

  • 16th out of 31 countries in terms of Civil Service Integrity and Policy Making
  • 26th in terms of Openness (bottom 10)
  • 20th in terms of Capabilities, and Fiscal and Financial Management
  • 13th in terms of Inclusiveness
  • 22nd in terms of Attributes (bottom 10)
  • 28th in terms of Regulation (bottom 5)
  • 8th in terms of Crisis Risk Management
  • 1st in terms of Human Resource Management (aka, working conditions and practices)
  • 4th in terms of Tax Administration
  • 31st in terms of Social Security Administration (dead last)
  • 21st in Digital Services and in terms of Functions (bottom 10)
So while managing to score at the top of the league of countries surveyed in terms of pay, perks, hiring and promotion, Irish Civil Service ranked within bottom 10 countries in terms of areas of key performance indicators, relevant to actual service delivery, with exception of one: Tax Collection. May be we shall call it Pay, perks & Tax Collection Service?

But, hey, know the meme: it's all because of severe austerity-driven underfunding... right?.. 



Update:

In response to my post, the Press Office at Dept. of Public Expenditure and Reform posted the following, quite insightful comments on the LinkedIn, that I am reproducing verbatim here:

Secretary General Robert Watt: I was interested in reading this comment – and in particular the data on civil service performance.  There are methodological issues with the Study quoted.  Nevertheless readers might be interested in other data about the effectiveness of the Irish civil and public service which might give a more balanced assessment of performance. Important to consider the evidence before we reach conclusions.  Also, important to note difference between Civil Service (36,000 staff) and wider public service (320,000 staff)

Public Service performance

Over a range of international rankings, the IPA’s annual public service trends publication shows the Irish public service performing above average on many indicators.

The IPA’s Public Sector Trends, 2016

  • Ireland is ranked 1st in the EU as the most professional and least politicised public administration in the Europe;
  • Ireland is ranked 5th for quality of public administration in the EU;
  • Ireland is ranked 6th in the EU for maintenance of traditional public service values (integrity); 
  • Ireland is ranked 4th in the EU for perception of the effectiveness of government decisions;
  • Ireland is ranked 2nd in the EU for encouraging competition and a supportive regulatory environment;
  • Ireland is ranked 4th in the EU for regulatory quality;
  • Ireland is ranked 3rd in the EU in comparison of how bureaucracy can hinder business;
  • Business update of eGovernment services is higher than most of Europe with Ireland ranked 1st for highest update of electronic procurement in Europe;
  • According to the World Bank, Ireland is ranked well above average for Government Effectiveness (although individual rankings are not available);
  • Ireland is ranked 5th in Europe in the competitive advantage provided by the education system; 
  • Ireland ranks 10th for life expectancy at birth and 8th for consumer health outcomes, but slightly below average for the cost-effectiveness of health spending;

The OECD’s Government at a Glance, published in July 2017 shows Ireland ranking strongly across a range of metrics although healthcare is a notable exception:

  • Ireland is ranked 2nd in terms of citizen satisfaction with the education system and schools;
  • Ireland is ranked 6th for citizen satisfaction with the judicial system and the courts and is also in the top 4 best improved countries in the last decade;
  • Ireland is ranked 26th for citizen satisfaction with the healthcare system (slightly below average).

Recent customer satisfaction surveys of the Irish civil service show it delivering its highest customer satisfaction ratings to date. Satisfaction with both the outcome and the service delivered was rated over 80% which is close to the credible maximum.
General Public Civil Service Satisfaction Survey, conducted Q1 2017:      

  • 83% are satisfied with the service they received (up from 77% in 2015);
  • 82% are satisfied with the outcome of their customer service experience (up from 76% in 2015);
  • 46% would speak highly of the civil service (up from 39% in 2015);
  • 87% of customers claim that service levels received either met or exceeded expectations (up from 83% in 2015).

Business Customers Civil Service Satisfaction Survey, conducted, Q4 2016:

  • 82% are satisfied with the service they received (up from 71% in 2009);
  • 82% are satisfied with the outcome of the service received (up from 70% in 2009);
  • 61% felt that the service provided has improved in the last 5 years.

Lots done but more to do!



My reply to the Department comment:

Thanks for the comments on this, Press Office at Dept. of Public Expenditure and Reform. I got similar methodological comments regarding the robustness of the Oxford study via Facebook as well and, as I noted, in the technical analysis part of the paper, Oxford centre does show improved metrics for Irish civil service performance in the later data, which is heartening. Also, noted the apparent dispersion of scores and ranks across countries, with what we might expect as potentially stronger performers being ranked extremely low. Also, noted the issue of data on Social Welfare for Ireland being skewed out of OECD range and impacted by 2011 legacy issues (although it is unclear to me how spending via health budget on social welfare is treated in the OECD and Oxford data). I will post your comments on the blog to make sure these are not lost to the readers.


I agree: lots done and certainly more to do, still. 

Tuesday, March 1, 2016

29/2/16: GE 2016 - Ireland's Answers to No Questions Asked


The election 2016 is a catalyst-free contest that has been shaped by the political parties attempts to understand the mind of the electorate, while the electorate has been struggling to make up its mind about what the pivotal issues of the election should be. Compounded by the  epic gaffes of the reality-skipping life-time politicos (take that Enda Kenny pill, ye old comedian) and we had an election devoid of real ideas and ideals as far as the mainstream parties go.

Harder Left and genuine Centre-Left (e.g. Social Democrats and majority of the independents) have attempted to focus the elections on the issues relating to the lagging nature of economic recovery in the domestic sectors - an issue that, traditionally, has been the core breadwinner for the Labour. However, having completely abandoned any pretence at ideals-based, principles-rich politics, the Labour has thrown its weight behind the FG-led attempt to steer plebiscite into a debate about a general (and to majority of us abstract) notion of policy continuity and stability of governance as the panacea for the ‘continued recovery’. Topical issues and specific policies aimed at actually producing a real recovery that is not stuck in the canyons of tax arbitrage by the MNCs became the victims of this absurd departure from the world of the living into the world of FG/LP.

Even shielded from competition by being effectively the only Right-of-Centre (in the Politics of Boggerville 101-style of Enda Kenny and Michael Noonan) party, FG has managed to squander the election by such a massive margin, one has to wonder how on earth can the party continue to pretend to represent anyone other than a handful of clientilist farmers, rent-seeking businessmen and a bunch of conservative civil servants. 

Not surprisingly, the key battles of the GE2016 have been waged in the contestable space created by Labour’s departure from its social and electoral core. 

Failure of Labour and FG to consolidate Centre-Left and Centre has meant that the FF was left significant room to recover some of its electoral fortunes. In a typically FF fashion, the ‘new party of the Centre-Left’ has managed to deliver very few tangible new ideas, but provided plenty oppositional rhetoric and old-fashioned pork barrel promises.

All in, Election 2016 was dominated by the lack of big thinking, shortage of specific ideas, and a large doses of surrealism. Neither global, nor European context entered the mainstream debates; economics swung from ‘tax and don’t spend’ to ‘don’t tax and do spend’ heralding the arrival of the Celtic Tiger 3.0. The entire circus of the ‘fiscal space’ debates was yet another opportunity for Enda Kenny to play the role of a cross between the U.S. Republican contestants Ben Carson and Jeb Bush - a dynamic combo of a man who can’t run for the office and a man who doesn’t know he wants to run for the office. Money, advisers, analysts, party machines and even track record - all squandered on disconnecting from the voters.

In contrast, three smaller political groupings / parties: Renua from the Right and Social Democrats from the Centre Left and the Independent Alliance have mangled to produce far reaching, ambitious, even if, at times, poorly structured policies proposals. The Independent Alliance and Soc Dems have fielded some really strong, highly impactful candidates with ideals and occasionally ideas of their own. These three forces, relatively weak and surrounded by a sprinkling of other independents and political groupings brought into Election 2016 something missing in Irish politics - integrity, honesty, openness and debates. No matter how strong their showing in the current Election has been, they provided a crucially important alternative to the stale politics of Irish elites: the Axis of FG, FF and Labour.

The most surprising aspect of the Election 2016 is the complete and total disregard by the core political parties for the voter perception of Irish politics as a palace of parochialism, corruption and cronyism. After 5 years of the current Coalition effectively replaying old FF book on cronyism and favouritism, while droning on about the ‘New Era in Politics’, the litmus test of this electoral cycle should have been a focus on political system renewal and reforms. This simple was a task too difficult for the political system to handle and even contemplate. Which, sadly, means that our Permanent Government - the cabal of unelected advisers and senior civil servants - remain in place, aided and abetted by the school of hungry and agile piranhas from the private sector always ready to issue a research note or two about the need for continuity, the necessity of predictability, the value of stability and the fabled markets’ longing for conformity with the status quo.


All hail Tipperary North constituency for delivering much of it in a concentrated form once again… 

Which brings us around to 'predicting the future'. It will be the same as the past.  

Any coalition involving FG will be a poison chalice to either FF or FG or both precisely because although FF lacks ideas, at least it is based on the ideal of a pub-pump-politics that connects with wider ranging population. FG can't even muster as much. Despite the fact that the latter has a better pool of younger cadre than the former, in my opinion, and has been better in governance too (although here we really are setting the bar low to begin with). FG will continue to play the 'extend and pretend' card in any power deal, hoping the miracle of recovery (sooner or later, it is bound to happen in a meaningful way, or so the theory goes) will sustain them into the next election. Which means their track record will be woeful - no reforms, no change, just throwing pennies and dimes at problems as soon as Michael Noonan can rake them in. 

For FF, such a scenario won't be good enough because the party needs desperately to rebuild and re-energise its base (which it started doing in the GE 2016, but is yet to complete).

Any other coalition (involving Independents) will not be stable, as FG seniors clamour for top brass positions, while the Independents largely want the same. Competition is an unbearable condition for Irish elites that prefer to play a 'spread others' butter on your spuds' game.

Alternatively, the whole circus tent might come down and we might go to the polls once again, comes late 2016 - early 2017, especially if the 'fiscal space' gets shocked a tad.

I'd put 30-35% chance on the GE2016.2.0, an a balance on the FF/FG shotgun marriage, and a 40% change on GE2017. Though, of course, miracles of the parish priest and the publican agreeing with the AIB branch manager down at the pub on where to put that new Centra in town do happen, still... Harmony might be attained.

Tuesday, January 26, 2016

26/1/16: 'More than 1,000 jobs per week' Government Claims v Reality


One senior TD and a Junior Minister with position relating, indirectly, to employment and the labour market has just posted an interesting statement. A part of the statement goes thus: “we used the Action Plans for Jobs process to drive job creation, creating more than a 1000 jobs a week”.

Now, let’s raise two points. One philosophical, another purely arithmetic.

Philosophically, I am not aware of any Government that claims creation of jobs. Technically, public jobs are either created by the Civil Service or another Public body, as opposed to the Government itself. Practically, any jobs creation, in public or private sector is enabled by the economy (people working in, investing in, paying taxes in and interacting with public and private sectors) and not by the Government. Thus, Government may facilitate jobs creation by enacting supportive legislation or providing legislative and/or regulatory strategy, or not impede one, but it cannot create jobs. Minister can act as PR middle(wo)men and announce jobs created, but that is about as close to jobs creation as they ever get.

Aside from this, there is a simple matter of arithmetic.

Recall that the current Government came into power at the end of 1Q 2011. Let us suppose the Government really got down to ‘creating jobs’ by 1Q 2012. Which means the Government has been at its jobs game for roughly 14-15 quarters through 3Q 2015 or, at the lower end 3 years and a half. That means that the Government should have created “over” 182,000 jobs in that period. This benign to the Minister claim, because if we are to look at the record of the entire duration of the Government, his claim would have equated to roughly 221,000 jobs created.

Let us note that 1Q 20912 was the lowest point in employment levels during the crisis, so comparatives to that base should improve Government position: prior to 2Q 2012 jobs were being destroyed in the economy, past the end of 1Q 2012 they were being added.

Keep the two numbers in your mind: we are told that the Government has ‘created’ either more than 182,000 or more than 221,000 jobs over its tenure, depending on where one starts to count.

Now, consult CSO QNHS database - the source of official counts for numbers in employment. Between the end of 1Q 2012 and 3Q 2015 (the latest for which we have data), total employment rose 158,000. But wait, these are not all jobs. 4,500 of that increase is in the category of Assisting Relative. And 121,200 of these additions are employees, including schemes. Beyond this, the above increase also includes 30,100 new (added) self-employed with no employees.

It is hard to assume that the Government can claim it 'created' self-employment jobs where there is not enough activity to hire staff, or that it increased the need to help relatives.

So put things together in a handy table:


Numbers speak for themselves. By the very best metric, Government is more than 1/2 year shy of the lowest end of the claim of 'more than 1,000 jobs created per week'. It is more than 1/2 year shy of the claim that there were '1,000 jobs created per week'.

This Government deserves credit for helping sustain conditions for the recovery. Some of these conditions trace to the policies put in place by its predecessor and continued by the present Government, some are down to Troika and implemented by this Government, some are undoubtedly facilitated by the efforts of the current Government. The economy is recovering and, by some metrics, very robustly. And jobs are being created by the economy (yes, by entrepreneurs, enterprises, their employees and their clients and investors, but not by the Government).

This is not to take away from the positives the Government should rightly claim. But it is to point out that some of the outlandishly bombastic claims are not quite warranted.

Friday, January 1, 2016

1/1/16: Developers Questioning Banking Inquiry Report


While we do not know what is in the Banking Inquiry report signed-off this week, concerns being expressed by the two developers, namely Michael O’Flynn and Johnny Ronan, that the report is likely to be a whitewash of Nama is a legitimate one.

The inquiry basically and obviously failed to provide platform for the voices critical (or robustly critical) of Nama, opting instead to put forward testimonies of some developers who have potential coincident / congruent interest in seeing Nama escaping serious criticism.

Thus, legitimate suspicion can be (though we should wait to confirm or decline it) that the Banking Inquiry report will indeed skip over Nama's core role in creating a dysfunctional (and currently strongly legally challenged) crisis resolution environment in Ireland. And another legitimate suspicion (based on past record of coverage of the Inquiry in the media) is that most of Irish media will be unlikely to robustly challenge the report on any conclusions regarding Nama.

That said, let's wait and see the report...


Tuesday, April 28, 2015

28/4/15: There is a Spring... There was a Statement...


This Spring Statement was a lengthy and over-manned delivery of the vintage "A Lot Done. More to Do." 2002 FF slogan. As such, it is inevitable that the Statement ended up sounding like a self-congratulatory pre-electioneering platform announcement with some promises for the future. And you can read the Department document here: http://budget.gov.ie/Budgets/2015/Documents/SPU%20for%20Web.pdf in its full glory.

'Entrepreneur' or 'Entrepreneurship' are words not mentioned in the document. Self-employed are cited only once, in reference to timing of tax receipts the Government expects from them. Part-time workers - the crucial category that can drive up ranks of early stage entrepreneurs and can be a source for huge gains in productivity if their skills are increased forward - deserves only two mentions, both relating to the unemployment reductions trends to-date. Quality of jobs creation is un-addressed. And so on...

In his speech, Mr Noonan said the government is in a position to implement another expansionary Budget this year and every year out to 2020 “if this is deemed prudent and appropriate.” The "if" part - crucial as it may be - is hardly enforceable, once the train of spending rolls out into the station.

The Government deserves credit. The national deficit was reduced from €15 billion to €4.5 billion over 2011-2015. This was achieved with less tax increases and expenditure cuts than forecast at the onset of 2011. Minister Noonan is correct. But much of this was down to good fortunes from abroad. And still is. And, based on the Department of Finance projections still will be, if one to trust their outlook for the exchange rates, exports growth and jobs growth.

Per Minister Noonan, the state has, this year “fiscal space of the order of € 1.2 billion and up to € 1.5 billion… for tax reductions and investment in public services." So, “the partners in Government have agreed that [this] will be split 50:50 between tax cuts and expenditure increases …in Budget 2016.”

Does that make much sense? Well, no. 2014-2015 cumulated decrease in deficit can be broken down into:
- 50% from increased tax revenues,
- 14% to GDP growth,
- 9% to reduction in net Government expenditure and
- 27% other factors.
Jobs creation and wealth creation both require reducing burden of State and taxation on self-employed and early stage entrepreneurs. Who, both, went totally unmentioned in the Spring Statement. Domestic demand growth - that supposed to contribute 2/3rds of 2015 growth and more than 3/4 of 2016 growth - requires reducing household and corporate debt and stimulating domestic investment - preferably not in property sector. These too went un-mentioned in the Spring Statement.

Instead, we got Minister Howlin watershed discovery that the Government creates wealth.

Which is scary and even scarier in the context of missing real wealth creators in the Statement: the Government's role in wealth creation should be to remove itself from managing it as much as possible. But see more on this below.

Minister Noonan warned that returning to the days of “if I have it I’ll spend it” or the “even if I don’t have it I’ll spend it” policy stance taken by the opposition over the past four years, was by far the biggest risk to economic growth and job creation. He might be right, but his plan for expansionary Budgets into 2020 is more of a policy stance consistent with "I might have it, so I'll spend it".

“We must never again repeat the boom and bust economic model. Over the remainder of this decade we expect all sectors of the economy to contribute to growth and employment.”

He is right on this and the Government said much the same over and over again. But it is hard to see any coherent strategy emerging from the Government's numerous reiterations of Jobs and Growth plans and white papers on how broad growth can be delivered. To-date, the Government projected the same policy approach to growth as its predecessor - targeted supports and tax incentives. Not levelling the playing field, getting rid of state inefficiencies, political interference and tax-and-spend redistribution of resources. Note: this is not about redistribution of income. It is about allowing the economy to grow without political meddling and favouritism.

The Spring Statement was not much of a departure from the same. In the statement, the Minister mentions just one 'red line' policy item - the 12.5% corporation tax. Everything else is more of an IOU based on "if - then". Which suggests that this Government has little in terms of new economic growth ideas beyond corporate tax measures.

Mr Noonan said the mistakes that left the country on the verge of bankruptcy in 2010 must never again be repeated. Which begs a question: does Minister Noonan recognise the mistakes, linked to 2010, that this Government also participated in - willingly or not? Banks recapitalisations were carried out in 2011 on foot of 2010 policy decisions. Troika MOU - shaped in 2010 - was implemented by this Government. Bondholders bailouts were completed by the present Government on foot of mistakes made by the previous one.

Minister Noonan also referenced a promise to "give people security around their income and their pensions". But it is very hard to see how this can be achieved, given lack of any serious progress on dealing with legacy debts and the 50:50 split between tax reductions and expenditure increases in Government budgets forward. And on the point of debt, we do have a massive Government debt, now being augmented by the quasi-Government non-Government debt of the likes of Irish Water et al. Remember, expenditure increases do not improve people's incomes and pensions, except for the select few in State employment and contracting. Nor do they improve Government ability to deleverage its own debt.

And on that note, the Department of Finance says little about actual interest rates, but does project relatively benign debt-related costs through 2020. Which might be tad optimistic, given we are currently scraping the bottom of the historical rates barrel. The Department says that "While unlikely in the short term, higher policy-induced interest rates would have a dampening impact on Ireland’s economic activity. Simulations suggest that a 1 percentage point increase in policy interest rates could reduce the level of GDP by almost 2½ percentage points by 2020. This effect is especially pronounced given the large debt overhang. Such a deterioration in the economy would add almost 1 percentage point to the budget deficit by 2020". I know we all 9ok, not 'we' but almost 'all') expect the current interest rates to stay here forever, because, obviously the ECB is not going to raise them any time in the future under the 'new normal' of complete oblivion to the reality. But here's a bad news: current ECB rates are some 300bps below the pre-crisis average. And if we are moving out of crisis, that average is moving closer and closer in time. So for testing that 100 bps rate rise that the DofF did in the Spring Statement: try 300 bps next. And see the whole promise of the golden future go puff in a cloud of smoke.

Moving on through the Statement: it is also hard to spot any serious momentum for pensions reforms that can really be productive in restoring some capability of the private sector workers to secure pensions. The Government has all but abandoned the idea of pensions reforms in the public sector - the biggest drain on pensions resources in the country.


In summary, the Spring Statement is a call to the voters to support the status quo based on the idea that 'our continuity is less painful than opposition's change'. Which, of course, is an equivalent to giving a granny a choice of being mugged by the "Thank you, Mam" lads with school ties or by the rude villains in clowns' wigs. It is a choice. Just not the one many would order on their elections' menu after six years of economic and social bloodletting. 

Irish Times summed this up as "The spring statement can be seen as a political exercise in which Fine Gael and Labour adopt a common fiscal plan for the election campaign to come." (see http://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/spring-statement-analysis-assumption-nothing-goes-askew-1.2191971?utm_content=sf-man) and my favourite political analyst in this country, summed it up much better: http://thejacktrack.blogspot.ie/2015/04/michael-noonans-2-billion-return-to.html?spref=fb who says: "there was a haunting echo of Bertie Ahern and Charlie McCreevy resonating through the halls of his Department, and with it the emergence of a disturbing - if hardly, at this stage, surprising - sense that in Ireland there is no such thing as a lesson learned, only a lesson observed."

Sunday, November 17, 2013

17/11/2013: Irish Government Score Card 2013: OECD


Well-summarised insights from the OECD on Irish Government performance based on 2011-2012 data: http://www.oecd.org/gov/GAAG2013_CFS_IRE.pdf

Latest Government at a Glance page for all countries: http://www.oecd.org/gov/government-at-a-glance-information-by-country.htm

Note, to adjust for GDP/GNP gap in the case of Ireland, use roughly 20% gap (longer-term average).

Thursday, October 17, 2013

17/10/2013: Budget 2014 Missing the Targets: Sunday Times, October 13


This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times column from October 13, 2013.


Recent events have led to a significant reframing of the Budget 2014. With these, the Government is now actively signaling a more accommodative stance on next year's cuts. Alas, the good news end there and the bad news begin. Any easing on austerity in 2014 will be unlikely to produce a material improvement in household budgets. In return, the Government will be placing huge hopes on robust growth returning in 2014. If this fails to materialise, lower austerity today will spell more pain in 2015. Like a dysfunctional alcoholic, unable to stop binging at closing time, we ignore tomorrow’s hangover.


A combination of the latest IMF report on the Irish economy and the outcome of the Seanad abolition referendum have settled the debate on the scale of adjustment to be taken on October 15th. Embarrassing defeat in the referendum has meant that the continuation of Taoiseach's leadership required some symbolic gesture toward the electorate. Lowering the 2014 cuts targets on October 15th can serve the purpose for a few crucial months until the New Year.

Meanwhile, ambiguity-embracing IMF lent a helping had. The IMF repeated its insistence on EUR5.1 billion combined 2014-2015 cuts in the latest assessment of the Irish economy. Yet, the IMF avoided specifying the breakdown of these adjustments between 2014 and 2015. This has given the Government confidence to argue the case in favour of partially delaying 2014 adjustment in front of the EU overseers of our budgets.

Immediately after the IMF report publication, Irish media was promptly fed the rumors that the Minister for Finance was seeking a reduction in the level of budgetary cuts. This week Minister Noonan said that the 2014 adjustment will be EUR600 million lower than EUR3.1 billion originally agreed with the Troika. The savings will amount to 0.37 percent of our GDP: a small boost for the Irish economy, but a massive splash in the PR spin terms for the Government.

With some cuts delayed to 2015, Ireland’s debt sustainability and deficit targets now hinge on the Government’s forecasts for growth materializing over the next twelve months. The risks to these are non-negligible. Last week IMF lowered Irish GDP growth forecasts for every year from 2013 through 2018. Compared to the forecasts released in June this year, October forecasts for inflation are also down. This implies that nominal growth – the source of budget deficits and debt dynamics – is expected to be even slower. If back in June this year IMF expected Irish economy to be at EUR205.8 billion by 2018, now the fund is projecting it to hit EUR201.7 billion. Cumulated forecast nominal GDP for 2013-2018 is EUR15.6 billion lower in October report than in June assessment.  Even before Minister Noonan’s latest reductions in fiscal adjustment for Budget 2014, IMF projected worsening of Irish deficits in 2014-2018.

Department of Finance forecasts, released this week and underpinning the Budget 2014 calculations are more optimistic on nominal growth, expecting higher inflation and anticipating more domestic consumption and investment than the IMF. If the Department gets its forecasts wrong, we will pay 2015 for the delays in cuts planned for the next year.



Flying on hopium of rosy growth expectations is a risky proposition for the Exchequer especially ahead of our drawing down the final tranche of the Troika funding. For this risk, the savings to be delivered in the Budget 2014 are likely to be insignificant from economy’s point of view.

Given the precarious position of the Government in public opinion polls, it is a safe bet to assume that the coalition will be putting the money to ‘work’ as an investment stimulus and a cushion against cuts to social welfare and health.

New building programmes in the more sensitive constituencies hold some serious political capital. But planning allocation of large sums to new investment is a lengthy process before construction jobs actually materialise. Growth impact of these measures in 2014 is unlikely to be significant.

But the thrust of 'savings' is likely to go to the second option. Doing as little as possible for yet another year in structurally altering the way we spend on social supports and healthcare will mean that the budgetary changes to health spending in 2014 will likely be identical to those undertaken in the past. Expect more cost shifting to private insurance, more sabre-rattling over cost overruns and more imaginary gains in productivity. Social welfare ‘cost containment’ measures will continue to rely on 'demand attrition' - the declines in demand due to unemployment benefits expiration and emigration. This means zero impact on growth in 2014.

Meanwhile, revenue side of the budgetary equation will keep pressuring the economy.

Fine Gael's side of the Coalition is promising us that the Budget will contain no new taxes. Alas, in Ireland we have a very narrow definition of both terms: 'new' and 'taxes'. In 2014 we will be facing a full annual Property Tax bill, which is expected to take out additional EUR250 from the average household income. The Budget will also likely raise charges on families to fund education and healthcare. The Irish Government is saying these are not new taxes. Anyone expected to pay them would disagree.

Last year, PRSI changes and reduction in child benefits were not identified as 'new taxes' either. These cost an average working family with two children some EUR494 per annum – an involuntary reduction in family income.

Per research note published by Grant Thornton two weeks ago, a family on EUR80,000 with two earners with two children saw their tax bill rise by 54 per cent since 2008. Their disposable income is now down a massive EUR6,132 per annum. Only a small fraction of these were officially recognised as new tax measures.

Meanwhile, the same families have also seen the costs of basic services provided by the state agencies and enterprises, or controlled by the state regulators and heavily taxed, rise dramatically over the course of the crisis. On average Irish consumer prices fell 1.6 percent between August 2008 and August 2013. Health insurance costs more than doubled over the same period, education costs inflated by 29 percent, bus fares have gone up over 46 percent, and motor tax went up 27 percent. Increases in core public services costs have taken out close to EUR3,500 annually out of the pockets of an average Irish family. These came on top of the Grant Thornton tax cost estimates cited above.

What is the opportunity cost for the families of the losses brought about by the fiscal crisis? For an average family with expected working life of 25 years, the above costs of austerity are equivalent to around EUR111,000 in foregone pensions savings. This excludes costs of the same measures continuing beyond December 31, 2013 and the new measures yet to come in 2014-2015.

The devastation of the above financial arithmetic is even more apparent when we realise that we are far from completing the full set of fiscal adjustments needed to restore our public finances to health. Medium-term Government fiscal consolidation forecasts confirmed by the IMF last week, envision total fiscal consolidation for 2014-2015 to be EUR5.1 billion. Of this, new revenue measures for 2014-2015 are to be set at EUR1.5 billion against carry forward measures of EUR0.3 billion. Current spending cuts are set at EUR3.2 billion. These adjustments translate into additional fiscal burden of EUR3,300-3,500 per annum for an ordinary family.

The hope is that the general economic recovery will mop up the household finances blood spilled by the fiscal crisis.  This rosy expectation is in turn driven by Minister Noonan’s worldview in which Irish trade partners are expected to also grow faster in years ahead. Alas, this Tuesday, IMF cut its global growth forecasts for both 2013 and 2014.


Forecasts aside, today, Ireland has run out of the road on tax hikes and revenue raising measures.

Instead of hiking tax rates, the Government is expected to widen the tax base in Budget 2014. The most efficient way for doing so would be to close loopholes on income exemptions. Less efficient, will be to lower income threshold at which upper marginal tax rate kicks in. Middle and upper-middle class families will pay in either scenario, but the costs to them will be higher in the latter.

In addition, the Government has been briefed on the potential for hiking PRSI for self-employed, while opening up access for this category of workers to social security net. Conditions for accessing cover will be so onerous, few self-employed will ever be able to qualify, but the hike will be politically acceptable. Currently, a self-employed person earning the equivalent of minimum wage pays almost six times as much tax and PRSI as an employee. Few interest groups so far have taken up a challenge of pointing this fact out.

Reality is, Ministers Noonan and Howlin have hit the brick wall. All the low-hanging fruit of marginal tax hikes and revenues extraction schemes has been picked. What's left now are two possible options. Option one: cut social welfare and health. Option two: delay adjustments and hope that comes Budget 2015 day, growth will pick up, unemployment assistance costs will fall, and Brussels will be happy enough reveling in the euro recovery to let things slip a bit on targets in Dublin. No prizes for guessing which option the Coalition will pursue comes next Tuesday.


Source: Department of Finance





BOX-OUT:

This week, the IMF published an assessment of the impact of the monetary policies deployed since 2008 by the ECB, the US Fed and the Bank of England. These unorthodox measures ranged from outright quantitative easing to lowering of the key interest rates to direct lending to the banks against riskier collateral. These monetary interventions, it has been argued in the media and by the majority of analysts, helped to ameliorate euro area sovereign crises. Per conventional wisdom, as the result of the central banks interventions, and particularly those carried out by the ECB, government bond yields and borrowing costs declined post-2011 across the euro area periphery. In addition, supporters of these policies have suggested that unconventional MPs were responsible for increasing equity funding in the real economies, thus supporting the recovery.

Rejecting the mainstream claims, the IMF researchers found that over 2008-2012 various monetary policies had zero statistical impact on the sovereign bond yields in Ireland, Portugal, and Greece. The policies have let to a moderate reduction in Italian Government bond yields, and a weak reduction in Spanish yields. In the case of Ireland, the IMF found no benefits to sovereign bond flows or prices that can be associated directly with the ECB interventions. Furthermore, ECB interventions were associated with outflows of liquidity from Irish equity funds. In contrast, Fed and Bank of England interventions resulted in net inflows of funds into Irish equities.

The paper clearly suggests that the ECB has not done enough to support recovery in sovereign debt and equity markets in the euro periphery.

Sunday, September 8, 2013

8/9/2013: Priory Hall Is Enda Kenny's Problem to Solve

Gene Kerrigan in the Sunday Independent has a very passionate column on the relationship between the Government leadership and the case of the Priory Hall residents.

The column is here.

On foot of my tweets earlier today, few of you asked to get my response on the issue. Here is the summary in the form of my earlier tweets:



Thursday, April 18, 2013

18/4/2013: Legalising Modern Version of Slavery


Insolvency guidelines published today were wholly and fully written by the banks and for the banks.

The core points are that under the new regime, Irish mortgagees will be:
  1. Treated as de facto strategic defaulters until they are proven not guilty of such behaviour in a biased process that will see them face fully resourced lenders while having no practical and meaningful means for defending themselves. 'Innocent until proven guilty' principle no longer applies in the Irish State.
  2. Permanently branded as defaulters for the rest of their lives as there record of applying for the resolution process will be kept indefinitely, independent of success or failure of the process.
  3. Will lose basically any means to sustain real savings, investment, pensions provisions for the duration of up to 6 years or even longer without any guarantee that their engagement with the system will end in resolving the debt overhang at the end of the process.

This means that the Irish economy will continue to struggle with the debt overhang and, materially, the current change in the regime will only serve the purpose of further shifting financial resources from the households to the banks.

There was no real functional process for consultation with the current providers of services to those facing the insolvency. There was no transparency in developing these Guidelines. Give you one example, there is no reference to the protection of consumers, mortgagees or borrowers in the entire text of the document.

Take it from the top: "A debtor should be able to participate in the life of the community, as other citizens do. It should be possible for  the debtor ‘to eat nutritious food …, to have clothes for different weather and situations, to  keep the home clean and tidy, to have furniture and equipment at home for rest and  recreation, to be able to devote some time to leisure activities, and to read books,  newspapers and watch television" according to the Guidelines.

In other words, from get-go, a debtor is not to be allowed to plan or provide for the retirement, to arrange for health cover, to build functional (as opposed to token) precautionary savings, or to have incentives to better their lives. 

Presumably, Irish social inclusion does not provide an allowance for dental care either. At EUR5 per week in allowed savings, a debtor would have to wait around 140 weeks in agonising pain before they can get a tooth cap. Children braces will take as much if not longer. And you better not dare go to a doctor more than once every two months during your dental affordability waiting period.

Now, let's give it a thought - we are releasing households with children into the wilderness of living without providing a single cent for uncovered (beyond those stipulated by the guidelines) eventualities - e.g. dental emergency or a breakdown of the sole family vehicle. And we give them no capacity to acquire such means by working harder or undertaking different jobs which pay more.

When it comes to access to car, the guidelines do not distinguish between the need to commute to work and to commute to deliver children to schools or childcare facilities. The guidelines also appear to ignore the fact that shopping for a family is not the same as shopping for a single individual when it comes to transportation options allowed. There are no provisions for households that may require two cars. There are no realistic provision for caring for the old-banger vehicle that Guidelines allow for and which cost more in repairs than newer vehicles which the households will be forced to sell.

The real flaw in this approach is that we start from the point of allowed disposable income and work our way back to earned income. This means that a household has absolutely no incentive to earn more, no allowance is provided for them to take up risk and become entrepreneurs, no capacity to fund change in employment. 

This is precisely what wage slavery is all about. And we are now putting people into it.

The Guidelines talk vaguely about the need to incetivise households to engage in economic activity, yet provide a cap on savings of EUR5 per week per adult. None allowed per child. 

In other words, suppose you satisfy the conditions of the Guidelines and you get a new job paying an extra EUR50 per week. You cannot save anything out of this, which means all of the additional income immediately accrues to the banks.

Now, imagine that a new job offer comes with the prospect of better pension down the line, greater promotional opportunities, better life satisfaction and other benefits you might want to have and that can significantly improve your and your family wellbeing, not to mention the economy. Alas, also assume that the new job requires you to commute to work by car while prior to that - with your old job - the Guidelines allowed only for public transportation option. You have no savings to buy the car and no access to new credit. Which means that you will either have to turn down the new job (at a loss to you, employer, the bank and the economy) or to borrower on terms and conditions from the bank with which you have arrangements in place (at a loss to you, as you can't keep the upside of the new job pay). 

This is like taking slave labour and forcing it to consume bank-provided services at prices set by the bank. In the 19th century this was the practice with monopsonist employers and it led to industrial unrest on a massive scale and even revolutions. Welcome to the New Ireland, folks.

Thus, even in theory, the Guidelines are not consistent with one of their intended purposes - that of supporting economic activity and participation in this activity by the households.


In a summary: From the beginning of this crisis I have argued that we need to import UK insolvency regime into Ireland, so as  to allow effective and efficient bankruptcy resolution. 

What we have done instead is put forward a modern-day, democratically legislated slavery in the name of protecting our banks and created an incentive for tens of thousands to convert current bankruptcy tourism into a permanent bankruptcy emigration. 

Welcome to the 21st century model of a Dickensian nightmare grafted onto, as Namawinelake puts it perfectly world's most exemplary Nanny State.


Updated:
Two excellent posts on the Guidelines that are a must read:

Brian Lucey's: http://brianmlucey.wordpress.com/2013/04/18/pettifogging-nanny-state-gone-mad/

and

Namawinelake's: http://namawinelake.wordpress.com/2013/04/18/hey-world-if-you-want-to-see-what-a-true-nanny-state-looks-like-look-at-what-ireland-has-just-done/

Monday, January 14, 2013

14/1/2013: Irish Savings Rates - Q3 2012


Data for Irish Savings rates for Q3 2012 has been released by the CSO (see release here). Instead of rephrasing the release, lets take a look at the underlying data (link to data is provided on page 1 of the release).

First off: household savings and consumption expenditures, seasonally-adjusted:


Per chart above (all in current market prices, so no inflation adjustment, but seasonally-adjusted)

  • Disposable income rose in Q3 2012 to EUR23,002 million - up EUR486mln (+2.16%) q/q after expanding EUR385mln (+1.74%) in Q2 2012. This is good news. Year-on-year, income is up EUR1,158mln (+5.30%) and this follows up on EUR823mln increase y/y in Q2 2012 (+3.79%).
  • Historical comparatives for total disposable income are also looking good. Average income since Q1 2008 was EUR22,984mln, so we are close to that in the latest figures. We are also ahead 2010 average (EUR22,198mln), 2011 average (EUR21,693mln), but below 2008 average (EUR25,061mln) and 2009 average (EUR23,310mln).
  • Final consumption expenditure in Q3 2012 stood at EUR19,319mln up EUR64mln (+0.33%) q/q partially reversing decline of -EUR77mln (-0.40%) q/q in Q2 2012. Year-on-year, consumption spending was up EUR217mln in Q3 2012 (+1.14%) after posting a y/y decline of -EUR165mln (-0.85%) in Q2 2012.
  • In longer range averages terms, latest consumption reading is just about at the average level for 2012 (EUR19,302mln), slightly below 2011 average of EUR19,362, and below 2008 average (EUR22,264mln), 2009 average (EUR19,836mln) and 2010 average (EUR19,532mln).
  • Gross household savings stood at EUR3,684mln in Q3 2012, up EUR423mln (+12.97%) q/q and this follows EUR463mln rise (+16.55%) in Q2 2012. Year-on-year, household savings rose EUR942mln (+34.35%) in Q3 2012 after posting a EUR988mln (+43.47%) y/y rise in Q2 2012/
  • So far, Q1-Q3 2012 average savings run at EUR3,248mln - ahead of all annual averages, save for 2009 when they reached EUR3,475mln.

Saving ratios:
  • As the result of the above, the household savings ratio (ratio of gross savings to total disposable income) rose from 14.48% in Q2 2012 to 16.02% in Q3 2012. This represents an increase of 1.53ppt q/q (following a 1.84% rise q/q in Q2) and a y/y rise of 3.46ppt (down from the y/y rise of 4.00% in Q2 2012).
  • Longer-term comparatives suggest the return of strong precautionary savings motive (as shown in the chart below). More specifically, adjusting for growth variation in Irish GDP, longer-term savings ratio consistent with economic recovery for Ireland should be in the range of 8.6-11.9%. We are now well above that range. More significantly, even taking shorter period deleveraging pressures in 2008-present crisis, the savings ratio averages at around 14.10%, lower than the current 16.02%. 2012 average savings ratio through Q3 is 14.38% against 2008-2011 average of 11.9%. By all metrics, Q3 2012 looks like a return of the precautionary savings motive for households.


However attractive it might appear to make an argument that savings ratio is too high amongst Irish households, one must consider the fact that our households are:
  1. Under immense pressures to deleverage out of extremely high debt ratios (an objective consistent with banks stabilisation objective of the Government and with Troika concerns about debt levels, as well as with the goal of restarting household investment cycle)
  2. Household savings = banks deposits and I doubt there is out there a single Irish politician brave enough to suggest we need less of the latter
  3. Current act as the main driver for supporting gross national savings from complete and total collapse. Do recall that national savings = national (domestic) investment (ex-FDI). And do recall that in Ireland, SMEs are funded by domestic savings (at least equity, non-debt funding component). Which means that were we to have meaningful investment activity here, we need to encourage and support, not discourage and tax, savings.
On this note, let's take a look at seasonally unadjusted data for aggregate savings in the economy:



The chart above shows clearly that:
  • Total savings in the economy declined to EUR7,320mln in Q3 2012 (down EUR559mln or 7.09%) q/q, but rose EUR1,747mln (+31.35%) y/y. In Q2 2012 there was an annual rise of 28.71% or +EUR2,199mln.
  • Excluding financial corporations, the real economy's savings fell EUR452mln (-8.05%) q/q in Q3 2012, but a re currently up EUR1,851mln (+55.84%) y/y, against Q2 2012 annual rise of EUR910mln (+19.3%).
  • The chart above shows that once we exclude financial corporations, savings actually are running much closer to long-term trend and that the trend is moving up, toward rising savings once again. This upward trend was established around Q1-Q2 2011 and as we shall see shortly is not necessarily signalling a major departure from the long-term established trends (se chart below).
The decomposition of savings into sectors shows that:
  • Household savings rose modestly q/q in Q3 2012 (absent seasonal adjustment) and are up significantly y/y (+26.6% in Q3 2012), although that rise was well-matched by 26.0% increase in Q2 2012.
  • General Government continued to dis-save (accumulate debt) in Q3 2012, shrinking national savings by EUR2,331mln (more than 9 times the rate of dissaving, as the rate of saving in the households). Year on year, the Government has managed to post EUR423 increase in dissaving (+17.2%).
  • Financial Corporations also showed dis-saving in Q3 2012 or EUR107mln compared to Q2 2012 and EUR104mln (4.6%) compared to Q3 2011.
  • Non-Financial Corporations posted savings of EUR4,930mln in Q3 2012, up EUR1,606mln (+48.3%) on Q2 2012 and up EUR1,215mln (+32.7%) on Q3 2011. 
  • Thus, savings increase in Non-Financial Corporations outpaced savings increase amongst the Households by the factor of almost 6 in quarterly terms and by 1.2 in annual terms. If the Irish Government (and some analysts) are concerned with high savings rates, they are better off targeting companies accounts not household ones. But I doubt they are likely to start calling for a savings tax on MNCs.


Two charts below show long-term trends in savings components by sector. I reproduce two charts to show best-fit models and comparable models.



The charts above very clearly show that since about mid-2005, long term trend in Government savings diverged from those for Non-Financial Corporations and Households. Specifically, National savings became positively dependent on Households and real Companies and negatively impacted by the Government. In other words, current high Household savings rates are a saving grace for the economy that suffers from extreme pressures of Government deleveraging.

The third chart above clearly shows that Households contribution to total savings in the economy counter-moved with Government contributions, supporting the overall savings activity. In fact, correlation between Government savings and Household Savings averaged remarkable -0.91 in the period 2002-present and statistically-indistinguishable -0.89 since Q3 2006 through present. Over the same period of time, correlation between Government savings and Non-Financial Corporations savings runs at slightly lower -0.88 historically and -0.86 since Q3 2006.


Tuesday, September 4, 2012

4/9/2012: Imagining the banks costs


Excellent info-graphic on the cost of Ireland's banks rescue to the economy via Stephen Donnelly (TD, Independent):


And the link to the original.

Thursday, December 1, 2011

1/12/2011: Sunday Times, 27 November 2011

Here is the unedited version of my article in the Sunday Times, November 27, 2011.


Since the collapse of the bubble, Irish perceptions of the residential and commercial property markets have swung from an unquestioning adoration to a passionate rejection.

As the result of the bubble, the overall share of property in average household investment portfolio is likely to decline over time from its Celtic Tiger highs of over 80% to a more reasonable 50-60%, consistent with longer term averages in other advanced economies. But housing will remain a significant part of the household investment for a number of good reasons.

While providing shelter, housing wealth also serves as a long-term savings vehicle and an asset for additional borrowing for shorter-term investments. Security of housing wealth in normal times acts as an asset cushion for family-owned start up businesses and a convenient tool for regular savings. Over the lifetime, as demand for housing grows with family size, we increase our savings, normally just as our life cycle earnings increase. We subsequently can draw down these savings throughout the retirement when income from work drops.

In short, in a normal economy, housing and household investment are naturally linked. In this light, the grave nature of our economic malaise should be apparent to all. Ireland is experiencing a continued and extremely deep balance sheet recession, with twin collapses in property prices and investment that underlie structural demise of our economy.

The latest Residential Property Price Index, released this week, shows that things are only getting worse on the former front. Overall, residential property price index fell to 71.2 in October from 72.8 in September. The latest monthly decline of 2.2% is the sharpest since March 2009 and the third fastest in the history of the index. Relative to peak prices are now down 45.4%. Take a look at two components of household investment portfolios: owner-occupied and buy-to-let properties. For the majority of the middle class families, the former is represented by a family home. The latter, on average, is represented by apartments. Nationwide, per CSO, prices of these assets are respectively down 43.7% and 57.9% relative to the peak.


The impact of these price movements is significant and, contrary to the assertions of the Government and official analysts, real and painful. House price declines imply real capital losses to households and these losses have to be offset, over time, with decreased consumption and falling investment elsewhere. Absent normal loss provisioning available to professional financial sector investors and businesses, households suffer catastrophic collapses on the assets side of their balance sheet, while liabilities (value of mortgages) remain intact. Decades-long underinvestment and low consumption spending await Ireland.

Dynamically, things are not looking any brighter today than a year ago. House prices have fallen 14.9% year on year in October, the worst annual drop since February 2010. Apartments prices are down 19.8% over the last 12 months – the worst annualized performance since April 2010.  Given the price dynamics over the last three years, as well as the current underlying personal income, interest rates and rental yields fundamentals, Irish property prices remain at the levels above the short-term and medium-term equilibrium. This means we can expect another double-digit correction in 2012 followed by shallower declines in 2013.



Not surprisingly, the collapse of the property markets in Ireland is mirrored by an even deeper crash in overall investment activity in the economy. The latest National Accounts data shows that in 2010, gross fixed capital formation in Ireland declined to €19 billion in constant prices. This year, data to-date suggests that capital formation will drop even further, to ca €17 billion or almost 58% below the peak levels. In historical terms, these levels of investment activity are comparable only with 1996-1997 average. If we assume that the excess investments in the property sector were starting to manifest themselves around 2002, to get Irish economy back to pre-boom investment path would require gross fixed capital investment of some €26.9 billion per annum or more than 60% above current levels.

Between 2000 and 2009, Irish economy absorbed some €319 billion in new fixed capital investments. Assuming combined rate of amortization and depreciation of 8% per annum, just to keep that stock of capital in working shape requires €25.5 billion of new investment. This mans that in 3 years since 2009, the Irish economy has lost some €15.5 billion worth of fixed capital to normal wear-and-tear. In short, we are no longer even replacing the capital stock we have, let alone add new productive capacity to this economy.

Looking into sectoral distribution of investment, all sectors of economic activity outside building and construction have seen their capital investment fall by between 18.4% in the case of Fuel and Power Products to 70.4% in the case of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing sector. So the aforementioned aggregate collapse of investment is replicated across the entire economy.

The dramatic destruction of capital investment in the private sector is not being helped by the fact that Government capital expenditure is also contracting. In 2010, Voted Capital Expenditure by the Irish Government declined to €5.9 billion. This year, based on 10 months through October data, it is on track to fall even further to €4 billion – below the target of €4.35 billion and more than 53% below the peak. In fact, the entire adjustment in public expenditure to-date can be attributed to the capital spending cuts, as current expenditure actually rose over the years of crisis. Since 2008, current expenditure by the state is up 1.9% or €775 million this year, based on the data through October. Thus in 2008, Irish Government spent 17.4% of its total voted expenditure on capital investment. This year the figure is likely to be under 8.8%.

Forthcoming Budget 2012 changes are likely to make matters worse for capital investment. In addition to taking even more cash out of the pockets of those still in employment – thereby reducing further the pool of potential savings – the Government is likely to bring in the first measures of property taxation. This will reinforce households’ expectations that by 2013-2014 Ireland will have a residential property tax that will place disproportional burden on urban dwellers – the very segment of population that tends to invest more intensively over time in property improvements, making the urban stock of housing more economically productive than rural. A tax measure that would be least distorting in terms of incentives to increase productivity of the housing stock – a site-value tax – now appears to be abandoned by the Government, despite previous commitments to introduce it.

Furthermore, we can expect in the next two years abolition of capital tax reliefs, increases in capital tax rates and high likelihood of some sort of wealth taxes – direct levies on capital and/or savings for ordinary households. In the case of the euro area break up, Ireland will also see draconian capital controls.

In short, we are now set to experience an 8-10 years period of direct and accelerating destruction of our capital base. It doesn’t matter which school of economic thought one belongs to, there can be no recovery without capital investment returning back to growth.



Box-out:

In the recent paper titled “The Eurozone Crisis: How Banks and Sovereigns Came to Be Joined at the Hip”, published last month, two IMF researchers identify Europe’s Lehman’s moment in the global financial crisis as the day when the Irish Government nationalized the Anglo Irish Bank. In contrast to the current and previous Governments’ assertions, the IMF study argues that the Anglo was not a systemically important bank worthy of a rescue. As the paper puts it: “The problems [of collapsing financial sector valuations] entered a new phase – becoming a full-blown crisis – with the nationalisation of Anglo Irish in January 2009. The relevance of Anglo is, at first, not obvious, since it was a small bank in a relatively small country. However, …it is possible that the large fiscal costs as a share of Ireland’s GDP associated with this rescue raised serious concerns about fiscal sustainability. Suddenly, the ability of the sovereigns to support the financial sector came into question.” In other words, far from helping to avert or alleviate the crisis, Anglo nationalization caused the crisis to spread. “In retrospect, the nature of the crisis prior to Anglo Irish was simple, being mostly driven by problems in the financial sector… The winding down of Anglo Irish, for example, would have been preferable to its nationalization…” In effect, the previous Government made Anglo systemically important by rescuing it. If there ever was a better example of the medicine that kills the patient.



Saturday, February 19, 2011

19/02/2011: Paying down our debt out of Exports

Let's do a quick exercise. Suppose we take our current account - defined as the sum of the balance of trade (exports minus imports of goods and services), net factor income (such as interest and dividends) and net transfer payments (such as foreign aid and remitted profits). Suppose every year we use the current account balance solely for the purpose of repaying our Government debt. How long will it take us to do so.

Let us start with some notes on methodology.

Our current account is in deficit - since 2000, there was only one year - 2003 - when we had a surplus in the current account (charts below), which really means our external trade was not enough to generate a surplus to the economy. So let us assume that the we can reverse this 180 degrees and that the deficits posted in 2009-2010, plus those projected by the IMF to occur in 2011-2015 are all diverted to pay our Government debt.
Notice - this is impossibly optimistic, as our Government does not own current account, but suppose, for the sake of this exercise that it can fully capture net profits transfers abroad and cut the foreign aid to zero, plus divert all interest payments on own debt and private external debts to repayment of the principal on own debt.

Secondly, assume that only Government debt is taken into the account (in other words, we assume away Nama debt, some of the quasi-sovereign financing of the banks resolutions, and all and any potential future banks and spending demands in excess of the EU/IMF assumptions, as well as all future bonds redemptions - the latter assumed to have a zero net effect at roll-over, so no added costs, no higher interest rates, etc).

In other words, here is what we are paying down in this exercise:

Now, suppose we take current account balances for 2009-2015 (projected by IMF) as the starting point. The reason for this choice of years is that they omit fall-off in our exports in 2008 and also the bubble years of 2004-2007 when our current account imbalances were absurdly large due to excessive outward investment and consumption of imports.

Next, assume:
  • We deal with present value of the debts
  • We apply an average 3% annual growth rate to repayments we make (current account transfers grow 3% on average per annum)
  • Currency effects are removed (so we use flat USD1.33/Euro FX rate throughout)
So here is the result:
And the conclusion is: if Ireland diverts ALL of its net current account (2009-2015 IMF projections taken at 3% average growth rate forward) to pay down Gov debt, it will take us until 2064 to reach 2007 level of official (ex-Nama+banks) Government debt.

Note: incidentally - the charts tell couple of interesting side-points based on our historical debt path:

The Government told us that we are not in the 1980s - as we had much higher levels of debt then. Ok, the figure above shows that as of 2010 - we ARE back in the 1980s: 2011 debt will equal as a share of GDP that attained in 1989. According to IMF database, our debt has peaked at 109.241% of GDP back in 1987. It is projected to be 104.7% in 2013. Not that much off the peak.

But, of course, in the 1980s there was no quasi-Governmental debt - the debt of Nama, some of the banks recapitalization measures and the debts that still might arise post-2013 from the Government banks Guarantees and resolution schemes. If we add Nama's 31bn worth of debt issued, this alone will push our 2011 debt levels to 121.8% of GDP and factoring in coupon rate on these, but 2015 our Official Gov Debt + Nama will stand (using IMF projections again) at 124.8% of GDP - well in excess of the peak 1980s levels of indebtedness.

Secondly, despite what any of us might think about the Celtic Tiger years, the Government never paid down the old debt, it simply was deflated by rising GDP. Which suggests that even during the Celtic Tiger boom years - our exporting economy was NOT capable of paying down actual debt levels.